CAREERS IN THE CLANDESTINE SERVICES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03091A000100020010-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 17, 2005
• Sequence Number: 10
• Content Type: REPORT

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CAREERS IN THE CLANDESTINE SERVICES
I. ASSUMPTIONS AGAINST WHICH RECOMMMTIONS ARE MADE:
a. The CS levels of pay today are based on GS schedules;
clerical and secretarial groups and both male and female of-
ficers in the grades GS-9 to GS-11 are comparatively better
paid than other agencies, including the State Department;
i.e. advancement is more rapid and classification of jobs
is more liberal because of factors peculiar to the CS.
b. From the GS-11 grade up (and in terms of age from
age 32-35) the rate of advancement is slower than in compar-
able positions in the State Department, i.e. an officer with
approximately the same responsibility in State occupies a
position classified higher than a comparable position in
the CS. In other words, pay for senior positions of respon-
sibility in the CS compare unfavorably with both the military
services and the State Department.
c. The CS has, in proportion to the total number of
positions occupied by individuals with educations, abilities
and officer-level career expectations, a limited number of
executive (i.e. supergrade) positions. A young man seeking
a career in the officer ranks in the armed services or within
the State Department has a far better chance of achieving the
responsibility, pay and status equal to that of a supergrade
than the same officer would have in the CS.
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d. The opportunities for the CS career officer to
look forward to positions of prestige or status (important
in the opinions of families and friends and ultimately to
the officer himself, even if more than outweighed by the
professional zeal of the CS officer) are even more restricted
than the limited opportunities for becoming a supergrade.
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e. More than 50% of the members of the CS perform ,
duties and work under conditions which are comparable to
those of the rest of CIA and many other agencies of govern-
ment; restrictions on their lives because of either cover or
operational security factors are minimal. The career officers
in this group do, however, have comparatively few opportuni-
ties to achieve executive positions (supergrades) toward the
end of career. Many of them perform entirely professional
intelligence tasks which require a high level of skills,
educational backgrounds, and abilities. An incentive, in
terms of end-of-career recognition with executive responsi-
bility and status, is required for a greater number of this
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group to a degree equal to that for the group more directly
involved in operational work abroad under conditions re-
quiring continuing restrictions on their lives because of
both cover and operational security factors.
f. A smaller group in the CS (certainly far less than
50% of the members of the CS) carry out professional assign-
ments over a long period of time (fifteen to twenty years and
repeated tours in foreign areas) which impose distinct restric-
tions on their manner of living, offer limited career opportu-
nities after middle age and fail to prepare the individual (in
terms of experience, skills and contacts) to compete for senior
executive positions in either private or government work out-
side of the CS. This relatively small corps of professional
intelligence operatives is the group for which CIA provides
the least attractive career. Because of the youthfulness of
the CIA, and particularly of this corps of officers in the
CS2 this career problem is only now becoming acute.
jj. The entire CS has a "hump" of officers (and senior
female secretaries who have moved in large numbers into in-
telligence officer positions without really having the potent-
ial to serve in the corps of intelligence officers described
in paragraph L. above) who entered government service in the
first half of World War II. Today the male members of this
group range in age from 40 to 55 and have, with few exceptions,
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stalemated at the GS-13 to GS-15 level. Probably less
than 50% of them meet criteria applied to the group in para-
graph f. above; a number of them (described as a group in
paragraph e. above) are, however, extremely competent and
should have some expectation for further promotion. This
can be accomplished only by (a) expanding the number of
executive positions in the CS and upgrading some of the
existing GS-13 and GS-14+ positions; and (b) eliminating
through a reduction in force from the GS-I1+, GS-15 and super-
grade ranks those individuals who are unable to compete with
the best of the officers now pressing upward from the lower
grades.
h. Some of the "hump" group do, of course, qualify
fully for inclusion in any program designed to meet the
career needs of the group described in paragraph f.
i. CIA (and CS) current arrangements for an officer
eliminated through 701/702 procedures are unsatisfactory if
we intend to use them beyond the present exercise. The pre-
sent 701/702 program is particularly unsuitable if we intend
to use it as a tool of management to eliminate from the CS
individuals who, in spite of long service in CS operational
roles abroad, have not been elected after reaching the age
of 40 to be retained in the corps of officers who will
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continue in this work with increased pay and early retire-
ment. The existing program is, compared to both State and
Defense arrangements, entirely inadequate and the justifica-
tion for more favorable separation settlements appears at
least equal to if not greater than State or the military
services.
II. OUTLINE OF A RECOMMENDED CAREER PROGRAM FOR THE CS:
a. All staff employees of the CS should start careers
with a common career program, pay scales and retirement bene-
fits; this could be the present system of adherence to the
GS pay schedules or to any other system adopted for all of
CIA or for the entire CS.
b. Promotions in the GS-7 to GS-11 professional posi-
tions which can be identified as those through which career
intelligence officers normally move should be at a favorable
pace -- presumably on the basis of automatic time-in-grade
promotions on the basis of satisfactory performance. These
promotions could be administered simply on the basis of record
and the signed statement of satisfactory service and profes-
sional progress by the Chief of the major component of the CS
to which the junior officer is assigned.
c. Promotion of officers beyond the grade of GS-11
should be entirely competitive. Al], service at the GS-11
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level and in some cases service in the grades above GS-11
before the age of 40 would be competitive not only in terms
of promotion but also in determining the future career
status of the individual.
d. A Clandestine Services procedure to determine the
career plan for the individual after he reaches the GS-12
level (at the earliest) or the age of 40 (at the latest)
should provide for a thorough and conscious reappraisal by
both the CS and, the individual of his future beyond this
point. Three career possibilities should be considered:
(1) The individual and the CS can determine that
he become part of the group of officers who will ex-
pect to continue service in operational work carried
out primarily abroad. The individual in this group
must consciously determine that he and his family are
willing and able to.accept any duty assignment, hazards,
inconveniences and other limitations and restrictions
characteristic of secret service operational duties in
foreign areas.
(2) The individual and the CS can determine that
he continue his career in the CS, look forward to either
specialized and more permanent assignments at Head-
quarters, and more limited opportunities for service
abroad primarily with duties not generally associated
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with CS operational activities. This individual
should be able to look forward to ending his career
at age 62, 30 years of service etc. having had the
opportunity to achieve executive responsibilities
commensurate with his service and abilities. This
career would also be offered to technicians, special-
ists and non-executive positions which do not lead to
more than middle-level salaries but can normally be
carried out until normal retirement age, i.e. 62.
(3) The individual could be eliminated from
staff status in the CS in one of several ways: (a)
conversion to non-staff status upon agreement between
the individual and the CS, (b) selection out for cause,
and (c) Lnvoluntarily separation from the CS as sur-
plus to is needs, i.e. 701/702.
e. The roup identified under paragraph d. (1) above
should be m ed under pay and retirement arrangements
separate from the rest of the CS. Pay should not be less
than that received by comparable levels of the Foreign Ser-
vice. Pay should reflect the lack of access, stemming from
service and the nature of the work abroad, the individual has
to business and investment opportunities to arrange for his
own financial security after completing his career with the
CS. Early retirement should be based on recognition that
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the type of duty involved tends to burn out men faster
than most other occupations. Retirement should also be
based on the fact that beyond middle-age officers in foreign
cover arrangements do not fit the cover. Also, a strain on
family relationship becomes more acute as the intelligence
officer's age, experience and ability become less compatible
with his status and prestige in his cover group. Finally,
the lack of senior executive positions within this element
of the CS is at least as much a factor as in the CS as a
whole.
III. IMPLEMENTING A. CAREER PROGRAM FOR THE CS:
Actions required include:
a. Establishment of a procedure for reviewing the record
of each individual, to include consultation with him, to
select members of a Foreign Intelligence Corps. The review
should start with the GS-15's and precede downward through
GS-12. Final determinations should be made on officers age
110 or over; immediate decisions need not be taken on offi-
cers under 40. However, where the officer under 40 clearly
qualifies, it is recommended that he be admitted without
delay.
b. New pay scales approximating those of the Foreign
Service should immediately be adopted for the Foreign
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Intelligence Corps to replace the GS-12 through GS-15
schedules now used. GS-15s should be brought into the
range of FSO 2; GS-14's should be related to FSO 3. It is
my opinion that the GS-12 and GS-13 schedules are approxi-
mately at the level they should be and grades comparable to
this should be maintained for officers brought into the
Foreign Intelligence Corps at the GS-l2 and GS-13 level.
c. The DD/P should administer the Foreign Intelligence
Corps and should either adopt existing panels or develop new
panels made up of supergrade CS officers to deal with matters
of selection into the Corps and promotion within it.
d. The DCI should submit legislation to obtain autho-
rity to grant early retirement with an increased annuity for
officers in the Foreign Intelligence Corps and for not more
than 15 other officers per year selected by the Director
from within the CS but not from the Foreign Intelligence
Corps. (Something along this line must be done to handle
the problem of retiring a limited number of supergrades each
year. If we determine that the Foreign Intelligence Corps
will include a range of grades shown in the attached chart,
it is assumed that an officer at the top grade of the Corps
who is promoted into the executive group will leave the
Corps but retain his acquired early retirement benefits.)
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e. The DCI should be asked to establish a new system
of executive pay for the CS covering all of the senior posi-
tions to which both members of the Foreign Intelligence Corps
and other groups in the CS can be promoted. Basically this
should include the present GS-16 through GS-18 levels with
one additional higher GS rating with pay comparable to the
top FSO pay. A GS-15 from the CS who was not a member of
the Foreign Intelligence Corps would simply be promoted to
GS-16 or a comparable executive level established by the
Director. A senior officer in the Foreign Intelligence Corps
who could achieve a pay level equivalent to the top of an
FSO 2 ($17,030) in our Foreign Intelligence Corps would be
able to perform most field assignments at this pay level
and occupy many positions at an executive level at Head-
quarters while still retaining his Foreign Intelligence
Corps status. A decision to retain this officer in the CS
and to use him in one of the more limited higher executive
positions could be accomplished by bringing him into the
executive grade comparable to our present top GS-17 pay, i.e.
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f. A committee should be appointed by the DCI to look
into other administrative arrangements, benefits, and special
management devices which could be used to enhance the esprit
and improve the morale and efficiency of the Foreign Intelli-
gence Corps. In administering the Foreign Intelligence Corps,
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the DD/P should enjoy considerable flexibility in deter-
mining the criteria for selection to the Corps. It is my
strong conviction, however, that past service in foreign
areas, demonstrated competence in languages, and a willing-
ness and ability on the part of both the individual and his
family to continue to accept assiginnents involving hazardous
duty, health problems and personal inconveniences in matters
of education, standard of living etc. should remain the major
factors. It is admitted that there are many intelligence
officers in Headquarters who make an equal contribution.
I believe we would defeat our purpose if we attempt to solve
whatever problems exist for this individual as we move to
deal with the more critical problem of maintaining an effi-
cient secret service abroad.
Attachment - 1
Proposed pay scale for CS
SEC.
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