RESEARCH ORDER 2

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03639A000500050001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 3, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 4, 1956
• Content Type: REPORT

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REPORT NO.
287
4 MAY 1956
RESEARCH ORDER 2
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RESEARCH ORDER 2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CONFIDEN.ITI AL
I INTRODUCTION ............................... Page 1
II DISCUSSION ....................... ................. 2
III PROCEDURE ....................................... 7
IV CONCLUSION ........................... o ......... o '9
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RESEARCH ORDER 2
1. INTRODUCTION
This report presents to the Metal Products Research Associates the re-
sults of an investigation and study for the development of weapons or technical devices
which, by the use of decoy mechanisms, literature, and other material, purport to
serve an apparent military requirement and whose existence is inadvertently releas-
ed to an unfriendly power through capture or breaches of military security, the pur-
pose of this being the distraction, dissipation and utilization of the efforts of the tech-
nical, engineering, scientific and research personnel of that nation in the investiga-
tion and study of these "decoy" devices.
After an initial analysis of various devices and equipment which could serve
this purpose, the efforts of the contractor were directed to consideration of a guided
missile unit which could be integrated into the present overall weapons system and
provide a false trail with respect to tactical capabilities as well as technical advance-
ment.
Presented herein are the general results of the investigation and the furnishing
of a purported technical proposal to the Air Research and Development Command
which is typical of the material necessary to introduce a new weapon into the Air
Force system.
C CJ ACT
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R EPUR i NU 1)ATE 4 May 1956
RESEARCH ORDER 2
II. DISCUSSION
In Report No. 212, dated 8 March 1955, this contractor proposed to Metal
Products Research Associates, the initiation of a project for the purpose of distract-
ing and dissipating the technical and scientific efforts of unfriendly powers. This
was to be accomplished by the careful build-up and supposedly inadvertent release
of data and information on weapons and components which would apparently have ex-
tensive military use or which were supposedly part of a present weapons system and
would indicate capabilities of that system far different than actually exists. This
procedure would have the additional effect of requiring the unfriendly nation obtaining
this information to reconsider its weapon counter-measure and tactics against such
devices with the resultant expenditure of tremendous technical effort.
The basis for consideration of this program was the logical expectation that mili-
tary and civilian intelligence organizations of all nations carefully and completely
analyze every obtainable item of military equipment produced by their potential enem-
ies as well as their present friends. The expected results of such studies are the ac-
quisition of knowledge of the weapons and devices which may be employed against the.
nation and the establishment of counter measures and tactical procedures to reduce
their effectiveness. Such information would then be used by that nation for establish-
ing a standard or basis of operation by which performance of their own weapons could
be judged, as well as the revealing of basic scientific fields in which their own dev-
elopment would be lacking or non-existent.
Because of these reasons it is definitely desirable that national groups expend a
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REPORT NO 287
DATE 4 May 1956
RESEARCH ORDER 2
considerable portion of their funds and man power for such analytical and technical
intelligence work. In particular, this is true of nations whose scientific and indus-
trial status is undergoing an accelerated program to achieve domination.
Many instances of phenomenal increases in quality of weapons and material have
been gained due to information from such studies. It thus appeared to the contractor
that it would be economical to spend a reasonable amount of time in the preparation
of a decoy program intended to create a condition of confusion and uncertainty in the
minds of the military planners of unfriendly countries with the possibility of an actual
change in tactics and operational procedures. This would, in effect, aid our own
people by the disclosure of the opposition's specific weapons which have been pro-
tected under an excellent security program and heretofore remained undetected.
In initiating this program, first thought was given to the utilization of equipment
and material which had been declared surplus or beyond the security stages; this
equipment to have had sufficient modifications to create the impression that a new
basic field of science was being utilized in their performance.
It was believed at that time that a typical device which could prove usable would
be certain high altitude cameras which had been developed for a particular scientific
purpose with the view towards impressing the opposed forces with the fact that air
observation of their facilities and military installations had been made. This pro-
cedure, while probably useful, was negated by the fact that considerable publicity
was coincidently aroused shortly afterwards by the use of high altitude propaganda
or weather balloons and the further utilization of the decoy camera equipment would
serve no useful purpose beyond aggravating an already tense situation.
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RESEARCH ORDER 2
AA second path which was considered lay in the possibility of utilizing certain
simulated fire control and search equipment which could be "lost in flight". In
view of the great number of possible programs which could be conducted in this one
field, guidance was requested with respect to the development of one particular item
which could prove of interest as a decoy device. This guidance was furnished the
contractor in the setting forth of a need for a guided missile which would fit into the
present weapons system and appear to be an operational device of a highly classified
nature and capable of air to air use, the missile fitting somewhere between the pre.
sent unguided rocket system and the guided missile of the Falcon type, Because of
the need to provide a unit which could be readily handled and whose'-inadvertent dis-
semination could be relatively easily accomplished, it was decided that a large missile
such as the Matador aircraft or the Snark would be undesirable and would show only
a limited developmental capability. On the other hand, it was extremely desirable
to be able to utilize present equipment such as aircraft external carrier and launcher
arrangements without modification.
First consideration for such a missile lay in the use of the five inch HVAR motor
with simulated guided warhead. Further analysis of this device showed a similarity
in concept to that of the Sidewinder and the Falcon and therefore a search was made
for a different motor. This led to consideration of the 2. 75 inch FFAR as the pro-
pulsion means with the thought that the technical and scientific capability of fitting a
guidance system into this diameter rocket would create the revision of an unfriendly
nation's combat flight procedures. Guidance and corroboration of this selection was
then requested by the contractor and it was agreed that if a feasible approach could
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REPORT NO. 287
RESEARCH ORDER 2
4 May 1956
be shown using the 2. 75 inch rocket, that such a unit could possibly meet the re-
quirements of the customer. Accordingly, an investigation was undertaken to deter-
mine the limits of aerodynamic stability of a longer rocket, the velocities and flight
path which the longer and possibly heavier rocket would take, as well as the capa-
bilities of such a device fitting into the launching equipment presently available for
the 2. 75 inch FFAR.
The contractor was aided in this investigation by previous analyses which had
been made to determine the maximum weight limitations allowable for the 2. 75 inch
FFAR configuration. The results of these studies showed that the warhead portion
of the rocket could be increased in length up to ten inches and increased in weight
up to ten pounds. This would show enough of a deviation from the standard to indi-
cate a new concept and design. In order to utilize existing production facilities and
minimize the developmental procedures and fabrication necessary for furnishing
such items, it was decided that only the warhead be modified and that the present
rocket motor assembly be used in its entirety without modification. During this later
study it was believed that the presentation of a fully guided missile within the 2. 75
inch diameter would represent a technical capability so far beyond the present com-
ponents and launching systems that the exposure of such a device could easily be
dismissed by the scientific personnel of the foreign nation as merely propaganda.
On the other hand, by combining the operation of the decoy missile with that of the
present 2. 75 inch weapon's mission there would be created a more logical weapon
structure and offensive system leading up to the Hughes Falcon and other fully
guided missiles in that category.
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REPORT NO. 287
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RESEARCH ORDER 2
ZOtLKt I
PAGE 6
Accordingly, this contractor has prepared a technical proposal, Report 282,
covering the development of a directed aircraft rocket with means for taking corr-
ective action against a target undergoing evasive maneuvers. The concept is called
DAREC and will be referred to as such in the remainder of this report. One dummy
unit has been fabricated for demonstration purposes and is shown in photograph 76150
while the modified head assembly is shown in comparison to the standard FFAR head
assembly in photograph 76149.
In accordance with earlier decisions on the subject, the plan followed for prep-
aration of this mock-up as well as the technical proposal of Report 282 was the same
as that for normal projects initiated
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No reter-
ence to the actual research order for MPRA has been made outside the presentation
of this report and the work was undertaken on the basis of a proposal initiated by
as No. P376 with a separate file being origi2AXcd
and work commencing on the basis of Report 282.
The operational characteristics and its capabilities for fitting into the present
2. 75 inch launcher systems is fully described in that report and need not be duplicated.
While three designs have been shown in Report 282, the mock-up was based on De-
sign "A", which is the particular design recommended by this contractor for utiliza-
tion.
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287
DATE 4 May 1956
RESEARCH ORDER 2
PAGE 7
III. PROCEDURE
The latter portion of the program, which commenced upon selection of
the 2. 75 inch FFAR as the basic vehicle, has been based on the introduction of this
missile into the current Air Force family of guided missiles by the use of simulated
"training" heads with maintenance manuals, technical orders, and other literature
pertaining to the installation and firing of such devices in conjunction with the pre-
sent 2. 75 inch rockets. These "training" heads, or dummy warheads, would contain
in the exterior shell only those components which would be considered non-critical
and yet give an indication of the function and feasibility ofthe unit. In accordance
with the requirements of the contract only this report, the mock-up and the technical
proposal have been presented with the view towards obtaining approval in guidance
from the customer with respect to further procedures.
Two possible procedures for widening the scope of this program appear feasible.
The first is based on the introduction of experimental units which will be fabricated
and then flight tested at the various available testing facilities such is Edwards Air
Force Base, Inyokern and Eglin Field and the furnishing of preliminary operational
manuals, reports and such printed material as is required of a contractor providing
items of a prototype or pilot production nature. These could be followed up by the
fabrication of large quantities of dummy or training units for dissemination to field
elements engaged in rocket target practice with the idea in mind of thus providing a
means for disseminating the information that such equipment is just entering the
operational field. The alternate to this would be the fabrication of large quantities
U_; rlv i 10 6 a i l=k
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287
4 May 1956
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RESEARCH ORDER 2
of these "training" heads as well as the printing of a large number of instructional
manuals and operational manuals and the dissemination of this equipment directly
to field users with the view towards providing information that such units are current-
ly operational Because of the need for correct insertion of these missiles into the
weapons system, it is believed by this contractor that the former operational pro-
cedure is the preferred one even though it may take slightly longer to indicate an
operational capability. The chances for disclosure are much greater plus the fact
that the weapon will enter the system in a normal R & D manner and thus have a
background capable of being scrutinized without disclosing its limitations.
It is anticipated that work at this installation will consist of research, design,
preparation of drawings, plus fabrication of prototypes. Upon completion of a limit-
ed number of prototypes, firing tests will be performed with perhaps the inadvertent
"losing" of a unit or components, whichever appears desirable at the time. After
completion of tests and satisfaction of the using service that the device is capable
of scrutiny, a limited number will be produced for distribution for training purposes
along with such handbooks and related material as is required.
In addition to the primary purpose of this program, which is the distraction Ind
confusion of the enemy, the secondary advantage of "Leak Detection" may be obtain-
ed. Since the operation of the program will be under constant control, it would seem
that after initial revelation of the general nature of the weapon, that any persistent
efforts to seek specific knowledge of the weapon details while they are still highly
classified would merit suspicion.
c r r% ri
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REPORT N:), 287
DATE 4 May 1956
RESEARCH ORDER 2
CONFIDENTIAL
IV. CONCLUSION
The "insertion" program as outlined could be originated immediately
upon the decision to do so, with the first steps being issuance of a "T" number
and other normal procedures by the Air Force. Firing tests could commence
very early in the program, starting with mock-ups being fired for ballistic eval-
uation.
During the time that these early steps are being taken and a true hist-
orical background is being established, the detailed plans for inadvertent revel-
ation can be more completely formulated and then placed into operation at a time
deemed advantageous.
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