POLAND MILITARY/AIR/NAVAL TEXT OF AN ARTICLE: 'PROBLEMS OF THE EFFICIENCY OF SECRET COMMUNICATIONS' BY MAJOR T. GRZYMALA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03082A000900090001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 23, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

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abroad POLAND
'~P~ disSem MILITARY/AIR/NAVAL
Text of an Article: "Problems of the Efficiency
of Secret Conununications" by Major T, GRZYMALA
1. The lightning development of communications techniques, and the
increase in the part played by manoeuvre and rapidity of action, ha.re
resulted in a situation where command is based to a considerable degree on
technical means of signals communication. However, parallel with the
increase in the importance of technical means of signals communication as a
means of command, there is taking place the development of techniques of
signals reconnaissance, and techniques of interception and exploitation of
data transmitted by technical methods of signals communication. I consider
that it will be useful to begin by discLssing in snore detail some of the
problems concerning signals reconnaissance, and particularly its organisation
in the U. S. A~nt
2. Already during the First World War, the Director of the British
Naval Intelligence, Reginald HALL, developed a system of mcnitc,ring German
radio communications and of breaking their cyphers and codes. Also during
the Second `'World ';War, U.S. Intelligence intercepted and broke Japanese
coded signals jodogram7.
3. At the present time, the American Army possesses an extensively
developed 'Communications intelligence', subordinated to intelligence and
reconnaissance organs, which is being carried out by an organisation called
the 'Arryr Security Agency' (ASA). An ASA group is allocated from the
Headquarters of the theatre of war operations to the field army, and operate-
for its benefit. The group consists of a Communications Reconnaissance
Group (Com Ren Group), which in turn consists of Corn Ren Battalions -- one
for each Army Corps - and a 'liaison team' - also one for each Division of
the Corps. A Com Ren Bn probably contains two communications
reconnaissance companies, which are the lovest orgaaisational unit of the
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ASA adapted for the execution of independent tasks.
4.. According to data obtained up to 1952 5-i27, such a company covers
with its operation an area 32-40 kms wide and 32 kms deep. The exploitation
platoons of the company deploy at a distance of 2,700 metres from tie FEBA,
or sometimes at the FEBA i+self. The company is able to cperate 20
monitoring sets throughout the 24 hours. It may now be expec'ed tra+ there
have been further improvements in signals reconnaissance equipment.
In general, the tasks of the ASA include, among other things, the
acquisition of Comm ications rjconnaissa:,.ce data by interception ..... la
line of text missinil ,..., the maintenance of 'Communications Security'
by own troops, and the execution of other tasks connected with
communications reconnaissance and the organisation of secret communications,
6. The Americans regard communications reconnaissance as one of the
most important soar ,es of information. According to American views,
reconnaissance corniucted with the help of techniczl means of communication
is able to obtain the following information:
- determine the strength, composition, and numbering of enemy units;
- determine the location of units, command posts and rear
installations;
- watch the regrouping of encn;y forces along the front, and the
approach of fresh forces from the depth;
- discover the plans and intentions of enemy forces,
These tasks are carried out by means of:
- radio DF-ing, leading to the determination of the deployment areas
of headquarters and military units;
- interception of conversations transmitted en Clair, and the
breaking of enemy cyphers, codes and signals;
- analysis of the radio traffic forming part of the enemy
communications network (studying the principles of the radio signals plan,
the number of messages trfcted by radio, etc.).
4
8. The work of the ASA in the army, and of similar groups in the naval
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and air forces, is coordinated by the National Security Agency. This is one
of the branches of the Department of Defence, operating under the supervision
of the Office of Special Operations, which forms a part of the Department of
Defence. The principal task of the Agency is to discover the code;; and
cyphers of foreign countries, to break them in order to uae them for its own
purposes, and to intercept conversations en clair.
9. From statements made by William Ch. MARTIN and Bernon F. MITCHELL,
the former employees of the U.S. National Security Agency who asked for
asylum in the Soviet Union in August 1960, t is knuwn the. the ce~:ltral
institutions of the Agency are located in the Fort 3eorge H. MURD Z's-i27,
Maryland, about 25 miles north of 'Washington. The Agency employs about
10,000 persons, directed (in 1960) by General of the Air Force John A.
)RD, The network of radio monitoring stations which supply intelligence
to the Agency cove; s th; entire glDbe a-u'. coosists of over 2,000 listening
posts serviced by 5,000 military cperaturs.
10. A large number of instruments intercep'L; information transmitted by
teleprinter. The basic function of the monitoring service is continued by
American military radio stations. Some monitoring sub-units are located in
ships and aircraft. The interception of cyphered and encoded messages, as
well as those transmitted en clair, is practised in respect of almost all
the countries of the world.
11. The organisation of the National Security Agency includes four basic
directorates. One of these is the operational directorate, which receives
the material obtained from monitoring, carries out the cryptographic
analysis of these materials, and studies the data thus obtained. The
operational directorate contains the following basic sections:
- the ADVA sectio:i: studies the government cypher systems and
diplomatic codes of the Soviet Union;
- the DENS section: studies the cypher systems of the Soviet krmy,
and the cypher systems used within tre USSR;
the ACOM section: studies the codes and cypher systems of
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- the ALLO section: studies the codes and cypher syste.as of the
allies of the United States, of neutral countries, and of other socialist
couwitrie s.
12. The above consideration of the radio intelligence methods ussd by the
U.S. Armed Forces (and undoubtedly a similar intelligence system is
organised by other NATO countries an well) indicates the very real danger of
discovery of information classified as a military secret, transmitted by
tec:mni.cal means of signals communication.
13. The importance of this problem follows from the fact that, during
exercises in units which did not apply the principles of Secret
Commuri.cations, checks have shown that en clair procedure was used for the
transmission by radio of information of such importance that, during
Zg-enuinee military operations, if the enemy succeeded in intercepting this
information, he would have been able to take ei'fe-,tive counter-measures,
14. The coni'ic;t of military operations with the employment of weapons of
mass destruction indicates the need for an even stricter observance of
military secrecy. Tne object here is to prevent the discovery of worth-
while targets for enemy nuclear strikes, and the preservation of strict
secrecy regarding one's own intentions to carry out nuclear strikes.
15. Before passing to the discussion of the main problem, I wish to
devote a short time to the necessity for maintaining a simplified system of
command. As is known, on a nuclear battlefield one demands a greater
independence among subordinates in the ccmmand of troops. Subordinate^
should be given their tasks in a brief and concise corm. Signals for co-
operation and simple signals taken from the signals tab.Le should form (in
addition to the combat tacks) the basis for directing the operations by
troops.
16. It is also i.nacceptable to permit the method, frequently employed
during exercises, of the excessively frequent interference of superiors into
the conduct 5ynamika7 of combat, and of demanding reports on the situation
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of the forces overy one or two hours. Such a~ t4 mann49Qad in
the commanders (particularly unit commanders) becoming so abac.bed in the
preparation of reports that little time is left to them to the business of
com-nand. In addition, the prolonged period of operation of radio sets
facilitates for the enemy the execution of DF-ing and the interception of
certain important data. The employment of brief signals would., in my
opinion, greatly hinder such action by the enemy.
17. The preparation of numerous documents during command (which is often
done during exercise-i., simply in order to make an impression on thu
umpires) also has an adverse effect on the efficiency of command.
18. I should also like to draw attention to the importance and
necessity of adhering, during the work of headquarters during exercises, to
the principle that every soldier should have access only to those data which
are necessary to him for the execution of his official duties. I make bold
to say that in the majority of our exercises these principles are not
followed. For instance, the preparations for an offensive (defensive)
operation are know: in tie majority of cases, during exercises, to clerks,
draughtsmen, drivers, etc., to whom this knowledge is completely unnecessary
for their work. During war operations, when the enemy is conducting a
vigorous reconnaissance, such a practice may have serious consequences.
19. I shall now discuss the, in my view, basic problems concerning
secret communications. It will be realised that, within the framework of
perfecting the system of command, the increase in the efficiency of secret
communications is of capital importance.
20. It is obvious that a radical solution of the problem of secret
communications could be found in the provision of technical means for
concealment, such as cyphering machines, cyphering attachments to radio sets,
and similar methods of scrambling conversation. However, the problem must be
considered in the light of the existing situation in our armed forces. Until
the problem is solved on an overall kale, it will be necessary to organise
secret communications and to seek methods for its improvement within the
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21. One of the important problems is the question of the organisation of
secret communications already during peace-time, and the preparation of a
cadre for its suitable employment during a war. It must be admitted that,
in peace-time, the transmission of secret and confidential correspondence by
technical means of signals communication (with the exception of cyphered
correspondence) is very small, since almost all the official business is
conducted by means of postal correspondence. Such a method greatly hinders
the effective work of headquarters.
22. The number of transmitted letters is often wo large that it actually
hinders commend. For in3tance, some regiments received during a year about
2,700 secret and confidential documents, not counting unclassified letters.,
which are often much more numerous. I should like cnly to indicate here the
possibility of e. partial solution of this prcblem by sending secret and
confidential correspondence by means of coded signals fkodogiam , and overt
correspondence. by means of telegrams ,Telephoncgram 7, limiting the number of
written correspondence to an essential minimum.
23. Such a solution of this problem will be of enormous value, for two
reasons. Firstly, the style of work of headquarters will approximate to
wartime conditions, when there will not be enough time to write many letters.
Secondly, it will enable: the officers (regular NCOs) to develop a habit of
applying the principles of secret communications, so ilecessary in time of war.
It is difficult to imagine that secret communications will be properly used
during combat operations if they are completely disregarded in peace-time.
21+. In military units from unit (independent sub-unit) upwards, the
running of coding points should be entrusted to two officers or regular NCOs
each (two, on account of possible departures, leave, etc.). For training
purposes, the personnel running the coding points may be changed from time
to time Depending on local conditions of the unit concerned, the coding
may also be performed by duty officers.
25. I also consider it useful to carry out a re:bular programme of
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training in Secret Communications for officers 129 reg'x ar s, including
in it some subjects concerning secret effic? routine. Such training should
be conducted in accordance with a programme, and not organised ad hoc,
depending for example on the results of a check, or on future examinations.
Depending on the level of