RETIREMENT Q&A

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03091A000200020001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 27, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: LIST

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Why does- CIA. desire to retire all employees, excepting those few asked to con-
tinue in service, at age 60?
A. To increase attrition by shortening the career span of the total employee body.
Q. Why is increased attrition desireable or necessary?
A.. Attrition provides vacancies. Vacancies provide opportunities (ceiling, funds,
assignments)
(a) To recruit and employ new personnel having the qualifications
needed for current and prospective operations and which are
not available or susceptible to development among on-duty
employees.
(b) For the accelerated development of on-duty personnel by a
broad continuing program of rotational assignments.
(c) To advance and exploit the capabilities of OS employees who
otherwise would become frustrated.
Q. Why does CIA need to increase its rate of attrition?
A. The total need to increase its rate of attrition for several reasons-some of
which are directly related to the nature of the CIA mission.
(a) CIA. has an abnormally low attrition rate from resignation,
deaths, disability and retirement. The CIA. attrition rate
is considerably lower than that encountered by normal govern-
ment service. The major reasons for this are the following.
Q. Regardless of CIA's low attrition rate, why is it not adequate to merely replace
attrition from any cause with additional new employees?
A. There are two major reasons - they both relate to uncommon aspects of CIA.
staffing needs. These are:
(1) A large segment of CIA's total activities are related to the con-
duct and support of clandestine activities overseas. It is essential
that these activities be staffed preponderantly by relatively young
people (age 25 to 50). The nature of the work and the environments
in which it is performed requires endurance, drive, singleness of
purpose and fearlessness-qualities that are characteristic of re-
latively young people. Family inconvenience, frequent transfers,
long and irregular working hours, physical discomfort, stress and
hazard are normal factors in overseas intelligence activities. It
is an obserable and demonstratable fact that as the years pass tol-
erance for these working conditions decreases and concern for
family and personal consideration increases to the detriment of
optimum, performance of the Agency mission.
(2) It is an unavoidable fact that "cover" employment opportunities abroad
become progressively more difficult to provide as individuals pass
age 40 and attain higher levels in the hierachy of employment. Not
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only are approprial "cover" assignments increasingly difficult to find
or create but the need to perform cover duties substantially and ef-
fectively lessens the individual intelligence usefulness.
Q. Does CIA. not have a special retirement system for these intelligence personnel
that permits their retirement as early as age 50 and makes retirement manda-
tory at age 60? Does this fact not take care of this segment of your personnel
body?
A. It helps to solve the problems of excess numbers of over-age intelligence officers
and supporting personnel. Managing, supporting exploiting and developing the
overseas intelligence activities of CIA. is a Headquarters organization of approxi-
mately equivalent size. It is highly desirable that this organization be staffed in
so far as possible by personnel who themselves are experienced in or are being
trained for overseas intelligence operation, This is done by a continuing program
of job rotation between field and headquarters and by gradually moving the most
outstanding officers into senior staff and management positions at Headquarters
as they outgrow their usefulness in overseas assignments. Many of these posi-
tions over the years tend to become filled by personnel who have never qualified
for the CIA. retirement system. The reasons stem from the stringency of the re-
quirements for eligibility and the relatively recent creation of this retirement
system. Cumulatively therefore a substantial and steadily increasing portion of
of the position at Headquarters both within the Clandestine Service and in other
Agency components may be pre-eminently qualified are not available for field-
headquarters rotation or for exploitation in the later career phase. The age 60
retirement poli4'j for personnel in the Civil Service Retirement System materially
alleviatejthis situation by increasing attrition. It is a matter of providing more
opportunities for the most outstanding overseas employees to continue their
careers to the benefit of the Agency.
Q. What other reasons compel the Agency to continue to hire new employees at the
apparent expense of the old employees?
A. Intelligence inherently embraces all elements of economic, political, scientific
and social evolution. It is always concerned with change. The urgency and impor-
tance of its need, direction it may take, the techniques that may be required Land
the situs of emphasis can not be predicted very far into the future. Counter-
measures are always present and must be overcome by new techniques, tactics
and scientific applications. There is therefore a compelling need to adjust the
mix of skills, academic and scientific background and experience available in
the CIA. employee body to the requirements of the moment and the predictable
future. Time and practical consideration frequently preclude the re-education,
retaining of on-duty employees. Expertise, of whatever kind, must be brought
into the Agency when required. In addition, intelligence collection and exploita-
tion calls for the highest levels of imagination, creativeness and currency of
knowledge. There is little doubt that a steady influx of new minds, new view-
points included by years of proven experience is a desirable if not essential
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requirement to the maintenance of a viable dynamic intelligence organization. The
most effective, and most equitable way to provide room for the employment of the
"new blood" required is by limiting the career span of employees.
Q. What is the practical impact of the age 60 retirement policy on the career span of
employees?
A.. The most recent report of the Civil Service Retirement System shows that the great
preponderance of employees retiring voluntarily do so in their 65th year of age.
This would indicate that the age 60 retirement policy shortens each individual, s
career by five years.
Does the shortening of career span by five years have any special significance to
CIA. other than those previously pointed out?
A.. Indeed no! CIA has two unusual characteristics in the makeup of its employee
body.
(a) CIA., and indeed, kS intelligence in the modern conception, had its
origin. in World War II and the Korean War, CIA. was initially staffed
during this period by persons e'ientially of the same age and historical
perspective. With a low attrition rate until recent years the Agency
has an age and cultural "hump;. " The individuals. comprising this "hump"
predominantly occupies the managerial and staff portions of the Agency.
Even with the age 60 retirement policy the peak five year span for re-
tirement of this group will be 1971-1976 (? ). Most of these individuals
were at or near their career peaks, as limited by the number of op-
portunities offorded the Agency organizational structure, in their late
40, s and early 501 s. With an age 60 retirement policy they will make
their maximum contribution for roughly a ten year period. Without
the policy most will perform the same duties for at least 15 years and
many for a longer period. During this 10 to 15 or more year span there
will be _ minimal opportunity for the introduction of new blood and the
advancement of officers who in many cases are better qualified than
their seniors.
(b) The other characteristic is derivitive of the rapid and high rate of
growth in the size of the Agency and the scope of its activities during
its first 20 years. The urgency of need was so great that despite
stringent selection standards a considerable number of employees
of less than optimum qualifications and potential by todays standards
were employed. The rate of growth has been so great during the brief
existence of the Agency that there has been no opportunity to thought-
fully weed out those of less than fully desirable compentence until it
was too late to do so in terms of their career investment and years
of loyal service to the best of their abilities. The Agency now has
the option of attempting to correct this situation during the next
to years by the process of retirement at age sixty, the develop-
ment and advancement of better qualified personnel who have risen
through the ranks but are presently flocked, and by the employment
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operations. The alternative is to extend the process over an addi-
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tional 5 or more years. A further alternative would be selective purge of those
not meeting todays standards - an alternative that would doubtless destroy the
morale of the Agency and result in legal action jeopardizing the Director's se-
parate authorities.
Q. What evidence do you have that CIA. has a substantial accumulation of personnel
in their 50's who are not properly or ideally qualified for their present or other
assignments or more specifically as not as well qualified as available subordinates?
A. No,, actual survey has been made since the process itself would entail serious
morale problems. I believe based on many discussions with Heads of Career
Services that each service has a substantial number of employees who have pro-
gressed to positions beyond their capabilities who are unassignable to other than
positions tailored to their capabilities. I believe, that supervisors at all levels
will affirm that they would rather lose a few outstnading employees at age 60
than retain most employees to age 65 or more. I believe there would be strong
affirmation that the best interests of the U. S. Government call for the retention
and enforcement of the present age 60 retirement policy in so far as all pro-
fessional employees are concerned. A survey made in the Intelligence Directo-
rate appears to support this belief.
Q. Why is it we adopt the same mandatory retirement age for employees in the CIA.
Retirement System and the Civil Service Retirement Service Retirement System?
A. Question reflects the fact that the CIA Retirement System with its provisions
for early retirement at age 50 and mandatory retirement at age 60 was a specific
remedy for the fact that clandestine intelligence operations abroad must be ac-
complished by a preponderantly young group of employees. There is none the
less a compelling need for the services of a substantial number throughout their
careers at Headquarters. The age 60 retirement policy for personnel not in the
CIA.. .Retirement System contributes greatly in providing job rotation opportunities
at Headquarters for those whose careers relate to intelligence operations and
for their best utilizations during the final decade of their careers. The age 60
retirement policy for those in Civil Service Retirement System is completely
justifiable in its own right without regard to the CIA. Retirement System and
the members thereof. Question and Question provide some reasons in sup--
port of this policy.
Q. What other reasons are there?
A. In my own judgement there is one reason that surpasses all others. It is inherent
in the nature and importance of the intelligence business. I believe the intelli-
gence business thrives on challenge, stress, competition, and obsession with
the task at hand. The task is to provide the best intelligence possible. The
fact that "best possible is" unmeasurable merely mea:is that it must be done
by the best personnel available putting out their best efforts. It requires the
continuious matching of qualifications to constantly changing targets and world-
wide situations. It requires intense concentration and effort on the part of each
indivi*lro 'hU4t&.vR l Mbb/ftf1 b&A- N01M&ZUUD`16 0`?+3 imum levels
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whether due to inability to keep abreast, lack of qualifiecations, distractions due
to ill health or other interests, mental or motivational digeneration detract from
optimum performance. I believe it is incontestably true that in the mass, people
tend to relax, become less discerning and understanding as to the changes taking
place around them., rely more heavily upon part experience than on newly ac-
quired knowledge, and more distracted by problems of health and less aggressive
and progressive as their physical and intellectual needs become satisfied. I
believe this is particularly true when a man realizes that he probably has attained
his vocational peak. When this happens he either coasts or seeks fullfillment
in non job related endeavors. It is in this area that the difference of five years
in the terminal phase of the working careers of CIA. employees is critical.
Either the best interest of the Agency and the Government are sacrificed to the
best interests of the individual or vice versa.
Is the need to assert the general best interests of the Government in this respect
equally relevant to every individual employee , all CIA functions, all areas of
career specializations and all levels of positions?
A. The answer is clearly in the negative. With respect to any given individual, to
various fields work, to very many specific jobs entirely satisfacting perform-
ance can be expected until impairment of physical or mental competence takes
its toll. In many hundreds of jobs nominal fall off in productivity or effective-
ness might be acceptable in deference to advancing man. Similarly it cannot be
demonstrated that thousands of individual jobs have any direct effect upon the
intelligence product of the Agency., ,or that turnover in these jobs is needed to
provide career development and advanement opportunities for those on the way
up.
Q. Since this is the case why does not the Agency identify such jobs and exempt the
incumbents thereof from the age 60 retirement policy?
A. Practical administrative consideration preclude the Agency from making an in-
dividual determination regarding each employee. Now only would the magnitude
and useable standards for such subjective judgements. Furthermore, and pro-
bably more important, employees would tend to defer retirement planning until
a discussion had been reached regarding their retention in service. This would
be detrimented to managerial planning of succession and each adverse decision
would be personally offensive to the individual since post retirement loyalty to
to the Agency is highly important in times of national security, such a process
should be considered. It would be possible, with relatively little impairment
of total Agency performance to exempt substantial categories of jobs or possibly
all jobs in specific functional activities.
Q. Why does the Agency not do this? Failure to do so appears to restrict the in-
dividuals discretion as to the extent of his working career for no valid purpose.
Valuable work know-how is lost and recruitment and training expenses must
be incurred?
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A. The separation of employees into two categories - those incorporated in and those
excluded from the retirement policy is feasible. There are very real and dem-
onstratable reasons for doing so-there are conjectured reasons for not doing so.
The major reason against doing so is the following.
(a) The creation of an exempt category or categories of employees
will instantly create an odious comparison. A pressure point
will be established that will plague management indefinitely and
consume endless hours of research and debate. Since many of
basic considerations underlying the policy are necessarily em-
pirically derived additional requests for exemption will forever
arise and which will be reasonable only by fiat incorporating
impirical reasoning. Chronic morale problems will inevitably
preval. The major reasons for exempting a substantial number
of position from the policy are as follows:
A. It will be impossible to justify the need for the policy
with respect to specific individuals or specific types
or levels of work. This could well lead to circum-
stances wherein the courts will attempt to adjudicate
between the rights of an individual and the Director's
judgement as to what is best for the Government.
B. There is known to be at least one group of employees
(in Printing Services) to whom the Agency has given
assurance at the time of employment that their job
tenure would not be impaired.
C. It is an obvious and demonstratable fact that the lower
graded positions fall in the categories of work where it
is most difficult to establish, even by empirical methods,
that job turnover and optimum level of performance have
any direct or significant bearing upon the total perform-
ance of the Agency. It is also in this group that the
majority of cases of inadequate preparation for retire-
ment and financial hardships generating emotions for
compassionate consideration arise. It is also the group
where the loss of five or more years of employment is
most crucial, Offsetting this is the fact that this group
can generally most easily find subsequent employment
in a reasonably good labor market since their skills are
widely used and their good character is almost attested
to by their Agency employment record. Nevertheless,
were these lower graded employees generally exempted
from the retirement policy considerable emotional on
the part of the individuals and their supervisors would
be avoided.
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