INDICATIONS INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03362A000800120002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 31, 2014
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 1, 1955
• Content Type: SPEECH

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TAB
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210-11".
Ode.d. iA Iss. vo..)
INDICATIONS INTELLIGENCE
50X1
0,1?, //i(!.
s of Ir*Ucations Intelligence is primarily a rather highly
form of current intelligence. it began its life over in the
current intelligence shop here in CIA. It flourishes in a constant flow of
information and it bee very little time for anything like research in depth
ar even, in most cases, thinking in depth. We do our thieking first. We set
up a matrix or an outline plan and then we usually scan everything that comes
across our desks for evidence to fit it. In a sense this is preconditioned
intelligenoe and it is prone to all the errors of preconceptions. At the same
time, however, we have masters that can force upon us a certain objectivity
and real!". It keeper us pretty well cleaned out. The business is fairly old
by intelligence standards. Not many things in intelligence go back more than
6 or 7 years, in their present manner of practice. We go back to the summer
of 'AS when the perilous state of CIA and of American intelligence in general
mode it unpleasantly clear to ea that, in the case of the Berlin Blockade, we
had no idea whether the aircraft that were arriving in fields around Berlin
represented the Soviet intention to interfere with the ainift to the extent
of shooting down our aircraft and thereby running a very grave risk at war,
or whether they were merely a routine replacement of the aircraft normally
stationed in the area. We discovered that we knew very little about the level
of Soviet rilitary preparations, the extent to which they had backtracked since
the level of readiness that they maintained at the end of the mar, and we were
astonished to discover that no real integrated plan existed for pulling that
information together in one place. Out of the series of panic-struck questions
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,
vo,
whieh were addressed to various collectors in the field by the alit
limos agencies: and by ourselves, and out of a little bit of deep thinki
plegariem from some brief studies, we pulled together en indication. list, a
shock list. A cheek Het is the core and heart and guts of the indicationm
business. It is a list of those activities which we expect to see the Umtata
the Civmtete,xualerteke prior to going to weir. Implicit in this definition
and
are a number of thing'
prepered to go
many respects
themselves in a state
war
One of them, that the Swifts at ,my one time are not
t implies, likewise, the, the Soviets, reasonable in
self interest, would take certain measures to place
esdilaess before they take off. They mill not start
off upprepared if they plan to win a war. It likewise impliee--and this is
our greatest, most ticklish operating assumptioo--that somehow, someplace, some-
where, evidence that these aetivitiee are being undertaken by the Soviets and
members or the Communist party will come to the attention of the fasuflung out-
poets of CS and
These are pretty big assumptions Noah
remains to 'ansfczn thi into fact. ut they are reasonable aaetione at
present and we think we can operate in them. By indicators, thus, we postulate
in categories largely fUnctionel the degrees of mobilisation, steps toward
mobilisation and weir readiness which a given level of Soviet existence, leak
of preparedness, revelers for auctimum war readiness. Wow these indicators are
drawn from what al:peers to be reasonably necessary in our 'current intelligence
appreciations of what the Soviets are doing or are about in their eley by day
operetione. If the Soviets, for example, in the instance of state loom, have
as they did abort4 after Joe's death, reduced the requirement on the individual
LI
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which in prepare
'barbel goods the Soviets
is reasonable to aesume that
set into existence a btzub of
in the consequent concurrent shortages of
have to siphon off in some way or another-.it
one farm or another the bite on the fleeting
eonsx purchasing power will be nods. Therefore, for the purposes of our in-
dleator list, one element in Soviet military preparation is the raising of the
state lasa or the adoption of other measures which exist and can be identified
for the siphoning off of consumer purchasing power. Br a backtracking proves',
which starts from a point of the amount of consumer goods floating around in the
merket on which theee connumer purchasing power rubles can be 'pent, you can
estimate, roughly, about where in the mobilisation process it is necessary to
impose these measures, Our current estimate is that they would probably have
to be doing it at about 1100 days. Certainly, in some of the areas where the
rural population can keep the purchasing power situation loused np with a goad
heathy free norket, they may have to impose it a little earlier. Thorofere
if we see this imposition of the purchasing power restrictions concurrently
with a number of other items, we can arrive at some sort of conclusion that the
aussiene are ap to something that they didn't have to be up to prior to name
decision taken at some prior date. An indicator by itself, and there are
hundreds or them literally, is not particularly useful alone. They can give
pon a misleading impression. If you hang all your bats on one hodk that hook
is not adequate to give you a judgment of color. A number of theee thioge will
Mese ooncurrently, The pattern of their oocurance be rate at which they
fellow one another in the position, in adoption, in implementation will give
you something of an idea of the rate of preparation. Backtracked from it will
tLif h
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hthed.
tag prepared to meet any aggression on
a collateral Josue the interesting spew-
believe their own propaganda that the United
? aggressive &attritive and intentions'whieh
elle The cumulative effect of reading the
of it in the daily current take which he on cms
La the prooess of indications Intelligenee.
more than a highly specialized view of
stated The indioater lists Whieh exist
drool up in the *ourse of the panic of
moditied to include lessons we learned from the
of them have yet mode the adjustmest.
atomic, bombes and the various new
In thie high performance of spool
and ultimately we mill have to adjust
Imes, therefore, is tr no means a
and it needs revision all the time,
of the things which we, in 1948
the norm now beeeme so mak a
he disabused as haviog am-
Whig mere than the eUhstanee of daily life
troops.
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OLWIL-11
vie
am n amount of birtility and a
eater d*Penda primarily on the amount of kmKnoleige
?twee which en be martialad to study the validitV
find that it is no longerreasmaible to believe that
te to the Polishmaussian or ftemmdan.anssian
ng etook from East Germany and Hungary in order to
in behind the advancing tome-4f this
have springing soles thRt move book and
f railcars eastward is no longer of
uneble to determine whether or not
we had a very tlTteT*8ting report
mnsged to e3aep through the change.
the Soviets did
done so often
? points tt2t the Whole not *rouse a
very smooth, It's very off t3es3ydone. but it
to permit massive through passage of freight trains
tems. h.y'r. doing it by arenas They piek up
pit& it right up like that and eit it down on
aro operated with such amoothnesa and efficiency
is not even Waken in the tranefer. This
himself on his way into Poland. As far
hangs of axle without any change in
axles:taro.
job Gan be
to d
eh
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changes, this iuiicatcT goes oii
to save the amount of time that
an whether or net these freight cars been evacuated to the eastern borders'
in order to get rid of it from our considerations,we need to be told V an
intelligence analyst more or lees specialised in transportation that this is
saw the ease with respect to rail axles at the border obange.pcints. We
eamst do it far ourselves; there are not very mew of ea and we have raw
ether lobs to do beside* fallowing transportation intelligence in its minute
MXpeind this example to include almoet any other indicator that you
might think of and you find that our real function is nothing much more than
a central coordinating exobanges where we go beck to them people asking them
if they harasser', anything to justify the value of this indioator as being
metal nowt ourrent1y valumbles or whether they think because of teohnologleal
edwameement an the part of the Soviets, the indicator ought to be thrown out
and the money spent trying to collect information on that should be spent in
some other wr
This whole promos
have to go Into more and more of the garlioators that had built.in
Many items of preparation, for example particularly in physical
life spew. They'll be good for six menthe, they'll be
they'll be good for a year, but no more. The ideal Indio-atm
t is one which reflects an activity so expensive in nature that
or the difficulties we run These
reporting. Now, since the the oases
that they don't need to beee
ow. To put it out the windows and
put into trying to collect information
4-tr)
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op .ry.
purposet the of conducting a
houiit b? on. Ch can be easily observed, either
repercussions on life in general
our observers are restricted in
U53iOfl$ of this partieular activity
Wu. New, there are not very many
it takes to do it is a little
If we believe, for example,
preceded by urban evacuation and
in the ovist orbit it does not re.-
it these beoms, of the
it of materials involved, diltake a
is not very taxing on the gint.
a longer period of timethan the
baeetoatS target, This is a
and it needs a groat deal mare uark on
cannot believe that the Soviet ninisters.-
nowt who have case up through the ranks, and
their machinery and their industrial plant
very dimly peracive--that these men would knowingly
equipment, plant, and the industrial powers vhich
operations by bOling to take this seesuret of
tion. Rehabilitation of vital industry in part mews
where, menned halt-tine er on a stand.by eustodial
on heavy machinery building enterprieee? and also
0
a 1
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law
eelvanixedro
given regions
workers would
in quantities
what they
in; canned food
arr of whieh will be visible A'on the
of which will be reflected in the
on material that is reenired.plastic board
large nature compared in
e far the tents that the
requiring as it does certain techniques
of preparatim and cans. Canned food is not a ni loditT in the USSR
in the VUAnme that it is in the OS; eansequeut27 of abnormal
sequestration creamed goods vill have an ineedie impact on the civilian
market particularly if it's undertaken on a wide seals in a very abort period
of build., time, as would have to be the case if it were to preoeed a sneak
attack on the Milted States. Now, this involuted reasoning process is what
needs to go min all oases, far all indieetors. at it involve* is a
eontinual perfulation or a projection of a personality, of ourselvee..into
wMt the Scvleta met to have to do, and then reading from our many, many
contacts of what they are doing and whether or not there is aur Juxtaposition
mincidenne, parallel or'oorrespondence between What the Soviets are doing
and what we through constant zireamerath of these problema find that they
should be doing in order to prepare for wur* itts a transparently simple
Preelles? Mgr, is no magic about it* but it does reqpire a group of people
primerily oriented in this direction and with little elm to do* In other
words, am indications group of any sort needs to be sprung from the neoessity
of regurgitating the contents of State Department cables in a publication.
the incredible amount of time and energy that goes into the grab, gobble and
regurgitate process of current intelligence vitiate* the concentration rewired
? I
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SECRET
9
At long last me have achieved thin remarkable lirvena. WO have an i
center established and we will prebably be moving in this weekend, in the
second baeement of the Pentagon down neer the Air 'brae Command Post. mor
g*ise &railroad ear, in effect to work withm.a space 20 ft. midi and 150
l'eng mbich requires fintastio juggling in order toad* it operate
ffleiently. Mike gat 20 people in all, 11 analysts drawn from the Arm, !key
Airforce, Stets and CiA A lot of them senior people a lot of them experienced
in the reeket, mew of ths with considerable military experience In intelligence
during the lest difficulties or Noreen situation. Cer respoosibility is to
grab as mob infermation as we an from as many ectweos as we den. WO hove
provided for us direct dissemination to es fres all of the earvices CIA and
trnte, in all of the olaseifloations and categories that e required for our
We get the i tion esmi-eaw, semi-finished aM finished, and we go
t of us now do almost automatically the kind of
given item of information that we pia up, and
an the current intelligence point of view
btIbII xt which forour specialised purpeee is just so darn much
as a enpport operation fer an into:regenay
fl various farms ter some time. The first
49 after a year of concentrated missionary
a pseudo, quesi, partial aemi.eammittee
In late 1950, the job was turned over to
eb had other earittee going paralleling ours and roughly feeding
mark
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`11- 4.111,
a
cent
"7.
of colonels and brigidier
which our informal situation
tion right ep to August
people. At that time
ove tbe*lves...?which we salutary and
ee nod in a recommendation for the .atab.-
ion like Indications Center. This was
thought about it and appointed an WA= eon.
tions center if it were possible. This was
a loag, 100g, vinter of muoh diecussion over rimy
been passed to me totally unsolved. This proems
AC in May of a DC/C lA widely known as one-halt-
gave us a charter of things to ft', /fret
diseussion so far that we ere in the in..
he intelligence business prinerily, it can be
erter t we have other things do as well.
lizing and highly controversial prevision in our
Ito are to develop and operate on the ammentoontinuing heals
intelligence plan for astern:Maine, 000relming 004 00-
ih appropriate channels the world-wide oollectioa by DS
tion and intelligence that Is pertinent to the Watch
is a great deal of hope promise and ultimate
deepeir 1 ppoee, in the word 'energising', a rare and interestiee word
in the int
gence comma/404 and one which doesn't usually find it's way
through the stream of gobblady-gook into a domment with the official etature
SECRET
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t energizing a collection channel is yet to be die.'.
covered, but we are working on means. Its intent is laudable; the difficulties
inherent In the lack of definition in this charge are the substance of the
problems which wedaily feco. The purpose of it is obvious], for 1.1A to be able
in ringing tones of commamd, to inform a collector in Warsaw that he better get
off his chair and get out there and count the freight cars coming through from
Brest.Litovek on their way to Frankfurt on the Oder or get out and do something
anyhow. To do so, however, requires passage through a number of established
channels and mapr of them troot energising attempts in the past have developed
a protective coating somewhat like a pearl, though less valuable, against such
tissoli. This is to bad. I think we will have to adopt a principle of the
corrosive effect of vinegar on pearls, ultimately, to bring about an aoecmplish?
meet this responsibility. We also are to arrange through the IAO, r the
appropriate member thereof, for the exploitation of every domestic and foreign
source of information and intelligetee pertinent to the Watch Committee mission
end, among other actions, arrange an appropriate time for representative IAC
field s to confer with us, and so on, in order effectively to 'coordinate
but not direct (it says here) field intelligence activities. The contrast
betjeen what is intended in the second charge with what is required for the
execution of the first providee us mein one of these gloriously unsolved pblem
with which we must daily live. Nevertheless, we're getting along, we'll get the
Many of you are veterans of this organisation, and know the intelligence commundty
better than a first?come on basis; you knowP what it takes to arrange through the
IAC or the appropriate member thereof the exploitation of every domestic and
foreign source of information and intelligence pertinent to the Watch Committee
_
3E1-
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I
'44111T '41Wit
12 -
siesian. Ton can see in this a task of magnitude, partieu1arLy when you deal
with eteh nonoLttbie entities as G-2 and the requirements apparatus in CIA
ass such things as that which have a defensive language all their own, not
susceptible of interpretation by those who venture in .rom the outside We
arrange with the IAC agency for a aystematio screening or informetion and intel-
ligance received by them by any means for the purpose of immediately extracting
and forwarding all items which may contain indications of Soviet Communist
intentions to commit hostile actions, and so on. Arranging with the IAC
agencies for a nystematie screening in essence boils down to going out beating
the streets and collaring analysts everywhere and saying If you see anything
like this send it to us and remeMber it six months from now when you eight Imo
It." Our principal job follows right in this charge, and that is a constant
irritant, an irritating liaison with those who are otherwise preoccupied that
they shall remember, when the der comes to pass, a piece of dope which we
desperately need on our remote underground dungeon. This inherently implies
an set of faith on, which the national salvation depends. That sounds rather
grandiose, but it is ultimately the came. It imparts to the individual analyst
responsibility to get for us from that they IMO the word which will fit in
with all the other pieces we should at the same time be reosiving from a number
of her analysts. We will have a cumulative picture of Soviet tar preparation
frca day to dey, coning along so that we will be able to take this to the Watch
Coemittee and ow "Reverend Sirs the situation is bleak," and they can In turn
will put their stamp on it and pass it up to the IAC and so on. I have long
experienced with analysts, having been one myeell, being one still in many cases
ad I am aware that there many diversions on them. They are required to grab,
gobble and regurgitate current intelligence, and because or the convolutions of
R1:19F1
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13
which
cesses in the intelligence c
all their own, I know that the a
f his piece, on which he has lavl
which have a regener,-
more preoccupied with
professional care,
rued with the recognition of the intelligence items and their
he-less it is our mission to keep him jammed up enough
t along when he finds it, if he finds it, and as he finds it. This
ly or CiA, but it is also for every other organization from which
rawmar raw materials and intake. As I ear there are eleven of us
ssional side of this indications center and I think it is quite
Is that we've got quite a job right there. Now we do other things
roreafly inescapable. The three that I've gone into here in detail
are the challenging aspects of the job. That's the hard work. That's the
essential to cur success. If we can't do these things, then we haven't any
business being around, drawing pay and being a repositca7 of national confidence
in a manner of speaking. tie also develop early evaluation, we coordinate, we
prepare meterial for the use of the Watch Committee, we reproduse and diseeminate
approved Latch Committee reports, maintain files of indications, maintain raw
maps and test the application of mechanical aids and techniques to the problem
on an experimental basis. This in a recognition of the high level pressure
for a pi .b.13. machine of flame sort which will react with flashing lights and
the chorus will start waving a banner at the appearance of armaments information.
Therese an incredible amount of pressor* that we do this I fortunately have
been able to draw up gy budget without any reference to a mechanioal emperimenta.
tion category. I don't know haw long I'll be left in my innocence to continue
that wey. The indicationn center Is just getting started. We have spent six
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oLtaiir I
%NW
of the most lute
14
and confused months that I think anyone could eve
have in the intelligence business. 4e have built this thing from a direot e
up into a physical appliant, into personnel, into regulations, into everything.
We've done everything that it took to originally build CIA. And if the CIA
is ever demolished T am available for rebuilding. I know how to do it.
I've done it. T have an kir Toro* Officer who's a colonel, who thought he had
seen everything in SAC, and whose confusion and perturbation is great these
days since I have banded him meny of the jobs I am unable to undertake myself.
We run into oppoeition over-ambitious help, encouragement occasional contempt,
aM now and then the insolence of office. These are exceptable in the Intel-
nee community; by and large the reaction has been extremely helpful. BY
and large the amount of energy and help that people are willing to give us
Is Just unexpectedly great. Much will depend in the future on our timing in
going back to these people for hap. They want to use their help at this time
We hope that their hopes and enmies and good will will oontinus to exist in
the future when we will desperately need them. Now, we are an interagency
organisation engaged in current intelligence of one sort or another. We are
a full-tine shop with gs sitting there wearing various uniforms and various
forms of civilian clothes. We represent a new thing. This is the only ernoh
thing. There are other inter-agency operations which are more of a coordina-
ting body, a consultant body, advisory body, ad-hoc committee or something like
that, but we are a working substantive organization on an inter.agency basis
and as such our problems certainly reflect a new thing under the sun. This
being the case we afe repository for many collateral and occasionally irrelevant
qr11F3L1-
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problem which
have sort of had in the back of their safes for maw
year* waiting for an inter.agency substantive organisation to come along and
here it is let's give them this to work with. #ot of our tine is spent in
fending these off. In view of the nature of Soviet technological advancement
recently and the horrifying appearance of a faur-jet bomber last year, there
is a great deal of pressure by those wile feel the need for an alert meohanisr
of great reliability, high speed, accuracy, and perceptiveness hitherto
=achieved. They have been trying to hang that albatross on me for some t.
WS profess and sincerely believe ourselves to be in the advanced warning beale
and not the early warning basis We consider ourselves to be different than
those energetic peeple in the far north sitting in those round houses watching
blips on screens. Tde do not believe that we have the capacity properly to
seise upon the receipt of information . a flight of Soviet bonbers are emeAng
In over Alaska - and order the ADC into a goner qparters. I blanche at the
idea of r doing something like that. I'm not getting paid nearly enough for
that kind of responsibility. Let them who are being paid cam it. I firmly
believe that our position should be when such a flight of bonbers Is spotted,
nW* told you so, you stupid jerksand we told you six weeks ago that they'd
be coming about now. Properly done advanced earning will do that I
If I didn't think so I wouldn't be in the business. But it is our firm oon.
viction and it is supportable, I think, that the concurrent appearance of
activities which are implacably required in Soviet military preparation and
the knowledge of those responsibilities made avelleble to us at the proper
time will demonstrate to us a change in climate from that which we now live
in and we will see that they are headed up towards something. At first we
will see V-is dy and our signs will he susceptible to many interpretations.
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t;Ltiv
Alpo
Ono of t
a great pitfalls of life in the intelligence
betterit in than 14 years of experience in it
of an analyst to believe that the most obvious
tion for a given event. There ie every great tendency also
who are tired, and many of them are, to avoid giving to a
e a flapworthy interpretation lent he would have to etey
in the middle of the night and generally oonduot himself like
sYmpathize with this. But we, in a wey, will take the same
piece or ev
late or get
a dervish.
tv
piece of current intelligence and we don't care about sleep, apparently, and
we will go ahead and give it an ominous interpretation ourselves, hoping that
we will see more ominous information progressively so that we'll all get
decorations-. The analysts, consequently, will not hold us in high regard
or with any great love because I imagine we will probably call some of them
out of the sack for their expert view. r look forward to the early hour that
we shell do this just for kicks. But, I do believe that we oan get this poop
together singe we are now free, as I have said, from current responsibilities
to do this. I think the machinery exist* now to do the job of advanced warning.
We do not preforms to be able to point with unerring accuracy at 1300 hours in
the afternoon of 25 February 1956 as the date an which Soviet bombers 14111
drop their first bombe. But we can, I think, point to a level of preparedness
in the Soviet mi3itary machine of each an order of magnitude that there is
little more they need to do at any given time to go to war, and that there
is nothing more that we can see now which will give us say mere warning than
we already have. Our job of advanced warning would then be merely the noti?
oation of this state of affairs to the appropriate operational people, who
7CFV---T
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r
bY God they will then order their
alert, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week so that
knook dmda auything that oarly vorning says
t and valuable thing done thershy. We have
forces on a 24 hour, 7 days a week alert %ten
we have insure that they will be in that alert can.-
tancas Soviet preparation indioate that they should
those of a long range nature and theta
and aequestial appesranos of these should
a of the pace and order of their proceedings and when
evidence pertinent to last mina* indicators
at and point to the fact that this is a lost
degree of which we will be able to do this
into the business of refining o indicator**
there are very short range indicators, and
we will have adequate knowledge We
a alasnin...va estimate, and this is really a
t for a classic cross frontier combined aros
vla forego, in what people would regard as
notice sir weeks or more in advance that sudh
critical situation we flate is at hand. In the
081. of a sneak and surprise attack on us eondueted solely bY 50 Soviet
teebere taking off from the Kola Penisula in Chukotaki / think we can give
24 hours of yarning. This is 18 hours more than the early yarning deal give,
and therefore :notifies a seplxration. of this process from radar. 24 hours
warning is enough time to get the aireraft gassed up and the bop get their
rrrr
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I t
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ac.utiL
1111pr
I don't know ho
up in Zabrninr-
?outvoted blip,
to Newfoundland
seem got a going.overthey
geese then not :amp at all
thistle the eituet
0 $
of lives and a
do this
United
can,
of reel estate.
ever be askedto do and I would prefer
that we can accurately evaluate blips an
ingly to be massive flights of
ut of bed for that fleck of paw
usg one one time when a gur
vwla1 got one of these ?an-
we serembied aircraft fran Weetoyer north
incoming flight of Soviet bombers and these
long remember. I'd rather see them :gimp for
have th bombers
We're willing to get up and came in even
short etory. celled the dows.connt,
13...8. At D
6 months this is
deteotion of an oncoming major war, erbined arms,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved
ioatorB will fall in the economic mobili?
its very nature take longest to accomplish
i34 see ow the organization of certain
that tight centralised control the Soviets
Many of the committees which
be war against the Germans have been in the
be reorganised and racialist tuted.
7:7C RFT
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e 'for
of Hinisters viU be the pp.ere or the
ook for. Her,, this committee's jab will
muCh material They vill begin to be
and the Soviet press. An alert analyst
X trust, pick up this thing and send it
that then mark a date si onthe from than on
We will probably have to have many ofthene things
vvry eyes. And we viii prdbeiay have to have many
vs can convince our bosses that this is going on.
re should be catching up vith the realities re-
at D minus 6smaithe But if ve oatah up vith
D 4n 4 on vs should really be on the ball Changes
reductionn of ?enamor parchaeing
t. This is only a partial list vary partial list.
ing in increased attention to economy in aerttin
ioal fertiliser for example, fartilizere aro
vist Union, at least in the !MIS They don
for manufacturing these thine emmercial
I believe, have enoug
fertilisers, and gun pod'end explosives too. Explosives have a definite
era
In order to aoquire enough explosives on hand at the
they will have to take something mow from the
bless until the chemical fertilizer busineas in the
ity for both gums and butter. WO mould cheek
F T
Z
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