THE 'TRUST' THE HISTORY OF A SOVIET PROVOCATION OPERATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03362A002200040004-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 8, 2002
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 1, 1950
• Content Type: PAPER

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THE "TRIM"'
HtBtca7 a a Soviet Premeeation Operation
By Re WRAGA
(Teens3atioe of an article linioh appeared in VOspeghWele Ttaln*
Jenuary-Februnry, 19501)
(The old Rusalan emigration remembers the asendal create', tly the be-
lated uneararing of the meeeallod "Truet,r an aegenization ompeeialle
created by GPU for the purpose af demoralisation of the nedgrations ave.
oirieally its monarchist teatime Every one remembers the trip to Ressia,,
in 19270 of the well known politioal loader, V. V. SbeLein, ebo visited
MOSCOW .1'seningrad? and Oriessa? and up aa his return published a book,
mhich created a senaatione Thin aonsationel trip, mattop
spell, leder the rem of the omnieeient GPU ei oegeneeeet as it
use 1ater found out, by the wfruat"? awl even the book re Shulgin iteaf
wan edited by the GPU operatives in Noseole, The author of this artiele is
feemer hoed of the Russian deak of the Pelieb Intelligence serrlee and0 in
the couree of his intelligence activities, had the oppertualty to hemee
tharoughly acqualnted with the setivities of the aTruerte')
AT =AMR ALMILMIDROVITCH :MU=
In the latter peel:. at 19210 theme arrived in the oapital ofEatomia,,
Tali% at that time still retaining ita &melon nano, Rovel? au empLoyee
of the Swint Foreign Trade Coeniseewiat0 Alerandr Alexaudroviteh Yelushote,
an hie my to Norveye HS wee a man of about fi1ty9 wallet:red, and gentle-
mergee%; A email goatee gave hie that air of a pre-Revalutioe eserlat
official whieh le eo dear to the hearts of R13801011 materehletee, Talaueuve
had been formerly0 ea offieial in the Ministw of Transport, Hs hoe the
reputation of an exeellent am/ efficient adminletratme. When Trotsky add-
ed the functions of the Commissar of Treneport to hie other militery sod
elviliau funetions? he ordered that Yakeshev be found, and made him eeeept
the post of the Dlreetor of the Department of Waterweere? despite the feet
thee leeauturr did not hide his potion and even animoeity? to the aims
of the BeIsheelk Revolution, in his nee lob Yekuebev performed for the
Boleheviem.valuable earreee. He coneidered himself am aerviog Hassle end
not Comennime, Fills wee during the war with Poland, and thousande of Yak-
reshavfee military and eivillenel were offering their services to Troteke
an the Commander In Chief. Evwe Brusilowy the here of the F-Iret weed War
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under/eat& a bowers 1ndefeasa of eternal Russia,
After a period of times, Yekaahav was transferred frau the Commissariat
of Transport to the Commissariat of Foreign Trade. Ric new position
provided him with an opportunity to go dbrowt, In Emelt Yakushav
vented to attend to an affair of a personal naturey and a typieally
emigre one. There resided in Revel the husbaod of a lady who herself
remained in Husain. For along time Yakushav wesve*. sawn to the lady
and wanted to /merry her. A divorce was neoesearyt Both Yekushav and. his
lady-friend mere not only good mcmarehtsts? but also good Orthodox Bassiene,
and reeogoized neither the Soviet divorees, nor the Soviet 'ZAGS0
marriages. The husband did not protest. The two mon developed a liking
for each other, slaw during the lengthg emerrsation it was discovered
that both of them uero faithful monarohists.
rekushev wont on hie way, and his now friend cent u long letter, thro4gh
regolar mail, to an emigre monarchist 'soder in Berlin. in this letter
he included in detail the aspects of his lonversations with Wu/ahem, touch
ing upon Soviet political end eoonomic matters. In order to protect
Tekunhcary he did not mention the lattmos names, but did not stop to think
that shoUld the letter- fell into the Soviet hands? the dotootiou of the
informant's name would not present the alightest diffieulty, because of the
subject-matter touched upon An the letter.
When Itaknehav returned to Moscow was levaidiately arrested. Om the
desk of the COLICkiSSar %rho inter4gatod him ley the photostat of the
above letter. Takaehers uss being interrogatol.by one Kiskowaki? en
assistant of the Chief of tho'CoentertIntelligenos Seetion of the Moira,
His real hams wes Vette Steckewiam. Formerlyy he belonged to Rervolutioo.
let groupe of Polish youth ands, at me time, vas a member of a eleadeatine
Military organization *irk collaborated with the Polish CODOTB1 Start,
Arrested by the Bolshevikal his case arouaod the interest of Dserzhinski
himaelf. Dzerzhinekt liati amen of great charm. Stechevioz soon became
me of the, moat Imprtant mawbara of the Chska. It was not the onlx came
of ;eh a soros-rem the part of Dzerzhineklo During the tame period,
the Boltaholdka am/rebel/dad another offieer of the Pelish Intelligences,
sego 4 former member of sooidlimtr.,reoeluttixmry organizations, 0.
Lieutenant lemma Debroyualii, who ma neatened amission In the SoW.let
interior.togother with his fianese? I oska. Both of them had the re.
potation of being utcompromisingly antioZolchovik, and their work tothe
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Polish military organizations was heroic, in the full sense of the
word. However, Dsorzhinaki started working on the eases also, with
the result that Dobreynnki, under the iliac of Sosnowski? too beoame
a trusted member of the Cheka.
When en, at the time, wore analyzing those cases of treasm corenitted
by people highly esteemed from the standpoint of the Polish revolution.
ary and national-Yu:moment, worthy, as it seemed, of the highest trust,
an idea occurred to us--had not Dzorzhinski used the assertinceo ands
to then? that ha- himself remained an eneey of Russia, and had not he
tied to cortviines thsm that in the servile, of Choke it would be possible
host of all to wreak a bloody vengeance) an the Russians for all that
Russia perpetrated in regard to Poland?
Immediately after the PelletheSoviet war, Steakewlez-Makowaki servedo
ender the alias of Kossinaki, in the Soviet legations in Helsingfors
and in Riga, where. he was the representative of Soviet Intelligence.
In this job he become well-erdented as to the situation in the Beltic
oountries. He was especially well-versed in the pereonalities and the
organizational aspects of the local Russian emigretion, In may ease,
he knew that which probably was not known to lakushev? to wits thero
were active monarohist anganizations'in.existenoein the territories
at Latvia, Hstoaia, and Finland, Which woreeearoving out an inteneive
week for the monarchist center in Berlin and for the letalligenee
aervice of General Wrangele
Kiakowski told Takushee that the Choke considered him to be an agent
of em emigre organization to which he tramemitted the infeeereatios deal.
Ing with the emonamie situation within the Soviet Union. The proof
ley in the letter, a copy of which was befoee Makowski.
Yakushera gave the full story, that is, he told Kiakoweki on what per-
sonal matters he went to Revel. An a reset, the fiancee of Yakushee
was Also arrested, She proved to be more clever thee Yakumhev hime
self and suegested how the Choke could chock the truth of their state-
ments. With this purpoee,.ehe suggeatedg she would write to her &raw
husband, and the letter then might be delivered by a OhekaE123fto Thie
man could cheek on the spot the feet that Yakeshav is not, and had net
been a member of any emigre organisation.
STBCCIWICZeKTO ISKI S MISSION
Makowski accepted her letter, and took upon himself the mission of
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deliveAng it. YakashevNts fiancee was re:moods, but YakalOwnr him-
self was sentoncad to death without waiting for the iiivestigation
of his ease to be completed. The Tribunal concluded that, despite
ail the circumstances Yakushev in fast row:tied the Soviet state
eacrotac, (Them mauls a factor which mama it doubtfUl whether
Yakuohov was acting in good faith on hia original trip to Rentulf? At
the time Yokuahov was au employee of mLesomaport." This organizatioa
was closely oannscted to Deorzbinakils pet throughout the ynars
Soviet rule.)
Steckswios-glakowskio this ti wo foe varietre sake using the alias
of Kolosulkov? proceeded to Ravel, with the lett r of ielougilevts
fiancee. lu Ravels, he pre tad himself to the addressee an a missba?
of a clandestine anti.Scariet ?Moore' organization. He quickly es-
tablishod the fao:It that Yakushev was toiling the truth, Just ail quilkly
be gainloi the confidence not ouly of the careless conspirator, but of the
ao-msmbors of his ovranimatione They asoopted him us a hero. Then
living in the !vMlosphaTe of well-beisg of rich and sevens Baltic capitals
had a fooling of inferiority before the accomplishments of the real
heroes who, in the droadful oonditioas of Soviet existence, were wagIng
the tight for the "restoration of the Taarts rule." Such a hero the:r
eau iu Kolosnikow, a formsr officer of the Polish Intelligence and slw
a Choka mac and a favorite of Dzorzhinski,
itatessikov established numarous contanta? proximal to sand in infor-
motion, gave sumo importartt instructions aa to the method of conduci,.
lug the anti,Soviet activfty ahroado and returned to Moscow, whmrs
Yamishov nightly waited tor the owaction of the death sent*, Is
the cell with him there was one Fidward Opperpnth. His stor,, ,74,11ted
by him if to Yakushov? was not only fall of adventtiros but
Bit real nuns was apeatirts. No was a son of a. Latvion peasant, wis
graduated with a gold medal from a aocuorom high school and, in
frau an offinerse achoa,, Dur1sg_thl war he was, at first? at We
German Proot? and theta at the Caucasian front? During the Revolution
he was a membnr of a Soldiery! Soviet and usn arrested by the Boisheilkso
After a period or tine be was released end workedo firat? in the field
of pre.muceriptian training ands, thous, in the Headquarters of the F-330,
Deftcas Command. After being assigned to the operations Against set,
Soviet guerrillas? and violently hating the Bolsheviks, be ostablieLvd.
000toct with co-unter..revolutimary organizations in Bysior*Raia and loos
&memo, witheuttarminating his official service for the Boloherika, ,tao
of the Isadore of thn local anti.Soviet organizatioew Oa their bakalf
eftlffatilittn
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cussed the Soolat allah frontier a number of times, and went to
to eatablish the contact with Boris Savrinkee. The latter, after
eaying Russia, founded ca the Polish territory, an antieZolehavit ox-
ganization ehich waa attempting to penetrate Russia. and bring about
popular uprising there. In collaboration with Savinkove and on hia
instructions, Owerierth organized on Byelorussian territery the
"Peoplete Union for Defense of the Country and the LibertyeN but, whea
this organization eveshed its highest point of development, he was
arrested in !Mak, was tortured, and foroed to divelee all he knew.
Under pressure ream the Choke ha wort* a paeOhlet the parpose of Which
wee to discredit Savinkev. This pamphlet was publiehed In 13erlin4
in 1922? Oppereelth did not ?camel from YakuShey the fact that he ate?
idered himeelf deeply at fault. He 'gave theinpressicat of amen oompleeet
4. broken and one who ronotneed all ther strugele vith the Baleheelkst
The starley afOppeeetxth were fibril of the details of turtures suffered,
Whim. I would talk by the hour about the ceetipotecae and melee
eine** of the Chekne
ROW OPP &UV! DeCeIMD BORIS SAVIITKOV
It must he acknoWledged that Opperputh told, Yakushev slmoat the
Whole trath? HO held beak only the feet that he vas arreated by the
Bolshevik:shin 1917e started working far tNea then, and immediately we
asaigeed to the Cheka,? At that time the Babe:mike valued the
Latvians very much aa a vort of "coodottierie of the Revekution6 Thy
Latvian regiments were either returning to their hemelands by brat/kite:1
throogh the Catwalk lineal, or 04180 giving vent to their hatred ef the
Russians, went into the Soviet service as punitive units destroying the
coontererevolution, the bourgeoiale? and in general, anything that core
Abair
Ax a Choke man Opperth perfarmed valuable service far the Bele
&mike? In Rigno aketeell as in St, Petersburg, his name was hold le
horror by the uountertereyolution, bat about all of this Opperputh,
of counsel did not 1e22 Yakumhev?, HO also did not tell that he aetmelly
established the oaateotp with antitiolnhevik organizations and vith
guerrilla unite, in his capacity ne a Bashavik provocateur,: The
waa aft a prerooateur in hie relationehip with Savinkov.
i.strenge maa was Boris Savinkovg Rue& vae written about him.
the more interesting deacriptioaa ammo free the in of Winston
Churehille But no one explored that doubleemiedeeneas of hie. vide&
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was the cause of the condition wheree.together with a brilliant
mind and a rare politieal.and literary talent, a gift foal organisa.
teen and a beeeeleee energy...there wao in him so mucdeof ineompree
heneible eredulity? irreepensibility? and almost childish romantic.
lam. However, such personalitioe are often mat with in the fialde ?
requiring anonymity, such as intelligence, terroriem, hai_otage, cod,
to mime degree, deplamaeye Such personalitiee may impress by their
=perimeter professional kneuiledge, but how often it is that, at the
meet critinal ammeter people of this type make ineenprehensible
mistakes and eh ew inexplicable irreeponeibility. Such a mistake in
Seelig:twee past vas his boundless. faith In Asef. When Rassian
revolutionistetwere investigating Awe, Saeinkew (already one of the
better.knawneleaders of the Russian socialisterevoluticalarynove-
mont) was porpeuely proclaiming: "I would rather believe my brother
to be a proveeateur than. Asa, the most crystal.pare of all the
people I knew."
Despite the warnings of the Polish Counter-Intelligence, Opperputh
gained fall oonfidence of Savinkov. He wen given access to the rest
important organizational secrete, and received frem Savinkev the
mission of organisation and direction of the work in the Soviet
territory. As a result, the organization established In Russia
by Sevinkev and Opperpath? "People's Union for the Defense of tht
Country and the Freedmen was in actuality, fres start to finish,
organized, directed, and at proper tines liquidated, by the Chekee
After that Opporpath.was removed from Savlaw and given another
aesignments he was charged with' the orgenisation of a similar
evemocation directed against the menarehists. It was In the role
?of such .a provocateur that Opperputh found himself in the 'same eel/
with Ye:kasha-v.
Later one Opperputh took part in the working out of a gen for iee
clueing Savinkav to *roes into Rusoia. In 1924 Sarinkov, eac.
=bine to the persuasiveness of some of his supporters, secretly
crossed the frentier in their company-. Upon the wrossing he was
arrestede His comeanions had long einem been Scmiet agents. The
Savinkov ease was given wide publicity by the Bolsheviks. True to
his romentlaise? Savinkov prepared an effecteal plan in the spirit
of a Wallonrohde: he repented, confessed to everything, and et.
pressed the desire to collaborate leth the Bolsheviks. -But it use
mueh harder to deceive the BoleherMes than. It was to deceive Savine
kov. Menem does not believe in tears and repentance. After
most two years of imprieonment, Savinbov succeeded in committing
suicide: he lumped out of a eiath-otory window of the GPU building.
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riONCCHIST ALLIANCE ele MSS/A
Let us return to Yalta/lbw. When, after a lennthy stay in the cell
with Opperpuths, he wee called before Stookeuleg he was a eharned
man, Steekewics broached the subject at the eZ.rt. NC natter
what eolore-white or red--Rassia rorsaino Husain, said Steekewles,-
One might have a different attitude in regard to the Bolsheviks,
one might wage the internal fight against then* but one can 'not
seek aslistanee in thie fight frau outside the country, frt foreign
nations, which are only waiting for the opportunity to paUnder
Russia. And one numt not fight against the BoleheeEno in alliance
with the Russian migration which servilely eaters to the fumes
inimical -to Russia.,
Thin Yakaahov understood best of all. Specifically, the rermegant.
atives of this emigration, their eareleesneea and talkativeness,
brought about his having had to watt from hour to hour for several
months, the execution of the death seatenoe. The hatred of Yakunhov
toward the emigration knee no bounds. I have freenently had maven
to believe that the psychology of treason is less cceaplicated then
It appecrs. Personal feelings, frustrated vanity, and hatred at
ten break through with such force that they fern a nail between the
pereon and the world's, and eompletely obstruct the ability to think
logically and to plan ahead.
Yeknehav tweed to everything. Steckewien laid before him a concree
plan. On Russian territory there would be created a monarchist cr.
ganization ("Monarchist Alliance) of Russia," or abbreviated in Rue-
sien? NOR). This cayetadesation would be headed by chief assietant
to the chter of CkamtereIntelligence? V. A. Styrne eepetially an.
signed to this taste V. S. Steekewice-Klakoweki (alce, wnich is typie
eel, ma the heed of the Angle.Sexon Section of the Cheka =inter-
intelligenee)? the- Chiof of Military Coneorghip Seetinen.A, A,
Langovoy? IeDobehinekieSosnoweld, Opperpnth, who, in addition to
other aliames added onemore Kossatkin, former District Attorney'
Boroshiestin and othorm. As a gent man the organisation would have
a Chairman, a Tsarist General A. M. Zajoneskawski, well.known to
the emierte. Be waz forced to accept this role under the threat of
execution of his beloved daughter. However, this "Chairman" did net
play any part in the further development of the affair. The actnal
management was taken aver by t,b0 Deputy Chairman of the GM, hien
Artusev? uhe? if I eamember rieht, was an Itelieyn His real
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name was Rieci.1
The task of this organisation, as Steckewice told Yakusheve should
consist of the counteraction to activities of the emigres inimical
to the interests of Russia, and in the resistance to the agvessive
intentions of foreign powers directed at Russia. Yakaohav evident.
ly has not been told that no less important was the drawing out of
internal countererevolutionary elements by the lure of monarch:int
slogans, and their uncovering. Yakusheme the only actual monarchist
in this thoroughly Chekist netting, began drawing up a political
program, In this respect he was given carte blanches it wed not
matter what he wrote as long as the results would appeal to the
monarchist earegres and would convince them that this new oreanizae
tion? ehich made its appearance on Russian territecy? was a serious
one.
eokaww../.0.610..M....0.0,1.00.yostanCr .rue wag Arst.21......e,........,....T4.6012.1grk
'For the first time in Wrages articleg, the name of General A. M.
Zajoncskowski appears in connection with the "Trust." His undoubted
connection with the GPU, mentioned by Wage, was fully confirmed
in 1927. Zajonczkowski, who was given the alias of Verkhovske dur-
ing his oonnectionewith the "Truett" not only lived through the
liquidation of the Monarchist Allianee of Russia, but continued to
live quietly in Moscow and tench in the Soviet military sehoola
until his natural death. After his death, the Bolsheviks provided
his widow with a generous pentrion. In his artiale, Urnga? for the
first time, in so far as we know, colls?ttle "Trust" in print by its
actual name, the Monarchist Alliance of Ramie, He is mistaken,:
however, in assuming that the birth of the "Trust" was Pally end ex-
clusive/y due to the machinations of the GPU. In reality it was a
vary complex combination of two opposing and warring forces. The
attempt of A.? P. Yutepov to penetrate Russia, and to induce in it a
revolutionary "detonation" through terroristic activitY?to the an
fleecy of .leieh? as a weapon independent of the existing political
or eociologice/ conditions, he attached a great importance--had as
much bearing on the creation of the "Trust' as the desire?of-the Bel
&mike
to prevent such a'penetration. The founding of the "Trust"
coincided with the beginning of the NV. Numerous trusts wore be-
ing created in the Soviet industry and commerce. In ereeting a male
for clandestine cosounicationst the members of the organieation,
about which Wraga writes, utilised the word "Trust" for the designat-
ion of the organisation itself, elactly in the same manner as they
? used cemmereial terminology for other designations in this activity.
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Takaehav was releared from prison. Ile was charged with errotally
the most important mission in, the whole bad.neee ife MO instruct.
ed to go abroad and to establish pereonal contaet with rightist
euseien organisations, penetrate their topmost echelone, and, espee-
Jelly, the high military circles_ and their leadership. in all his
statements he vas to bring out one leading theme. Russia is bo.
ginning to awaken after the horrible revolutionary experiences in.
her are beginning to be reaurrected powerful anti-Bolshevik forces
which, not bavi, the technital means to bring about a forcible
overthrow of the regime, are gradually gainieg the contrel of the
whole of the Bolshevik estem from below. The coetemporary Bel.
eherviszieeledaishev was to say?does not resemble the dangeroun come
mundems an it wan severel years ago. It had already undergonethe
basic process of ewolution. Not only Comnuninnn but a enedelism
as veil, ban lost face in Russia. The Russia being renurreeted
is the forum,* eternal Russia. A rector in this resurrection Is,
in part, the orgaelzation represented by Yekushere It would be
a catastrophe far Rneeian interests if. the seitipration were net to
understand this new re-birth of the country,. It woad be a ter.
Able mistake for the emigration to bring about an intervention
by foreign powers in Ruselen affairs. Thin would onlyeteas the
Ruseian people, who hate the interventionists, to unite around
the Belshorlike. Tho amimation mnst forego the direct activity
within Russia. Yakusherts ergsniesation would supply it with all
the necessary informetione weld fulfill all, the intelligence nie.
sions. The emigratlon, on ite part, ihimild limit itself to giving
to the great pavane the information couched in just such taros
which would protect Russia tram a premature revolution or a foreign -
aggression nest of alit the emigrationleest forego aey terrore
istic activity within Beenieo
Personally coached by Artuzov, Ithr went en his first trip
through Europe at the end of 1922.
TArustrares VISIT TO GRAND DOE IFICHOIAS
Evaeything that took place sabeequently? today sees unthinkable.
Uithout are, difficulties Yakuehav entebliehed the contact with the
monarchist leaders of the emigratiort. and gained their confideeee
to eudh a degree that on his second or third trip he vas received
pereonelly by Grand Duke Nicholas heeself.
Gemara* A. I. Denikin and r. Ne Urangel varemore cautious,
latter refused to eee Yakasher although hin closest Military' ad
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vieere Vetere to him as a hero of the anti.Bolehevik otruegleo
At the same time, vever, he did not take a definite stand on
the matter. The suceeeding developments showed that Yakambev
bad protectors of emeeptional caliber, both in civilian end
tary cdrolee. One of thee vas, by the way, the long-time Chief
of Staff to General Wrangel, Geeeral Nonkswita? in eharee of opera'
time against Russia. At tho end of 1e26? Generel Nonkawite
disappeared without a trace, and only later it vas determined that,
during all of his stay in the migration (sinee 1920)0 he had been
a Soviet agent. According to the information vs had, Menkevits
was in,Noseow? in 1932, in the matey of the GM, and, se ranor
had it, vas one of the organisers of the kidnapning of General
Wrengelle suottearsora General Itutepovjwho oonsidered Idle a per.
meal friend and had full eonfidenee in him). Another proponent
of liaison with the EOR was General Klimovitch5 fanner head of
Russian Department of Police, and, at the same ,time? heed of Wrangsl's
eounter-intialligettoe, He became a great parteaan of Yakushev
and widely publicised the orthodoxy of hia nonarchist feelings and
oonvictions. The ease of Klimovitoh is a alassin example of how er-
roneous, at timee, may be the professional counter-intelligenoe
evaluation if the objective approach is discarded and the evalua-
tion Is made exclusively on the basis of *intuition" and of pore
eonal confiatenee. Klimoiritah had, apparoutly? extensile' inner-
Jones in those matters, and yet he made the some mistake as ro.
garde rokushev, that the experienced revolutionary, Savinkuv, made
In regard to Opporptrth.2
THE CAU?IO s WRANGEL AND MIK=
Within a ahart period of time? the NOR gained complete control ef
the eight wing of the Russian emigration. Yakuehev, Who Tar wee,
Aar ? there is no reference in Wragags artiele to another
general who, together with Yeknehev, was misleading the Russian emie
gration. Farmer Ruesien Military Attaehe in Montenegro-, General -11.
Potapow? vhoee 'Trust" alias was Medvedeve asoompanied Yakuthev.
abroad on a number of socanione? was received with him be Grand Duke
Hithclas at Cheleey? and, like najonoekowaki, was living an the fruits
of his Choke aetivitien even after the liquidation of the ?Trusto".
As late as 193$, he was serving in the Red Arpy either as on Instraim.,
Ix. or a ailituey histertne
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spirateriel reasons assumed the name or Forlerovo established the
tact not only udth the monarchist groupings, but also with some ur-
emia time of other political colorations. Under hie Influence the
tone of the monarchist and the rightist press changed. It began
tom= against over-energetic aativities? againet calling en the
foreign nations to go to mar against the Soviets. it began affirvt
ingtthat deeper and deeper processes of evolution were taking Placa
on the Strvist territary, that a resurreation of Russia was at heri,
The taak et before Yakushear was not limited only to the astabliekt
:masa of coxbacts between MOR and the eralgre organizations. it west
mob fartbar. iskushev established direct contact with the Intel,
'Agent's services of different countries and concluded with them
number of characteristic two-sided agroassats. Zakushav visited
Revel; Riga Heisingfore? Warsaw; Berlina and Faris. The heads at
various serviess conducted eariaus negotiatioes with him on the
basis of the recommendations of tha civilian and military loaders
of the HUSSiOn emigres. Who *load know betters, they thoughtp
whether ar not Yaknehav deserves eonfidenda, than Generals Wrengel
his deputy Katepave Moskowitz, and Xlimovitch. But, for sea/ens
unknown; Wrangel man unwilling to talk about his canpicions and
geservations; and both Kutopov.ead Klimovitch believed in MOR, is
general,
and in Yeknober? in particular. Tha heads of intelligence ?
services thought that great possibilities aristedg Yakashav
waled in presenting the Er.OR picture as that of a videtsweed net-
work, the members of which sat in all the Soviet agencies, not
aspting the Ow and the OPU. Yakuahev mentioned a nano or a
Soviet general, 400 Denisow? who, cupposedly, vas working for the
MORO Only later it wan found out that this Denisov was mataelly the
above-mentioned Chi f of Nilitary Oenearehip, Longovoyo what we have
e:L ady diseneeed. Yalgushav did not limit himself to promises. Ha
genarcuely delivered from his brief ease %various reports, alestoso
and even original documents, dealing with economies aad military
matters in Russia. in return. fee the obligation to supply ttftott,
malice to this services, Yeknahav only caked that. they facilitate
communication between the emigre organisations and 101 in Massie,
Ls asked for assistance in moving the MOR mon beyond the anuflaes
of Ruasia?, This vas considered a minor mattarp and within a short
? time the diplomatic ?ousters of cooperating states began to Gum
Martell in their pouches to and from Nosoow, Oa the Soviet fron-
tier there were dozens of NOR nen. Sam intelligence services oath
had spaeial offierrs, assigned to the sole tank of maintaining colt
tact with NOR msn in Russia,. attached to their various eausulates
' and legationa in Moscow
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el2e
Nothing JO, MOM dangerous for an intelligenoe service than suoh a
situation, When, suddenly, it is unexpeetedly aonfronted with the
groat and eaey peasibilities.cf obtaining ieformation? In such
OA s0 the earriee &treats nal its faeilitiee emd energies toward
the exploitation of .theme poseibilities." It begino to disregard
other means mad cease* to be ereative. -And that is at happeued
in this case. The connection with the 11OR proved to be a* .fruite
ful? and at the anne time ao leexpensive0 in terms or hewn and
material expenditure, that iteempletely? monopolized ell tha aotiv-
ity of them .serviregao tikrhy"11701 10.014 ?Wanes, 44. engage in danger-
ous Clandestine aotivitieee lieense up large sums of money', when
almost weakly there arrdved Crete Moaeowdiplematio pouohes with
prettily sealed envelopes metalling the answers to almost al
their et lone eed giving men. greater promiee of continuing the
videfting and deepening of ineelligence activity in all directions?
lakusbervo, ea it heppened, wee ret only a good monarchist and moven
oellentarganizer, but alrotop.notel diplomate He appointed hia
rsonal reproeontatiees to different intelligence services. Theme
representatives, with the dloeley of- real envoys, repreeented the
Interests of the We compleeele iwlependent of the local emigre
gronps. The diplOiriatlattieneartiTh of Yakushev had a definite aim.
This aim consisted of uneoveving the methods of commeeloatioe and
collaboration between different nervicece Oa the other hand, these
maneuvers oonstanely and weeteveties117 created intriguem and
misunderstand/4m the purpeee of whiCh wee the weakening of such
aellaboration. Up to this thatesooperating with eaeh. other, the
heads of friendly ietelligeneit services now adopted the attitude
of jealous mature competing for money of the seme heiress
'au coN-FEnTzs TaE BURASIAN$ AT MOWN
When, at the end of 1922? the Chika built up the 14004 neither steo.
ovios-Ltakeeniti? nor Artuzor, nor even Deerehineki himself, probab4
dreamt that eheir proyeastioa would develop into aneh a. far-flung
operatiene that fees a single contact between Tokueheets fiancee
and hor aironleeeinded husband there %mull be developed mash a huge
mrgenizatiou which eeuld enoompass not only a at part of the
Russian emAgrattea? bue alae most of the nuropean General Stafft
and IntellAgenem eervieee. After a short period of time it beeame
necessary to oompartmenteliee the whole operation eaeofully into
sepertte pro3eote? se-oared "legends." In 19270 there were about
fifty much "legends."
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3adurity InTormattoo
43
With the growth of the "Trost," the appetite of the GPU grow also,
By now it uae not satisfied with merely paralyzing the activity oe
the Ruseien ouigration and the foreioi intelligenee services. Work
of a merle profommi &erecter almiag at long range objeetives now
began.,
One of the wlegnade," eimed at suoh a lone.range objective, was tle
exploitation by the Choke of the Mtrasiansfl" This organization
appearod in the Ruesian oolgration at the beginning of 1922. It
was headed by RuLttima profeekton.aand eolentiote: Prime Troubetslay?
Alexoyax? Sawitsky, and others. Outwardly, the alma of the organ-
isatien were atriotly aoaderalco It based itself on a speculative
theory. namely, that Russia, as a state, is neither Europe nor Leaf,
but a oontinont in itself--Nurasia. The Eurasians definitely fatto-
ed the historie Rusaian imperialism and, starting from suppoeed34
idealietio and entiti &mien thosee, horaltoterily fell prey to taw
theory or Watoriael kmterialism and were bound, as a natter of
clouree? to arrive at the aceeptanoe of the Bolshevism, in their
reeearck? as en unavoidable atage in the developmeot of Eurasia.
4ush psemdo.scientifio oencepta wholly wiaoided with the aims of
the Soviet politer, It woe important for the Soviets to have such
oonoepts develop In international ocientifle and political circlet.,
fatah would reoognize the uaity of the Rusaian state and would
counteract all attempts of foreign intervention in Russiaa affairt.
The loaders of thu "Truat" were ordered to uake oontaota with the
Iturasian movauent. Several couriers were sent to Europe who were
to tell the emigre A/realms that their theories were not isolated
that in Soviet Russia the Eurasian movemeat had many partisans, Ir
The "Trust," this work tins given to DenisevaLangovon, To artzengtl'en
tho Eurarians, a Clandestine oonferenee of Eurasian leader, Was
oanized near rosette in the summer of 1926,b To this conference me
inyited Frofeasor 3:viteky, reprosenting the emigre EUreelans?. I
don't knoll if another euah auedonio acellarooto wow took plaint, fel,
only one actual academiaian wee present, Suit sky. Al] the other
membero were agents of CPU, wall-trained for the weasion by Denisly-
'..engovoy? Langevoy was a polite reon; soon he returned the
oourteey lry 'honoring .he gorasian conferenee at Prague with his
prosenoo?J.
.14
the story or Wraaa as to the connection betmoon theCIT and toe
Soviet diplomatic corps and the merging of these tun &Viet agencies
into a single eapionageodiversionist instrument, te* nay add the fo1.-
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eeeLemeamiaesig,
Osearitty Informatiod
SIDNEY Urea' AD ADO BIRK
Tue other eases which tweeted oanelderable agitation In their time
yore also connected with the *Trust": the cases of Ceptain.RafUy
end of Ado Dirk, The Reilly WA? waa written about extemeively2
and2 for the most part inaccerately, and in a fantastic vein.
Shell not go into details as regards this tragic story, but cely
limit myself to deliniating the main feats. Captain Reilly was ove
of the bravest. amt the meet outstanding officers of the British .
Intelligence, He wee eonsidered a speniallet on Rusaiae affairs rnd
meta-mad vnluable services far his country. In 1925, the repre-
sentatives of the *Tenet* lured him into the territory of the Soviet
Mime, He wne pronised that he would be sham the workine of the
organization in Russia itself. Several months after hie crossing
the Sevieterinniah feontier, the Bolsheviks issued a statement to
the effect that Soviet frontier guards shot several individuals
nnon g wham one uaa identified as a Captain of the Britieh Serviaei
Reillye Aotual/y at happened was entirely ditto-met. Reilly are .
rived without a mishap in Loningred? and then in Moscow, and was
arrested there a firm days later? I'still have not been abisto
visualise fully ell the details of the ease, and 1 dont know if the
British Intelligenes win able to reeonstruet it, either.
According to the information I hed at one time the *Trust0,plenned
at first to let hisatmee beck, but during the harder dressing, al4
as a reault of the eenvereatiens with the members of the "Trusts*
there .arose in Reillyve mind definite suspicion that the Whole ?FP.'
ganization? from top to bottom was shot through with Soviet preme
eatione He was not able to hide hits eeepieione. Naturally, tulleWm*
ouch eircumetancee, he was to be destroyed, since the GPU ureler no
conditions eculd allow the return of a witness (and such ft mitnemel)
of its proveoatico bank to &trope? For several years Reilly wan
inprisoned in Lubiankar where he supposedly finally vent mad, .
The Ado Birk ease was more complex no wee the Illasetnien envoy'
Moscow Through *Trust,* the CPU attempted to reeruit hie as an
,
lowing detail not appearbeg in the article of the Polish authors the
Chekist mentioned by him, A, A, Langovoy, alias Denisoe in ?herr*
of the Eurasia *legend* in the "Trust,* was., ate e the lieuldatiet of
the "Trust*, &member of the Soviet delegation, at the Ceneva Disama.
ment Conferencer
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Se writer Inteematicea
agent, This whole affair is full of see saw hardetotbeliers dot
tails that a Whole boat mild be written on the sehjecto This
case is complicated by the fact that in the Estonian legation there
vas at that time another Birk, Raman, who was the lialsom man be.
twaen the Estonian Intelligence and the "'Treat" organization. IA
thin ease9 the alreadyantiArtlng edllaboration between the GPU ami
the Cemmissarist of Foreign Affairs beeomes aharacteriaticany
eildento The deputy to Chloherin, Litvinov, earnestly'wrked an
a provocateur? Roman Dirk was worked upoa and inmpired by the GPU,
and Ado Birk by the employees of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs.,
However, it wneld be difficult to give an answer to the qpeation
as to mhave the Commiseariat of the Foroign Affairs ends and tht,
beginsc, During that time the Chief of the Polish and Baltin
Sections In the Commieneriat of Foreign Affaira was one Lasenowaki
who, in 19239 while a Secretary of the Soviet legation in Warsaw,
organized the blowing.-up of the ammunition dump at the Warsaw *its
-
del, Loganowsli was a Close friend of Stedkawicz and of Sosmowskie
GROKTEC, Boorcua" Z&RUBIN, MALMSGELER =RIMS
When we emelt about the conneetion between Seviet diplematic and
intelligenee services, we &mild remember that in Soviet Russia
theme two services are not differentiated as to their funotioncp
Maeh Soviet installation operating abroad, regerdless of which gove
comment ageney they are a part? must starry out espionage fUnetione,.
prevooation and diversinnist activities? In the SAMS manner as Veto
IMO fUnations must he performed by all the Communist Parties in
411 countries, and 611 Partv meMbere everywhere in the world, if
they don't want to be aocueed of Trotokyien or ?espionage for
eapitalist imeerialimme" in the first few years following the
Revelution some d:IplomateetChleherin? Kressin, Rakovskyl and other.--
attempted at least to limit espionage targets and missions given to
diplomats and the employees of the Foreign ?Moe. Chloherin had
a, dread or the GPU? and in mo far as he *midi, fogght against the
penetration of his central ?Mee and his legatione by. the Cheklets,
But, already, Maxim.Litvinov "perfoeued valuable servles" by his
coaajaaaa as regardt those tasks and obligations with which hie
agency ma saddled by the GPTL With the passage of time, theme
talks grew mere and mom, And, finally, the prinniple was adapted
thet to be a "real," exemplary, Stalinist diplomat, one had to ba
aChakista a Bolshevik, lobo not oely went through theoretical tretr.
ing in various 'general" and "higher Intelligent:en aehonle? but
Also had preotioal GPU eeperience. The first organizer of the
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Seeerity Ixd'ormatia24
Pereima Division of the OW was Davtians later a Smelt "diplemat"
in the Near East and the first Soviet envoy imaWarsaue ubo wee
liquidated in the Yeshov purge of 1937 (the role of the "liquidator"
was played by a beautiPul opera sin eers Naksalovas planted with him
es hie wife). During the years of the first "fivoeyear-Olens"
there were etill in the Soviet diplomatic service two groups of
diplomats and diplomatic personnel: the authentic career personnels
and those detailed from the Gate Howevers'from 1939 one in order
to beeme a major diplomatic officers one had to have behind him an
eapioneeeediversionist records and a good record at that. All the
welleknoun diplomatic figures?Oreaykos Bogaeolov, Zarubles Guesen
Malik-at one time wol.zed in the GPU and were doing espionage work.
However, at that time, the nothode used for recruiting Ado Birk in
the GPU network seemed to be fantaetie beyond belief, Not only
his chiefs and subordinates were net against him, but be was even
*eaten ard physically tarrorireds and all that while he was still
a re:molly aceredited envoy. As a result of this pressures the
suceeeded in having Ado Birk sign several letters to the editors
in the Soviet preset, amposed by the G7U and the Foreign Office9
which attempted to discredit his own government and accused theEse
tonlan goverment of establishing anti.-'Soviet liaisons with other
Paropean countries, and in particular ulth Poland. Apparently the
Gr11 committed a number of mistakes in the Dirk ease. Betause of
this it Is difficult to oossprehend what its fJeal eine were in
this cease. It may be assumed that Birk was to play a major pert
as an infoener discrediting thee:Lime of the Baltic countries and
or the nations frenne to them, After eme time EirksmaCISed to
avade his !Nerd and to escape into the Finnish Mission comixAnwl, in
Moscow and finally to make his way into Estonia s where hetes put
en trill. This tasc was not only somber, tut also somewhat delicate
eines of cure9 a:woman was involved,. The Estonian Tribunal ape
quitted him.
The Birk ease a se great agitaticn In world public opinienu
understood that the Soviet policy is not built on the foundation of
international lest or the aft:opted rules of ethics and morals. This
it understood and, of =weep did not arrive at any ocaalusialta.
The ease of Captain Reilly and the ease of Ado Birk merted a great
influence, at' we shall sees an subeeepent history at the "Trust,*
SHULGINGS VOYAGE TO RUSSIA
926 there took place ono of the most effective *Trust" actions.
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aemarity Information
Ito leaders invited one of the Most noted emigre nonarchiat leaderet,
V. V. Shulgin, to Russia. Shulgin? who for many years edited the
1;tetialeiga, enjoyed the repotation of being an umuoationod euthere
ity in the fields of moverabiet idealoa and politics. An enthus-
iastic aupporter of Stolypin maasuree, he gladly accepted the invite
ation and at the end of 1.926, cromsed the EntoniateeSeviot frontier
and arrived in nem) Otulgin apent several weeks in Raoeia? In
addition to Fiero he visited Haecow, leningrad, and sevorel provine
eiel cities. His trips throughout? was managed by the members of
the "Truet" and,* everywhere, he had long conversation., uith the
leaden; of the "Drunt." He wee gtvon almoot complete freodam of
novemeet and of observation of Soviet life, Aa a result heves
blinded by the stremgth and the possibilities of the "Truet?" and
promised its leaders that he vould bone witness to the fact that the
aspielone that the "Trust" was a provocatien attempt, were pot
only beeelees? tut also highly damaging from the standpoint of Ruei
sian leteroets. The 2oedera of the "Treat" attached mich great
Importance to S'ealginte testimony that they ao!ed him to write and
publieh a book dealing uith Rueetan reality, and the role plkved
in it by the organieetion of Russian patriots. Even Sleelgin Mae
eelfvs antonishol, How could he write each a boek and than ease
promise and endanger the orgenieationt Hoverer' had. reached
*Trust" frienie
quieted him down? saying that the organisation lad reaehed eueh
stage of development,ennol wee so powerful, that nothing amid dnmag*
it anymore, So now Shalgies, upon his return to arope, been to
write an antieSoviet took written under Soviet dietation. It Is
probably the only one of its kinde The book VMS called e
Smite
tekg and was published. in Berlin, in /927. The pentioue S
fearing, deepite the assurances he had racetved, to oompromise the
?reanimation by his disclosures, sent the draft of the book .to MOS%t
crirlf, to the leaders of the "Trust9" for their approval. Only later
he found out that the draft- was proof...read by the Deputy Chief of .
Artusov, himself. No doubt, this work amused Artuseov greatly,
THE "TRUST* ACQUIRES A GREAT INFLUFNCE
Four ueare alarmed ire& the time or the birth af the *Trust" to the
time Sksi1giu4a book wee oullieheel. During tle period, the "Trust*
eot only became a powerful organisation which attracted to itself
all the orthodor monarchist and anti-Soleheeik elements, bat alma
obtained oonteel over most of the %Mira% emigration. It not only
eohieved peeetratien int', the print:4nel antieSoviet intelligent*
snevices? acquired inf/ueece over the information about Soviet
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-Age
Russia going to a number of !kronor= calitals? but it, itself, be-
eame capable of conducting deep reconnaissance in Duren? and of
eommitting salx)tage in the realm of international relations. One
could pose the obvious question; ware there no suspicione aroused
during this period lasting severel years? Hadn,t anyone neticod
the ease with which the NCR moved its men across Uie frontiors
and with which it collected and dianeminatod inforeation? Did it
not seen suspicious that this organisation, so much talked ahout
in all 7bropean capita/8 and all the emipre cabarets, had
not heeneneovered by the Bolsherilo?
It suet be admitted that there wore suspicions. Uith the passage
of time, the euepiolons occurred more andepre often. These sus-
picions arose in the ninths of eame of the Rumaian emigres, but no
ewe weawl/ling or able to formulate thee openly or loudly., and,
'when the attemptn to do PO wore made' they. weresiemediataly drowned
by the shouts of the enthusiasts about the "taerifices of the worker
AA the Ruesian.nedergroand movement." The MOR ideology was wholly
aeoeptable to most 13usnien emiemes. It was the accepted thought
that Bolehetiee would perish of its own aceord? that Runde remains
Russia, that it would be possible to regain the country without
tenth effort. In the end man will believe that which he wishes to
believe, In addition* there was one anpeet which strengthened this
belief. For certain monarchists Russia has almaya been a state
which was ruled by an insierificfent minority-ea state in which the
people were subjected to an unrestricted political control. The
whole question, therefore, came down to a personalitios problems
who was to be the ruler, This was even discussed by some of the
leading nonarehists pabliely who stated that the Soviet regime is
quite acceptable and that it only lacks a Tsar at the head. This,
hy the way, was OVRD atated by the pretender to the Russian throne,
Grand Duke Cyril, himself, who wrote, in 10270 that the Soviet Con-
stitution "is not bad at all." It is ohly necessary to chanee the
leadershin. Shulgin, who travered.over Russian for several weeks,
did not notieemmuch difference behmen Tsarist and Seviet Ruesia.
tEveeything In as before, only worse," stated Shulgin with satiee
faction. Could the MCP theses fail in such an atmosphere, to find
fruitful soil in the adoration an could the Soviet provocation
effort fail to. find ameng the Zigris ferventpartisan, ready to
swear -under oath that they wore dealing with a manifeet:tion of true
Russian nationalism?
The "Trust" affair proves that, essentially, no emigration is cap-
able of chocking itself, that it cannot erotect itself free provoca-
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tion and and from agents, that emigre evaluations in security matters
oennot be considered objective and reolistio estimate of the situa,
tion as on the wish to believe in that which eoincides with their
aims and political programs.
Muth greater responsibility for not nneovering the "Trust" as a
Bolshevik provocation Iles on the intelligence 'services of theee
countries which establisOed contact with the nTrust." In this ?nes,
however the Weems provoention wee aided by that bunger for infore
nation :nd that permit after eaeilyabtainable results which are
eemewitielly characteristic of those services which limit theenelvee
to gathering great quantities of information without seeinge or even
being interested in seeixte,., the camplete picture,
resulting from
the obtained informatdenr In that period, the servioes of the Wanim,
tries bordering on RueriLerinland, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, and
Ramenienevere new eervieee, begin-tare lacking experience. Deepite
this fact, they were, in the eyes of other, bigger, services? the
atperts in Rued.= matters because of either their geographieel
positioe or the superficial knowlodge of Russian life uhich we
poesessod by some officers in those servic s.
Dut even in the ateuespinere of easy intelligenee gains, thane intel-
ligence eervieee ehould have, with the passage of time, come fates
to face with circumetanees which could not fail to arouse enanicionee
First, eutpicions evidently arose in the ends. of the office re of
the British Intelligence), The case of Captain Reilly tended to
etreegthen the enspicions of the British Tntelligeneee .Ae to Pella.
Intelligence, very serious euspicione arose there as early as the
beginning of l925e There were three 'sources of theme susplaione.
The meet serious euspieions areas fram the study of other Intel.
ligeno* eateiiale made in a special tureen charged with this tesk.
This material was.very voluninoue? and ONMO from oompletelyreaisllt
nonrees. This material did not confirm the evaluetione end the
information supplied by the MDR...From it, it did not at all follow
that the Bolsheviks were in a proeess of evolution, that the Com-
ennist Party wee loping ground to natirnallet elements that Soviet
Russia was losing the ability to expnod politieally.an uniteril3r.
The second source of suspicion wee our. Frontier InteIllgence-See-
time, Colonel St. Moo later the head of Polish Intelligence, and
at that tins serving an the frontier, repeatedly reported that the
'Activities and the type of information supplied by the Nrn people
vere causes for suspieien. Finally, the third source was our rem-
eentetive in Revel, Captain?. Dop who on his awn initiative began
reading the MDR mail peesierthrou his hands. He was astonished
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by the glaring coAtadie4ione and the lack of seeurity vonscioue-
nese, on the part of the MDR organization in Russia, in matters
bearing on the soeurity of the organization iteelf. The representa-
tivee of Polish Intelligence called General rutepeOe attentisn
to their doubts, but the indignation of the heave Cannel at oh
suggestions knew no teunde. He was eompletay eonfident in the
trustworthiness of the NOR iteelf en d of its agents in Marope.
It le intereeting to note that eoon after our warnings, the rumors
began to spread among the emigree to the effect that there were
Soviet ageats in the Polish Intelligence, who, wore trying to.
oabotsge the work of Rustrian menarehists, in Bessie and *broad*
In 1926, Marshal Pilsedski became Polieh War Minister. After
familiarisIng himself with the work of our intalligenco as regards
%side, he pointed out the fact that Intelligence wee rolying too
much on itn connection with the MON amd was giving him inforea-
on which he wus to base his decisions* without makinr auf-
ficient efforts to confirm it through other source*. Pilaudski
ordered the Chief of Intelligence to denand oategorieally roma the
Nal that t) deliver the Soviet mobilisation plan
At this time Takusher, whom our representative contacted on thie
matter, vas in Paris, Yakushev? alwaye appearing wirier to undere
take any assignment, this time evineed visible dissatisfaction. Re
stated that the MDR did not have people in the Mbbilisetion Section
of the Soviet General Staff just thee, thatheveold have to bribe
Outsiders, end eon set in advance the ,sam he mould need at
0/00000 at that time a considerable sue of money. The Chief of
Intelligence inatructod our man to guarantee the payment of this ,
sea. Several months later? the NCR sent in the recillented report
with supporting documents. The material was submitted to Ilarahed
Pilsudati? who returned it some time later with the matatione
"CcuntesTedts" Our analysis bureau only several weeks laterdisoovered on what ressende Pileudak; based his conelusion.The
plan thawed that, in wee of war, the Dolshavike would coneentrate
their main forces ces their left, amtherno flank of the front,
and gave in eupeort, to convince us of the validity of thisdoeue
sent, false leformstion on the railroad capacity. Ce letkuehaves
not vieit? he vas told of the evaluation given to the plan. Re
vas non-plussed? while his explanations appeared, WM more gape
pitions. So, in 1926, there were a *Briber of factors affecting
the "Trust" affair, which were unsatisfactery froe the Delshevik
stomdpoint. Under the circumatonces, the G7U evidently amid not
reir Imam the possibility of ecntinuing this provocation indefinite-.
lye
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seurity Infonstation
TI TSRRORIST "TRIADS" OF GEEpAL NUTEPOV
In Aprily 1927, tpperputh appeared in Helsingforsy after trossing
the SavietjinniSh frontier illegally. With him came Multi, Zak.
harchenkowSebults miss marked for several years in the mnn and onis
jovod the reputatipn of being one of the most courageous members of
this organisation.4
Zakharchonka.Sobults belonged to that category of idealistic countess
revolutionaries which the NOR *aught to attract in order to control
their activities. Opperputh told the Finnish Intelligence officers
and the reprusentativon et local Russian emic!res the following ortoryl
the MOH as an organisation was not without blemish. The orcsuisation
had been created by the CPU and was placed under his control in order
to eouiateretet the activity of the emigres to divert the work of
foram intolligauce serviOeso and to foot; them false information.
All the leaders of the NOR, including himself? Upporputhe and Yakms-
elt(Wp wero.sgents of the GM, blindly following the instructions
given thma Press abovo, About himself Copperpmth told what he already
told Yakushavs, in iMbianka. He only added that he could not contirm*
to play this tragic and disgusting role any longer, and had there.
fore,. decided to warn Ilazi$ ZakharchenkosSObalts and sumo other ideas
istio monarchists of the real character of the "Trusty" and now he
had some abroad in order to give yarning to the loaders of the Ruseisn
emigres.
In addition, maid Opperputh, the success of the Soviet provosation
was aided in a larse degree by Goviet agents who .were wozkling clan-
destinely. in several intelligence services? particularly in the
Polish Services Opperputh hinted that the Chief of the Polish Gen-
eral Staff, himself, was a. Soviet agent. At the mune time Opperputh
stated that the greatest success achieved by the ":ittusty" from the
Soviet point of view., was the fact that for soseral years the Rue.
aian emigration refrained from using terrorist tactics on RUMGien
territory. For thin reason, Opperputh mac insisting upon tho neces-
sity of organising the terrorist activity with redoubled effort? and
offered his help, abroad am well as in RtifiStao..
?
4The name Z che3eMa1tp was a oonhination of 14,, V. Radkeviteh's
maiden nmse? mith thopseudonym under whieh She and her hue.
band, G. N. Radkevitch? at one time lived in Helsingferss
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At that ttee, my predecessor in the post of head of the Russian
Seetlon of the Polish Intelligence, Major M, Tog was in neisine
fors. Re yarned the Polish Intelligence against Opeerputh? cell-
Log him a dangerous Beviet provocateur, In hie opinion Opperputh
continued his game as before. General Kutepov was called to Bel
eingforte from Perim. Bevan of different opinion. Zakharehenko-
Sehults ear; thoroughly impressed with Opperputhas eaerage and cone
-aimed the Generai that he tehould give Opeerputh the opportunity
to rehabilitate himself in full *armee.' participation in terrorist
activite in Russia Cpnerputh steeled in Finland for several months,
and eontinued, during this time, to maietain lively correepondenee
teeth the pram, However? the irresponsibility of the leaders ofe
the Russian emigre organisations and of the Finnish Intelligence
was mach that he was newer thoroughly interrogated on the subject
of the "Trust," RC told only that which he wanted to toll, and
his telea emaehod more of adventure storiee than of a taotual test.
imony of a participant in one of the biggest provocations in the
history of Intelligente. Opnerputh vas not only alio:awl to take
part in the planning of the terroriet activities, hut even was
given direction of theme In the =IOW of 1927, three "triads"
were sent to Russia, to commit ante of terrorism in Moseow and
LenengraC They were to use exploetwes for thie purpose, At the
head, of one of these- "triads" was Opperputh hieeelfe One triad
(Lariceen. kkereakhov,
and Soloviev)? sent to Leniegead, three three
bombe in the Central Communist Club, on 6 June 3.927e Thie triad
performed the aosigned task yuccossfullye bele:vase It deviated ftme
the instmetions given it by ?pee:math, Another group consisting
of ppperputh? Ukharehenko-Schultz, arid Voskrossensky (Peters), made,
the 'attempt, on) Julee to blow up a Gito emeleyeee dormitory. in
Moscato The participants in this action perished during their flight
in the Ryeloreeelan reeion. Among thong according to the .
official 'special gentian commie:Ivey which -ems signed by Menehineki,
was Opperputh, on whose body wee found an operational diary with
Wermation on a proposed operation against the habianke?..This
eaueod a Warsaw (emigre ?) paper, Za beekebe to. one the question
of provocation. In the fallowing year these terroristic actions
were repeated: Radkaritah, Zakharehenko's husband, with a fiend,
threw a. badb in the Lubianka Headquarters. Radkeviteh was killed
in the explosion, and his friend vas captured awl killed near Mo*
cow; the nembers of other kneecaps, intereepted by Chakiets in the
&Ate weren't able to carry throuch their plans at all. Some wore
killed on the spot (Soleviev, Sharon), while others were ehot after
the trial (the ease of "monarehiete" Eeimassov? Solskye and others).
The operations opeeations organized by Opperpath justified the wide
h'leity given by the Bolsheviks to the danger to the Soviet Regime
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trot the t rroriet acts of the Russian emigres and the internal *ppm:
tion,
THE END OF THE "THUS?,
Opperputhre rorie into Russia formally terminates the "Trust" Af-
fair? Fram that time on, the traces of Yakushev, and of Oppeee
putt, himself, are lost, As to the latter, nereral years later,
there apneared agent reports to the effect that the GPU had diee
patched htm to the, Far Sect, where he worked amoeg the loofa Ruse
nian emigreee Artumovi Styrne, Steekewice? Sosnowski? end Lange
ovey-were a/larded the Order of the Rod Banner. Steekewice and
DobrzhinekleSomoveki contimed among the leaders of the W14 hold.
ing General 'e rank, until their liquidation in the purge eondueted
by Yezhov.
This, however, was only the formal aspect of the liquidation of
the "Trust." In actuality? the affair /asted longer. During these
years, the arti penetrated deeply Into the Russian emigre organize.
tions? and especially those of militarreharacter. It vae in the
"Trust" thet the idea of kidnapping emigre mints leadere, each
as Gen s %toper and Nillerl wae conceived and suocessfully
plane
The damage inflicted Pj the "Tru str en the Russian emigration le
incalculable. It ean be stated without exaggeration that the pout..ical and military capabilities of the emigration were undercut to
much an extent thate from 1927 on, its role became insignificant*
Ho lesser damage, inflicted by the *Trust, was sustained by the
intelligence services of the European powers intereated in Ramie,
einem, for mererol years they were severed from their awn paten.
tial reel sources, yore being fed notional and deeeption material,
and were demoralleed as a result of the apparent easiness of the
work., The "Trust" was the cause of numerous misunderstandinge be-
Ween various servieee? which destroyed thet mutua1 confidence
ebich? at first, united them in their work against the Sovietse,
Thic is Idly I elvers coneidered and still consider the ?Trust" affair
'Aecording to information ree teed by the editors from a reliable
&aurae, Opperputh continued to operate- as a Soelet agent until 1943,
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the most interesting and educational for everyone sto is ihtereated in
the intelligPnce operations agsinst Russia. I also think that, un.
fortunately the nost-Uorld War Il period abounds in circumstances
described above.on the basis of shieh the Bolsheviks could, vithout
much difficultyi, create, an organisation as dangerousp an full of pro-
vocation as the "T itL.the Trust Ho. 1!
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