SO/OSS WAR PLANNING, ETO, WORLD WAR II

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03362A000300020001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: SPEECH

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SO/OSS WAR PLANNING, ETO, WORLD WAR II
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SO/OSS WAR PLANNING, ETO, WORLD WAR 11
I INTRODUCTION
A. Purpose of the Lesson
To give an historical example of war planning by a U.S. clandestine
services organization.
B. Scope
It will include:
1. Organization for planning and operations by the SO Branch of OSS
at Theater Headquarters level, and organization for coordination
with the British SOE.
2. Problems of coordination with the French FFI.
3. Plans developed at Theater Headquarters level for support by
clandestine paramilitary forces to the military invasion of the
Continent, and post-invasion military operations on the Continent.
4. Organization for coordination at Army Group and Army Headquarters
level of plans for clandestine support of military operations.
5. Lessons learned.
C. Preface
It is necessary for the students to keep in mind the situation
existing during the war-planning period in the SO Branch of OSS, as
distinguished from the situation today. In England, SO had approxi-
mately 18 months within which the plan for support of active military
operations by clandestine forces could be worked out prior to the
beginning of those military operations. But it was during a period
of open hostilities, which made many of the factors influencing the
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development of the plan quite different, in all likelihood, from
those which will affect your planning task. Similar to your task,
it was advance planning, during a period of planning military
operations and the build-up for carrying out the military plan. At
this point, however, similarity ends. The following are some of the
conditions existing then, differing from the present.
During the planning period, very active clandestine operations
of the paramilitary type were being conducted, as distinguished
from the very limited organizing for such operations that CIA is
conducting today. During the conduct of these operations, no holds
were barred; there had been previous declarations of war by all the
parties concerned. The current operations were considered by the
British opposite organization, the Special Operations Executive (SOE),
to be a form of economic warfare, and the SOE at that time actually
was a division of the Ministry of Economic Warfare of the British
Government. It was recognized, however, that these clandestine
operations could provide material support for the military operations
to be conducted in the future. Therefore, planning to switch SOE
over to military control, and planning for support of military
operations proceeded concurrently with planning for the military
operations. The war situation existing then during the planning
period made the planning task simpler, in all probability, from the
planning task confronting you now. It was easier to get decisions
or approval of plans at higher levels and such decisions were made
and approvals granted much more rapidly. Every resource of the
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nations concerned that could be allocated to the clandestine
organizations was made available without qualification to those
organizations. It might be said that, as distinguished from the
probable planning situation of today, planning then was done under
ideal conditions. As further background necessary to an understand-
ing of the World War II clandestine services war planning, it must
be realized that SOE had been in existence and actively in the
business some three years before OSS, etc.
QUESTIONS?
II ORGANIZATION FOR PLANNING AND OPERATIONS BY THE SO BRANCH OF OSS AT
THEATER HEADQUARTERS LEVEL, AND ORGANIZATION FOR COORDINATION WITH THE
BRITISH SOE.
A. Establishment of Special Operations (SO) Branch, OSS, in the ETO and
First Problems of Coordination with the British.
OSS was created 13 June 1942 by Presidential Military Order, and
placed under the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However,
it was not until about December, 1942, that JCS published a directive
setting out the OSS responsibilities and jurisdiction.
OSS General Order #9, 3 Jan 43, created the Special Operations
Branch (ETO SO War Diary, Vol. 12, page 13, and Vol. 1, page i).
The order assigned as SO responsibilities:
1. Conduct of sabotage in enemy and enemy-occupied countries.
2. Organization and conduct of guerrilla warfare.
3. Support and supply of resistance groups.
Therefore, it can be said that on the whole, the SO Branch had
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responsibilities parallel with those of 110S/CIA today, with the
possible exception of the resistance problem.
An officer was designated by the Director, OSS, as chief of the
SO Branch in London in June, 1942, but apparently he was powerless
to do anything until after JCS issued its directive. In January, 1943,
the Chief, SO Branch, OSS, Washington, went to London, relieved the
officer mentioned, and proceeded to organize an SO Branch within
the "London Mission, OSS". This man also was a representative of
the Director, OSS, for negotiations with the military forces, U.S.,
in London. The London Mission, OSS, apparently came into existence
about the same time. No authority for it had been obtained first
from either the JCS or the War Department, and no notice had been
given concerning it to the Coimnanding General, ETOUSA. Yet the
terms of the JCS directive creating OSS made it clear.that all OSS
activities within a Theater of Operations would be under the command
of the Theater Commander. Without first getting this problem
straightened out, the London Mission began organizing, established
close liaison with its opposite British organizations (SIS and SOE)
and began planning.
The SO Branch, OSS/ETO, first consisted of four men, three com-
missioned Army officers and one civilian. Organization for planning
developed very slowly. A working agreement for coordination of
activities between OSS and the British SOE had been worked out long
before, in June, 1942. The agreement provided that the basis for
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operations would be one of close coordination of operational plans
and of field operations to prevent:
1. "Crossing of lines".
2. Competition for agents and material.
3. The playing off of one service against the other by other
governments.
The agreement considered specific areas and countries of the world
in which the two organizations would be mounting operations, and set
out specific understandings of the type or kind of coordination
necessary for each area. As to Western European countries, especially
France and the Low Countries, it was clear from the beginning that
the two organizations were contemplating eventual integration of the
services to some degree.
Every SO staff officer present then or assigned later was given
training at one or more of the British SOE schools to learn something
of the nature and capabilities of the clandestine forces with which
they were concerned as staff planners.
In March, 1911-3, an SO planning officer was assigned to the
Planning Section of SOE, London Group, on a full-time basis. In May,
he became the head of the planning staff section of SO for all ETO
plans.
B. Problems of OSS and SO Branch Relations with Military Command
In the meantime, the whole problem of OSS official status and
structure in its relation with the military forces in the ETO was
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undergoing consideration and changes. It was necessary for the SO
Chief from Washington to approach the Theater Commander, advise that
the London Mission was present, explain the function of OSS, and
discuss the question of military control. It was a difficult task,
at first, to "sell" the capabilities of OSS to U.S. Army personnel.
(However, to give an idea as to how well OSS proved its worth in the
ETO, even before the beginning of Operation OVERLORD on the continent,
the following is quoted from the War Diary, Vol. I, page 22--almost a
year later: "The Supreme Commander in a reply to a cable from the
War Department dated 30 April 1944 requesting an opinion as to whether
OSS was useful to the Army, and whether or not the Army needed
continued and increased help from this agency, wrote: 'The Office
of Strategic Services is definitely useful to the Army in this
Theater. The four separate operating branches of the OSS, plus the
R & A Branch, are highly important functions necessary to the success
of the projected military operations which no agencies other than
the branches of OSS are prepared to fulfill. Their continued help
on the scale we have requested is needed in order that the military
plans which we are now completing and in some cases have begun
executing, may be carried out'.")
OSS requested that it be made a military detachment under Hq
ETOUSA. Ultimately this was done. Initially, all OSS activities
were coordinated by and were under the staff supervision of the AC of S,
G-2, of Hq ETOUSA. Later, OSS established liaison with G-5, COSSAC
(Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Command). SOE addressed a letter to
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COSSAC pointing out that SOE and SO were collaborating on operational
plans, and it would be desirable to bring SO under COSSAC operational
control, also. The British Chiefs of Staff Committee approved a
plan for giving COSSAC operational control of all SOE/SO activities
in northwest Europe; CG, ETOUSA, concurred, and in November, 1943,
operational control of SO activities for that area passed from ETOUSA
to COSSAC.
C. Final Developments of SO Branch and British SOE Coordination
Later, some discussion was had which seemed to indicate an
intention to integrate SOE/SO completely, but the SO officers at
London opposed it, and complete integration was never effected.
SO retained its identity. So far as France, the Low Countries,
Norway and Denmark were concerned, a re-statement of understanding
between SOE and SO, dated 15 April 1943, provided (SO ETO War Diary,
Vol. 1, pages xxxii and xxxiii):
1. In order to coordinate activities, SOE would control and
integrate operations, whether joint, or carried out indi-
vidually by SOE or SO.
2. SO continued to function autonomously and was responsible
for administration and control of its own agents, staff, etc.
3. SO had a representative on the SOE Planning Staff who was
1'1 cl~
to be consulted on all matters affective-the above countries;
SO was to have additional representatives on such other
Planning and Operational staffs as necessary to coordinate
joint operations, or to coordinate SO operations with SOE
operations.
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4. SOE and OSS would consult with each other regarding requests
from the governments of the countries named for assistance,
supplies, transport or communications facilities, "etc.",
to ensure that assistance or facilities given was agreeable
to both.
On 10 January 1944, a directive signed jointly by the Director of
the London Group of SOE and the Chief, SO Branch, was issued stating:
"Integration between the London Group of SOE and the SO Branch of OSS,
ETOUSA, has taken place. Therefore, duties will be assigned to
officers irrespective of the organization to which they belonged."
The paper, however, contained express recognition of the separate
interests of the two organizations. This "integration" was called
a "partnership" in the SO War Diary, rather than a real integration.
By the end of 1943, eighteen SO officers had been attached to
different Planning or Country Desk Operational Staffs or Divisions
in SOE. The organization of SO Branch at the main OSS Headquarters
in London had been set up on exactly parallel lines with the
organization of SOE so far as planning and operations were concerned.
Although this partnership arrangement was approved by CG, ETOUSA,
the JCS did not agree with it, taking the position that the interests
of both nations would be served best by the continuation of independent
operations by OSS under the control and direction of CG, U.S. Forces
in the ETO. General Eisenhower had been appointed SCAEF by this
time. At a meeting of the British Joint Intelligence Committee on
18 January 1944, it was suggested that since the partnership of SOE
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and SO already existed satisfactorily in fact, if it met with
SCAEF's approval, he should so inform the JCS, which should remove
their ob ection. This apparently was done. At any rate, the
partnership continued without modification. On 1 May 1944, this
partnership organization was changed in name from Headquarters,
SOE/SO, to Special Force Headquarters (SFHQ). At that time, one
American and one British officer served as Co-Directors, and nearly
every staff and geographical section had both U.S. and British
officers assigned.
The structure of SFHQ during the summer of 1944 consisted of:
(SHOW CHART)
1. The Co-Directors.
2. A "General Staff" Section of two officers, responsible
for Staff coordination and supervision of all current
operational matters. Officers, one U.S. and 25X1
one British.
3. A "Planning Staff Section of two officers, responsible
for preparation of all advance plans for support of
military operations. One U.S., one British.
4. A "Training" Staff Section. One U.S.
5. An "Air Operations" Staff Section. Two U.S., one British.
6. An "Intelligence" Staff Section. One U.S.
7. A number of geographical operational divisions and branches
(desks).
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8.
An "Army Staffs" Staff Section.
One U.S.
9.
A "Jedburgh Section". One U.S., one British.
10.
An "Operational Group Section".
One U.S.
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"
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11.
Supply
ion. One
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12.
A "Communications" Section. One U.S., one British.
13.
A "War Room" Section. Two U.S., (Sit Maps.)
The reasons for the partnership-integration were enumerated by
the British officer assigned to the General Staff Section as follows
(War Diary, Vol. 1, pages 11 and 12):
"The resistance elements in Western Europe have by now crystal-
lized into loosely knit groups. As it is the task of both the
organizations to assist and send supplies to these resistance
groups, duplication is avoided by the integration of them.
Furthermore, with two organizations of this nature pursuing an
active policy amongst resistance groups there would be bound to
be clashes in the field which would undoubtedly lead to loss of
security and the consequent discovery by the enemy. Even if an
immediate loss of life did not follow, the penetration by the
enemy would probably seriously detract from the value of the
groups on D-day.
"It has been decided that small staffs from SOE/SO Headquarters
should accompany both army groups and armies when an invasion of
the continent takes place so as to correlate the work of resistance
groups with that of the military forces. It is essential, there-
fore, that SO Branch of OSS be in a position to obtain information
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regarding resistance groups known to SOE not merely on a day-to-
day but on an hour-to-hour basis.
'...ommunication by radio to resistance groups is carried out
by sx,^ial radio stations in England, some of which are staffed
by the SO Branch of OSS. These stations are interlocked and it
would, therefore, be impractical, nay impossible, to divorce
some from the others.
"Aircraft have been allocated by the Air Ministry to SOE and
by the 8th USAAF to OSS. Since both air forces are serving the
same resistance groups in the field it would be impractical to
split, for example, France into two areas, one to be served by
one air force and the remainder by the other. It is, therefore,
necessary that the closest cooperation exist between these two
organizations in order not only to economize in the use of air-
craft but in order to prevent clashes on the continent. These
clashes might be caused either by too many aircraft going to the
same area on the same night, or by the majority of supplies being
sent to resistance groups in one area and not spread proportionately
over the whole of France.
"In the event of supplies not being pooled for the benefit
of both organizations there would obviously be a duplication of
orders with the result that stores will probably be shipped to
Europe in excess of those actually required."
The quotation just completed gives emphasis and amplification to many
of the reasons for the close coordination of the two services.
QUESTIONS?
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D. SUB-SUMMARY
1. In organizing for planning at Theater Headquarters level, it
was necessary to have:
a. A planning staff for handling current operations. This is
a task being handled today by the CIA Hq and Field Station
planners.
b. A separate planning staff whose whole task was the prepara-
c.
d.
tion oftplans for the furnishing of clandestine operational
support for planned military operations. Planning by this
staff was done concurrently with the preparation of the
military plan by Supreme Headquarters, and very closely
coordinated with the military plan. This is an exact parallel
to the situation today.
The war plan developed called for the use of special teams and
groups to be furnished to resistance groups or to execute
special coup de main missions. Staff sections were created
to handle planning, training and administrations problems
concerned with such teams and groups. These staff sections
can be likened to special staff sections, in that they had
a dual function: planning, recommending and supervision in
a staff capaci on and control, or executive
and operationa heir second function.
War planning included planning for the type and number of
SFHQ personnel that would be assigned or attached to military
units in the field to coordinate plans for operations by
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resistance groups with the current military plans. As soon
as the organizational plan for such personnel was developed,
a separate special staff section was created to carry the
plan out.
2. It appears probable that your war planning task will include
3?
working out a plan for the organization of a Theater or Sub-
Theater CIA Headquarters, and for the organization and status of
CIA personnel assigned or attached to military formations in the
field. The brief outline of the historical record of the experi-
ence o rs .S. personnel ever involved in a like task,
A
given above, may furnish some leads, suggestions, or points of
departure that may prove to be helpful to you.
As can be seen, the Director of OSS realized from the very begin-
ning the impossibility that two allied clandestine services could
organize and conduct clandestine operations of the so-called
"executive action" type, or paramilitary operations, in the same
area without clashes, overlappings, duplications and competitions
which would be extremely dangerous to the security of the operations.
It must be realized that operations of this type are totally
different in nature from espionage and counterespionage operations.
The very action nature of the operations creates the probability
that two or more independent and uncoordinated organizations
engaging in such operations in the same country, if the organiza-
tions achieve any effective size, will eventually run into con-
flicts with each other. These were the factors that caused the
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early coordination and later complete partnership-integration
between SO Branch of OSS and the British SOE. After military
operations in France and the Low Countries ended, and the mili-
tary forces entered Germany, the situation changed, and there
was no longer the need for such close coordination. This can
be explained only by the fact that resistance and the subsequent
sabotage, guerrilla, and escape and evasion nets in France and
the Law Countries were highly developed and extensive in scope,
while in Germany there was no such development, and all operations
were of an ad hoc or "off the cuff" nature -- short range or
tactical espionage missions for the most part.
From this discussion it is apparent that two principles stand
out which should be repeated:
a. If clandestine paramilitary organizations of considerable
size and scope are developed in the same area by two or
more.allied clandestine services, and those organizations
will furnish operational support to an allied military
operation in the same area, the activities of the clandestine
b.
nets must be coordinated between the allied services to
eve the greatest
posse eAu iza on or the organizations. The degree of
coordination will depend on the size and scope of the
clandestine organizations.
If allied military operations are conducted in an area
in which effective friendly resistance forces and para-
military organizations have not been developed, but short
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range or tactical clandestine coup de main or espionage
operations are to be conducted in support of the military
effort, each country's clandestine service can conduct
its own operations within the boundaries of its own
military unit zones with little or no coordination with
the other clandestine services.
III PROBLEMS OF COORDINATION OF WAR PLANS WITH THE OFFICIALS OF THE FREE FRENCH
IN CHARGE OF RESISTANCE MATTERS.
A. Relations with the Free French Prior to D-Day
Prior to D-day itself, none of the'Free French forces, including
Generals DeGaulle and Koenig themselves, was given any information
concerning any part of the plans for Operation OVERLORD for security
reasons. The one possible exception to this situation was in May 1944,
when General Koenig was informed that the invasion of the continent
would start in France. This apparently was because of his official
concern on behalf of the Free French with the Underground activities
in France (he was DeGaulle's personal representative for such purposes),
and possibly because of the part he was to have in connection with Ouch
activities later.
B. Official French Interest in SFHQ from D-Day on.
On D-day, the Supreme Commander placed General Koenig in command
of all French Resistance activities. The War Diary (Vol. I, pages 26-7)
states: "The situation was a peculiar one. The British and American
officers at SFHQ did not welcome the idea of being merely a service
organization since in this kind of operation it would be difficult to
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divorce operational and service functions. The French were con-
sidered to be 'ill-prepared to assume control. They lacked the
necessary personnel, a fact which they readily admitted. The
American and British deputies on EMFFI (i'Etat Major des Forces
Frangaises de 1'Inttrieur, the name adopted for the part of SFHQ
furnished to General Koenig for direction'of French operations),
Lieutenant Colonel van der Stricht and Mr. Brook, took orders from
Colonel Haskell and Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman (the U.S. and British
co-directors of SFHQ). Naturally, General Koenig made voluble
objection. Nominally, control was vested in General Koenig by
SFHQ, but due to its control of all the services and of air priorities
in particular, it continued to exercise actual control."
C. Organization of Headquarters for French Control of Clandestine Operations
in France.
On 22 June 1944, a tri-partite headquarters and staff within
SFHQ concerned only with operations in France, and under command of
General Koenig, was established. It was named EMFFI. It had U.S.,
British, and French officers, and was set apart from the rest of
SFHQ, finally in a separate building. By August, 1944, the many
complicating factors involved in establishing EWPI as a separate
entity had been pretty well worked out. Many sections of SFHQ had
existed without identification with operations in any single or
particular country; they serviced such operations in all the ETO
countries. The War Diary (Vol. I, page 69) gave this description
to the matter: "It was necessary to divide the duties of SFHQ
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functionally into that part pertaining to France and that part
pertaining to all other countries within SHAEF's sphere so that
General Koenig could exercise personal control over the French-
division."
Sections which could not be divided, however, included:
1. The section responsible, both for execution and general
administration, for submission of requirements and sup-
plies, and for planning the packing production,pr,
for operating the War Room, and some duties pertaining
to target selection.
2. The one arranging air operations and administering
packing stations.
3. The section providing personal documents and papers,
and handling all plans for Poles in France.
r+. The Special Airborne Services liaison.
5. The section handling infiltration and exfiltration of
personnel, courier messages, etc.
6. Signal communications.
7. The Planning Staff for current operations.
(SHOW CHART)
The EMEFI organization finally developed included:
1. One U.S. and one British deputy under General Koenig.
The General decided to concern himself principally with
close high-level liaison with SHAEF, and with the U.S.
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and British Army and Air Forces, and other U.S. and
British agencies, leaving to the deputies the handling
of day-to-day EMFFI operations.
2. The original SFHQ French section, having two divisions
(F and RF).
The Army Staff detachments with Army Group and Army
Headquarters.
4. Relative elements of advance planning section.
5-
SAS Brigade liaison.
EMFFI also was given facilities for direct liaison with the
following SFHQ sections which could not be divided:
1. Signal communications.
2. Air dispatch.
3. Planning Staff for current operations.
These three sections remained under SFHQ command, but met EMFFI
requirements as resources permitted.
Previous to the creation of EMFFI, all advance planning based on
future operational plans of SHAEF was done by a Planning Staff in SFHQ.
The elements of this Planning Staff concerned with France were placed
in EMFFI, and it worked on directives given it by General Koenig
the same as it had previously on directives coming directly from
G-3, SHAEF.
SFHQ became the agency responsible for providing air transport,
sea transport, packing of supplies, signal communications both with
the Resistance forces in France and the Army Staff Detachments
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attached to military formations, to EMFFI for all operations in
France. At the same time, SFHQ continued to be responsible for plan-
ning and conducting all its types of clandestine operations in all
other countries in the ETO.
SUB-SUMMARY:
1. As a refinement of principles stated in the preceding sub-summary,
it is apparent that when two or more allied countries have organized
resistance forces in the same area, and military operations are
being planned for that area, security problems may make it inadvisable
or impossible to coordinate future plans with one or more of the
allied countries.
2. The above may be true without influencing the necessity for coordinat-
ing current operations in the same area.
The situation may be one in which such coordination for current opera-
tions may involve the furnishing of all forms of signal, logistic
and financial support to the allied country which is not permitted
to take part in advance planning for support of military operations.
When this occurs, it is a fortunate situation for our own planners,
as the furnishing of such support may be the control medium for
forcing the allied country to accept the restrictions against taking
part in advance planning.
ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS?
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IV PLANS DEVELOPED AT THEATER HEADQUARTERS LEVEL FOR SUPPORT BY CLANDESTINE
PARAMILITARY FORCES TO THE MILITARY INVASION OF THE CONTINENT, AND TO
POST-INVASION MILITARY OPERATIONS ON THE CONTINENT.
A. Background
After the fall of France in 1940, the growth of a spirit of
resistance against the occupying forces started with extreme slowness
but entirely spontaneously and locally; it was given no assistance
from outside the country initially. There is no historical record
available which indicates how the British became aware of this growth
and its potential. However, it is clear that the DeGaullist forces
and the British soon learned of the development. The British were
the only ones capable of doing anything about it, and they quickly
gave support to the Free French and began themselves recruiting,
training and dispatching agent personnel to France to encourage the
development of this spirit of resistance, and then to-recruit from
French who indicated a desire to resist actively agents willing to
carry out sabotage and guerrilla action.
QUESTIONS?
By late 1942 a very large-scale program of active resistance had
been developed, much of it organized. The British obviously had been
giving serious study and consideration to means of using this force
to support the military operations, which were being planned for the
European continent, by the time the SO Branch of OSS in the ETO came
into being. Credit must be given to the British SOE for tie originj?%_dti1 5
Mr practically all the plans for the support of later military operations
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by clandestine paramilitary forces. The SO Branch of OSS deserves
much credit for its later contribution in developing and perfecting
those plans. SO recognized that the plans drafted and recommended
by the British were sound and based on long and careful thought and
testing, and on detailed experience with the resistance forces in
the countries concerned.
B. First Plans and the Test of the Plans
By early 1943, COSSAC had concluded that the general missions
that should guide the activities of the active Resistance forces,
looking toward the ultimate military invasion, should be:
1. To assist in bringing about conditions considered essential
to the success of an invasion of northwest Europe: Reduction
of German Air Force strength, lowering the morale of German
troops, and keeping German forces dispersed.
2. Inflicting damage to the German war machine generally.
3. Preparing to take action to give direct assistance to an
Allied landing on the Continent.
Specific plans developed by the British SOE to accomplish the
first and second missions mentioned included the continuation of
current sabotage activities to the fullest possible extent consistent
with the security of the "Resistance Groups", concentrated against:
1. The German Air Force in all its aspects.
2. Submarine repair and maintenance facilities, supplies and
morale of crews.
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3. Railway locomotives and trains carrying vital war materials
and troops.
4+. Factories producing materials for the German war effort.
5. Shipping of all sorts including inland canal barges and
canals themselves.
6. German military installations.
7. Gestapo and collaborators.
8. Any other objective, the sabotage of which would hamper the
German war effort or undermine morale.
As for the mission of giving direct assistance to the Allied
military effort, specific plans included:
1. Dislocation of railways by numerous planned demolitions, by
derailments, by interference with the railway signalling
system, and by a general strike of railway workers.
2. Interference with the movement of local enemy reserves by
various means, such as road blocks, mines, tire.bursters,
harassing fire from small arms, bazookas, etc.
3. Arming and equipping Resistance Groups for guerrilla activities
to create confusion in enemy rear areas, including attacks on
small enemy headquarters, couriers, staff officers, tele-
communications, dumps o(f 'fall kinds. It was realized then.
that "in the wilder Maquis areas of France it is possible
that the guerrilla activities may become so extensive as to
cause a minor military diversion".
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A specific limitation of capability was expressed in connection
with this statement of specific plans which is especially noteworthy,
and part of it is as applicable today in connection with the develop-
ment of war plans as it was then. "In considering the foregoing
activities, it should be recognized that little can be done by Resist-
ance Groups in a tactical sense as it is expected that the enemy will
carry out large scale evacuations or otherwise interfere with the
mobility of the inhabitants in areas within or immediately behind the
lines. Furthermore, because of the substantial time lag in getting
messages to the field, it usually will not be possible to assign tasks
to Resistance Groups which will have a bearing on the tactical situation.
On the other hand, long-term, strategical tasks will be assigned to
Resistance Groups located well in the enemy's rear areas.."
The planning at that time had progressed sufficiently far to
include the command and control structure, including the coordination
necessary with Supreme Headquarters and its G-3 Section; plans for
the furnishing of staff detachments to the G-3 sections of all Army
Group and Army Headquarters to advise the commanders of those forma-
tions as to the capabilities of Resistance Groups in the field, and
to work out plans for the commander concerned for employment of such
groups on missions which would assist the efforts of the military
formation concerned, with the express limitation that such plans
would be recommended to SFHQ for action; plans for the communications
net necessary for control of agents and groups in the field and between
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the staff detachments and SFHQ (independent of the normal military
signal communications nets); and plans for the formation, training
and dispatch beginning about D-day of special teams to known Resist-
ance Groups in the field which lacked communications with SFHQ,
supplies, equipment and sometimes leadership.
.These plans were tested in March 1943-by the British SOE taking
part in maneuvers with British troops in an exercise called "Operation
SPARTAN", and the plans proved to be sound. Two U.S. officers from
SO Branch, OSS, took part in the SOE part of these maneuvers, one in
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and the other, the officer newly assigned to the
SOE Planning Staff in the SOE control center for the
maneuver. Following the test, SOE reduced their plans to a formal
staff study which was submitted to the appropriate British government
headquarters with recommendations for approval of the plans. The SO
Branch adopted the plans, converted the language to correct U.S. Army
terminology, and submitted the paper to CG, ETOUSA, with recommenda-
tions for its approval as the SO Branch plans for support of the
military invasion to take place later. Approval was granted, and
the plans became the basis for all subsequent development by the SO
Branch in coordination with the British SOE.
C. Later Specific Plans for D-Day Action in the Field by Resistance Forces
By September 1943, plans for a coordinated program of sabotage and
guerrilla attacks which would take place on signal coincidental with
the military invasion of the continent had been drafted. There were
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eight separate fields of action included originally, each given the
name of a plan identified by the French word for a color or another
French word. Of these eight, it was determined finally to be possible
and practicable to implement only three:
1. Plan Vert (green): This covered the destruction of all
railway communications. Its object was to isolate areas
and prevent all enemy movement to, from, and through the
areas. An effort was also to be made to kill German key
personnel, especially at the more important rail centers.
2. Plan Tortue (tortoise): This included road blocks and cuts
3. Plan Violet (violet): This dealt with the cutting of tele-
communications which were of value to the German Army. The
aim was to isolate certain areas from the rest of France or
whereby the enemy reinforcements, particularly armored units,
would be prevented from reaching the coast in time to hold
up Allied landings. This type of clandestine action today
is called a Retardation program. The maximum interferenc
was to be effected with the movement of all enemy troops.
It was felt to be of vital importance to dislocate and delay
the road movement of enemy reserve panzer, motorized, or
iLfantry divisions. This was to be achieved by carefully
prepared ambushes and road blocks which would depend for
their success on a detailed preliminary reconnaissance. This
plan was to be supplemented by other activities, such as
the misdirection of traffic and general guerrilla action.
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Germany. The full plan was dispatched to the field in
May 1944, with instructions that it was to be implemented
and effected in conjunction with the advice of official
French Poste Telegraphe et Telephone (PTT) specialists of
the long distance lines section who were already members of
the organized Resistance forces all over the country.
Plans subsequently were developed and carried out to brief Resist-
ance,leaders as to their part in these over-all plans of D-day action
in some cases by exfiltrating them from France to England by small
aircraft, and in others by parachuting special liaison officers to
them who could brief them in their assignments. The plan also pro-
vided for careful reconnaissance of assigned areas for specific targets
by the Resistance leaders and their exfiltration to England to work
out detailed plans for their actual operations on the ground, to be
modified by radio approval later as German troop units changed locations
and other factors of the situation changed. One of the most touchy
problems involved in the planning was the system of sending alert
and action signals to the Resistance forces in the field on an
arrangement by which no saboteur or other member of the Resistance
forces could know in advance the datefor the invasion. It was recog-
nized that should the Gestapo arrest any member of a net who had such
information, the Gestapo's efficient methods of torture could extract
it from the most obstinate human. The plan worked out consisted of
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sending signals by the BBC propaganda broadcasts beamed to France
in the form of simple code phrases, such as "La rose est rouge",
which meant that the groups who were to hit targets indicated by the
signals were to stand by and listen each night for the following
ten nights. During this time, the signal might be repeated again,
which started a new time period of ten days. This might be repeated
numerous times, or the ten days might pass without any repetition
of the alert, or without giving the action signal. However, during
any of these ten-day periods, the action signal, another simple
phrase, might be given. This meant that within whatever time limit
the plan for the group provided -- 24+ or 48 hours -- the group was
to carry out its D-day attacks on assigned targets.
The operational plans for France and low countries after D-day
were simply to continue the same kind of operations, with modifications
to be worked out by the coordinating efforts of the SF Detachments
attached to the military formations and SFHQ as the changing situation
required.
It should be realized that the above three plans were the main
over-all plans for D-day support. There were many others complementary
or subsidiary to them, including separate plans for the use of special
teams, special airborne units of substantial size for special coup de
main missions, plans for diversionary activities in Norway and Denmark,
deception cover planning for the French Resistance to assist in the
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deception as to the location of beach areas to be used for the
invasion, plans for accelerated air lift of supplies to resistance
forces, etc. Plans closely coordinated with the OSS and SOE forces
in the Mediterranean Theater were worked out in detail as to spheres
of responsibility for support of Resistance Forces in southern France,
and. for phasing the changes. of responsibility from SFHQ in London
to SPOC, the joint SOE/SO headquarters for AFHQ,in the MEDTO (or SACMED),
as the date for the invasion of southern France approached. (Operation
"Anvil" or "Dragoon".)
D. Planning for operations in Germany
During the entire period from the creation of the SO Branch in
the ETO until September 1944, the SO Branch and its partner were
entirely preoccupied with planning for operations in France and the
Low Countries. Absolutely no consideration had been given to the
possibility of conducting clandestine operations in Germany itself.
The unexpected speed with which France.and the Low Countries were
liberated after the breaching of the beach-head line brought to focus
the need for immediate planning for Germany. Although there were
some fairly reliable intelligence reports of some developments of
resistance inside Germany itself, it was realized that the German
internal security forces and the intense national spirit of the
German population made it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to
develop any effective clandestine organization within the boundaries
of the Reich. It was obvious, therefore, that any sabotage or
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guerrilla activities that were to be.carried on would have to be
short-range ones by agents or groups recruited for the purpose on
the Allied side of the combat areas, trained, briefed, and dispatched
by air, who would hit their targets and get out by exfiltration, or
go into hiding until overrun.
Does anyone want more of an explanation of "short-range" sabotage
or guerrilla attacks?
These kinds of operations did not require the close partnership
between the British SOE and the SO Branch that operations in France
and the Low Countries did. Each organization could carry on these
types of operations in the zone of its own army groups without much
chance of crossing of lines or conflicts between sabotage or guerrilla
groups. Therefore, the SO Branch planning officers were withdrawn
from SFEQ and formed a Planning Section for the SO Branch at OSS
main headquarters in London. Coordination was maintained with the
SOE as necessary, each keeping the other fairly closely advised as
to operations being planned.
The remaining months of the war were devoted to consideration
of one plan after another for the type of operations described above,
all of which were scrubbed because of the "impossibility" of finding
personnel capable of performing the missions. Among the groups or
types of persons considered for recruitment and/or briefing and
dispatch were members of an organization of Communists in France of
German birth who had been members of the International Brigade
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in the Spanish Civil War (organization named "Calpo", Comite
Allemagne Libre pour l'Ouest);'German PW's; foreign conscripted
labor in Germany, to be organized by teams of American German-
speaking SO officers to be parachuted in and supplied by air; any
indigenous German resistance that could be spotted and 'organized
by such teams.
In the meantime, the SF (Army Staff) detachments that had been
attached to 12th Army and First, Third and Ninth Army headquarters
had been released back to OSS, and had been replaced at each of these
headquarters by OSS Field Detachments of small size composed of
officers representing all the operational branches of OSS working
together. These detachments actually went ahead and developed
successful short-range tactical espionage operations using German
PW's who were carefully screened and selected. There was such poor
coordination between these field detachments and OSS London Head-
quarters that no support of. any kind came from London Headquarters
despite many requests from the Field Detachments. The latter had
to scrounge signal, logistic, financial and air lift support through
Army channels for themselves.
The picture is clear that London was planning in an entirely
fruitless manner, and the Field Detachments were operating entirely
without headquarters support.
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E. Plans Coordinated with Naval and Air Forces
Two additional aspects of planning prior to D-day for operations
both on D-day and later need* emphasis. Plans were developed for a
program of sabotage of naval and merchant marine vessels and facilities
particularly in Norwegian waters, and for some French ports. OSS had
a Maritime Unit branch which was the channel for coordination with
the Navy, and for procurement of small craft and equipment. The
25X1X8 British SOE had its own research center which developed clever one-man
submersible craft and other special equipment for such operations.
~.._ Also, through close coordination with the RAF and USAF, plans
for an operation known as "BLACKMAIL" were developed. Under this
plan, when an industrial target in France or the Low Countries had
been selected, and it was decided that aerial bombing of the target
risked heavy casualties to French or other friendly civilians, or it
was desired to stop production in the plant without great destruction,
an officer of a sabotage group was instructed to call on the head of
the industry. He would inform the industrialist that his plant had
been selected for destruction by bombing, but offer to have the bombing
canceled if the man would agree to the proper sabotage of his own
plant, and give aid in selecting key or vital spots for the sabotage.
If the victim questioned the agent's bona fides, the latter suggested
that the industrialist select any phrase he would like as a test and
the night he would like to have it broadcast over BBC. It was made
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clear that the industrialist had no other choice. If he did not
agree, or iftiie agent was not heard from by his headquarters, the
bombing would take place as scheduled. The plan was effective. After
one or two collaborators had refused to play, their plants had been
totally destroyed, and the word was spread by Resistance forces by
the rumor pipe-line, excellent cooperation with good results were
achieved in a large number of such operations. It should be under-
stood that these were industrial targets selected on the basis that
to stop their production was a direct and essential support to planned
military operations.
Other planning involving close coordination with the Air Forces
was essential in connection with Plans Vert and Tortue for retarda-
tion purposes. Questions arose in target selection as to what rail
and highway bridges should be designated Air Force bombing targets,
and which should be left to saboteurs. In general, large bridges,
normally considered.key bridges, were assigned to Air Force. Such
bridges normally had strong army guard units which were too strong
and heavily armed for Resistance units to attack. Consideration was
given also to preserving bridges as our forces advanced. Plans
provided for this that only those bridges prepared by Nazi forces
for demolition would be destroyed. In some cases, Resistance forces
were directed to try to preserve key bridges by disconnecting demoli-
tion charges or replacing them with dummy charges.
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F. General Problems. of Planning
It is interesting to note that the directive for all plans
developed for clandestine operations in support of military operations
came from SHAEF. However, the SHAEF directive resulted from the
closest kind. of liaison between SFHQ and SHAEF G-3. It probably is
safe to assume, therefore, that the directive included nothing beyond
the capabilities of existing Resistance forces or of forces which
reasonably could be developed by the time the support was to be given.
During the first months of war planning, the planning staff
officers had no knowledge of the specific plans for military operations
that were being developed. However, the SFHQ war planners were pri-
marily concerned then with determining what kind of support clandestine
forces could give military forces, haw such clandestine forces could-
be controlled best, and what organizational structure was necessary
to control the clandestine forces and advise military commanders.
Therefore, the lack of knowledge of military plans was relatively
insignificant. After this preliminary part of planning was accomplished,
however, it became apparent that to continue war planning further it
was essential that the staff officers concerned had to have some
knowledge of the military operations being planned; otherwise, they
would have been doing their planning in a vacuum. So it was that
several months before D-day, the top command and planning staff
echelons of SFHQ were given sufficient information about the planning
of Operation OVERLORD so that they could begin the plans of specific
clandestine operations to support the military operations being planned.
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SUB-SUMMARY
Matters which control or affect the development of plans for clan-
destine paramilitary operations in support of conventional military
operations which can be determined from the experience of the SO Branch
of OSS include the following:
l.. The mission or missions to be accomplished by the clandestine
forces must be determined and stated by the commander of the
military forces to be supported. However, he normally will need
advice from the staff officers concerned with planning the clan-
~T
destine operations as to the capabilities and limitationsnkveI
of the clandestine forces to insure that no mission beyond the
capabilities of existing forces is assigned, or to insure that
the mission does not require the build-up of Resistance forces
beyond the capability of the agency responsible for, building up
and organizing such forces. The planners of clandestine operations
obviously must be informed of the military operations planned to,
be able to plan clandestine support for the military operations.
2. The staff off icers planning such clandestine support must have
a good general understanding of clandestine paramilitary operations,
their capabilities and the limitations thereof. Normally,
security compartmentation within the agency responsible for
organizing and controlling such forces will prevent such staff
officers from having detailed knowledge of specific organizations
in specific areas. Staff officers must obtain information of
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III
 capabilities from the controlling or directing headquarters
operating personnel by the closest coordination with such
personnel. This actually was done by the SFHQ planners, who
coordinated most closely with the country desks actually direct-
ing and controlling operations of the forces in the field.
3. Development of effective plans for such support by clandestine
paramilitary forces in a friendly country occupied by a hostile
power is possible regardless how effective and efficient the
hostile security forces may be. It takes a long period of time
to organize the clandestine forces into an effective organization.
However, the picture is exactly the reverse when consideration
is given to developing, organizing and controlling such forces
inside a hostile power openly at war with our nation.. The very
factors which make the task possible in the friendly country
occupied by a hostile power, i.e., national spirit or patriotism,
resentment against the hostile power, the difficulties of the
hostile power in maintaining powerful internal security forces
at home and in the occupied area at the same time, etc., militate
against such developments inside the hostile power itself, re-
gardless how many dissident or opposition groups there may have
been in the country prior to the outbreak of hostilities.
Development of effective plans for support of military operations
in hostile countries, therefore, depending as.they must on the
ability of the operators to develop effective resistance forces
in the countries, is an extremely difficult matter. As a result
of the capabilities and actions of hostile security forces and
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the resulting security factors in maintaining secure clandestine
paramilitary forces, staff officer's must always emphasize in
advising commanders that the latter can never rely on clandestine
forces to produce and act as they rely on their own forces
because there are too many factors affecting the existence of
resistance forces beyond the control of the agency responsible
for them; that the success of a military operation must never
depend on clandestine operational support; that any support
given by clandestine forces must be considered pure "gravy" --
a bonus force additional to the commander's own.
4. At all times during the war planning at SFHQ, great care was
exercised to insure that in the conduct of sabotage and guerrilla
operations prior to D-day, no operations were planned that would
unduly expose the groups to the Nazi internal security forces.
In other words, only operations consistent with maintaining a
high degree of security were ordered. To have done otherwise
would have meant, in all probability, that on D-day, no effective
resistance organization would have been in existence to give
support to the military operations. This illustrates a principle
that must be paramount in the minds of all war planners at all
times: Are the operations that are being planned for Resistance
forces consistent with the maintenance of the degree of security
that will permit the forces to continue to exist to fight
another day.
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PRINCIPLES:
1. The general mission of clandestine support for military operations
must come from the military commander. The clandestine war
planners must have knowledge of as much of the plan for military
operations as is necessary for them to plan intelligently specific
clandestine operations to support such military operations.
2. War plans staff officers must have a good general understanding
of clandestine operations and.the limitations thereof. Because
of security considerations, information of detailed capabilities
of existing clandestine forces which will form the basis of
plans for clandestine support of military operations must-come
from the headquarters operating personnel.
3. Because of security and control problems, support of military
operations by clandestine forces must be considered as a bonus.
War plans staff officers must always advise against making
military operational plans which rely on the support of clandestine
forces to determine the success or failure of the military action.
4+. War planners, in estimating the clandestine situation and planning
operations, must always weigh such operations in terms of the
security hazards they impose on the clandestine forces, and
remember that the clandestine force which does not maintain
security ceases to be a force of any kind.
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V ORGANIZATION FOR COORDINATION AT ARMY GROUP AND ARMY HEADQUARTERS LEVEL
OF PLANS FOR CLANDESTINE SUPPORT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS.
25X1X8
A.' Reason for Creation of "Army Staff Detachments" and their Organization
During the early part of the war planning, it was realized that
in order that SO activities might best assist the military forces
-- units from SO should be attached to the staffs of the field armies
to work in close conjunction with the operational and intelligence
divisions of the army staffs and to maintain liaison between the armies
and resistance groups behind the enemy lines through SFHQ in London".
The theory of operations was that "moving forward with the advancing
armies these SO staff units would be informed of the plans and require-
ments of the army commanders and would inform the commanders of the
capabilities of resistance groups to assist military operations. The
SO staff units would be able to make quick contact with members of
resistance groups overrun by the advancing armies and obtain from
them information of resistance groups still behind enemy lines and of
the vulnerabilities of the enemy to resistance group operations".
Accordingly, in January 194 4., G-3,.SHAEF, alerted headquarters of
First (later 12th) Army Group and First, Third and Ninth Armies,
that they could expect later to have attached to their G-3 Sections
"SF Detachments" which would act as a "source of general and specific
information for over-all plans for use of Resistance Groups as the
development of the reoccupation of the Continent took place".
SOE furnished exactly similar SF Detachments to British Army
Group and Army headquarters.
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Each of these detachments had three sections: An Operations,
an Intelligence, and a Counter-Intelligence Section. The detachments
themselves were not to be in direct communication with Resistance
Groups on the enemy side of the combat lines, but were to direct
requests for operations to be carried out by Resistance Groups
direct to SFHQ in London via their own independent signal communica-
tion facilities, which went through the same radio communication.
facilities in England used for communication with agent and group
personnel in the field. Accordingly, each of the OSS/SF Detachments
had its own mobile radio signal unit, furnished by the Communications
Branch of OSS. SFHQ would consolidate operational requests, determine
priorities in light of orders also coming from SHAEF, and send orders.
to the field.
Each detachment was furnished a "Kardex" file listing every
group and its officers known to SFHQ, operations which each group
had conducted, the group's location, its state of armament and other
pertinent information. As soon as these files were furnished to the
detachments,. and prior to D-day as well as after, SFHQ began furnish-
ing to the detachments immediately the latest situation reports
concerning the groups, which the Intelligence Sections of the detach-
ments posted in the Kardex, keeping them up to date. The duty of
the Operations Section was to keep informed as to each group, to attend
the daily staff meeting at the headquarters to which attached, and be
prepared to advise the commander as to the capability of Resistance
Forces to carry out operations desired; then to work out plans for
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support as desired by the commander for transmission to SFEQ as
requests. The.Counter-intelligence Section had the staff duty of
keeping informed as to the security status of all groups, making
estimates based on the situation reports received from SFEQ and on
interrogations of overrun group members, and advising the detachment
commander and the operations section personnel accordingly. They
had the operational duty, in addition, of contacting overrun Resistance
personnel, identifying them to prevent the use of Resistance cover
by enemy forces to plant agents, interrogating them,for intelligence
or CI information and disseminating such information through proper
channels, and then either to turn over such personnel to the Operations
Section if any operational missions of a"line-crossing" nature were
planned for them, or of disposing of them by arranging air lift back
to England. Experience in the field by the CI Sections demonstrated
the need for authority and funds to set up "safe houses" near the
headquarters to which the Detachments were attached where overrun
agent personnel could be housed, messed and interrogated under proper
security safeguards.
B. Results Achieved by SF Detachments in France
Except for the last mentioned item, the above outline states
the plan of operation of the detachments in advance of actual experience
in the field. In all probability, had the military operations in
France proceeded more in accordance with the expected speed, the plan
would have worked fairly well. There never was an opportunity to give
the plan a fair trial for the following reasons:
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1. The original beach-head area was one that had been
"written off" by SFHQ so far as organized-sabotage or guerrilla
forces were concerned, for the reason that the Nazi forces
were so thick on the ground in all beach areas it was felt
impossible successfully to infiltrate agents into such areas
to organize the local or indigenous resistance elements, and
to carry out executive type operations on any scale commen-
surate with the risks involved. The result was that when
the SF Detachment with First U.S. Army was landed on the beach,
about D/3, and the CI Section personnel began interviewing
French civilians, they learned that there were large numbers
of French who had set up their own limited organization, tied
in with the Free French Resistance controlled by SFHQ, but
these people had never got weapons, ammunitions, or other
supplies, had no direct radio communication with England,
and had engaged for the most part in clandestine intelligence
information gathering for which they had not had special
training. They had been further handicapped by a lack of
-rapid means of reporting same, having to exfiltrate it to
the interior where resistance forces did have communications
with SFHQ in England. During the first days in the beach-head
area, and while combat remained fairly fluid, these people
claimed (and proved) an ability to get through the combat
lines with ease. They volunteered to go through the lines to
contact members of their organizations not yet overrun, to
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brief them on intelligence targets to. look for and start
them working through the combat lines to the Allied area
bringing such information. A system for this type of tactical
intelligence information gathering was worked out.and put into
operation, with officers from the SF Detachment going forward
to Corps and Division headquarters to handle such missions.'
No effort was made at any time to work out the long-range
strategic operational plans to impede the movement of Nazi
reserve divisions by rail or highway sabotage at Army head-
quarters. General Bradley did make a request very early to
have resistance forces near the combat areas carry out wide-
spread cutting of telecommunications means to force Nazi
communications to-take to the air via radio, which would
give an opportunity to Army Signal Security Detachments to
intercept and decipher. This was strictly a tactical operation
in a relatively small area. Once the beach-head line became
solidly established and mobile or fluid warfare (as distinguished
from static) ceased, the line crossing operations came
virtually to a standstill.
2. The greatest single factor militating'against the use of the
SF Detachments in the manner planned, however, is stated in
the War Diary as follows: "The general conception of the
function of an SF Detachment was that it would serve as a
liaison between the field forces and SFHQ in London for the
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planning and execution of strategic missions by resistance
groups behind the enemy lines. Just as soon as the staff
was established with the field forces in Normandy, it became
apparent that the army commanders expected to use these staffs
for close-in tactical work without reference to SFHQ. Every
corps, every division, in fact all front line units were
confronted with the problem of what to do with Frenchmen
they overran in the course of battle. Many of these Frenchmen
came up and introduced themselves as resistance workers able
and willing to carry out short-range missions involving infil-
tration through the enemy lines. While the combat forces
were interested in interference with enemy communications
and other typical SO missions, they were far more interested
in obtaining intelligencnformation of the enemy, by the
use of these resistance workers who were all so closely tied
in to SOE/SO." In other words, the army commanders failed to
understand the real capabilities of the SF Detachments and the
major contribution they offered in support of the military
operations.
After the beach-head line finally was ruptured,.the Allied
advance was so rapid and so unpredictable that in those
instances where efforts were made to use the services of SF
Detachments in the manner planned, missions planned nearly
always were aborted because of the rapid Allied advance, or,
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where carried out, had little chance to accomplish anything
because by the time orders were sent to the field via the
communications facilities in the U.K., and the field forces
organized to carry out the mission, Allied forces had arrived
in the area where the mission was laid on.
C. Change in Organization of Field Units Accompanying Formations
in Germany.
During the operations in France, Belgium and Holland, where
resistance forces were highly organized and large in number, it had
been felt necessary to furnish to Army Group and Armor headquarters
the separate SF Detachments for the exclusive purpose of coordinating
resistance operations to give support to military operations. Other
branches of OSS, such as the Secret Intelligence (SI) and Special
Counter-Intelligence (X-2), furnished separate detachments to the
G-2 Sections at each of such headquarters. But in Germany, where
there was no organized resistance controlled by OSS, there was no
need for. such a large amount of personnel as represented previously
by the separate detachments. Further, operations in Germany were
limited almost entirely to short-range tactical espionage missions.
To plan and conduct all operational missions, OSS withdrew the.
original detachments, and replaced them with small joint missions
having officers qualified to carry out'such functions'regardless
of which type of mission was desired.
SUB-SUMMARY :
1. In areas where resistance forces are large and well organized,
military formations need small staff units of specialists who
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know the field of clandestine sabotage and guerrilla. operations
to coordinate plans for clandestine operations in support of
military operations as the military situation develops and
changes. The staff units should include sections charged with
the responsibility for the physical and security control of
resistance personnel overrun eetrrun and picked up or otherwise
coming into the staff's headquarters. Where the operations are
in such areas, it is probable that best results will be achieved
by having separate staff detachments representing the two major
operational branches of the clandestine services; that is,
resistance type activities, and espionage and counter-espionage.
2. In areas where resistance forces are small or non-existent
and the clandestine resistance organization can contribute nothing
more than short-range coup de main or tactical sabotage or guerrilla
attacks, best results appear to be achieved by the furnishing of
small joint staff units composed of representatives of all
operational branches concerned. Such staffs can work out the
plans for and conduct short-range operational missions by infii
3.
trations through the lines, beach landings, parachute drops, etc.
The staffs should be augmented with personnel qualified to provide
secure holding and training facilities for the agent personnel
to be used on such missions.
Considerations must be given to providing Air Force and Navy
headquarters with qualified staff personnel for planning operations
to meet the special requirements of such forces.
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ecurI v a inn
VI LESSONS LEARNED
1. Officers furnished by a clandestine service to plan support for
military operations must have a sound general knowledge of the clan-
destine forces concerned.
2. Close coordination must take place between allied clandestine services
planning clandestine resistance support for allied military operations
in any area where resistance forces developed by those services are
strong.
3. Such coordination is not necessary for support furnished by espionage
forces.
~+. War planning staff officers furnished by a clandestine service to U.S.
military headquarters must educate military personnel to understand:
a. The character of support clandestine. resistance forces can give
to military operations.
b. That the primary responsibility of the clandestine service is
strategic in nature.
5. The need of military forces, particularly army at army.group., field
army and lower echelon headquartersj,'.for tactical support by clandestine
forces cannot be ignored,, but must be given as a secondary mission.
6. Support of military operations by resistance forces must not be planned
which will prevent such forces from maintaining a reasonable degree of
security; otherwise, there will soon be no resistance forces to give
support.
7. Plans for clandestine operational support of military operations must
be limited to those capable of being supported logistically by the
military forces.
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