(sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03082A000900220001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

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MiJitar
Text of an Artiole3 "The Role and Tasks of the Artillery xr.
Radio--Electroniv Counter Meaeures"
I A general description of enemy ra.di.o-electronic
devices and the method of engaging them by
the artiilleryo
II Jamming of enemy radio-electronic devices.
III The protection of own radio-electronic devices
from enemy oovnter-measures.
IV The reconnaissance of enemy radio-electronic
systems.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
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1. Radio-electronic counter-measures are not, the exol isive domain
of any particx ar branch of the forces; they are employed by all the arms
and snavices which use radio-e?ectro.- is equipment In their operaticn:Is, or
wh;ch can influence (neutraliss) similar equipment of the enemy. The
artillery has a large share in the whole field of radio--electronic
counter-measures, a_nO the present paper is devoted mainly to this aspect
of the whole questi',-ei.
2. In order to disc}ass in the most comprehensiie way the problem
of radio-electronic co;antsr-me sure w'uich can be perf.'o.-:mod. by the
artillery, it will be eLami.n-ed from t see points of view;
(a) a: i.Uery activities with La the framework of radio--electror..i_c
oounte1'-measures for the benefit of other asms ", serviLces;
(b) artillery activities carries: out for its or,,.n needs;
(c) the a:tivity of other arms and services for the benefit of
the arti.ll.exy.
3, The only practical way inhich the artillery can operate in
the field of radio-electronic counter-measures for the benefit of
other arms and ssr-v-ices is by neutralising (destroying) the enemy radio-
electronic devices. When operating for its own benefit, the artillery
carries out such actions as reconnais lance, neutralisation by fire and
jamming of enemy rariio-eloot :~?onic devices, masking own radio-electronic
system`, and prcteoticn of own radio-elcetroriu devices from enemy
iiterference. Other arms and services, operating within the framework
of radio-electronic counter-measures, carry out for the benefit of the
artillery reconnaissan.ae, jamming, and destruction of certain enemy
radi o-electronic aye t-ms and devices.
Int.rcdt'otion
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I . .A, genera-1. des or.i; T_,:,n oOenze rradio
and. the ma hod of
The neutzalis-!ng (jaming, or destruction; of enemy radio-electronic
systems and do?y-i ces, with the simultaneou3 preservation of the operational
capacity of own resources of this tyke, results, on a modern battle-field,
in the achievement of considerable superiority over the enemy and decides
to a very great extent the success of the operation. Modern designers
are well aware of this fact, and they try to ensure that the resources
and equipment devised by them will. have pr%Dvision for mua?.ti-charnel
operation, or will be able to carry out their tasks according to a pre-
arranged programme. The employment of all sorts of astro-navigation,
inertial, self homing passive type, and other systems provides one method of
solving the difficulty, out such systems can be applied mainly to munitions
of a great destructive power, in the employment of which errors of the
order of some hundreds or even thousands of metres are of no great
consequence.
5, The situation is different on the battle-field itself,
particularly in. the tactical area. The employment in this case of
weapons of great destructive power may not produce the required effect,
since, in the maiority of cases, it is necessary to secure very accurate
hits on specified targets. Such a task may be executed by conventional
and rocket artillery using radar de-ices for directing and correcting
their fire, by rocket artillery using guided missiles, and by bomber
and fighter-assault Lmysliwsko-szturmowe] aircraft guided to ground
targets by means of special radio-electronic systems. The =doer of
such devices on a modern battle-field is very large.
6, A separate important group of radio-electronic devices
essential in a tactical area is formed by systems and devices used
in A.A. defence, the effectiveness of which depends above all on these
devices. In addition, the tactical area contains a very large nT=ber
c,' all sorts of communications, television and radio-eleotronio
counter-measures equipment,
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7.
To illustrate the fact, the table below gives the approximate'
number of various types of radio-electronic devices which may lie within
range of our conventional artillery in the zone of operation of an army corps
of a U.S. field army. Account was taken primarily of radio-electronic
devices of considerable dimensions and great importance.
Arm
(or
service)
Purpose of radio-electronic
devices
No* of
Devices
Distance
from
(~ FEB&
Conventional
Radar sets for reconnoitring the forward
artillery
edge of the enemy defence, assisting
21+-30
2-5
artillery shoots,, and detecting the mortars
Rocket
"Lacrosse" missile guidance sets
12
1-3
artillery
A. A.
Early Warning (tactical control)
60
artillery
M-33 artillery radar systems
8
T-38 artillery radar systems
72
Detection
Radar detection and guidance sets
6
10-12
& guidance
systems
Air Force
Radar sets for guiding aircraft to ground
3-6
5-15
targets
Signals
Medium-power SW and VHF radio sets
to 50
10-15
Radio relay stations
20-25
Television systems
1-3
0-3-0.5
Re--on-
Vim' DF sets
2-14.
5-10
nai3sance
Radio-electronic reconnaissance sets
2-5
2-3
Counter-
VBF communication jcmning sets)
up to
3-10
measures
Radar jamming sets )
several
7-15
dozen
8. It is apparent from the above table that the number of enemy
radio-electronic devices which can be neutralised by the fire of
conventional artillery is very large. The majority of the enemy radio-
electronic devices mentioned. above have their counterparts in our own
equipment, as a res t--of--wh"3.ah~their significance, size, and value are
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known and appreciated. It is only necessary to gate brief aharacterist
of such equipment as: the "Lacrosse" missile guidance system, the system
for guiding aircraft to ground targets (AN/11.,rQ-1), and the tactical tele-
vision system.
9. '-IAcrossen &ded missiles are intended for striking single and
group targets in the tactical area of defence (up to 20 laps from the FEBA),
as part of the direct support given to forces on the battle-field. The
range of fire is 8-32 krns; the missile reaches a height of 1800-3800 metres;
the accuracy is very good.; the average error on impact Lblad trafienia] is
5 metres at a range from ' he guidance set of 1000 metres, and 10 metres at
a range of 5000 metres, The missile launchers are deployed not closer
than 10 ions from the FE3A, while the gi idance equipment is brought up as
near as possible to the MAL. Missile guidance begins at a distance of
250 metres from the launcher, and ends when the missile has travelled
about 20 laps from the guidance system. In the initial phase, the missile
guidance is automatic, using inertial and later command guidance,, The
guidance system of the missile consists of the following elements:
(a) Ground elements:-
- radar missile guidance set (angular co-ordinate measurement set);
- electronic computer;
- radar range-finder;
- pu?sed light locator, serving for the measurement of the
en-ordinates of visible targets;
power supply.
(b) Mounted on missile:-
- radio beacon, making it possible to measure the angular
co-ordinates of missile;
-. transponder, co-operating with the ground radar range-?inder.
'i0. The radar angular co-ordinate measuring set ensures th4h
coYgirnuous_ measurement.. of. f? - oo-ordinates by obtaining bearings 3n the
/radio
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radio beacon mounted in the missile. The set operates by the cone
selection method, in tho azimuth sector of + 3300 and in the angle of
elevation sector of -15? T + 87?. The width of the cone of selection in
the coarse system (the period of search for the missile) is 24.?, and in the
fine system (tracidrig) -2.8?. The set operates on wave-lengths of the
order of 1.6-1.8 ems, with a recurrence frequency of 2000 cps. The
power of the radio beacon transmitter is 20 kW.
11. The range-finder operates or. ?iav,~$-lengths o the order of 70-100
ems. The ground command '-ran smitter has a power of about 10 W. The width
of the directional aerial beam is al?or.t 70?.
12. A battalion of "Lacrosse" missiles consists of )+ launchers, which,
during the first hour, can enure the launch of 12 missiles (3 from etch
launch r)*. An army corps is usually allocated three battalions of these
missiles.
13. The AN Q-1 system is intended for guiding the "Matador" guided
missiles, and bcmber and fighter bomber aircraft of the tactical air force.
The range of the system is about 320 ?. The full complement of the system
consists of the following elements:
(a) On the zround-.-
- radar set, type AN/ M3-9, for tracking the missile;
electronic computer, type !AN/YvISA.;
- automatic plotting table [? planszet];
- command transmitters
(b) Mounted in the missile or aircraft:
- tray aponder, type AN/AP?-11, working with the AN/YvIPS--9 set, as
a result of which a long aircraft or missile tracking range has
been achieved;
- cc:nd receiver.
/14..
*The occupation of a position which has been prepared from a topographical
and field engineering point of view, and the preparation of a single
launcher for fire takes about 30 minutes.
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15. The answering device in the missile or aircraft consists of a
receiver, transmitter, answering pulses, command and lode decoder, and
command indicator (in aircraft).
16. The command transmitter operates in the 30-40 Mo/s band, with
frequency modulation, and is vrobably rsed for the transmission of commands
for the dropping of bombs or setting the missile into a dive [pikowanie],
17. The ground guiding post usually consists of 1-2 sets of AN/IVISQ-1
systems. In the zone of operation of a U.S. field army there may be up
to 6 or 9 such posts.
18. Tho tactical television system is intended for operation on
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114.. The AN/MPS-9 radar set has been designed on the basis of the
artillery radar set type SCR-584.. It operates in the 2700-3100 Mo/s
band., with a recurrence frequency of 380--1+.50; two or three-pulse
coding groups per second (a suitable spacing of the pulses and their
modulation has resulted in a considerable immunity to jamming and a
capacity for transmitting the necessary commands). The set operates
on the cone selection system [wybieranie stozkowe].
behalf of the tactical formations. The range of its ground-based TV
cameras is, in day-time, about 1.6 kms. Cameras mounted on aircraft
extend the visiti_lity to abort 8 kms. The ground equipment consists of
three observation posts (cameras), which send back pictures through
television relays operating on centimetric wave-lengths over a distance
of 30-1+0 kms. The airborne equipment generally consists cf two
reconnaissance aircraft equipped with TV cameras, which pass the picture
to a ground receiving base even at quite a considerable distance,
19. A small television assembly (called 'Creepie-Peepie') consists
of a camera making possible observation up to a distance of 1.6 kms, a
video transmitter integral with it and operating in the 360-600 tic/s band,
and a receiving device up to 1.5 las distant from the camera.
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20. Enemy radio-electronic devices, or groups of devices, selected
by the Front (army) HQ for engaging with artillery fire, are detailed in
the radio-electronic counter--measures plan of the Front (army), in the
part concerning the artillery, in a general form (without giving their
co-ordinates). The location of targets selected for engagement by the
artillery may often be insufficient to determine the firing data. In this
case, the staff of the army artillery, within the framework of reconnaissance
organised for the purpose of determining the location of all the targets
selected for neutralisation by the artillery, issues tasks for the
additional reconnaissance of enemy :.-adio-electronic equipment as well.
This reconnaissance is usually carried out by optical, air and radio-
electronic methods.
22. Optical methods do, it is true, make it possible to determine
the co-ordinates of targets with great accuracy, bLt when the enemy has
almost completely camouflaged the positions of radio-electronic devices, the
possibility of using optical methods is limited. At night, radio-electronic
devices, particularly during the changing of their position, may be
observed by infra-red methods.
23. The reconnaissance )f enemy radio-electronic devices by the forces
of the rtillery air force is conducted within the framework of normal
reconnaissance work, by means of photography and visual observation.
Photographs are usually taken at a scale of 1:3000. During a single
sortie of a reconnaissance aircraft, it is possible to reconnoitre 1-3
major radio-electronic installations (radar sets, high and medium-power
radio sets et,.).
21-. Radio-electronic reconnaissance devices held by artillery units
(sub units) make it possible to detect enemy radio-electronic equipment,
to determine its co-ordJ_ ates, and - by analysing the signals - to
determine the type of the radio-electronic equipment. Artillery
reconnaissance devices are usually deployed 1-2 kms from the FhtA of
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distance of the radio-electronic device being DF-ed amounts up to 5 Inns,
the incidental error may amount up to 35 metres in direction, and up to
150 metres in range.
25. In order to maintain fire at specified enemy radio-electronic
targets, one determines the firing data (the setting of the aiming devices;
the range, direction and angle of sight). Depending on the actual
situation, one carries out detailed preparation fox fire, the switching
of the fire to auxiliary targets (actual targets) ranged beforehand, or
direct ranging on targets (e.g. by z.ians of a field artillery radar set).
26. The numoer of projectiles (N) required to neutralise an enemy
radio-electronic target (e.g. a radar set) is calculated according to
the formula.
_ 8 _ no d i ssem abro
defence, at intervals not exceeding 3 the desired range (taking into
account the radio horizon), The reconnaissance data are processed in
reconnaissance sub-units on special plotting tables [planszet]. The
accuracy of these data is not as great as on an air photograph; taking
into account the error of the topographical tying-in, the error in the
crientation of the radio-electronic reconnaissance device, and even the
error arising when making the plot on the table, in practice when the
Ed * Ek
N = K ?
S
where K = fire effectiveness factor (taken, during destruction,
as being equal to 0.3);
Ed = average error in range (in r.etres);
E,c = average error in direction (in metres);
So = the area of effective damage with one projectile.
The value Sc varies with different calibres of guns, and
is taken to be a given in Table 2.
Table 2
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27. Table 3 gives the numbers, verifiedn39 p1 q o ' p-A
radar set by means of 122-mm guns, depending on the method of determining
the firing data and the firing range.
Tab le 3
Method of determining of firing
Range of fire in kilometres)
data
4
6
8
10
1. Detailed preparation:
(a) Co-ordinates fro*u air
160
190
24-0
330
photograph
(b) Co-ordinates determined by
220
250
310
380(?)
observation from airoraft
2. Switching fire from auxiliary
60
90
150
220
targets
3. Direct ranging with the help of
100
120
130
150
a radar set (co-ordinates from
photograph)
28. When. destroying radar sets; the consumption of projectiles
increases two or three-fold.*
29. Depending on the role fulfilled by the individual enemy radio-
electronic devices, they should be destroyed at different periods.
For instance, during the regrouping of own forces, one should &estroy
radar sets whose function is to detect moving targets and to reconnoitre
the FEBA of defence (or to direo4 the fire), as soon as they are
discovered. Before beginning attacks 'by own aircraft, or before
beginning an operation, one should destroy the maximum number of A.A.
artillery radar sets and the early warning and. aircraft guidance radar
sets. Generally speaking, the time of destruction (neutralisation) of
/specified
*Tables giving full data of the consumption of ammunition for
,and the method of executing the fire, are
contained in the "ArtilI ry Manual: Reconnaissance and. Engagement
of Enemy Radio-Technical Means", which will be published in 1962.
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specified types of radio-electronic devices should be chosen in such a way
as to prevent the enemy from re-establishing, before the beginning of our
planned operations, specified radio-electronic systems by using the forces
and resources of the reserve, or by regrouping from secondary axes.
IT. JAmming of 'enemy radio-electronic devices
30. The direction and execution of radio-electronic counter-measures
sho?,ld be centralised as far as possible. Excessive decentralisation is
harmful, since it leads to frequent differences betwe3n the 'various arms
and services using radio--lectronic devices (mutual interference, prevention
of reconnais anco, etc.). However, if the, actions and methods of radio-
electronic counter-aot:on as a whole cuntain some action (or method) which
is specific to only one arm of service, and if this does not harm the
interests of others, then it is worth while to place the burden of its
implementation on that particular arm of service. In the case of
artillery, this specific action includes the jamming of radar sets which are
carrying out detection of artillery (mortar or howitzer) fire positions.
31. The principle of operation of the special mortar-locating radar
set eotisists of tracking a mortar projectile and determining the spatial
ca-ordinates at a number (at least two) of points on the ascending path of
its flight, and then determining the location of the point of origin of
this projectile on the basis of the physical rules of ballistic flight,
taking into account the weather conditions. Owing to the great accuracy
in determining the various co-ordinates after the introduction into the
computer of the corrections connected with the prevalent weather conditions,
the average error in determining the mortar fire positions does not exceed
10 metres. The determination of a mori:ar fire position is possible
after the firing by he mortar of 2 or 3 projectiles, that is, within
a few dozen seconds. The effectiveness of operation of a mortar-locating
radar set is dependent on the efficiency of organisation of the co-operation
/of the
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of the set with the artillery sub-unit detailed for mortar destruction
(this co-operation depends to a large extent on an efficient system of
communications).
32. It follows from the above that the prevention of effective
operations of mortar-locating radars is one of the principal tasks of
the artillery in the sphere of combating enemy radio-electronic devices.
The first and principal method of preventing operation of these radars is
by +heir destruction.. In order to carry out this task, the artillery
commander, through the reconnaissance organs, should issue tasks to his
radio-electronic reoonnai.-sance cell for determining the locations of
mortar-locating radars, However, as the enemy will not switch on these
sets unless it is clearly necessary to do so, he should be skilfully
provoked into action. The artillery fire directed at the destruction
of these sets must be executed as rapidly as possible, to prevent the
enemy from moving the sets to another position.
33? Another method of :'educing the effectiveness of a mortar-
locating radar is by preventing the enemy from tracking the flight
of the projectiles along the asuendLig path of their flight. This task
may be accomplished by masking the moving projectiles by means of intense
passive interference. Passive jamming may be used by firing special
projectiles (fitted with time-fuzes), filled with metallized fibres.
The large nu?.fiber of metallized fibres in a projectile, their dispersion in
space by means of an explosive charge, and their slow cLescent (about 60
metres per minute), together with the limited possibility of
differentiating between targets by the enemy radar sets (mainly in azimuth
and angle of sight) result in the following:-
(a) the intensity of the jamming, compared with the intensity of the
signals reflected from projectiles, is very large and he constant
echo suppressor circuits (based on the classic principle of
utilisation of the Doppler effect), which might be used in
/mortar-locating
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mortar-locating sets, are unable to distinguish the signals
reflected from the projectiles from the total ,Hass of signals;
(b) as far as the radar set is concerned, this jamming is in
practice continuous, in spite of its being created by a
ruccession of separate explosicns of projectiles containing
metallized fibres;
(e) the period during which the metallized fibres remain in the air
is ccmpa:ati.vely great (interference clouds created at a height
of 1500 metres will only fall after 15-20 minutes); furthermore
the jamming can oe renewed from time to time.
34. When planning the creation of this interference, one should
nevertheless take into account, the existence of one's own sets of the
same type, often operating in the same wave-band, and the necessity cf
protecting from attack the mortar sub-units detailed for creating the
interference.
35. For instance, if it i3 necessary to screen various groupings of
mortars, one should above sl oo-ordinate the deployment of the fire
positions of these mortars, and their axes of fire, with the location of
own radar sets fo.? locating enemy artillery fire positions. From
Figure 1 it is -pparent that one's own radar set, located about 2 laps
from the FEBA, is not 8lways able to observe the projectiles fired in
certain directions from the positicn 'x', since the intense curtain over
the fire positions of our own mortars will form a screen preventing
observation in sector 1-2 behind the screen. (Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4.
are at the end of the report).
36. The necessary number of projectiles filled with metallized
fibres, and of time fuzes, as well as the required axes of fire, can be
oalc'ulated on the basis of one's own tasks (e.g. battery tasks) and the
tactical and technical data of the enemy radar sets. Knowing the maximum
ene can draw the probable paths of the
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(b) in depth of the area of interference - depending on the resolution
projectiles (Figure 2) and, lmowing the axes of fire, one can determine
the width of the area of interference (Figure 3)-
37. The places of individual bursts of projectiles containing
metallized fibres are de-%'-,ermined:-
(a) in width of the area of interference (1) - depending on the
azimuthal resolution of the radar set when:
1. `D ? e +0.5 d
where: e = width of the radar set beam in azimuth
(in thousandths);
d = dieneter of the interference cloud (in metres);
D - distance from radar set to the screen (in
kilometres);
(c)
of the radar set in distance; in practice, one should set off
the bursts at a distance from each other equal to the diameter
of the cloud formed by a single projectile;
in height of the interference area (h) - depending on the reso-
lution of the radar .set in the angle of sight, when:
h