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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03362A000500160003-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 75
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2000
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: October 20, 1952
• Content Type: SPEECH

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TAB
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I. INTRODUCTION TO THE USSR
(1) As you will note, this lecture is concerned with the introduction
to the USSR. More particularly, it will be concerned with the period ex-
tending from 1904-05 to 1941. Now why do we select this particular period?
First of all, the limit of time, two hours, precludes the possibility of
covering the-whole sweep of Russian history; second, this period from 1904
onward to 194.1 is of particular interest to us since this is the time of
change and growth which points definitely toward the system which prevails
in Russia today. The fact that we have all lived through the period from
1941-1952 and are reasonably familiar with it encourages us in the belief
that in selecting we need not overemphasize this later period.
Concerning note-taking: I would advise not trying to take down every-
thing that is said; however, there are certain areas which, I believe you
will note, are of distinct importance. You will be able to select as a
result of the emphasis placed on those areas.
The material here presented will be, for some, comparatively new; for
others it will be familiar but will, perhaps, be valuable as a refresher
of memory in this phase of history.
(2) I should like to point out four reference works which are basic and
well known. First, I suggest A History of Russia, by the famous British
historian Fares (Bernard); second, I suggest A History of Russia by
Vernadsky, a good basic work which, because it is done in slightly less
detail than that of Pares, is somewhat easier to read. One will find in
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Isaac Deutcher's Stalin, A Political Biography, an extremely interesting
and valuable discussion of Russian history as it evolved around the present
Soviet leader. Also, of very real value is 'Russia in Flux", by Sir John
Maynard, 1951.
II. RUSSIA - A LAND OF EXTREMES
Physically
Political - Economic - Social
Russians represent the most numerous of the European white peoples, but
Russia is the most backward of the European countries.
Her government has been continuously the most extreme type of aristo-
cratic autocracy; her natural resources and economic life are comparatively
undeveloped and three-quarters of her population are unable to read. (In
1941)
(1) Physically
To the hardships of tyrannical government have been added those of
severe extremes of climate, frequent droughts, and uncontrolled floods.
Moreover, a vast isolation has oppressed Russia. She has been out off
from easy communication with the Western world and its influences; and
within her over-vast boundaries, enormous distances and inadequate means
of communication have kept her peoples separated in small and isolated
communities, whose interests centered in themselves, rather than in the
nation as a whole.
Despite its vast extent, as late as 1939, Soviet Russia had less
than 50,000 miles of railroad (about 1/5 the mileage of the United States).
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This very isolation, however, made it all the more necessary that Russia
should continue to be a political unit, and that the individualistic tenden-
cies of her different provinces and social groups should give way to a
recognition of their neutral interdependence, and that all should act together
for the preservation of the nation as a whole.
The notorious reports of Russia's political institutions have led people
to overlook the real spirit of Russia and to accept many erroneous and some-
times contradictory statements about her. She has been called the "Russian
Riddle," and people have unthinkingly regarded her as a nation that could
not be understood. The character of her historic development, and the
nature of the tasks which from the first confronted her, account in large
measure for Russia's peculiarities.
(2) Races:
A branch of the Slavic people, who later came to be known as the Russians,
settled on the western fringe of the East European plain, and gradually moved
eastward, occupying and developing this vast stretch of inhospitable country
and passing over the contiguous continent of Asia, finally reached the
Pacific. This task of empire building took many centuries and was all-
absorbing. In the process of accomplishing it, the strong tyrannized the
weaker, the clever over the ignorant, and the result was the practical en-
slavement of the great mass of the people, and the institution of a purely
autocratic government.
Next to the Slavs, the largest ethnic group is the Turco-Tatars
21,000,000. Dark-visaged and oblique-eyed. They are descendants of
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Her ports are few and inadequate.
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Genghis Than 'and Tamerlane's warriors. They include the Crimean and Kazan
Tartars and Azerbaidzhanians of the Transcaucasus.
Olive - skinned JAPHETIC peoples
Mountains and highlands of the Caucasus and Transcaucas - 7,000,000
Several religions - including the Armenian Christians
Includes the primitive KHEVSURS, descended from a lost band of Crusaders
until recently wore medieval helmets.
Chain armor, and white Frankish crosses - also - the gay, wine-drinking
Georgians - most famous is Joseph Stalin.
5,000,000 FINNO-UGRIANS - closely related to the Hungarians and Turks.
Includes - Estonians, Finns, Karelians.
Over 5,000,000 Jews
Also - Latvians, Lithuanians, Moldavians, Germans, Iranians, Mongols.
Several hundred Negroes.
Nomadic Siberian peoples - same origin as the Eskimo and North American
Indian.
The gaining of new territory was the chief aim of the first rulers, and
little thought was given to the improvement of conditions of life within the
borders of the empire. The vast plain must have its seaboards, and they
must be wrested from other countries. Western neighbors, fearing the young
giant country which was growing up on their borders, constantly harassed it,
and when it defended itself complained that it was trying to ruin all its
neighbors. But still Russia grew and stengthened itself economically and
politically.
Tartar Conquest
We know little about these early Russian settlers untilrvbh
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 EN T I A L
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A. D. By that time, they were settled in separate principalities on the
DNIEFER and the VOLKHOF rivers, which together formed one of the most im-
portant trade routes of the world of that day. These separate groups ac-
cepted the leadership of the Grand Prince of KIEV, which was a beautiful
and progressive city comparing favorably with the cities of Western Europe
of that period. The Russians had adopted Greek christianity from the East-
ern Church of Byzantium and culture was beginning to develop in the primi-
tive community. But Western Slavs are Roman Catholic!
But in the 13th century the Russian principalities were overrun by
Mongolian hordes of Tartars who came in from the East. The Russians were
subjugated and forced to pay tribute to the Khan of the "Golden Horde" of
Tartars. For almost 300 years the Tartar yoke rested upon the Russian
people, and then, under the leadership of the Prince of Moscow, they
liberated themselves. This new leader became the 'Grand Prince" of Mus-
covy. He welded together the scattered Russian lands, proclaimed himself
the Czar of all the Russians and set out to establish his empire.
Time of Troubles
(1) At the beginning of the 17th century, Russia passed through what
is called her "Time of Troubles".
(2) Economic distress caused by constant wars had led to the breaking
down of all authority - anarchy prevailed.
(3) Jealous neighbors on the west - Poland and Sweden - tried to take
advantage of this situation and to finish off the sick and troubled country.
But again a national awakening came, with the accession of Michael
ROMANOFF (1613 - 1645) - founder of the Romanoff line and the "foreigners"
CFA
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were driven out of public affairs.
Beginnings of Modern State
(1) Peter the Great (1689 -1725) contemporary of Louis XIV (Reigned
1643 - 1715)
With Peter begins the modern period of Russian history.
Ability - ruthlessness
Wanted his country to be more European - and tried by force and
compulsion
Long and difficult wars - terrible loss of life and property
Tried to get outlets to the sea
(A) Set up administrative machinery
(B) Modern army
(C) Forced education on the Court
(D) Universal military service or universal labor service
building canals, factories on his new capital at St.
Peterburg (Petrograd - Leningrad)
(2)
(3)
Catherine the Great (1762-1796)
By 1800 Russia had become a modern state - internal developments,
education, means of communication.
A "racket"
Formalism and dogma
Priests and officials - worldly grafters (cf. "France Up to 1789"
Voltaire.)
Byzantine culture
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Superimposed on a tribal state of civilization not developed from the
people up - as Western Europe - an extraordinary phenomenon.
Reforms and the Reaction
(1) Peasants had been serfs or unfree laborers. They were not slaves
but they were not free, being'attached to the soil" and to the individual
landlords.
(2) ALEXANDER I (1801 - 1825) had very radical ideas of reform - he
had already commenced to carry out his reform programs when Russia became
involved in the Napoleonic Wars. During these wars reform was abandoned.
Both Alexander I and his successor Nicholas I (1825 - 1855) were driven
into a panic by the development of the revolutions in Europe - they soon
turned their attention to protecting Russia against what they considered
the corrupting and perverting "western" ideas. All interest in the
emancipation of the serfs was suppressed as revolutionary, and even dis-
cussion of it was forbidden. For 40 years - 1815-1855 - Russia made little
progress.
In 1853, Russia became involved in the Crimean War - a war originally
with Turkey - France, England, Sardinia also came in. Russia, badly de-
feated, the government proved incompetent and corrupt. The people were
angry--many peasant serfs rose against their landowners--burned and pil-
laged estates. The revolt soon assumed threatening proportions.
Before the war was over, a new monarch, Alexander II (1855 - 1881) came
to the throne.
(A) He ended the war as quickly as possible.
(4) He announced that reform was the order of the day. He frankly
said that it would be better to have this measure carried out from above
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than to wait for it to be forced upon the government from below.
Reform of Alexander II (1855 - 1881)
(a) Lacked his father's firmness. Little experience in
administration but patient, cautious, and kind-hearted.
(b) Wanted to bring Russian institutions into closer harmony
with the progressive and humanitarian spirit of the 19th
Century.
(c) Alexander II decided not to weary of reform as had his
uncle, Alexander I.
(C) Emancipation of the serfs.
(1)
Jan. 1861
(2) 40,000,000 Russian serfs
(3)
(4)
To visit a rural Russian community in 1850 was like stepping
back into the Middle Ages.
9/10 of land was held by less than 100,000 noble families.
(5) Serfs - attached to the soil. Could be sold with the estates
to new landlords. Flogged cruelly for slight faults.
Interfered with in private affairs and family relations.
A serf could not marry without his master's consent. He could not
leave the estate, if he did, he was punished.
Nobles declined to modify the system voluntarily, so Alexander II,
after careful consideration, issued a ukase, abolishing serfdom - 1861.
Further decrees - 1863 -1866 - Serfs became free citizens - retained
their cottages, tools, and sufficient land to maintain themselves.
Aristocrats ceded part of their estates to the community village
or peasants Mir - were promised compensation in return.
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Results
(1) Nobles complained bitterly.
(2) Peasants also dissatisfied. Land apportioned to the 1 was often
infertile. Actually not freed - government expected them to pay
off by a special 'redemption tax" the enormous sums expended to
reimburse the landlords. The serf - to get his land and liberty -
had to make annual payments for 49 years.
(3) Larger crops
(4) Increased acreage under tillage.
(5) Better living conditions.
(6) Rise in trade. This act was the most important in Russia in the
19th Century.
Millions of new citizens created, set up ZEMSTVOS, or district assemblies,
to train the people in self-government. The Zems v s were comprised of dele-
gates representing landlords, townsfolk, peasants. Each Zemstvo was a local
parliament - responsible for roads, schools, churches, jails. Could levy
taxes for local purposes. Excellent in theory - poor in practice.
Judicial Reforms
(1) 1362 - Czar decreed a court system modeled on that of the Western
nations.
(2) Local justices of the peace.
(3) District courts
(4) High court of final appeal.
(5) Trial by jury - open to the public.
But the great ignorance of the masses allowed the old corruption and
graft to continue.
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Also - Alexander was inconsistent. He allowed the infamous "Third
Section" and the secret police tribunals organized by his father to punish
political offenders.
Accomplishments
(1) Sketched a plan for public school education - elementary up to
and including college at State expense.
(2) Relaxed the strict censorship of the press - permitted Russians
to travel abroad freely.
Criticized on all sides - Conservatives - "He is too radical."
Radicals - "He is too conservative."
Fatalism of MUZHIK - Cholera epidemic - was urged to boil his drinking
water - "If God wishes us to drink hot water, He would have heated the Neva."
Long years of tyranny and lack of progress produced discontent - partic-
ularly among the university-educated younger people (there were now eight
large universities in Russia.)
A small group of such revolutionaries tried to organize an uprising of
the recently-emancipated serfs.
The isolated, suspicious, and uneducated peasants did not respond. But
the Government was aroused - more hostile to reform. When an attempt was
made on the life of the Czar by an individual acting "on his own" - the anti-
reform leaders completely prevailed.
Under their influence Alexander~II curtailed many of the reforms already
started. Such repression bred more revolutionary sentiment; soon the Govern-
ment was fully engaged in the suppression of revolutionary agitation to the
neglect of the deeper welfare of the people.
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Reaction set in against Alexander II
(1) Polish uprising of 1863
(A) Dreamed of national independence.
(B) Crushed by superior Russian forces.
(C) Leaders executed or exiled. Their land sequestered.
(D) Russian became the official language.
(E) Catholic church in Poland lost much land.
(Russia supported North - 1861 - 1865)
(2) Attempt by a fanatic in 1866 to assassinate him - embittered.
(3) Began to steadily restrict the Zemstvos, law courts, newspapers,
schools.
(4) Police spies circulated among all ranks of society.
Even Count Leo Tolstoi (1828 - 1910) confessed that he felt surprise
each morning on awakening to find that he was not on the road to Siberia.
Russo - Turkish War 1877 - 78
Indicated once again the technical and organizational backwardness of
the empire as compared to the industrial west.
This unrest culminated in the assassination of Alexander II in 1881 by
a nitro-glycerin bomb hurled at his carriage.
During the reign of Czar Alexander II the revolutionary idea was chiefly
current among the "Raznochintsi", i.e., individuals of no definite class, a
mixture of different social classes. They rapidly formed a new social class,
the so-called intellectuals, which included also many members of the nobility.
The university students contributed the greatest number of radical and revo-
lutionary leaders. These leaders desired not: only political changes, but also
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a social revolution, despite the fact that the Russian industry was too un-
developed to supply a firm basis for socialism. As a result of this, the
radical intellectuals undertook first preparatory propaganda among the masses
of the Russian peasants. Many members of the Intellectuals went "V Narod"
("To the People"). This so-called Populist movement lasted from 1878-1884
and failed because of the peasants' aversion to innovations. After this
failure the Populists formed a secret terrorist society called "Narodnaya
Volya" (People's Will) and an inactive group under G. Plekhanov called "Black
Partition." The Executive Committee of "Narodnaya Volya" decided to bend
every effort upon assassinating the head of the government and so on Msr ch 1,
1881, Czar Alexander II, the Emancipator, was killed by a bomb on the very
day when he signed the UKASE calling for Representative Committees to advise
the State Council on the Constitution drawn up by Boris Melikov, the Minister
of Interior and a liberal.
Under Czar Alexander III, all attempts at political conspiracies were
mercilessly crushed by the police. In order to grant the police greater free-
dom many provinces of Russia were declared in a state of special protection.
This enabled the administration to suspend the normal laws of procedure with
respect to political prisoners and to crush the Populist secret organization.
The Populist ideas were taken up later on by the Social Revolutionary Party
(S.R.).
After their defeat in the revolution of 1825, the Russian liberals sup-
ported by the landed gentry went into the local self-governments Zemstvos
and towns. The goal was an elective representation and the institution of
a parliament in order to complete the unfinished reforms. This political
movement culminated in 1905 in the formation of the Constitutional Democra-
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tic Party,: identified with such idealistic-minded gentry as Prince Lvov,
Miliukov and others.
The revolutionary movement among the workers was slow to start due to
the fact that the Russian workers were connected with the peasantry. After
the emancipation of 1861 they were in fact still peasants temporarily engaged
in factory work. This partly explains the psychology of the Russian worker,
who had little interest in his occupation or his factory. The worker almost
always could, if he wished, return to his village where he could secure an al-
lotment of land. In order to keep the workers with the factories, they were
kept constantly in debt by fines and a general fund for pensions. There was
not enough native capital available and the influx, of foreign loans created
an inflation. The workers were exploited to the maximum of 12 to lg hours
a day. The Populist were the first to help the workers to figure out their
problems. It was against the P?pulist theory to concentrate their activities
on the workers and when the workers did solve their problems by themselves
the intelligentsia was surprised. The first revolutionary workers' organ-
ization appeared in 1875 in Odessa under the name of "The Russian Southern
Alliance." Its leader Zaslavskii and others were soon arrested by the police.
In 1878 another labor movement was started by Stefan Khalturin and Obnorsky
in St. Petersburg called the "Northern Alliance of Workingmen." This was the
first independent organization of a defensive character from which intelldct-
uals were formally excluded. Its central demand was for formal political re-
form as a necessary step to the further advance of the labor movement. The
"Northern Alliance of Workingmen" is also considered the birthplace of the
Social Democratic Party, which gave birth later to the Communist Party.
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Marxism in Russia
A. It was along ,journey from pure Populism to the view of orthodox
Marxism. The first document pointing out the change was the program of
"The North Russian Society of Land and Liberty" published in 1880. It
advocated socialistic propaganda of purer principles among the workingmen
and the minority of peasants and a terroristic political struggle. A more
thorough reconstruction of the theory was undertaken in 1883 in Switzer-
land by some former revolutionary populists like G. Plekhanov, P. Axelrod,
Vera Zasulich, L. Deich and V. Ignatov. Continuing the work of "The Northern
Alliance of Workingmen" they organized in Geneva "The Group for the Liberation
of. Labor." The leader of the group was G. Plekhanov. He is considered to be
the first one to start Marxism on Russian soil and during his career he did
a great deal for its propagation. Plekhanov worked hard for the development
and propaganda of the Marxian Philosophical Materialism and fought for it
against the subjective sociology of the Populists and against the West
European revisionists who were trying to reconcile with Kant. The emphasis
of this new party was shifted to the workers and so the spirit of Populism was
defeated leaving a solid theoretical foundation for a revolutionary proletarian
party. "The Group for the Liberation of Labor" organized Social Democratic
cells in many industrial centers of Russia which were suppressed by the police.
Gradually several independent labor groups were combined in big Social Demo-
cratic organizations called "Unions for the Liberation Struggle of the Workers'
Class." In 1895 "The Union of Russian Social Democrats" was formed in Switzer-
land. "The Group for the Liberation of Labor" was absorbed by this new organ-
ization and their common goal was the organization of a united Social Democra-
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tic Party, which was tried at the first Party Congress in Minsk, Russia
in 1898 and failed because of the interference by the police." The congress
at Minsk was the first concerted attempt to create a Russian Marxist party
on Russian soil."
B. 'Alex I was succeeded by his son Alexander III (1881-1894) who
simply continued his father's policy.
Meanwhile emancipation made no real progress.
The ZEMSTVOS continued to develop but too slowly.
The organization of a just administration of the law was practically
abandoned in favor of a return to arbitrary police methods of government.
Censorship of the press increased.
Nicholas II (1894-1917)
Limited outlook - though possibly a good and kindly intentions.
believed implicitly in the divine origin of his autocratic power and in its
necessity for the welfare of his country. He stopped all talk of coopera-
tion by calling petitions for very moderate changes "senseless dreams."
IV. Defeat in the Japanese War led to the DUMA
(1) 1904 - war declared over a dispute respecting rights in the Far East.
(2) War was not popular in Russia
Much corruption and inefficiency
(3). Terms of peace were most disadvantageous to ssia.
A factory laboring class, quite distinct from the peasants, had now arisen.
This group was organized for action by socialists and revolutionists.
Mutinies in army and fleet.
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Of especial significance are 1904-1905, the years of the Russo-Japanese
War, a clash between the Czarist troops and the Japanese. It was a war for
which Russia was not prepared and which they lost quite badly. They lacked
industry and they lacked communications essential for war. The Trans-Siberian
Railway, with its single line, was not constructed for heavy traffic, such
as guns; it also had a gap of 100 miles around the mountainous southern
slope of Lake Baikal; so that until April, troops and stores had to cross the
lake in sledges. The result of this was a bottleneck at this point which
materially slowed the progress of the Russian armies.
To be brief, the Russians ultimately took a bad defeat: on land at
Mukden and on sea when the fleet, directed by the Czar's orders, sailed out
of the Baltic into the North.tlantic to the South Atlantic, around the Cape
and into the South Pacific, to the North Pacific and eventually to the Straits
of Tsushima, where it was straightaway sunk by the Japanese. This ended the
Czar's naval action against the Japanese and was a decisive factor in en-
couraging the coming to terms at Portsmouth, N. H., where, under the aegis
of President Roosevelt, the Treaty of Portsmouth was signed.
During this long trip of the Baltic fleet a strange incident occurred
in the North Sea. Awakening at daybreak, Admiral Royhdestvensky came on
deck to find his ships surrounded by foreign craft. He immediately gave the
order to open fire. It was only because of the quick thinking of a subordinate
that the order was countermanded, thereby keeping a British fishing fleet fro4i
being blasted out of the water. Perhaps it is true, as rumored, that the
Y is iu. E ^ Y
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Admiral was drunk, and could thus be excused for mistaking English fishing boats
for the Japanese fleet.
At home during all this time discontent was growing and the defeat of
the Russians by the Japanese increased the trouble which grew into the first
Russian Revolution. This revolution was not typical. It was a series of
sporadic revolts which rose and fell like the tide. A very important event
occurred, however, on a day that is now labeled "Bloody Sunday."
Zubatov, an agent of the OKftANA, the Czar's secret police, had succeeded
in organizing the workers along purely economic lines (to keep them from
political activity) and was ordered by Plehve, Minister of Interior, to intro-
duce his system all over Russia. Following the assassination of Plehve and
the dismissal of Zubatov the workers' organizations continued to develop under
a new leader, Father Gapon, a priest in the Russian Orthodox church.
It was in connection with the workers' movement in St. Petersburg
that the important event occurred on 22 January 1905, a Sunday. At that
time Father Gapon led a few thousand workers to the Winter Palace, the
Czar's winter quarters, in which, incidentally, he was not present at the
time. The workers were unarmed and came merely to petition the Czar to
effect reforms. However, the Czarist troops fired on them, killing a number
of people. The figures ranged from sixty to something in excess of a. thousand,
depending on the political complexion of the person who reports them.
The affair had an electrifyinneffect and resulted in the alliance of
the workers with the socialist working-class parties and a hardening of their
feelings toward the ezar.
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In the middle of the tide of revolution in 1905 the Bolsheviks called
.their Third Congress. The Mensheviks refused to attend. Eventually I shall
clarify two terms: Bolshevik, which literally means 'majority men" and the
Menseviks,"minority men."
We should insert here a few facts. The Social Democratic Labor Party
was organized in 1898 on the model of the German Social Democratic Party,
which followed the teachings of Karl Marx. They were primarily interested
in getting in touch with the workers.
At the convention in 1903, the Social Democratic Party split into two
groups. The radical group, subsequently known as Bolsheviks, sought to
realize a social revolution in Russia by violent means. Likewise, they advo-
cated a party narrow in numbers. The Mensheviks, who were more moderate,
leaned toward persuasion rather than violence, and unlike the Bolsheviks, they
advocated a party broader in scope. The Mensheviks insisted that before a
social revolution could take place, a bourgeoise or democratic regime should
be established. The leader of the Bolsheviks was Vladimir Ulianov, whose
pseudonym was Lenin. At the head of the Mensheviks was Plekhanov, a theore-
tical Marxist.
The Social Revolutionary party undertook to defend the interest of the
peasants. They contented themselves with terrorist activity against the
government officials. They felt that the people should be stirred by example.
This revolutionary theory was derived, not from Marx, but from Franch socialism
of the Utopian school.
In 1903, liberal groups organized an illegal party consisting of pro-
fessors or liberal land owners. In 1905 the bourgeois classes, merchants and
manufacturers, jointed with the liberal groups and formed the Constitutional
Democratic party. This group did not base their program on Marx and western
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-19-
socialism but upon the political teachings of constitutional and democratic
groups of western Europe and America. They attempted, not to teach the mass
of the people, but to iflfluence the thought of the government employees and
petty bourgeoise in the cities. It was a middle class party.
Lenin, in 1905, observed the street fighting from behind barricades and
concluded that, organized as it was, it could not be successful; he also con-
cluded that aggressive action (mass action) could find its genesis in the
Soviets. As a result of this, the St. Petersburg Soviet gave direction to the
fighting and acted as a base for mass action and as a revolutionary council.
The revolution was not, by and large, successful, but Nicholas II came
out in October (30) with the October Manifesto, which, among other things,
granted a State Duma; however, the Duma franchise was limited and the Czar
could dissolve it at any time. In spite of the October Manifesto, the Czar
could do pretty much as he pleased.
(2) Duma. - an elected representative
(1) national assembly
(2) called only after a general strike - supported by all classes
in the community
First DUMk - 1906
Early dissolved by Czarist autocrats
A second one shared the same fate.
Not fully representative
But an important step toward constitutional government.
Dominated by property interests - but did try to bring about reforms.
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How elected -
From the people by a group system of voting which secured privileged
representation to landlords and manufacturers - and very little representation
to peasants, workmen, and professional groups.
P we - Its sanction was required for the passing of any law, but it had no
control over the governmental machinery for the carrying out of the law.
DUMAS
1905 - dissolved 1906
1906 - dissolved 1907
1907 - dissolved 1912
1912 - to 1917
The first and second Dumas were dissolved in 1906 and 1907, primarily be-
cause they undertook to consider matters which the Czar regarded as being with-
in his own personal domain. The third and fourth Dumas,, convened in 1907
and 1912, were weak but were of importance because they provided a platform
for the radicals. We will note that the Bolsheviks under Lenin met in 1912
at Prague and finally established formally their own separate party, the
Russian Socialist Democratic Labor (Bolsheviks). This brings us to the advent
of World War I and events which preceded the Revolution.
V. Summer of 1914
(1) First manifestation of discontent in Russia
(2) Strikes of unusual proportions in industrial centers
(3) August 1, 1914 - Relations betweenAustria and Russia had been strained
for some time,
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(4)
Tannenberg
1. The Schlieffen plan included the defense of East Prussia by a
single Army, the 8th Army.
2. But August 14, 1914 Rennenkempf - Russian lst Army crossed the
frontier at Gumbinnen. Samsonov - Russian 2nd Army crossed fur-
ther south driving for Danzig.
3. Soon Von Prittwitz - of the German 8th Army-was telegraphing for
reenforcements.
4. Moltke detached 11 divisions from his right wing in Belgium -
supplanted Prittwitz with Hindenburg a special knowledge
of the terrain and gave him Von Ludendruff as Chief of Staff -
from the German 2nd Army who had distinguished himself in the
recent fighting at Liege. Tannenburg - end of August - defeat-
ed Samsonov.
Masurian Lakes - mid-September
"In Germany, Lindenburg, and to a less extent Ludendruff, became the
objects of a worship that non-German people can hardly understand.
The heroification of Nelson in England a hundred years ago is perhaps the
only comparable case. But it is to be remembered that to the German
mind the battles in East Prussia represented the veritable exorcism of an
allpervading terror. The Empire of the Tsar, mysteriously remote, in-
calculably powerful, a hinterland of barbarism and the matrix throughout
histroy of devastating migrations, this was Germany's real enemy.
In 1915 Russian infantry was "sick at heart." "Not even the Russian
conscript, in his almost insensible patience, will consent to be driven
into the line without rifles or go forward to the attack without artillery
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22
The French ambassador in St. Petersburg - wrote August 1915 - "The heroism
and self-denial of the Russian Army is still admirable but it no longer believes
in victory. It knows that it is sacrificed in advance, like cattle led to the
slaughter."
Russia resented the Gallipoli expedition which was to take Constantinople,
which had been promised to Russia.
Tannenburg
1. Schlieffen plan used there also.
2. Rennenkampf used the rail line - Petrograd to Berlin by way of
Gumbinnen, Furstenburg, Allenstein, Eylan.
3. Samsonov came by way of Warsaw.
4, These two armies - united could crush the German forces.
5. Moltke at Namur sent a dispatch to Gindenburg in Hannover where he was
smoking his pipe and drinking his beer. He and Lindendruff took the
train together on August 22nd and went into a huddle over their
maps. Decided to destroy each Russian army separately.
First - turned their attention to Ssmsonov's army which now menaced the
German communications. Samsonov, an impetuous man - had excellent troops.
A trap was set. Line of hills on both sides of Allenstein. 22nd Corps
fell back and allowed Samsonov to occupy Allenstein. "He believed he had won a
victory."
But German troops attacked from Vdsan and threatened communications.
Samsonov failed to grasp the significance and "went on pursuing his idea
of breaking the German front at the middle." But the front line had the best
German troops and his heavy guns attacked for 3 days - August 26-29. A five
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day battle left only men wandering about dazed and starving.
Numbers - East Prussia
Russian - 800,000 men
1,700 guns
Germany - 210,000 men
600 guns.
Hindenburg said that his plans were to annihilate Samsonov so that he would
be free to deal with Rennenhampf. Much of the fighting took place in the woods
behind Tannenberg where Russian artillery superiority was nullified.
(After Rasputin had his way)
"The zealous Russian commander in chief, Grand Duke Nicholas, complained
that, whenever Russia went to war, spies and traitors created a housing problem
in the Tsar's capital."
A German radio in the fortress of Konigsberg picked up messages in clear,
disclosing the strength and intentions of both Samsonoff and Rennenkampt."
This colossal blunder revealed that Rennenkamptts army could not come up in
time to fight beside the Second Army if Samsonoff were attacked."
In addition - precise information on the strength of the Russian forces
"We were very glad to know the exact objectives of the individual enemy corps."
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WORLD WAR I - 1914 - 1918
Mobilized
65,000,000
Killed
9,000,000
Wounded
22,000,000
(7,000,000 of these permanently disabled)
Prisoners
7, 800, 000
Total % Casualties
57.6
Mobilized
12,000,000
Killed
1,700,000
Wounded
4,950,000
Prisoners
2,500,000
Total % Casualties
GERMtNY
76.3
Mobilized
11,000,000
Killed
1,773,000
Wounded
4,216,000
Prisoners
1,152,000
Total % Casualties
64.9
Mobilized
4,000,000
Killed
53,000
Died of Disease
62,700
Wounded
201,000
Prisoners
4,400
Total % Casualties
7.0
ENGLAND - 36% Casualties
FRANCE - 73% n
JAPAN - 2.2%
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WORLD WAR II - 1939 - 1945
Mobilized
80,000,000
Killed
14,000,000
Wounded
34,600,000
USSR - K. W. and Missing
12,000,000 to 15,000,000
Germany - Killed
2,100,000
Missing
2,900,000
Wounded
4,000,000
Civilians Killed
500,000
Yugoslavia - Killed
1,685,000
China - Killed
1,300,000
Wounded
1,752,000
United States Army
10,400,000
Killed
225,000
Wounded
598,935
Prisoners of War
151,000
United States - Killed or died of disease - 307,554
Missing
1,434
Navy - Killed
66,629
Wounded
80,299
Craft lost - all kind
696
Merchant ships
538
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_2b_
In August 1914, the month in which Russia went to war with the Central
Powers, there were 1 1/2 million workers on strike in Russia. This included
40% of the factory workers. Russia at this time was on the verge of another
revolution as she went to war. Despite the proclamations by various European
socialist parties prior to 1914 to the effect that they would have nothing to
do with what they called an imperialistic war, all of the socialist parties
except the Bolshevists in rather short order did support the war efforts of
their various nations. The Bolshevists refused to support the Russian war
effort from the outset.
Once again Russia was unprepared for war; she was badly unprepared for
such a war as World War I. She was deficient from the point of view of industry,
agriculture, and communications. She lacked the heavy industry necessary to
produce the weapons and supplies of war in the great proportions demanded.
She could only barely feed her population. She could not adequately feed
great armies. Her distribution system fell far short of what was required to
support her extensive fronts. The result was that she rapidly commenced to
suffer staggering defeats and great loss of life. Ultimately about 1,700,000
Russians were killed in action and her economic complex began to feel the strain
of war and to deteriorate. An indication of the way in which she had to fight
her war was the fact that very often only the first wave in the attack was
supplied with rifles. The later waves were told to pick up the arms of their
fallen comrades.
The people as a whole at first supported the war. But the activities of
people in high places will in part explain the tragedy of Russia in World War I.
General Sukhomlinov, Minister of War, was a detriment: to the war effort
He eventually was tried for treasoh and proven guilty. It was probably due to
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his planning that shells manufactured in Russian factories fitted no ordnance
and that ammunition trains were sent in a direction opposite from the point
where they were actually needed. War supplies, ammunition, artillery, machinery,
and food stuffs were discovered years later rotting on wharves and in warehouses
far from the field of operations.
At the same time Colonel Myasoyedov was sending systematic information by
airplane to the Germans.
This discouraging picture was further complicated by the corruption which
emerged at the highest levels of the state. The outstanding example of this
corruption was perhaps the affair of Rasputin, whom we have known as the "Black
Monk." His real name was Grigori E. Rasputin-Novyk. Rasputin was a self-
STYLED Black Monk from Siberia, the Black Monk being the lowest order of monk
in the Russian Orthodox Church. He was actually a sort of free lance monk.
Rasputin persuaded the Tsarina Alexandra that tith his professed powers of
hypnotism and clairvoyance, he could cure the Tsarevitch, the Crown Prince,
of his hemophilia, or chronic bleeding. There is some indication that he did
alleviate to some extent this unfortunate disease of the prince. But of much
more significance was the part that he played in state affairs. On the one
hand his scandalous exploits in the Imperial Court led to much gossip amongst
the Russian population and lowering of their estimate of the royal family. On
the other hand - and more significantly - he rose to the point where he was
formulating major state policy, and to where he was playing an important part
in governmental fiscal affairs with disastrous effects from the point of view
of the welfare of the nation. The story of Rasputin is nearly unbelievable;
it certainly is dramatic.
Charlatans and healers have enjoyed a vogue in European society and among
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the royalty; but, in the case of Rasputin no public official's position was
safe at his hands, nor, may we add, was any woman's honor. In due course, not
even the nobility could tolerate him.
Rasputin was assassinated by Prince Yusupov, husband of the emperor's
niece, and Purishkevich, one of the extremist conservatives in the Duma. Grand
Duke Dmitri was in the house at the time. He was sent to Persia.
The German government enabled Lenin to circulate defeatist literature in
prisoner of war camps.
Court circles formed around the Empress, Alexandra Feodorovna, with the
result that at the most tragic moment in Russian history the government was
composed of men with little ability and no will to rule.
The Tsardom was not so much overthrown as it simply collapsed of its own
inertia and its own incompetence. The point was simply reached in the winter
and spring of 1917 when the Tsar had no base of support. The result was that
he fell and was replaced by the so-called Provisional Government, and the
process constituted the Second Russian Revolution.
We shall outline briefly a few of the events which led to the establish-
ment of the Provisional Government. In the winter and spring of 1917 the
desertion of soldiers from the front lines, largely under the influence of
Bolshevik propaganda, was very extensive. Disorders and strikes began to
spread throughout the country. The Soviets began to reappear in various parts
of the country. In March there were serious food riots in Petrograd. The
rioters were joined by a regiment of the Imperial Guard. Together they forced
several of the prisons in the city and freed many political prisoners. The
Duma proceeded to appoint a provisional government committee. The Social
Democrats, however, refused to participate. Instead the Socialists formed a
Provisional Executive Committee of the Soviet of workers' Deputies, and called
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for elections in the factories and barracks of Petrograd. On March 12 the
Petrograd Soviet Committee was proclaimed to be in existence, and it proceeded
to elect its officers. Chkheidze, a Social Revolutionary, or SR, was elected
chairman of the Petrograd Soviet. The vice chairman was Alexander Kerensky.
We may note the basic difference between the Social Revolutionaries and
the Social Democrats. The SR's were socialists who based their approach upon
the peasantry and found their support primarily in the peasantry. The Social
Democrats, both Bolshevik and Menshevik, based their approach primarily upon
the industrial workers.
The Tsar abdicated the crown on March 1$. He abdicated in favor of his
brother, the Grand Duke Michael; but Michael, it rapidly became apparent, was
not at all anxious to take over the crown, and within a few days he, too, stepped
out of the picture.
Prince Georgi Lvov, a Constitutional Democrat, or Cadet, a middle-of-the-
road party, formed the first provisional government cabinet, a cabinet which
included Alexander Kerensky as the Minister of Justice and the cabinet member
fdrthest to the left. Fundamentally the program of the provisional government
called for two things. It called upon the people to fight on, to continue the
war against the central powers; and secondly, the government proposed that all
basic questions with respect to the future nature of the Russian state be left
to a constituent assembly which would be convened in due course. Unfortunately,
this constituent assembly was never convened under the Provisional Government.
And so we have during 1917 a very peculiar situation in Petrograd. We
have substantially two governments: We have the official government, that
is the Provisional Government, which was not popularly established since it
was drawn from the membership of the then-sitting Fourth Duma, the franchise
for which had been quite limited. On the other hand, we have the,trQgrad,
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Soviet of workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. This was a popularly elected organ,
at least as far as the workers and soldiers of Petrograd were concerned; and
it rapidly became the real source of power.
The peasant, accustomed to having orders come from above, was ready to
accept the decrees of the provisional government and the constituent assembly.
One village even sent to Petrograd for a portrait of the new sovereign
Revolutsia.
As indication of the real power of the Petrograd Soviet lay in the famous
Army Order No. 1, which was issued by the Soviet on the 14th of March, the day
before the actual date of the revolution. This order had four sections. It
told the Army, first of all, that soldiers' committees were to be establish-
ed in all units; second, that each attachment was to obey the Soviet in
political matters; third, that orders of the Military Commission of the Duma
were to be followed only if they did not contradict the orders of the Soviet;
and finally, that all weapons were to be under the control of the soldiers'
committees. The provisional government refused to approve this order, but
it went into effect anyway; and the soldiers' committees were formed.
This was followed by mass desertions, instigated again by Bolshevik
propaganda. Within two months there were 2,000,000 deserters flooding the
rear.
The first decree of the Provisional Government, issued under pressure
from the Petrograd Soviet, proclaimed, among other things, first a general
amnesty for all political, religious, and military prisoners; second, freedom
of the press, freedom of speech and freedom to form unions and stage strikes.
Third, the abolition of all social, religious, and racial distinctions. Fourth,
the calling of a constituent assembly. Fifth, a people's militia was to replace
the police. Sixth, elections to be based on universal suffrage. Seventh, troops
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that took part in the revolution whould remain in Petrograd and not be trans-
ferred to the front. Eighth, soldiers to have the same public rights as
civilians when not in active service. The Soviet did not wish to seize power
only because it feared reaction among the liberal and conservative elements.
The Soviet preferred to maintain the Provisional Government, i.e., nominal
authority as a bait for other social groups, controlling it and checking its
authority at will.
Lenin returned to Petrograd from his place of exile in Switzerland on
April 16th. With him he brought other leaders of the Bolsheviks, and with him
he also brought his famous April Theses. The April Theses contained three
po,i .ts: (1) immediate peace, (2) immediate distribution of land to the peasants
and the seizure of the factories by the workers, (3) "all power to the Soviets."
Leinin was returned to Petrograd in a sealed railroad car, which traveled across
Germany with the permission of the German Imperial staff. The Germans were
happy to see this man returned to Russia because they knew that he proposed
to take Russia out of war with the Central Powers at the earliest possible
moment.
Lenin had not been back long before the effects of his return became
evident. On May 3rd, the Bolsheviks demonstrated in Petrograd under the
slogan "Down with Ma.liukov:" Miliukov was then Minister of Foreign Affairs
in the Lvov government, favored continuing war. On May 17th, a new cabinet
was formed which excluded both Miliukov and the Minister of War, Guchkov.
Lvov remained the premier but Kerensky, Minister of War, was now the real
chief of government and shortly became the premier.
On June 16th, the first all Russian Congress of Soviets convened in Petro-
grad; the Bolsheviks found themselves in a distinct minority. They called
for a revolution but were turned down.
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In July, Kerensky personally directed an offensive against the Austrians
on the southern front. The offensive initially succeeded, but then failed and
the Russian forces were once again thrown back. This had the effect of further
demoralizing the Russian people.
A very peculiar affair occurred on July 16th to 18th - peculiar to the
extent that the workers and soldiers of Petrograd got even ahead of the
Bolsheviks in their movement for immediate revolt. Lenin, seeing that the
attempt, while in his opinion ill-timed, could not be halted, determined that
the Bolsheviks would provide leadership, and hoped that the attempt might be
deflected. The Bolsheviks were successful in deflecting the revolt, but, as
Leinin feared, the government immediately counterattacked, arresting a number
of political leaders, including Leon Trotsky, who had now returned from exile
abroad and was playing a major part in the events in Petrograd. Lenin was
forced to go into hiding into Finland.
While the government had momentarily avoided being overthrown, its
situation became progressively worse. Under the burden of war, the national
economy continued to disintegrate. There was great turmoil in the country-
side, where the peasants were failing to reap the harvest; the demands of the
factory workers were impossible of fulfillment; the railroad system was widely
disrupted. With such an inadequate tax base, government finances came into
bad disrepair. Taxes fell of 1/3 in the first month of revolution. Internal
loans of Prov. Govt. did not sell well...printed money.
On July 30, Kornilov had been appointed by Kerensky to replace Brusilov,
Commander in Chief of Army.
Differences of opinion had arisen between the Commander-in-Chief, Kornilov,
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who had established the death penalty at the front, and Kerensky, who hesitated
to establish it at the rear.
Kornilov had demanded of the government return of military discipline
and the death penalty for desertion. Kornilov was surrounded by political
opportunists. He intended to get rid, by annihilation, of the Soviet, by
military force. He tried to win the cooperation of the provisional govern-
ment; but if, at the last moment, he found that he couldn't get their cooper-
ation, he intended to get rid of both the provisional government and the Soviet.
This was further complicated when a direct split was made evident on August 27,
at a National Political Conference, attended by Kornilov. Kornilov was
applauded by the conservative members. The socialist half of the delegation
applauded Kerensky.
Kornilov, in agreement with the Provisional government moved the Third
Cavalry Corps toward the capital in anticipation of a Bolshevik revolution
on the announcement of measures to secure discipline in the Army.
A further complication was brought about by V. N. Lvov, who attempted
to play the part of an intermediary, representing to each that he had full
authority to speak for the other. Kornilov received the impression that
Kerensky was prepared to hand over to him, Kornilov, dictatorial power in
Russia, while Kerensky would be satisfied with a place in the government.
Kornilov agreed.
Then Lvov presented to Kerensky the proposal as an ultimatum from
Kornilov. On September 8, Kerensky called Kornilov for confirmation of the
report that he had delegated Lvov to convey information of his plans and
purposes. Kornilov replied affirmatively, neglecting to ask Kerensky what
Lvov said to him..
Kerensky, on September 9, dismissed Kornilov as Commander-In-Chief.
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Kornilov, on September 10, issued a proclamation to all Russian citizens
refusing to give up his post and asked for support against the Provisional
Government. At the same time he ordered General Krymov to move the third
Cavalry Corps against Petrograd.
Kerenskymeanwhile joined forces with the left groups of the Petrograd
Soviet and ordered the Petrograd garrison to prepare to fight General Krymov.
Propaganda by the Bolsheviks in the ranks of Krimov's forces had an
important effect, and Bolshevik railroad workers deflected a number of Krimov's
troop trains. When the two forces met, some distance outside of Petrograd,
there was more fraternization than fighting. Kerensky ordered Krimov to
report to Petrograd. Krimov did so, and committed suicide the next day.
Kornilov was arrested. In appreciation for the assistance given to him by
the Petrograd Soviet, a number of the Bolshevik leaders, including Trotsky,
were released.
(1) Russia - economically backward
(2) Poor lines of communication. Germany was blockaded; so was Russia.
(3) Government proved itself as incompetent and corrupt as in 1854
and 1904
(4) Great military disasters.
The people, very patriotic, gradually lost enthusiasm but the Czar
only listened to the selfish advice of individuals in his immediate govern-
ment circle - interpreted all demands as unpatriotic or groundless. With
his approval, the government interfered in every possible way with the
activities of the DTJM.
By 1916 internal discontent, especially in the large cities, has swelled to
alarming proportions. The food situation had become e?itical.
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VI. March 1917 -
(1) Bad food shortage in Petrograd - demonstrations of protest accompanied
by riots
(2) Soldiers went over to the people - deserting the government
(3) Duma, in session at the time, although daily expecting dissolution
by the Government, was alarmed by the street riot in the capital
resolved to act to save the situation.
Organized a temporary provisional government, and sent a delegation
to the Czar demanding his abdication.
Political Parties
1898 - Social. Democratic Labor Party (Workers)
1903 - Split -
Menshevik - Minority
Bolshevik - Majority
1912 - Russian Socialist democratic Labor Party
1895 - Social Revolutionary Party (SR)
(Peasantry)
(1) Some came from the militant group - ;'Will of the People"
1905 - Constitutional Democratic Party
(professors, liberal landowners, merchants)
Wanted a strong middle class party.
Nicholas II abdicated for himself and his son (March 15) and was put under
arrest.
Revolution of March 1917 was accomplished within a week. The rest of the
country, and particularly the army promptly submitted to the new authority.
Only a little bloodshed.
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For a while the government was in the hands of the non-socialist
Constitutional Democrats, but in July passed to Alexander Kerensky a
brilliant orator of moderate socialist views.
Provisional Government
(1) A difficult situation to face.
(2) Russia tired of war.
(3) A "bourgeois" control - property rights to be respected.
VII. Rise of the Bolsheviks
(1) Came forward at this critical period
(2) Many returned from exile.
(3) Urged withdrawal from the war
(4) Wanted a social revolution and not merely a political one.
"Bread, land, peace."
(5) Instrument for such a revolution
"Soviet of Workmen's Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies" which
had been organized throughout the country on the model of the
Petrograd soviet.
Revolution - November 9, 1917
(1) Drove Kerensky from Petrograd
(2) A bloody affair
Riots, assassinations and measures just as autocratic as any
in which the Czars had indulged.
New government -
"Russian Socialistic Federated Republic of Soviets"
July 1, 1918 - Czar, Czarina, brutally shot to death.
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First step - arranged an armistic with the Central Powers.
March 1913 - Brest-Litovsk
Allied assistance to White Russians - pro-Czarist followers.
Many countries, including U. S. refused to recognize the new government.
As the year 1917 wore on, the strength of the Bolsheviks continued to
grow. And most significantly that strength rapidly developed in the two
bodies which Lenin felt were essential to successful Bolshevik revolution.
These bodies were the Soviets and the Army Committees which had been
created under Army Order number one.
Lenin realized that Bolshevik dominance of these two elements was
essential to success. The two great slogans of the Bolsheviks during 1917 and
at the time of the November revolution were "Peace, Bread, and Land" and,
secondly, "All power to the Soviets."
The first slogan was particularly well chosen from the point of view of
mass appeal because it was "Peace and Bread and Land" that the people of Russia
most wanted.
Trotsky, who had been released from prison following the Kornilov affair,
was elected in October as President of the Petrograd Soviet. This was a de-
velopment of major importance to the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks also controlled
the Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet.
On November 4, the Petrograd Army garrison was ordered by the Soviet
to transfer its allegiance to the Military Committee of the Soviet and it did
so. On November 6, Lenin returned to Petrograd from his hiding place in
Finland and, with his return, the revolution was under way. November 7 is the
7~ r- q~ 17
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traditional date of the Bolshevik Revolution. During the night of November 7,
the principal government buildings were occupied by the Bolsheviks. Posters
announced their program: (1) immediate peace negotiations; (2) partition of
large estates; (3) control of all factories by the workers; (4) creation of
a Soviet government. The fighting in Petrograd was over by November 8. In
Moscow the fighting lasted somewhat longer. In Petrograd, the fighting was
climaxed by the assault on the Winter Palace and the Admiralty by the
Bolshevik forces. In their attack they were supported by the Cruiser Aurora,
which was anchored in the river Neva, and by the guns of the Fortress of Peter
and Paul. However, these two sources of fire were of little help since the
Aurora fired mostly duds and the guns of the Fortress fired all all over the
place with very little accuracy. The last military unit to defend the Provi-
sional Government was a women's battalion. This battalion had been formed
during 1917, under Kerensky's direction, in order to shame the men back to
their places at the front during the time of mass desertion. In Moscow a
few thousand military cadets defended the Kremlin until about November 14.
Kerensky, after attempting unsuccessfully to recruit troops, fled and took
no further part in the struggle between Bolsheviks and their opponents.
We come now to the matter of the formation of the new government under
the Bolsheviks and with it we find Russia in what is known as the period of
War Communism or the Period of Militant Communism.
On November 7, the day of the Revolution, the All Russian Congress of
Soviets, dominated by the Bolsheviks, met in Petrograd and approved the Bol-
shevik Coup. On Lenin's motion, the Congress passed decrees for: (1) the
Conclusion of peace, (2) the Nationalization of all land, and (3) the
Formation of a Council of People's Commissars. Lenin was chosen to be chair-
man of this first Council. Trotsky became Conmiissar for Foreign Affair
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Rykov was Commissar for Internal Affairs; Lunacharsky was Commissar for
Education; and Stalin-was chosen Commisar of Nationlities.
The new government found itself faced with a great deal of hostility on
the part of the old governmental bureaucracy. Much of the bureaucracy did not
feel that the Bolsheviks could long stay in power and, as a matter of fact,
they were joined in this opinion by several of the Bolshevik leaders, who felt
that the best they could hope for was to set a revolutionary example for the
most advanced industrial nations of the West. Through persuasion and liquid-
ation,'however, the bureaucracy was progressively brought under the control
of the new government.
In the provinces, power was rapidly switched from the political Commissars,
put there by the Provisional Government, to the Soviets which became dominated
by the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks sent out agitators and armed supporters to
secure control of the Soviets.
In December of 1917 there was created the Cheka, which is an
abbreviation of the Russian for Extraordinary Commission for the Suppression
of Counter Revolution. There followed upon the creation of the Cheka the Red
Terror, during which the Cheka turned its vengeance upon all enemies of the
new state and liquidated thousands upon thousands, including a number of workers.
The formation of the Cheka was in line with Lenin's policies, announced in
the statement: "No dictatorship of the proletariat is to be thoughtof without
terror and violence." His selection of Felix Dzerjinsky as the head of the
Cheka was ideal for his purposes. One can say only that he was cold-blooded
to a degree that is unbelievable; for example, at the meetings of the
Sovnarkom it was Lenin's custom to exchange notes with his colleagues. On one
occasion he sent a note to Dzerjinsky asking, "How many vicious counter- re-
volutionaries are there in the prisons,?" Dzerjinsky repled, "About 1500."
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In February of 1918, there was created the Red Army which, under
Trotsky's direction, defended the new regime during the civil war which ensued.
The new regime employed food rationing in order to insure political
control. Those who supported the state and were engaged in productive labor
received their food ration; those who did not, received no food ration and
were subject to starvation.
The Bolsheviks engaged in pure revolutionary action in many fields, In
the field of industry, wages were equalized and the factories were turned
over to control of the workers; the result, by and large, was chaos. The
skilled worker did not necessarily make a good plant supervisor and the workers
in many cases looted the plant and the production of the plant.
In the field of Finance the Bank System was abolished and it was acme time
before it was replaced with a new state banking system. The result was severe
with respect to the nation's financial affairs.
The government declared itself against religion and in the provinces,
a number of priests were murdered,
On November 20, 1917 Lenin called General Dukhonin on the telephone and
ordered him to treat for an Armistice with the Central Powers immediately.
When Dukhonin refused, Ensign Krylenko was sent to the front to replace
Dukhonin. Krylenko as an ensign was the equivalent of a 2nd Lieutenant or a
Warrant Officer. When Krylenko arrived at the front, Kukhonin was murdered
and mutilated by his own troops.
In January of 1918, the Bolsheviks convened the long-awaited constituent
assembly but when the assembly had met, Lenin discovered, much to his disap-
pointment, that the Bolsheviks were in a distinct minority. Finding this situ-
ation intolerable, he dispersed the Constituent Assembly by force one and one-
IAT
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half days after it had met. In doing so, he did precisely what the Czar had
done when he was dissatisfied with the action of the Dumas, the only difference
being that Lenin employed force.
Leon Trotsky was sent to Brest-Litovsk in White Russia to negotiate with
the respresentatives of the Central Powers for an Armistice. Trotsky was per-
haps a poor choice. He was a devotee of permanent revolution. He believed
that the revolution having been successful in Russia, revolt would follow in
rather short order in the great industrial nations of the Test. Therefore,
Trotsky chose the occasion of the negotations at Brest-Litovsk to propagandize
to the peoples of the West over .the heads of their leaders. The Germans, and
the Austro-Hungarian representatives listened to Trotsky for a while and then
left in disgust. Trotsky left Brest-Litovsk with his famous statement,
"Neither War nor Peace." Trotsky may have felt that there could be a situation
where they could have "neither war nor peace," but the Germans did not agree
with him and the forces of the Central Powers once more began to move to the
East, thrusting on into the Ukraine, the Baltic States and White Russia.
Leinin realized that peace immediately was absolutely essential to the preser-
vation of his revolution. He therefore acted to persuade the party that Russia
must sign at any cost. The terms which had been presented to Trotsky at Brest-
Litovsk were very severe, but Lenin said that he was prepared to pay almost
any price for peace. With great difficulty, he persuaded the party to his
point of view and Sokolnikov was sent to Brest-Litovsk to sign with the Central
Powers. The treaty presented to Sokolnikov was even more severe than that
which had been presented to Trotsky but, under instructions, Sokolnikov signed
the treaty of Brest-Litovsk on March 3 of 1918. The treaty was accompanied by
an economic agreement which provided for a rather thorough economic exploita-
tion of Russia by Germany. Under the terms of this treaty, Russia lost virtually
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all of the territory which she had gained on her Western Frontiers since the
time of Peter the Great. Taken from her were the Baltic States, Poland, and
the Ukraine, and ultimately Finland. But of course Germany met her Waterloo
on November 11 of 1918 and with that the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk became essenti-
ally inapplicable.
VIII. Civil War 1918 - 1921
We now come to a brief consideration of the Russian Civil War. It took
place fundamentally for two reasons. The Bolsheviks first of all were a party
which had a program calculated to achieve mass appeal, but it was a party which
had a dogmatic concept and it was ruthless in the application of that concept.
The result was that the Bolsheviks rapidly achieved the opposition of all of
the political right and center and much of the left. Secondly, the Western
allies were very reluctant to see Russia withdrawn from the war and they were
determined to displace if possible any Russian regime which sought to take
Russia out of that war. We shall not endeavor to describe all of the campaigns
of the war in any great detail. In general, it was a war fought over a vast
area, ruthless in its nature as civil wars are wont to be.
There was great loss of life, running into the many millions amongst both
the civilian and military populations. It was, in many instances, a highly
fluid war - typified by a situation in which the Bolsheviks would take a town
in the morning, the Whites would retake it in the afternoon and the Bolsheviks
would perhaps be back in the evening. There were, however, relatively static
fronts fought over in the more classical sense.
The Allies gave substantial assistance to the White Forces in the form
of military supplies. In addition, in some areas there were clashes between
the Allied forces and those of the Reds.
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The Bolsheviks held the center of Great Russia Proper, that is the area
of Moscow, Leningrad and environs. The White Forces were arrayed against the
Reds along the circumference of this area. The Bolsheviks were long hard
pressed but held out, eventually were able to go over to the counter-attack
and the civil war had substantially ended by late 1920.
Concurrent with the struggle in the civil war was the Russo-Polish War
of 1920 which ultimately resulted in defeat for the Bolshevik Forces and the
signing of the Treaty of Riga.
The question-arises why did the Bolsheviks win? They did win against
great odds. Several reasons may be given. First, from the point of view of
tactical advantage, the Reds held interior lines of communication. They were
to fight most of the war along a relatively abbreviated front and they held
the area best covered by communication facilities. A second major reason was
Trotsky's truly brilliant organization and direction of the Red Army. Starting
virtually from scratch, he was able in short order to organize an effective
fighting force. Thirdly, the Bolsheviks tended to be united through the
pressure on their limited perimeter. Bunched together in a common cause, they
had the relatively high morale typical in such cases. Fourth, with their
effective propaganda, they were able by and large to win and retain the support
of the youth and the workers. Fifth, Red propaganda in the ranks of the Whites
was in many cases quite effective and in many cases resulted in numbers of deser-
tions. Sixth, and very important, there was a distinct lack of cohesion in
the ranks of the White Forces. This was due primarily to the great divergence
in the political attitudes of the various White Elements. In political point
of view, the Whites ranged from Monarchists to Social Revolutionaries, and it
was exceedingly difficult to get effective cooperation between such diverse
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F'I L
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groups. Finally and,also very important, after the signing of the.trmistice
in the West, in November of 1918, there was a fall in Allied interest in sup-
porting the White Forces, although Allied assistance to the Whites did not
reach its peak until mid 1918. Thereafter, Allied aid progressively declined.
We are now brought to a consideration of the state Russia at the end of
the Civil War. Russia had suffered very severly from the effects of World
War I compounded by the destruction of the Civil War. With the end of the
Civil War at the close of 1920 inflation was rampant. The deficits of the
government were very great. The industry of the country was 5/6 dissipated
or destroyed. The transportation system, never adequate, was now hopelessly
shattered. Private trade, having been outlawed, was taking place through
illegal channels. The government had wrecked the oasis for foreign trade by
its confiscation of foreign property. In summary, the country was living on
its depleted reserves and those reserves were very badly depleted.
IX. New Economic Policy
In 1921 we find the commencement of the era in Soviet development known
as the period of the New Economic Policy of NEP. This period runs from 1921
to 1928. During the period 1920 to 1921, there were serious peasant up-risings
in the Ukraine and the Northern Caucauses. This resulted in large measure from
the punitive expeditions which were sent into the countryside by the govern-
ment in order to collect the badly needed grain for the use of the Army and
the workers in the city.
The peasants in many areas bitterly resented this effort and there was
considerable bloodshed.
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The New Economic Policy was in essence a partial reversion to free enter-
prise, a recognition that the situation was so serious that the plans of the
Bolshevik Party must be altered if the Bolsheviks were to remain in power.
The basic object of the NEP was to re-achieve Russia's 1913 level of production.
This was substantially achieved by 1928.
In the field of agriculture the former practice of the government - taking
the entire crop surplus-was now replaced first with a crop tax and then a
money tax. This was necessary because it was found that the peasants had simply
not been raising any surplus since the government would take it anyhow? Now
the surplus left after the tax could be sold in the free market. The purpose
was to give incentive for cultivation. This led to the introduction of free
trade which was established in July of 1921. Foreign Trade however remained
a government monopoly and has been such to this date.
In thb field of industry, heavy industry was largely operated under state
trusts. Light industry on the other hand was given over to free enterprise.
Concessions were made to foreign capital to commence its influx.
In the field of finance, the currency and banking systems were reestablish-
ed. In late 1921, the State Bank or Gosbank with branches throughout the country
was established. Abroad, the NEP was largely misinterpreted, it being held
that the Bolsheviks were conceding that Socialism did not work and that they
must revert to capitalism. The NEP was merely an emergency measure to avoid
complete disaster for the Reds. A substantial measure of state control and
supervision was still involved in the NEP and the party definitely planned to
revert to full state controll at the earliest possible moment.
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RUSSIA 1921 - 1939
1920 - Allies abandoned the blockade.
1922 - Japs withdrew their forces from Eastern Siberia
(1)
Soviet Russia had shown her ability to survive - at great costs.
(2) Wholesale execution of suspects and hostages by Bolsheviks.
N.E.P. 1921
(1)
Bolsheviks attempted to carry out their program to nationalize all land
and industry in Russia.
(2) By 1921 Lenin saw the task was too great for immediate execution.
In many industries production had fallen to less than 115 of the pre-
war output.
Peasants - disillusioned
(1) Confiscated lands were not theirs.
(2) Had to surrender their crops to feed the city workers.
(3) Lenin sponsored a compromise known as New Economic Polic .
Restored the smaller plants - employing no more than 15-20
workers to private control
Permitted the peasants to sell their grains for profit.
Obtained capital be extending concessions to foreigners.
Communist Party (as the Bolsheviks named themselves in 1919)
became more popular.
When Lenin died in 1924, his desperate experiment was on the road
to success.
Communist regime in the most interesting social experiment in the
20th Century.
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On August 18 of 1918, Lenin was badly wounded in an assassination attempt
by a Social Revolutionary, Dora Kaplin. There followed upon this attempt
similar attempts on other Bolshevik leaders, a number of whom were killed.
A Reign of Teror followed as the Chika rather indiacrimately rounded up
thousands of individuals, many of whom were executed almost on the spot.
The Bolsheviks later admitted that many of them were undoubtedly innocent
but that the important thing was to get the guilty parties however marj in-
nocents might die. In May of 1922, Lenin had his first cerebral stroke. In
March of 1923, he had a second one and on January 21, 1924 he had his third
and final stroke resulting in his death. Lenin's death was followed by a
virtual deification of the man - largely under the personal supervision of
Stalin. This was undoubtedly contrary to Lenin's desires but Stalin evidently
ff 4.grrr,dbilee ` W0.
th en?ent` n 1~ ~p~Y btrt
V t0~~ .L /V1.i vP
figured that this was convenient from the point of view of mass appeal.
With Lenin's death, there was established a so-called triumvirate as the
rulers of Party and Government. This Triumvirate was constituted to exclude
Trotsky with whom no one could get-along. It included Stalin, Kamenev and
Zinoviev.
What was the basis of Stalin's strength? How was he able to rise eventual-
ly to dictatorial control of Party and Country? This was made possible by the
positions that Stalin early achieved. We have spoken earlier of the fact that
he was Commissar of Nationalities in the first Sovnarkom. As Commissar of
Nationalities, he had intimate contact with the various non-Great itussian
peoples and leaders in the country. This gave him a broad association and in-
fluence. Secondly, he was Chairman of the Workers' and Peoples Inspectorate.
As such, he was head of the organization with extensive power of inspection
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in all industrial and agricultural enterprises and thus was able to extend his
influence amongst both workers and peasants. Thirdly, he was an original
member of the Polit-Bureau and thus from the outset was a member of the organ
which eventually became by far the most powerful element in the Party.
Finally and very importantly in 1922, he became General Secretary of the Party.
This position was of most fundamental importance to him in insuring his rise
to power. As General Secretary, he created all echelons of party officials
from the Village to Moscow. Thus when the Party Congresses met, they were,
in short order, Congresses primarily of Stalin supporters. Stalin took to
busying himself primarily with administrative matters and in so doing, insures
that he created an administrative organization in the Party which supported
It is interesting to note the techniques that Stalin employed in the
high Councils of the Party during the inter Party struggle of the 1920's.
Stalin tended to sit back and listen to the statements of the others, observe
carefully the reaction of the various members of the Party Organs and then
speak last, summing up in a manner that he was confident would win the approval
of the majority of the members. This technique he employed effectively to
defeat Trotsky and the others time and time again. During the 20's Stalin and
Bukharin and Rykov stood for a relatively lenient policy toward the peasants.
Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev were in opposition to this position; they were
for a more forceful approach and were called the Left Bolsheviks. The
Opposition also fought the autocracy of the Polit-Bureau within the Party.
The decline of the so-called oppositionists, onece under way, progressed
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rapidly. In April 1925, Leon Trotsky was switched from the War Commissariat
to the position of Commissar of Nation Economy. In October 1926, Zinoviev
and Karenev recanted, apologizing for their opposition and agreeing to cease
their struggle against the Stalinist majority in the party.
It is interesting to note that Zinoviev and Kamenev were willing time
and time again to apologize in an effort to be reinstated. Trotsky would
never recant and held implacably to his position.
In July 1927, Trotsky was expelled .Qm the Central Committee when he
had the audacity to denounce Stalin before that body. He was the last to
do so. In November 1927, Trotsky and Zinoviev led a demonstration in Moscow
against the Stalinist element on the occasion of the celebration of the tenth
anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution. For this performance both Trotsky
and Zinoviev were expelled for the party. A month later, in December 1927,
all of the opposition leaders were expelled from the party. In January 1928,
Trotsky was exiled to Alma Ata. In early 1928, Kamenev and Zinoviev again
asked pardon and in turn were given minor positions in Central Russia. In the
summer of 1928, Kamenev and Zinoviev were readmitted to the party as simple
members. In early 1929, Trotsky was brought back from Alma Ata and deported
to Turkey. Why was he not liquidated at this time? Presumably because
Trotsky was so well known to the Russian people that Stalin felt that it was
politically not expedient to actually eliminate such a personality. From
Turkey, Trotsky proceeded to publish his Bulletin of the Opposition, a
journal which set forth the views of those Bolsheviks opposing the Stalinist
position.
Customarily, the conflict between Stalin and Trotsky is described as the
conflict between Stalin's theory of socialism in one country, as opposed to
Trotsky's of permanent revolution. In reality, a much more significant basis
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for the conflict can perhaps be found in the difference between these two
personalities. Trotsky flamboyant, dynamic, and aggressive; Stalin patient,
plodding, and ruthless. The one man, Trotsky, concerned with policy; the other,
Stalin, patiently and quietly building up under him a party hierarchy upon
which he could count when the time came.
In speaking of Soviet Russia's foreign relations during the 1920's, we
shall confine ourselves to a brief description of the activities of the
Comintern, the Third Communist International, during this period. In March
of 1919, the First Congress of the Comintern met in Moscow. As a result of
the work of this Congress.. Communist regimes were established in Hungary and
Bavaria in 1919. However they did not last long; and in July 1920, the Second
Congress of the Comintern was held, and the major decision reached was to
concentrate on propaganda activities.
During the 1920's the Comintern met with little success in the Middle
East and India, due primarily to the opposition of the religious of these
areas. Bolshevik atheism simply did not go over w; . with the Moslems, and
the Hindus. Under Stalin's direction, the Comintern supported the Kuomintang
in China during the period 1926-1927. Initially the collaboration of the
Chinese Communists with the Kuomintang was successful. However, in 1927,
Chiang-Kai-Shek broke with the Communists end attacked them. This episode
was quite embarrassing to Stalin. Trotsky had opposed collaboration with the
Kuomintang. Stalin had supported it. The Comintern is perhaps most signifi-
cant during the 1920's as a great obstacle to the establishment by the Soviet
Union of good relations with other nations. Very possibly, the lack of success
of the Comintern played a major part in turning Stalin's primary interest in-
war towards the development of the Soviet Union rather than outwards towards
the promotion of external revolution.
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X. The Five Year Plan
With the arrival of 1928 and the conclusion of the NEP we come to the
period of the first Five-Year Plan. The basic objectives of the first Five-
Year Plan were, first, the rapid expansion of Russia's capital goods complex,
and secondly, the collectivization of agriculture. In the field of industry,
the slogan of the day was "overtake and pass America!" This objective, of
course, was hardly accomplished, but was perhaps well-designed from an in-
spirational point of view. The task that faced the government and the party
in staging the first Five-Year Plan was a tremendous one. Essentially, it
was a matter of converting a peasant economy to an industrial economy.
During the plan, there was tremendous waste) in both product and manpower.
At one point in the plan, it was estimated that 40 per cent of the national.
product consisted of waste material. The people suffered to a. tremendous
extent during this period. Factories were built before housing was put up,
with the result that the workers engaged in the construction activities often
lived in caves, in rude huts, or in the open. The peasants pulled into the
factories, not used to mechanical processes, were often the victims of the
machines they operated; and industrial casualties were at a high rate. The
costs of the products were phenomenal at the outset. Consumer goods were cut
to the bone in the effort overnight to create an industry substantial for the
future. For the most part, the new industry was concentrated east of the Ural
Mountains in the belief that these mountains could act as a protective
barrier in the event of future invasion from the West.
There was substantial accomplishment during the first Five-Year Plan,
but accomplishment at a tremendous cost and a tremendous waste. Evenually,
the plan was shortened to a Four-Year period anc was declared at a close in
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1932. But at this point, the plan had fallen far short of fulfillment.
An interesting development during the period of the first Five- Year Plan
was the charge of wrecking, or sabotage, lodged against many thousands of
workers in the factories. If a simple peasant brought to a factory to work
dropped a piece of machinery and broke it by accident, he could be-and often
was--charged with sabotaging the Five-Year Plan. He was tried, and in many
cases sentenced to extensive periods of penal servitude. And from this began
the vast slave labor system which the Soviet Union possesses today.
In the field of agriculture, the basic objectives were to break the rich
peasants, the so-called kulaks, "kulaks" being the Russian word for "fist,"
and probably having its origin in references to the hard-fisted landlord. In
reality, we might question whether the so-called kulaks were really rich
peasants, a rich peasant at this time being defined as one whose annual income
was roughly 80 to $100 per annum, the middle peasants being classified as those
with incomes of- approximately $50 to $80 per annum
,,and the poor peasants
being those with lesser incomes. The agricultural plan sought to create
collective farms, and "Sovkhoz," state farms, in order to achieve greater
efficiency in agriculture, along with mechanization of agricultural effeciency,
but also to release vast numbers of peasants from the farms for employment in
the factories.
A very discriminatory tax and levy system was imposed in order to force
the peasants onto the new farms and break the kulaks. The situation was
tremendously complicated by the failure of soviet industry to deliver anything
like the required number of tractors, combines, etc. The peasants fought
bitterly against the attempt to collectivize them, with the result that there
was open and widescale warfare in the Ukraine and the northern Caucasus.
In many cases it was difficult for a peasant to determine whether he was a
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rich peasant or a middle peasant. If he had two cows, he was afraid that he
might be regarded as a kulak; therefore, in many cases the peasants would
kill one or both of their cows to be sure that they would not fall into the
kulak category. The result of this was a tremendous decline in Soviet income,
and a very severe famine in the agricultural areas that resulted in the loss
of millions of lives. Many kulaks were liquidated, and at least a million
others were deported to slave labor in Siberia.
In the midst of all this suffering in the countryside, in March 1930
there appeared in Pravda Stalin's famous article "Dizziness from Success."
In this article: , Stalin indicated that it was very unfortunate that all this
had occurred, that it was really quite unnecessary, that the party workers
must have misunderstoood their instructions, that the peasants were to be per-
suaded of the desirability of going to the state farms and the collective
farms, that they were not to be forced. What Stalin was doing was playing an
old Russian game - the game of the leader, be he Tsar or Party General
Secretary, telling the masses that he - the leader - was for them; and that
their suffering was the result of the bungling and the criminality of the middle
men, the bureaucrats. The party leadership had clearly instructed the party
workers to do exactly what they had done However, there was some amelioration
of the collectivization program.
The second Five-Year Plan was gotten under way in 1933. The con-
centration continued to be on the development of heavy industry. There was,
however, at the outset a somewhat greater production of consumer goods. Shortly,
however with the threat of Germany to the west and of Japan to the east, the
consumer goods were once again sacrificed, this time to the development of
the armaments industry and the production of arms. There was somewhat better
order in the second plan, but there was still considerable inefficiency and
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confusion. In 1935, a development of considerable interest was that of
Stakhonovism. Stakhonovism takes its name from a miner in the Don basin by
the name of Alexi Stakhonov. Stakhonov discovered that by rationalizing the
performance of his mining crew he could achieve substantially greater production
of coal than could the other crews in his mine. The director of the mine took
a fairly dark view of this, realizing that mass production was achieved not
by individual, sporadic high level performance, but by a smoothly coordinated
process of production. The party, however, found in Stakhonov what they had
been looking for and from Stakhonovism there developed a great speed-up program,
one of the devices most hated by truly free labor. Stakhonov was made a Hero
of Socialist Labor and was pera.ded about the country to exhort workers in
various lines of endeavor to speed up their production by processes of national-
ization. Under this program a worker who could give an ottstanding perform-
ance was amply regarded under a progressive rate system; but the worker who
was a little old, or a little sick, or a little weak, and who fell behind the
daily normal of production would see his wages fall rapidly to the point where
he could starve to de M. In various forms, Stakhonovism continues in exist-
ence in the Soviet Union today.
In the third Five-Year Plan, which was under way in 1938, t 07erwholming
concentration was on the production of armaments as the Soviet Union raced to
prepared for war again at great sacrifice to the consumer economy. The third
plan was cut short in June of 1941 by the German invasion.
Five-Year Plans
1928 - First Five-Year Plan
(1)
e ec r c power
mineral output
new factories
tractors, cars, railway equipment, planes, etc.
Stalin decided to spend 20 billion dollars to speed up Russian industry -
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(2)
Coordination - Each factory to be given a quota.
(3)
Workers very enthusiastic - hoped to achieve all this in 4 years.
(4)
Goal of Russian industry - 133% increase in 5 years.
(5)
Engineers and technicians hired from England, Germany. U.S. to supervise
and train.
(6) A State planning commission kept the records.
especially those who failed.
(7)
(8)
InvestigLted quotas
Communist leaders boasted how superior this was to capitalism.
A progressive socialization of agriculture - creation of "State farms."
"In each rural community the more energetic and farsighted farmers had prospered,
increasing their acreage, hiring helpers, and emerging as men of property, so
that ten years after the great estates of the nobles had been copfiscated, a
new class of landowners was in process of formation. Against these well-to-do
peasants of IKULAKS, the Government opened a campaign of intimidation and
suppression. Collected their harvest - By 1940, less than 5% of the harvest
was listed as raised on private farms.
State farms were organized
Workers live in model villages
Have their own newspaper, movie hall, library, hospital, recreation.
But no independence.
First 5-Year plan officially terminated December 31, 1932.
Results - encouraging but no consumer's goods.
Second 5-year plan -
(1) Planned for complete socialization of agriculture by 1937.
(2) 50 - 200% increase incrops.
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(3) Double the output of basic industries
(4) 6-fold increase in electric power.
(5) 6-hour working day.
(6) More consumers goods
2nd 5 -year plan - 1933-1937
3rd 5-year plan - 1938-1941
4th 5 -year plan - 1945-1950
5th 5-year plan - 1952 -
Official birthdate of the Red Army - February 23, 1918
Established on that day as a "volunteer" force by a decree of the Soviet
of People's Commissars
Lenin wanted this new army to be "class-conscious" - working class.
Compulsory recruitment began June 29 - ages 18 to 40.
By the end of 1915 the Red army numbered 300,000 men. Of the officers, 20,000
were of the old Army.
To watch these, Commissars as "guardians of the revolution" were assigned.
Planning of military operations continued with the commanders, but all orders
had to be countersigned by the respective commissar. This duality of command
was bad. The political commissars were hated - and the use of them was
abolished in November 1942.
Demobilization after 1921
1921 - Reduced from 5,300,000 to 1,400,000
1922 - Further reduced to 800,000
1923 - Reduced down to 612,000
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Difficulty in formulating a comprehensive military policy.
(1) A large standing army
(2) A citizen or army of territorial militia
(3) Decided to compromise
Standing army reduced to 562,000 men
Field Strength 29 Inf. Divs.
12 Cav. Divs.
Enlistment Basic arms - 2 years
Aviation - 3 years
Coastal defense
Frontier guerd
Navy - 4 years
Territorial Militia
$50,000 men.
41 Inf. Divs.
4* Cav. Divs.
Small permanent cadres subject to the same enlistment terms as the regular army.
Alternating contingents of men serving a total of from 8 to 11
period of five years.
Reserves
(1) Two types
(2) First - age limit 35
(3) Second - age limit 40
Training
(1) After 1924 - command courses for commanders,
(2) New military schools - 3-4 years curricula.
(3) Different schools for branches of service.
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(4) Rigorous discipline
(5) Majority of Fold army" officers mustered out, However, /4 000 remained
in high staff and command positions.
Greatest weakness - Red Army
Lack of modern technique and equipment.
Soviet strategy and tactics rejected definitely the idea of the supremacy of
the defense.
Visualized future war as a war of movement and maneuver, with possible periods
of stabilized positional warfare in certain sectors.
5 -year plan of 1928 began to supply the tanks and planes necessary. "By
1934 the Red Army's mechanized forces and aviation were qualitatively equal
to any in Western Europe." Army now ready for numberical expansion.
(1) March 1934 - Army and Navy reorganized into the Commissariat of Defense
with sweeping powers over the armed forces.
(2) 1938 - A Supreme Military Council set up, headed by Stalin.
(3) Standing army raised to 9/+0,000 men in 1934.
(4) In 1935 - raised to 1,300,000
Expenditures for Red Army.
1924 - 395,000,000 rubles
1934 - 5,000,000,000
1936 - 34,000,000,000
1939 - 34,000,000,000
A voluntary military organization for defense training numbered 12,000,000
by 1939.
1939 (March)
(1) Reised reserve status to 50.
(2) Army numbered 2,000,000
(3) Tank forces had increased by 108% since 1930. Aviation by 130%,
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(4) Artillery arm, the most powerful in Europe
(5) Divisional artillery - All rifle divisions (of the triangular type)
were increased from 13,000 to 18,000 men:
As a result of battle test
1938 - 1939 in border war with Japan
1939 - 1940 - Finnish War
Marshal Semyon K. Timoshenko - Began drastic changes in training methods -
May 1940.
(1) Improvement of tactical leadership of platoons, companies, battalions
(2) Eradication of routine training methods.
(3) Large scale maneuvers abandoned.
(4) Tactical field exercises - no larger than a division at a time.
(5) Re-create the realities of the modern battlefield.
(6) Separate training of different arms was abolished, since teamwork
a d flexible cooperation of all arms were considered the foundation
or modern tactics, with infantry and artillery recognized as the
mainstay of the battle team.
(7) Night combat
(8) Prolonged operations in extreme cold.
(9) Troops toughened by intensified physical training and long
marches over difficult terrain.
In 1.936 a new constitution was approved in the Soviet Union, the Stalin
Constitution, or the Constitution of Victorious Socialism, as it was called.
It was held that the enactment of this Constitution to replace the earlier one
of 1923 marked the arrival of a classless society in the USSR and the substantial
realization of socialism. In reality, the society into which this constitution
was born had a gradation into classes reasonably unique in western history.
NUAL
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Suffice it to say for the moment that while there were many features in this
constitution which on paper appeared to be highly democratic, there were others
which were highly undemocratic, and when the constitution had gone into effect,
if rapidly became apparent that the Soviet Union remained as much a totalitarian
state as it had been before. The forms had been changed; the reality continued.
We will now consider briefly the great purges of the 1930)s, the purges
which finally enabled Stalin to eliminate all possible opposition within
party, government and armed forces. It all started on December 1, 1934, when
Serge Kirov, party boss in Leningrad and a personal friend of Stalin, was
assassinated by a former member of the Komsomol, the Young Communists League
of the USSR. Stalin went immediately to Leningrad and personally interrogated
the assassin. The young man denied any accomplices, but Stalin had just the
excuse that he needed. There followed a reign of terror in which, once again,
thousands were rounded up, including many top party leaders. The accused were
examined for two years. The first great trial took place in August 1936, with
Kamenev, Zinoviev, and eleven other leaders in the dock. They were tried be-
fore the military collegium of the USSR Supreme Court. They were charged
with the murder Of Kirov, a plot to assassinate Stalin and other Soviet leaders,
the overthrow of the Government and the destruction of the Five-Year Plan, atd
the promise of the return of the Ukraine to Germany in return for German sup-
port of the new government.
Most of the accused were found guilty, and several were executed, includ-
ing Kamenev and Zinoviev. Thus, the end of Stalin's two former cohorts in the
triumvirate that succeeded Lenin.
In January 1937, there occurred the trial of the 17, including Karl
Radek, Piatakov, and Sokolnikov. The changes against them were that they
plotted to overthrow the government and that they had maintained contact with
fir
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Germany, Poland, and Japan. Most of the accused were executed. Karl Radek
was sentenced to 10 years and has never been heard from since.
In June 1937, 7 of the top generals in the Army including the Chief
of Staff, Marshal Tukhachevsky, were tried by secret court-martial and all of
them executed. In March 1938, there occurred the trial of the so-called "bloc"
of Rightists and Trotskyites." There were 21 accused, including Bukharin,
Rykov, and Yogoda. Yogoda was the former Chief of the Ogpu and had been
responsible for some of the earlier purge trials. Now his turn came. Most
of the accused were executed, including Bukharin, Rykov, and Yogoda. No
friend, no cohort, no acquaintance of any of the accused was safe. Anyone
iaho had had contact with the accused was contaminated in the Party's eye.
The purge ran the gamut of the party, the government, and the armed
forces from top to bottom. The total number accused, tried and sentenced ran
into the many, many thousands. The sentence of death against Leon Trotsky
was not carried out until 1940. At that time, Trotsky was living on the out-
skirts of Mexico City. A man known as Jacques Monard appeared on the scene,
claiming to be a loyal follower of Trotsky's Fourth International. Evenually,
Madam Trotsky introduced Monard to her husband and within a few minutes,
Monard had struck Trotsky with a pickax. It became clear that Monard was
acting as an agent of the NKVD, but it has never been possible conclusively
to prove this. Monard is currently serving a long prison term in the Mexican
penitentiary, where he has a nicely furnished suite of cells and is provided
for by "some unknown source."
FII
i $.
m a a
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RUSSIA - 1939-1950
Foreign. relations up :Lo 1939
Recognized by England 1924
Recognized by U. S. (de facto) 1933
Anti-Comintern Pact - 1937
Undeclared war on Japan 193 1939
Entered League of Nations 1934
Aided the Republicans in Spanish Civil War 1936-1939.
Franco (Rebels ) (Government loyalists)
(Nationalists) (Republicans )
In 1931 Stalin said:
"We are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must
make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it or they crush us."
XII. World War II - 1939-1945
In 1941 the ten years were up.
Hitler in 1941 -
"The enemy (Russia) is already broken and will never rise again. . .
10 year non-aggression pact with Germany.
September 1, 1939 - Germany invaded Poland.
Russia moved in on the other side
March 1940 - Russia annexed over 16,000 square miles of Finland.
August 3, 1940 -
Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania
(60,000 sq. miles
6,000,000 population)
Became members of the USSR
-Ipr
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June 26, 1940
Bessarabia
North Bukovina from Rumania
These gains added about 100,000 sq. miles - 10,000,000 inhabitants.
Russia - a revisionist State
This is a restoration, not expansion
All this territory save North Bukovina had formed part of the Russian Empire
1914.
Here was a great danger to Germany - no buffer States between her and Russia.
Germany - wanted Russian oil, coal, timber, minerals, wheat.
Germany was afraid of Russia.
Vast Russian plains offered an ideal field for Blitzkrieg tactics.
Russia -
(1) Studied German tactics in Poland.
(2) Eliminated a two-front war by concluding a ten-yeax non-aggression
pact with Japan - Arpil 13, 1941.
(3) April 1941 - Stalin end Molotov visited Berlin - wanted too much.
(4) Stalin - supreme command.
June 22, 1941 -
German armies smashed across the Soviet frontier from the Baltic to the Black
Seas. 200 divisions.
Finland - Hungary - Bulgaria - Rumania
Wehrma,cht captured 1,000,000 prisoners -
Smolensk - Kiev - Odessa - Kharkov - Rostov
Russians yielded territory for time
Rallied before Leningrad - Moscow - Sevastopol
Guerrilla forces in the rear.
Vi l 1-1 " H LI!1
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(Von Manstein - "War Crimes"
Against International Law
Loss of German tank forces Guderian - Hitler
Russian counter-attack in the winter
Skilled in winter fighting and transportation problems.
Constructed factories in the Ural region - 1,000 miles from the
combat zone.
Napoleon once described Britain & Russia as the '4great intangibles" -
Britain because of the Channel. Russia because of its vast area.
Summer of 1942 -
(1) German armies renewed the attack
(2) This time they turned South
(3) Oil of the Caucasus - worth 1,000,00.0 men to either side.
(4) Sevastopol and Rostov fell
(5) Stalingrad on the Volga - through which the oil was shipped
Held out for months against titanic assaults.
(6) Germans bogged down again in the winter.
20% of its oil
30% of its population
40% of its coal and machine tool_ industry
50% of its richest wheat fields, livestock
1943 - 1944 - Russian counter-offensive
Spring of 1944 - Germany defending her own horders.
Eastern front ablaze from Finland to East Prussia through Poland,
Hungary, Rumania.
1945 - Germany engulfed by hordes of Russian armies.
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Soviet Contribution
4/5 of the total Germancasualties in killed, wounded and missing were
casualties of the Eastern front.
American contribution - 70% of Western Front.
Allied air forces "softened up"
Germany - "round the clock bombing."
Eastern front - 200-300 divisions
3-4 million men
In first 3 years of the war Russia lost in battle
5,300,000 killed and prisoners
30,000 planes
49,000 tanks
48,000 guns
Add about 20% for the remainder of the war.
Destroyed by Germans -
1,710 towns and cities
70,000 villages
6,000,000 buildings
31,850 factories
98,000 collective farms
7,000,000 horses
17,000,000 head of cattle
About 3/4 of a million sq. mi. of Russia laid waste by the war.
Last shots fired on Western Front May 13, 1945.
As agreed upon - Russia declared war on Japan exactly 3 months after the
capitulation of Germany - August 8, 1945 (Yalta).
3 Soviet army groups converged on the center of Manchuria from 3 Bides
Jap army - 1,000,000
Lost 594,000 prisoners including 148 generals.
80,000 killed
925 planes
369 tanks
1225 field guns
Red Army lost only 8,219 killed, 22,264 wounded,
U. S. supplied Russia with $11,141,000,000 of Lend Lease.
(British Empire - 30 billion; France - 2 billion)
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41 RIAL
XIII - Post War Problems
Stalin - 1946 - "I do not believe in a real danger of a 'new War'."
United Nations -
Security Council - 11 States
5 permanent U. S.
England
France
China
Russia
6 non-permanent - elected for 2-year terms.
No international police force.
Its authority is almost exclusively moral.
After Germany surrendered - Russian troops in Berlin and Balkans.
(This is what Churchill feared).
Russian foreign poling dictated by Stalin and Commissar of Foreign Affairs-
Vyacheslov M. Molotov.
Peace making machinery set up in Berlin - August 1945
Stalin - Attlee - Truman
(China and France not consulted much.)
Treaties were not submitted to the U. N. before they were signed.
The "Council of Foreign Ministers" drafted the terms.
Peace terms were imposed on the defeated.
Everything went slowly - the foreign ministers couldn't agree.
Meanwhile "elections" were held in the conquered and "liberated" lands.
Peoples of these areas usually voted to please their occupying force.
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In Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia - Russian influence
was dominant. Communism was voted in;
In Norway, Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium, the British and American
zones of Germany, and Austria, Italy, Greece - the Communist note was Small.
Post war plebiscites in general indicated that the 400,000,000 European people
west of the Soviet frontier preferred to work out their social and economic
problems by some middle road rather than by the extreme form of collectivism
which the Corm nist leaders had established in Russia
In the year following Germanyts surrender the "Council of Foreign Ministers"
met over 200 times - London, Moscow, Paris, New York.
By the end of 1946 they approved treaties for Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria,
Hungary, Finland.
The indemnities from these countries almost invariably went to Russia.
Armies of Occupation
U. S. 250,000 soldiers
Japan - South Korea - Philippines o Pacific Island
Russia 250,000
North Korea - Manchuria
Britain Hongkong - Malay States - Singapore - Burma
France - Indo-China (trouble)
Holland - Indonesia (trouble)
A year after all the fighting was over, more than 3,000,000 Russian, British,
and American soldiers were still on foreign soil.
About half (1,500,000) in Germany and Austria.
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1946 - Soviet forces $00,000
British 380,000
U. S. 305,000
RILL
Soviets kept an additional 800,000 in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania.
"Truman Doctrine'"-
U. S. to support peoples resisting attempted subjugation by outside
pressure. So Congress appropriated $400,000,000 to aid Greece and Turkey.
Molotov Plan - 1949
(1)
Red's answer to the North Atlantic Pact.
(2) A military alliance which includes easter# Germany, Finland and
China and all the satellites - planned by Molotov.
(3) Unification under a central Moscow agency of all military, economic,
industrial, and financial resources.
(4) Ultimately a single system of communications and currencies.
Creation of an intercontinental Eurasian army - under the direct
control of the Soviet General Staff and staffed by Russian officers
and political Commissars.
(5)
Can we stop the Red Army on the Rhine?
Yes, says Nellor in LOOK, January 3, 1950,
(1)
He claims our top military leaders believe we and wour allies can.
(2) Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff - "We intend, under the
North Atlantic Security Pact and the European Arms Aid Program, to
hold Western Eurppe. We do not intend to have to take it after it has
been lost to the invader."
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General Bradley (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff)
"Russia must be stopped cold for at least 120 days after she launches
her initial assault. This is cushion of time we need to put the vast allied
strategical ground air and sea plan into operations."
Our allies - - Great Britain
Belgium
Holland
Luxemboug, Norway, Denmark, Italy, Iceland, Portugal,
Greece, Turkey, Iran, Korea, Philippine
France has 470,000 soldiers
9 French divisions are equipped with American arms.
U. S. - 5 divisions in Europe.
Allies, at the most, can count on 1,500,000
Russia can throw in 4,000,000
But unless stopped at the Rhine, Russia could get 10,000,000 men up.
Russian Air Force - 18,000 planes
(6,000 are the latest jets)
12 tactical air armies
She has 500 B-29 type bombers capable of carrying atom bombs.
Experimenting with a 1,700 mile an hour guided rockets - it fliees~ at
60,000 feet.
Maybe the Russians will break up into factions.
Germany made a great blunder in 1941. At that time she had millions of
eager accomplices in Russia.
Especially - Ukranians
Volga Tartars
Azerbaijan
Armenians
Georgians
North Caucasians
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Here are figures on Soviet prisoners - figures taken not from propaganda
sources but from the secret files of the Foreign Armies (East) Department
June 29 - July 7
Pocket of Minsk 320, 000
* July 16 - Smolensk 300,000
Aug. 5-8 - Uman 103,000
Sept. 24 - Kiev 665,000
Oct. 18 - Kryansk )
Vyazma ) 665,000
Mass surrender of more than 2,000,000 men took place at a moment when the
Soviet forces were fighting on their own soil against a nation which they
knew to be the aggressor.
Prisoners of war said it was impossible either to live or the under the collec-
tive system.
Ukranians, Belts, White Russians, even Great Russians were used as K. P.'s
then genuine volunteers - paid, fed, and clothed on the same basis as German
troops.
Hitler blundered on every point - in handling the Red Army, the peasants
and the minorities. Hitler in 1941
purely military means.
was confident he could beat Stalin by
By 1942 there were 200,000 of these volunteers.
By 1943 - there were 500,000 Soviet citizens in the German army. Some of these,
of course, were coerced.
Maybe there are possibilities here.
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4IAL
From Air Int. Reports, September 1947
THE EXTENT OF RUSSIAN EXPANSION DURING THE LAST CENTURY
In a recent New Times article entitled "American Expansion, Past and
!,resent," the Soviet writer A. Leontiev accused the United States of
territorial expansion to the extent of ten times the size of the original
thirteen colonies. In this connection, it is interesting to examine the
extent of Russian expansion in less than a century. Since 1858 Russia has
acquired a total of 764,300 sq. miles. (All area figures in this report are
given to the nearest hundred sq. miles.) The USSR's title to 184,900 sq.
miles of the 280,200 sq. miles added under the Soviet regime is still in
dispute because those territories were obtained as the result of provisional
agreements or unilateral actions.
Between 1853 and 1914 the Russian Empire acquired a total of 953, 400
sq. miles. The Crimean War (1853-1856) put a stop to expansion in Europe and
even caused the temporary loss of Bessarabia between 1850 and 1$78 . In Central
Asia and the Far East, however, Russia expansion reached its peak during this
pet.iod. In Central Asia, Turkestan (650,000 sq, miles) are conquered between
1867 and 1891 from local regimes, with some minor cessions from Persia and
Afghanistan. Meanwhile exploration and settlement of the Pacific coast re-
suited in the annexation of 266,600 sq. miles. North Sakhalin was incorporated
in 1857. Between 185" and 1860 China signed treaties recognizing Russian
possession of areas north of the Amur and along the Pacific Ocean is what
is known today as the Primorski (Maritime) Krai. South Sakhalin (1875) and
Port ,.rthur (1898) were both acquired during this period but were lost again
in 1905 when they were yielded to Japan by the Treaty of Portsmouth.
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In addition to the major annexations in the above areas, the Russian
Empire consolidated its hold on the Caucasus by the incorporation of Circassis
in 1864, and the cession of Kars and Batum by Turkey in the Treaty of San
Stefano (1878). These acquisitions (22,000 sq. miles) completed the con-
quest of the Caucasus which had begun in the eErly 1800's. Finally, ex-
ploration of the Arctic resulted in the formal annexation of the island of
`evernaya Zemlya (14,600 sq. mil.) in 1913. The area of Russia had been
roughly 7,691,600 sq. miles in 1853. (The territory of Alaska (today
586,400 sq. miles), which was discovered by the Russians in 1741, was sold to
the U. S. in 1867.) On the eve of the World War, following these annexations,
the Russian Zniipire comprised 8,645,00 sq. miles.
In the years iimriediately following the revolution of 1917 the territorial
domain of Russia was diminished by 469,300 sq. miles. Finland, Esthonia,
Latvia and Lithuania declared their independence. Kars was ceded to Turkey,
Bessarabia returned to Rumania, and a large area was lost to the newly created
Poland. Post-war Soviet Russia had an area of 8,175,700 sq. miles. The
only extension of territory before 1939 was the formal annexation (announced
in 1926) of all islands in the Arctic which fall within the triangle describ-
ed by the lines of longitude 3204'31". East and 168?49'31" West, the North
Pole forming the apex and the northern coast of Russia, the base of the
triangle.
Figures for the area involved have not been issued by the USSR. Except for this
addition, the borders of Soviet Russia remained static until 1939.
At present its territory comprises 8,455,900 sq. miles. Since 1939 the
USSR has expanded vigorously. A total of 280,600 sq. miles has been brought
under direct Soviet control; 20,200 sq. miles have been added to Soviet to j-
tory and 400 sq. miles are leased or jointly occupied. The net gain in acqui-
.~~IT1
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sitions since 1853 is 764,300 sq. miles. Territories which were formerly part
of the Russian empire, and comprising 196,400 sq. miles in all, have been re-
gained. These include Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bessarabia and Bokovina,
and South Sakhalin, as well as large parts of pre-war Poland and Finland. In
addition, the Koenigsberg area, the Transcarpathian Ukraine, Tannu Tuva and
the Kuriles (totaling 59,900 sq. miles) have been brought within Russian
boundaries for the first time. Not officially part of the USSR, but tempor-
arily under Soviet control are Porkkala UDD in Finland and Port Arthur in
Manchuria, roughly equaling 400 sq. miles.
Only part of these recent additions have been internationally recognized.
The new areas have been acquired in a variety of ways and the validity of
Soviet claims to them varies in degree. Annexation of the areas from Finland
and Poland and of the Transcarpathian Ukraine from Czechoslovakia, a total
of 95,400 sq. miles, has already been recognized in treaties with the countries
involved. A fifty-year lease of Porkkala Udd is provided for in the Treaty of
Peace with Finland. The USSR has not acquired sovereignty over Port Authur,
but has an agreement with China providing for joint maintenance of a military
base in that area for thirty years.
Soviet possession of the remaining 184,900 sq. miles still awaits inter-
national recognition and confirmation in the forthcoming treaties with Germany
and Japan. Provisional occupation of the Koenigsberg area was arranged in the
Potsdam agreement and of South Sakhalin and the Kuriles in the Yalta agree-
ment. Permanent title to these areas totaling 24,400 sq. miles, depends
directly upon the peace treaties.
The acquisitions of the Baltic States, Bessarabia, and Tannu-Tuva, totaling
160,500 sq. miles, are the result of unilateral actionF covered in the case
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of the first two by prior agreements with Nazi Germany along. The annexation
of Tannu Tuva was evidently accomplished by peaceful means and followed a vote
in the Tuvian council for incorporation. None of those annexations has as yet
been recognized by the United States, although only the legality of Soviet
incorporation of the Baltic States has so far been questioned.
20 October 1952
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