STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE [Vol. 2 No. 1, Winter 1958]

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Approved For Release 2004/12/17: CIA-RDP18-0392 A L #19 CON I EI"TIAL' STUDIES INTELLIGENCE JOB N0. ~~g39d1(~ BOX P1fl, _ --------- I EREIN 26X1 VOL. 2 NO. 1 LW ,1938 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF TRAINING momm Approved For Release E:I I(R7TE1A000300190001-4 Apprre't9 r'RILIE`2D1A - 78-03921A000300190001-4 Mia All opinions expressed in the Studies are those of the authors. They do not represent the official views of the Central Intelligence Agency or of the Office of Training. This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans- mission or revelation of which to an unauthorized person is prohibted by law. Approved For Release 2004/12/1RDP78-03921 A000300190001-4 CONFIDEI"IMAL Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA~P78-03921A000300190001-4 CONTENTS Page Origin, Missions, and Structure of CIA Lyman B. Kirkpatrick 1 Strategic Thinking and Air Intelligence Major General James H. Walsh 7 Concepts for a Philosophy of Air Intelligence Lewis R. Long 31 Developments in Air Targeting : The Military Resources Model . . . . . . . . . . Robert W. Leavitt 51 Horrible Thought . . . . . . . . . W. A. Tidwell 65 ELINT: A Scientific Intelligence System Charles A. Kroger, Jr. 71 Report on Hungarian Refugees . . . . Guy E. Coriden 85 Paper Mills and Fabrication . . . Stephen M. Arness 95 Lost Order, Lost Cause C. Bowie Millican, Robert M. Gelman, and Thomas A. Stanhope 103 Critiques of Some Recent Books on Intelligence The New Class-An Analysis of the Communist System, by Milovan Djilas . . . . . . . . Lena Marks 115 The Soviet Secret Police, by Simon Wolin and Robert M. Slusser . . . . . . . . . . John Rondeau 123 We Spied . . . . . . . . . Walter L. Pforzheimer 131 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 'ALEJVTo-03921A0003001900d4QRI/HRP THIS PAGE CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2004/12/17 $SDP78-03921 A000300190001-4 ORIGIN, MISSIONS, AND STRUCTURE OF CIA Lyman B. Kirkpatrick This is a brief summary of the history of the modern origin of the central intelligence concept and thus of the Central Intel- ligence Agency. In 1940 the fortunes of Britain and France were at their lowest ebb. Some high-level officials of the US Government were predicting that Great Britain could not hold out against the Germans. To check on this, President Roosevelt sent Colo- nel William J. Donovan, prominent New York attorney and winner of the Congressional Medal of Honor as Commanding 60+1, Regiment in SATnrlrl War T abroad to dis- Oar-c-- of th e t fi rs cover and eport his estimate of the sil, atioi1. Don-all visited the Mediterranean area, and on his second trip talked to leaders of both Britain and QFr~ance. His report indicated that Britain would hold out, lit he urged that the US im- mediately organize itself for global warfare. Donovan's par- ticular interest was in the intelligence field, and he went to talk to Secretary of the Navy Knox, Secretary of War Stimson, and Attorney General Jackson about his concept of an agency which would combine intelligence with the forces of propa- ganda and subversion. On 10 June 1941, Donovan proposed "a service of strategic information." This service would have an advisory panel com- posed of the chiefs of intelligence of the Army, the Navy, the Department of State, and the FBI. It would draw its personnel from the Army and the Navy and would also have a civilian staff. It would not displace or encroach upon the intelligence prerogatives of the established departments, although it would collect information independently. This was the start of the Office of the Coordinator of Information which combined in- formation, intelligence, and clandestine activities. In 1942, however, the Coordinator of Information was split and the Office of War Information - the predecessor of the present ? US Information Agency-was created and given the respon- sibility for all overt attributable propaganda, information, and to the Office of Strategic Services - went the responsibility for Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : P78-03921A000300190001-4 ``- MORI/HRP PAGES 1-5 Approved For Release 2004/je~&YCIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 clandestine activities and for research and analysis of intelli- gence. From the OSS the present day intelligence community in- herited certain assets. Among these were records and some methods and means of procuring both overt and secret intelli- gence. There were certain basic counterespionage files devel- oped with the advice and assistance of some foreign intelligence services, particularly the British. There was a considerable reservoir of knowledge of procedures for research and analysis of basic intelligence information. There were some skilled per- sonnel. Finally, but far from last in importance, there were agreements with key foreign intelligence services. The history of the OSS, and particularly its relationship with other US intelligence organizations during World War II, is far too detailed for discussion in this essay. But it should be noted that shortly after the creation of the Office of Strategic Services, top-level officials in the US intelligence community started to think about a peacetime intelligence service. On 25 August 1942, Brigadier General John Magruder wrote a paper on a proposed plan for a joint intelligence bureau which would be an agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For the next two years there was considerable discussion of this and similar papers. On 5 October 1944 a document was originated in the office of General Donovan entitled "The Basis for a Permanent World- Wide Intelligence Service." Certain of the principles enun- ciated in this document are interesting,ta-mete. This service would collect, analyze, and deliver intelligence on the policy or strategy level. The proposed organiiai.on would have its own means of communication and`corihroi over its secret operations. It would not interfere with Npartmental intelligence and it would not have any police function. An individual rather than a collective responsibility for national intelligence was pro- posed. Finally, the director of the proposed organization would be responsible directly to the President. It is interesting to note that Secretary of War Stimson com- mented on the subject of intelligence coordination in his biog- raphy "On Active Service in Peace and War." This quotation reads: "Stimson was insistent that no impatience with its occa- sional eccentricities should deprive the Army of the profits of co- operation with General Donovan's Office of Strategic Services. Throughout the war the intelligence activities of the United Approved For Release 20049I0ffr: CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 IA-R Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : C C EDP78-03921A000300190001- States Government remained incompletely coordinated, but here again it was necessary to measure the profits of reorgani- zation against its dislocations and on the whole, Stimson felt that the American achievement in this field, measured against the conditions of 1940, was more than satisfactory. A full re- organization belonged to the post war period." On 18 January 1945, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee reported to the JCS on the subject of a central intelligence organization. The members propose first a national intelli- gence authority composed of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy and the Chief of Staffo :the President: There would be an advisory board consisting of the heads of the various intel- ligence services. The new organization would have the power to inspect the operations of the various departmental intelli- gence services and would have the responsibility for protecting sources and methods. At this juncture the press got in _Qf_the discussions for creating a new intelligence organization and, on 9 February 1945, fairly complete details appeared in the Chicago Tribune and the Washington Times Herald. There was considerable furor, and some :members of Congress took a dim view of the creation of what they felt might become a peacetime "gestapo." Shortly after this - just a few days before his death - President Roosevelt asked General Donovan to get together with the heads of the various intelligence and security services and get -a consensus of views on a central service. Donovan did this and also went further and queried.,by letter, all of the members of the Cabinet. Within the intelligence community there was general agreement that a central service might be appropriate, but there were several conflicting views as to whether it should report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Department of State, or to the President, and there was also controversy as to whether there should be individual or collec- tive responsibility for national intelligence. The response from the Cabinet members was varied and ranged from yes to no. After open hostilities had cea ed, as we all vividly remember, there was almost frantic haste to demobilize not only the mili- tary services but many of the war agencies. On 20 September 1945, the OSS was disbanded. Its Research and Analysis Branch and its Presentation Unit were transferred to the De- partment of State, its Secret Intelligence and Special Opera- Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : 6FJP78-03921A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 4 SECRET tions Units were transferred to the Army, and the(forfne;=wvere preserved in the Strategic Services Unit which reported to the Secretary of the Army. On 22 October 1945,a report prepared by Ferdinand Eberstadt on possible unification of the Army and Navy ,recommended a central intelligence organization and a national security coun- cil. On 14 November 1945,the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy met, discussed the proposed central intelligence organiza- tion, and set up an interdepartmental working committee to attempt to arrive at a unanimous recommendation. The end product of these reports and committees was the issuance on 22 January 1946 of the Executive Order creating the Central Intelligence Group. ",.,.This Executive Order reflected much of the thinking and work that had gone on during the warms) A National Intelligence Authority was created, composed of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy and the Military Chief of Staff to the President. The Director of the Central Intelli- gence Group was designated by the President, and per onneia were to be assigned,from_ the respective departments l well as recruited from civilian life. The Director of the new Central Intelligence Group was charged by the Executive Order with preparing plans for coordination. The new organization could inspect the activities of departmental intelligence if such in- spection were approved by the National Intelligence Authority. It could recommend policies and objectives. It was responsible for correlating, evaluating, and disseminating intelligence and for the performance of services of common concern and such other functions as directed. The Executive Order explicitly stated that the departments would continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence. Finally, an Intelligence Advisory Board, composed of the heads of the service intelligence agencies, was established to advise the Di- rector of the Central Intelligence Group. With the creation of the Central Intelligence Group there commenced a process of accretion of functions taken from the wartime agencies and from departments which were anticipat- ing reductions in budget under peacetime conditions. The Strategic Services Unit was transferred from the Department of the Army and became the Office of Special Operations - charged with espionage and counterespionage functions. The Washington Document Center was taken over from the Navy Approved For Release 2004ggg41r: CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/178EC,,h2DP78-03921A0003001900%1-4 and shortly after that the Army's German Military Documents Center at Fort Holabird joined this unit and together became the Foreign Documents Division. The Foreign Broadcast In- formation Service, an organization with worldwide bases for monitoring all non-coded radio traffic, which had originally been under the Federal Communications Commission, was transferred from the Army and became the Foreign Broadcast Information Division. During World War II the Army and Navy and OSSIand occasionally other agencies had al4. ap- proached US businesses and institutions in search of foreign intelligence information. An early agreement was reached that this domestic collection should be performed as a service of common concern by Central Intelligence with other agencies participating as they desired, and this became the Contact Division. Another illustration of the type of functions taken on is the division of responsibilities with the Department of State on biographic intelligence. (The list would be much too long if we attempted to enumerate all of the functions acquired in this method. Slightly over a year- and a -half after the creation of the CIG-on 25 July 1947-the Congress, utilizing most of the fea- tures of this Executive Order, passed the National Security Act of 1947 creating the Central Intelligence Agency. the mission of the Central Intelligence Agency becomes fairly obvious with the preceding background. The National Security Act of 1947 describes the general mission with em- phasis on coordination and on performing services of common concern. It should be clearly noted also that the legislation assigns two roles to the Director of Central Intelligence and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence - over-all coordination, as well as the role of head (s) of an Agency. Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : C9KRbp78-03921A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 S0DP78-03921A00030019000~-4 STRATEGIC THINKING AND AIR INTELLIGENCE Major General James H. Walsh My purpose in this article is to discuss, in very broad terms, some of the significant aspects of air strategy for the future and the vital functions that intelligence must perform in order to insure the success of future air operations. The suspicions currently entertained that the Soviet sputnik may be getting intelligence of both meteorological and cartographic nature re- quired for accurate firing of ICBMs illustrate some of the possi- ble relationships between air power and intelligence. In a rudi- mentary way, even the first earth satellites point up the tasks and capabilities of future intelligence systems required for survival under conditions of international technological com- petition - intelligence systems which must meet three basic criteria: global coverage, instantaneous discovery, and abso- lute accuracy. I believe that we have a reasonably good understanding of past and present concepts of air warfare and the relation of intelligence to those concepts. it is far more difficult to look into the future and to do so with the precision and clarity needed to prepare ourselves effectively for the trials and dan- gers ahead. The reason for this basic uncertainty is not that many people have neglected the problems of aerial technology and its stra- tegic implications. The reason is rather that we are in the midst of a technological revolution. Changes are becoming so rapid, so penetrating and, in many instances, so contradictory that the direct and indirect results of the technological revolu- tion tend to control - and at the same time to confuse - the nature and application of tomorrow's air strategy. Neverthe- less, it is in this setting of dynamic technical change and a world beset by what often seems an unlimited number of related and unrelated political, economic, and military prob- lems that we must attempt to examine the future direction of air power. To begin with, we already have seen major alterations in the basic nature of air forces since World War II. The transition 00090/~RP PAGES 7-30 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : (WKUP78-03921A0003 0 1-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 SECRET to jets, nuclear weapons, sonic speeds, countless black boxes, and, to a degree, missiles typifies the changed environment which governs today's air capabilities as compared with those of 1945. Fifteen years ago the RAF qualitatively was the world's lead- ing air force. Today it is in third place. More important, it is not in a class, by a broad margin, with the air forces of the US and the USSR. It has neither the aircraft, the equipment, the bases, the research and development, nor the funds to become again a truly self-sufficient force, with strategic capa- bilities as required by world conditions. Fifteen years ago the Soviet Air Force was an adjunct of the Russian army. Statistically it represented a force in quantity, but it had poor operational know-how and no strategic capa- bility. Its aircraft were fair, at best. Today the Soviet Air Force is the largest in the world. It is equipped with modern weapons, some of them as advanced as those of any other nation. It has a well-funded and aggressive research and de- velopment program. Although it still has many weaknesses, the Soviet Air Force is making a bid for world air mastery. The US Air Force also has come of age in the postwar period. It has held the quality lead for most of that time and still holds it for most of the important equipments. Its personnel are superior in training and efficiency. But the USAF has prob- lems, especially in areas outside the SAC program. Its progress is not to be belittled, but in some areas its progress perhaps has not been so fast or so forward as we would like it to be. The fortunate aspect is that during the postwar period the USAF has grown to be a global force. In fact, to this date, the USAF - not forgetting its naval support - is the only global force extant. This American capability is a fact of overriding importance. It will remain a controlling factor in the inter- national power equation, to a certain extent, irrespective of technological slippage and of the inevitable acquisition by the Soviet Union of a global missile force. The most important single change since World War II is that atomic airpower has become the dominant military force. The only way a nation can deliver nuclear firepower overlong dis- tances and in a short time is through the air. Sea and ground delivery of nuclear warheads is important, particularly in spe- cial situations. But in terms of a global nuclear war, these Approved For Release 200W0KZIR'ET : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17E CG f2DP78-03921A00030019000) -4 systems - and some of the secondary means of aerial de- livery - can do no more than furnish local, regional, and tac- tical support to the strategic air strike forces. One of the changes upon us deals with defense in nuclear aerial war. Whereas the offense still seems to have outdis- tanced defense, the old axiom that like weapons are the best defenses against like weapons again could become true. For the moment there is very little one can do when an atomic explosion occurs except to be underground, fully equipped with food and non-contaminated water or, preferably, plenty of Irish whiskey. Nevertheless, the very possession of nuclear weapons for defensive purposes may act as a "prevent- ing" factor - not because even the best defense would be capa- ble of halting an attack, but because a good defense system would boost the force requirements of the attacker, lower the probability that he can execute his plan with full success, and thus, in some cases at least, tend to induce him to delay his aggression until he has reached the required force and tech- nological levels. It is in the nature of a "race," that the aggressor may be unable to achieve such a posture of superi- ority that he can dare take the risk of nuclear attack. If this should be a vain hope, for example, because the defender has failed to keep up with the pace of the race, the actual use of nuclear warheads against incoming vehicles should reduce the effectiveness of the offense. Some of our forward looking scientists are optimistic about the feasibility of employing anti-ICBM missiles, which would take advantage of the greatest point of vulnerability of the early ballistic missile, its fixed trajectory. Many ideas have been proposed about nuclear predetonation and sophisticated employment of modern electronics to interfere with incoming nuclear attack. There are a number of passive defensive steps which could be taken to lessen the vulnerability of our retaliatory force. These include the dispersal of aircraft and missiles, shelters, and other forms of base hardening, short exposure times, rapid reaction procedures, and maintenance of a substantial portion of the alert force in the air at all times. Unfortunately such systems can be very costly. They are limited in their coverage and may not be reliable enough for Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : LlP78-03921A000300190001-4 Aqr.roved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 SECRET the safety of personnel and certain equipment. Elaborate pas- sive defenses tend to disrupt and slow the ability of an air force to retaliate as rapidly as required. For these reasons the stra- tegic effectiveness of passive defense is predicated upon effec- tive warning. By warning I refer to technical alarms such as radar and infrared sensing and to interrelated strategic and tactical indications intelligence. The true effectiveness of defense will be a function of the scope, size, quality, and mental effort put into requisite weapons systems needed to furnish capabilities for protection, warning, interception, and countermeasure tasks. It may be dubious whether or not even the best defensive system pitted against combinations of different types of attack weapons ever will attain a high kill rate, but this may not be the critical point. Rather, countersystems embodying nuclear warheads and built around effective warning and reaction responses suggest that a nation may be able to close the gap between the power of the offense and present limitations on defense. Such sys- tems could pre-empt the advantage of surprise by sneak attacks by an aggressive nuclear delivery force. They would force the attacker into more elaborate and costly delivery means, pri- marily large and massive raids which are susceptible to stra- tegic and tactical detection and to interception measures. Through all these means and measures the offensive may not necessarily be priced out of business, but its effectiveness should be reduced against its primary objective - the opponent's re- taliatory force. Thus, it would be hoped, the attacker would be induced not to strike because of the uncertainty over the success of his initial blow and also because he would have to risk his main force at excessive loss rates. In nuclear war the first blow must be decisive: the retaliatory force must be killed. It is quite clear that intelligence influences the effectiveness of defense. Whatever the technical proficiency of a defense system, it can be improved by better intelligence, whereas even the technically most promising defenses can be invalidated through intelligence failure anywhere along the "assembly line" - from scientific intelligence to tactical warning. Per- haps it should be observed that good intelligence would allow the utilization of foreign scientific and technological achieve- ments for the improvement of our own posture. Beyond pro- Approved For Release 200491i;j : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A00030019000~ -4 SECRET viding us with better design patterns, such intelligence also would enable us to build our equipment to such specifications as to optimize its capabilities against the enemy's weapons. I should like to turn now to a discussion of various tech- nological factors, some of them here now and some on the horizon, and try to relate them into a strategic pattern. During the years ahead we shall be approaching practical terminal limits in certain key parameters of weapons systems. We already may have reached what could be called terminal explosive power, not that it would be impossible to achieve higher yields. Within the next few decades we probably will attain terminal speeds, at least for terrestrial operations. We cannot exceed certain speeds without being forced from the earth's gravita- tional field. Before we achieve theoretical terminal velocities we should reach a far lower practical speed limit for operations directed against targets on the ground. We must remember that the attainment of maximum speed in flight may require more time than would be necessary to reach a terrestrial tar- get at lesser speeds. We certainly shall be capable of terminal ranges in the sense that future air and missile systems will be able to circumnavi- gate the globe at least once. I am convinced that there will be no practical limits to altitude, although there may be tem- porary barriers to surmount before manned and powered space flight becomes a reality. Such restrictions could occur in metallurgy, engines, communications, aero medicine, and nu- clear components, among other fields. Let me dwell for a moment on the relationship of altitude to tomorrow's air strategy. In the immediate future, altitude essentially will be a matter of tactical advantage inasmuch as, with respect to powered flight, we still shall be competing in heights measured by thousands of feet. We have come to recognize that the attack force with the higher altitude capa- bility, generally speaking, is the force with the greater penetra- tion capability. To achieve tactical altitude advantage we are moving into speeds up to Mach 3 as a result of improved rocket fuels, higher thrust engines, aerodynamic advances, and even newer black boxes. I am talking about situations up to 100,000 feet. Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : c$ BP78-03921A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 SECRET But today we also stand on the threshhold of entirely new altitude dimensions. Space vehicles already have been climb- ing to heights of 600 miles, and unpowered satellites, or sput- niks, are flying around the earth approximately every hour and a half, at heights up to over 1,000 miles. This altitude is by no means a limit but soon will be exceeded. Disregarding the future development of orbital flight, even at this point the significance of the recent quantum jump is that we are acquir- ing the capability of staying in the air. This overriding technological fact will have the most pro- found impact upon military operations. At present altitudes, the airman must worry about hurricanes, fog, winds, and other weather factors characteristic of the dense air which lies just above the earth. Tomorrow's space flyers must be concerned with meteoric showers, cosmic radiation, electronic barriers, and Buck Rogers' conditions within his cabin. Instead of using flight as a means of traveling from one point on the earth's surface to another, either for friendly or unfriendly purposes, the new problem will be to reach an orbit, maintain it, and utilize nonpowered flight for scientific, military, and probably economic purposes. The flying machine of outer space will not spend 90 percent of its time on the ground, but 100 percent of its time aloft. In simple statistics, we are moving from transonic speeds and periodic flights of several thousands miles in length into an environment where speeds will be of the order of 16,000 knots and "ranges," depending upon the height and shape of the or- bit, easily may exceed 1 million miles per day and hundreds of millions of miles per year. The development of terminal weapons - in terms of ex- plosive power, range, endurance, and speed - will not bring the technological race to an end. Strategies will capitalize on the new dimension of altitude and perhaps endurance rather than distance as a decisive area of military competition. Mili- tary superiority will be dependent upon relative advantages in electronics, warning, and deception. Thus the sciences of in- strumentation and intelligence will become truly decisive ele- ments in the equation of a strategy in which the chief maneu- vers seek to conquer altitude and achieve enduring control from the ground to outer space. Approved For Release 200,4t-A' : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A00030019009 -4 SECRET Modern air strategy will be affected by a number of additional problems, each of which could become crucial in varying cir- cumstances. There is, for example, the requirement that a portion of the aerial strength must be on constant readiness status. A strike force that requires one or two days to get ready is a military liability. Even in today's war it would be caught on the surface. An effective air force must be numerically strong and able to get its combat aircraft into the air in time. It must be located on a large number of bases, preferably distributed on several continents and located at varying distances from the enemy. Moreover, it must be supported by reconnaissance forces operating vigilantly around the clock. Only such an air force is in a position to achieve a strategic, though not neces- sarily physical, invulnerability. In former wars, material strength was the decisive factor. The speed with which fire power could be delivered was an important but still a subsidiary element. The nature of a future war is essentially no longer a dispute about territory but a competition for gains in the time dimension. This is because, in the first place, technology is a variable in time. The speed with which this factor varies will continue to increase as long as technological progress continues. In the second place, sur- prise being a key to success in air and missile warfare, the initial rounds of conflict are little more than a contest to operate faster than the opponent. Surprise attack will be successful if the attacker moves faster than the defender. It will fail if the defender's "reaction time" deprives him of targets and dis- rupts the attack schedule. Intelligence must come to closer grips with the time dimen- sion. We are dealing not with one uniform period but with a whole set of different time categories. There is the time prob- lem of maturing manpower, scientific discovery, and technolog- ical invention - measured in generations. There is the dura- tion of research and development programs, decisionmaking, production, and incorporation of weapons into battle orders - a period of years to decades. There is the complex problem of warning - ranging all the way from advanced strategic warn- ing measured in weeks, months, or even years, to tactical warn- ing, measured in minutes. There is the problem of reaction time and interception, measured in seconds and microseconds. Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : C REIP78-03921A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 11 SECRET Pre-emptive, retaliation, deterrence, counterforce, retarda- tion, and disruption attacks all, in one way or another, are tied to a specific time requirement. The more mobile warfare be- comes, the more moving targetsare assuming significance, the less it is a question of mere "capability" than of "capability in time." An airplane carrying a high yield weapon can knock out an air base; the problem is to destroy it at a time when the target will be most lucrative - for example, just before the moment when an attack is to be launched from that target. Need I add that only intelligence can provide this all-impor- tant "timing capability"? Perhaps an additional illustration will clarify this thesis fur- ther: "Reaction time in guided missiles." It is important to count missiles in terms of numbers, warhead yields, and the like. But the foremost problem is that of reaction time or response. If it takes a strategic missile force four hours to launch, whereas the opponent can launch within minutes, the obvious advantage belongs to the side with the shorter reaction time - provided it has adequate warning. The 4-hour reacting force will never leave the ground; its threat will be pre-empted. If this is correct, it appears to be a mistake for intelligence to count the degree of deterrent power primarily in numbers of missiles or warhead yields. It will be necessary to assess, above all, relative times of reaction. Earlier we discussed the new parameters of altitude. It is appropriate, I believe, that we reflect on the purpose of operat- ing at such altitudes. The use of outer space will permit al- most continuous observation of any point on the earth, a situa- tion which, although not entirely without precedent, marks a new departure in modern strategic warfare. Space platforms are becoming indispensable elements of effective warning sys- tems against future means of weapons delivery. Unless we conquer space, a great deal of the scientific knowledge which we require to remain in the technological race will not be avail- able. Furthermore, orbiting vehicles eventually will be used as weapon carriers and thus will develop into crucial components of offensive and defensive missile warfare. All this poses the spectre of outer space military conflict which will involve three phases: first, the competition to get Approved For Release 2004Jg?k'r: CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : S- P78-03921A00030019000 - RET 15 vehicles into space in sufficient quantities to occupy desirable orbits and to make profitable scientific use of orbital flights; second, the development of military techniques for operating from our own orbits and for countering the enemy's militarily significant orbital activities; and third, the ability to neutralize or destroy terrestrial and aerial components of orbital systems. This new sphere of warfare raises some perplexing problems in world relations. In addition to traditional surface bound- aries, there will arise sovereignties over vacuous orbits and the areas beneath them-a system of interlaced surface and spatial boundaries thousands of miles in depth and tens of thousands of miles in length. A new pattern of international relations must be developed in which orbits are occupied peacefully or conquered and in which orbits must be delineated. During peacetime the nations must respect each other's scientific and security operations in the orbits, and in wartime, of course, the purpose will be to elimi- nate all of the opponent's space vehicles. In turn, there must be capabilities for protecting the satellites. It is clear that this involves entirely new types of "aerial" operations, as it is also clear that the diplomats and international lawyers will have to do some hard thinking to settle peacefully the problems of orbit allocation and orbit sovereignty. The introduction of the orbital dimension into warfare sig- nifies that factors such as Iron Curtains, the dispersal of air bases and missile sites, and the ability of navies to "hide," so to speak, in the vastness of the oceans will tend to lose signifi- cance. The nature of the new implements is definitive enough to suggest that the use of truly underground and of undersea facilities may dominate the terrestrial scene. As a result, the roles and techniques of surprise will undergo very profound changes, the exact nature of which we cannot predict. For a nation to exist and survive under these conditions, its intelligence system must become a predominant security tech- nique. Such a system must meet three criteria: global cover- age, instantaneous discovery, and absolute accuracy. The sys- tem must be fully operational both in war and peace. Intelli- gence must be run not only for the benefit of, but by those who are responsible for decisions of life or death. I believe I have reached the point where it is necessary to examine this strategic framework with its epochal implications Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : @Wrlg5P78-03921A000300190001-4 IA6pproved For Release 20054q J~7 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 in the practical light of where we are today and to consider the future directions we must take. The problems of strategic and technological surprise are becoming increasingly serious. The danger of tactical sur- prise is not lessened when the enemy, in addition to a high alti- tude and rapid strike capability, also has a capability for low altitude air attack and may be developing mixed high and low altitude offensive forces. Taking an even broader view, we can say that the nuclear explosive and the supersonic delivery vehicle have appeared at a moment when society is quite defenseless against such weap- ons. During the last few centuries, war has taken place at the margins of society. Society supported the war from its produc- tion surpluses and remained intact as a going concern despite losses and devastations. You recall that during ancient times, the situation was dif- ferent. During the Middle Ages, every town had to be self- sufficient for defense, with walls, moats, shelters, food, and water reserves. Practically every citizen had to bear arms. The American frontier town serves as a more recent example of this dangerous way of life. I believe that society eventually will adjust itself to the mod- ern technology of destruction. Perhaps we may have to be- come troglodytes; our ancestors were. Architects may develop new types of resistant houses and "safe" urban settlements. Perhaps we shall develop anti-radiation protection. The prin- ciple of "hardening" can be applied to many human needs. I am predicting only that the human mind will not stop in- venting. After it realizes the grim threat of modern weapons, society gradually but inevitably will take measures to assure its survival. I am basing this prediction on my faith that mod- ern man, morally and intellectually, is not inferior to previous generations of 700 and 2500 years ago. Whether this process of social adjustment is going to last 20 or perhaps 50 years I am unable to say. But during this interim phase, humanity well may be passing through the greatest peril of its existence. A war five years from now prob- ably will be immeasurably more destructive than a war around 2000 A. D. Our security, therefore, must be tailored to get us and the Free World safely through this immediate period of extreme hazard. Approved For Release 2004SIONBT: CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CSA-RRDP78-03921A000300190001-4 17 It is this interim character of the present military situation which confronts us with many perplexing problems. Defense planning, which includes intelligence, is faced with numerous paradoxes. In this age of maximum offensive strength, there may be a great deal of reluctance to use up-to-date weapons, simply be- cause no one wants to unleash a nuclear war. Yet we must prepare ourselves for a contest which requires us to put the bulk of our resources into nuclear armaments. As a result, we may have only limited capabilities to wage war in which nuclear weapons do not provide the basic fire power. Yet some people have gone so far as to advocate the retention of full-fledged non-nuclear forces in addition to atomic forces. It .is generally agreed that we should prepare ourselves to fight with nuclear weapons. Yet some contend that we also should retain a capability to fight in the style of World War II - high explosives on the ground, at sea, and even from the air. We probably could agree that the availability of non-nuclear forces would be very advantageous. Several types of non-nu- clear explosives will remain with us, even in the nuclear age. Under certain tactical conditions, those may be even more ef- fective than nuclear materials, which is the main reason why they should be retained. Unfortunately, the question is not one of advantage or dis- advantage, or even of choice. The question is one of capability in all aspects - manpower, military organization, research, funds, training, equipment, tactics, and so on. Suppose that we maintain both a nuclear and a non-nuclear defense establishment. There is the high probability or near- certainty that the investment in non-nuclear arms would be invalidated as soon as the first atomic weapons are used. This will happen, almost inevitably, at the first serious military set- back of either belligerent. But the question of non-nuclear armaments is not just a matter of duplication. The cost of matching atomic systems with non-nuclear weapons in terms of relative military effec- tiveness would be exorbitant. More significant, such a second force could not be established on any reasonable scale unless we acquire two sets of our national resources, two sets of our qualified manpower, and two sets of our country. Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : bBARD)P78-03921A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 18 SECRET Iam not raising the issue of limited versus general war. The requirements of any local war situation can be met from avail- able and programmed forces and resources. Rather, I am addressing myself to the problem of attempt- ing to build a non-nuclear force at the expense of our atomic strike and defense units, which must be maintained at an in- creasing degree of readiness because of the overwhelming pri- ority of the Soviet nuclear threat to the US and the Free World. We cannot turn back. There may be a collapse of nuclear courage, but no longer can there be any doubt that we have crossed the nuclear Rubicon. A similar paradox confronts us in disarmament. If the danger of attack could be eliminated by reductions of force levels and by the outlawing of particular types of weapons, the security of all nations unquestionably would be enhanced. The trouble is that with the power of modern weapons, even minor infractions to disarmament agreements may prove fatal. After 1919, the Western Powers tried to control German arm- aments. But practically every week a German arms violation of the Versailles Treaty was reported. Many work shops re- peatedly were discovered in which, it was said, machine guns were being produced under the guise of baby carriages. Nevertheless, the security of the Western Powers did not seem vitally threatened, despite the fact that the Germans maintained secret arsenals and continued surreptitiously to produce weapons which they were not supposed to have. These weapons did not seem powerful enough to pose a real threat to Western security. Neither were the camouflaged divisions which the Germans maintained secretly. But in our time a nation which produces perhaps as few as 50, or as many as several hundred high-yield weapons could become a real threat to the peace, even with makeshift delivery vehicles, especially if other nations faithfully adhere to their disarmament agreements. You are well aware of ominous in- fractions to such agreements in North Korea. The point is that we cannot go back in history and undo the discoveries of nuclear fission, electronics, and aviation. We have to live in the modern world. Technological progress will tend to "break through" even the most elaborate and sophisti- cated disarmament "controls." Each breakthrough will neces- Approved For Release 2004 jtT CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 :giI PP78-03921A00030019000(1 4 sitate renegotiation of agreements. There will be little, if any, stability and durability, let alone guarantee of assured inter- national safety in such arrangements. I confess that this is a very dismal picture. It will not be changed by expectations that the human race will become peaceful and angelic in the next 20 years. There are two brutal facts which we have to remember. The first is that the Soviet regime still is around. Although it sometimes seems to be showing signs of middle or even old age, there is no new evidence that proves that Kipling was wrong when he wrote : "Make ye no peace with Adanizod, the Bear who walks like a man." The Soviets have not changed their basic objectives. Their policies have remained constant in areas that count, including their fantastic military preparedness effort. It is clear that the Soviets do not expect that the millennium of peace has dawned. While they prepare for war we cannot turn our backs. When they talk conflict, we cannot risk to ignore the peril. When they arm themselves with the most modern weapons, we cannot reduce the magnitude of the threat by wishful thinking about their supposed inability to do that which manifestly they are doing. We can philosophize that the Soviet Union will enter into an evolution which, after some time, will transform the present Bolsheviks into Jeffersonian Democrats or Puritan pacifists. I do not believe that anyone who has studied Russian and other revolutionary history seriously expects such a mutation will take place. Naturally, I do not postulate eternity for the Soviet system: their time will come. The question is, when? So far, reports about their demise usually proved quite "exaggerated." Their resilience has been extraordinary. Distinguishing our hopes from realistic planning assumptions, we would be foolhardy not to give them an additional life expectancy of one or two decades. We must assume that they will remain in power dur- ing the entire period when the technological challenge to the US will be at a maximum. It is not certain, of course, that the Soviets deliberately will launch an attack on the US. But at the same time we cannot be sure they will not. In the same vein, there is no doubt but that the social system of Russia is changing in many ways. Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : G9 REb'78-03921A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 W SECRET But is this necessarily a favorable development? One danger surely is that if the Soviet dictatorship were liquidated by force or otherwise, this event - which only optimists expect at this time - could precipitate a major internal crisis. Such a crisis would be uncontrollable. This means that it could lead very easily to a world conflagration. There just is no way by which we could conjure away the ominous dangers in our future. This leads me to the second point of pessimism about peace in the foreseeable future. It is a mistake to consider the Bol- sheviks as the only cause of conflict. Wherever we look at the continents today, there is plenty of politically combustionable material. Old political structures are breaking down. New nations are emerging. Most of them have their own imperi- alistic ambitions, and some of the older nations show frighten- ing signs of decay. Economic difficulties, cultural transfor- mations, intellectual crises, and ideological passions acerbate many of these political changes, not to mention inflammatory propaganda campaigns, political warfare, and the like. Unfortunately many of the political minds still function as though we were living in the time of gun powder and sea power. Few have grasped the significance of the modern technology. There is a dangerous timelag between political thinking and technological reality. As industrial technology advances, psychological stability weakens. We must admit the possi- bility that world society will grow sicker and ever more un- stable, even as the descendants of Icarus reach out for the moon. It is unjustified, therefore, to expect that all nations will observe restraint in order to avoid nuclear conflict. Perhaps most nations will, but the odds are that there will be a few who will act irresponsibly. Hitler was not the last specimen of his type. Recent sociological research asserts that a large percentage of political rulers and regimes have been, historically speaking, criminal in motivation and action. There is no doubt that many rulers, especially those who acquired unlimited powers, may have been, at least partly, insane. In fact, a German historian coined the term "Caesarian insanity" in order to describe the actions of many Roman emperors. Although we have made some political progress, the world nevertheless has had more than its share of insane, criminal, Approved For Release 2004JO& : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CI RDP78-03921A000300190001 q and power-hungry rulers during the 20th century. Crime and insanity rates tend to rise as industrial civilization advances. It may be very convincing to us to say that because of the existence of hydrogen weapons the power-seekers should mend their ways. This type of argument remains unconvincing to the evil doer who is willing to accept the risk, regardless of the consequences. There is only one way to reduce the probability of criminal aggressiveness. That is, to remain militarily overpowering and mentally more vigilant than the would-be aggressor - to outsmart and outarm him at every turn and to apply per- suasive techniques to protect him - and us - from making a miscalculation. It is not enough to possess what could be called a "statistical posture of deterrence." The aggressor also must be convinced that it is inadvisable for him to break the peace. But do we master the techniques by which we could have such an impact on the opponent's mind? We are in the midst of a lasting crisis which Mao Tse-tung has described as "protracted conflict." Political and psycho- logical weapons are being used every day to advance the Com- munist cause. In modern conflict, even though actual shoot- ing may not be taking place, air power and the threat of almost instantaneous massive destruction have become the key ele- ments of the psychological as well as the physical struggle. The extent to which we can deter the opponent from attack- ing us determines our freedom of action on many of the world's battlefields. If the level of our ready deterrent strength is too low to provide the assurance that the enemy will not react with an all-out attack, we could be inhibited in executing proper defense actions in subsidiary theaters. Deterrence is a necessary condition for the maintenance of peace - and the waging of limited war - but it cannot be a static condition if it is to keep that peace. If any nation acquires a more effective weapons system, the best posture of deterrence existing before the technological mutation is subject to rapid nullification. We live in a world where the threats to tomorrow's peace are developing today in the laboratories and on the drawing boards. It is true that so long as the two main competitors run neck to neck, even a major advantage in one or more technological fields may not necessarily upset the balance. A state of mu- Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : (SKREJP78-03921A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/1 SEC2/17 : RET CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 2 tual deterrence may be reached which essentially would mean that a world conflagration could occur against the deliberate planning of both the US and the Soviet Union. Hence I do not believe that the Soviets merely are trying to catch up in the technological race. On the contrary, they seem to have organ- ized themselves to win the technological race on a broad front, not only in many significant scientific areas but also in combat operational strengths as distinguished from mockups and pro- totypes. In other words, they may be trying to surpass us simultaneously by at least one whole and perhaps two weapons generations. The technological race is the very essence of protracted con- flict. It is the main event which we cannot afford to lose. The essence of this conflict is not, as many of our contemporaries believe, a series of limited wars in the jungle and in the desert. Any American intervention into limited war depends crucially upon our relative technological posture. If we lose the tech- nological race we cannot fight on local and regional fronts. Nor will an increase in our capability to fight in Bali or Tim- buctu improve our over-all deterrence. It certainly is not likely that, should the US fall behind in technological capability, the Russians will press their advantage merely to get a few fringe benefits. The struggle between Rome and Carthage is more meaningful to our times than the formalized and restrained war-tournaments of some epochs in the history of Christian Europe. Technological superiority in means of delivery is the essence of success in nuclear war. The idea that nuclear war will take the form of an exchange of mutual blows perhaps forecasts correctly what is going to happen. However, this is not neces- sarily a concept on which the military planner should work. The purpose of planning for nuclear war is to achieve such a predominance of strength that a nuclear blow can be delivered, without the undue risk that a deadly retaliatory blow will be returned. Even the Soviet military leaders who, during the Stalinist period, belittled the importance of military surprise now appear to recognize that surprise could be the condition of nuclear success. The acquisition and maintenance of a dynamic capability to deliver a rapid and devastating blow - plus a proportionately dynamic defense - are prerequisites to survival. The nation Approved For Release 2004, g@: CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 :S~ArDP78-03921A000300190001-4 which insures that its retaliatory force is, in fact, effective at all times, is obtaining maximum protection against preventive and pre-emptive attacks. The success of preventive war and pre-emptive nuclear launchings depends upon the achieve- ment of triple or quadruple surprise - technological, tactical, timing, and conceivably strategic. The US can keep its re- taliatory guard up only if it is able to render those surprises too costly, too impractical, and too uncertain. Thus surprise attack will be too risky for enemy resort only if the US keeps ahead in technology and intelligence, as well as in its force levels and, above all, in reaction times. Should we lose tempo and should one or more of these four pillars of our security crumble, the enemy's superiority may become such that he need not use nuclear weapons except as a threat. The so-called ultimate threat of large hydrogen weap- ons could become "demilitarized" -- by manipulated fear. Suppose the aggressor says : "I grant that you can retaliate, but you will be completely devastated through my first blows. We leave it to you whether or not you want to elect your own death. If you retaliate, you will die, at best with the comfort- ing thought that you have killed some of us. Or you may survive under our whip. That is your alternative." It is known that the Soviets are doing considerable research on conditioned reflexes and brain-washing techniques. Manipu- lated fear and the conditioning of the opponents' mental and psychological reactions are strategic concomitants to nuclear weapons. The Soviets don't overlook a bet. Previous wars have lasted for years. Ever since the emer- gence of a modern industrial society with its long mobilization requirements, war could not be short. A future war may be decided within a matter of a few hours. I think it is wrong, however, to place all attention on the destructive phase of this type of conflict. In previous times, the length of the war allowed us to remedy the shortcomings and omissions of peace. Today and tomor- row, once the climax of the conflict has come, we shall be the prisoners of our previous decisions. In that critical phase we shall not be able to increase our force levels, acquire a new set of technological weapons, adjust our tactics to outdo those of the enemy, or even reassure the fearful and give orders to the panicky. Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CSlWA'78-03921A000300190001-4 f,proved For Release 2004/g Ja7,,: CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 The protracted conflict may last longer than any previous war. Although the climactic or decision phase of this conflict may be short, still, the conflict could endure for many decades. We are in the battle now. As a consequence, the main battles are being fought by military forces in continued readiness, by warning and intelligence services, by the research and develop- ment community, by national and industrial planners, and by budget makers, as well as by moral and intellectual attitudes. Militarily speaking, the decisive phase could be won or lost by the staff and operational officers who 5 to 10 years before the shooting select or reject certain weapons systems, succeed or fail in shortening lead times, organize offensive and de- fensive forces, determine the balance between force elements, and plan deployment and reaction times. It also may be won or lost by the executive and congressional branches which de- cide, with a timelag of 2 to 3 years, the force levels to be main- tained in any technological phase; by the weapons require- ment, procurement, and logistics planners within the military; and by industry, all of whom, together, have the task of devel- oping and producing superior weapons faster and in larger quantity than the enemy; finally, by intelligence officers who must try to forecast the relative strengths and weaknesses of the strategic equation 5 to 10 years ahead. The latter will suc- ceed - or fail - depending on whether or not they convince the powers-that-be that their best estimates are valid. In protracted conflict, the climactic phase may be war in its most extreme form. If the climax is a matter merely of threat and surrender, it will be the most "peaceful" of all wars. To intelligence its most significant aspect should be that pro- tracted conflict is a war during peace. It is easy to enumerate the need to win the technological race, the requirements for adequate numbers of weapons and forces, the advantage of hardened and dispersed base locations, the necessity for fast reaction times, and so forth. But the basic reason these requirements are difficult to satisfy is that no nation has the economic capability to live up to the exigencies of protracted conflict in the early period of the nuclear age. I am not talking about budgets which can be increased and reduced. I do not mean various degrees of economic mobiliza- tion and readiness. Rather, I refer to more fundamental limitations. Approved For Release 2004) p' : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 SJ&81DP78-03921A00030019009 -4 To win the technological race a nation needs numerical and qualitative superiority in technicians and inventive geniuses. Unless the most revolutionary educational changes are made, it is unlikely that sufficient scientists and technicians will be produced to satisfy the growing needs of increasingly complex military programs. Even a program which marshaled all edu- cational resources into scientific and technical curricula prob- ably would be inadequate for acquiring that degree of technical superiority and material effort which makes the launching of a nuclear attack or the psychological threat of such an attack a relatively riskless affair. The cost of weapons systems is rising geometrically, while the increase in productive capabilities proceeds much slower. There is the problem of protecting and rebuilding our cities and facilities to survive in a nuclear environment. This is a prob- lem - so far largely untouched - which clearly accentuates the severe limitations on our economic capabilities to meet the challenge of the nuclear age. In this time of economic plenty, scarcity still is the supreme fact of civilian and, above all, mili- tary economics. Material resources are not the only limiting factor. Time, which is a major resource, also is in short supply. For ex- ample, the time needed to transform a blueprint into a modern weapons system has become such that a military force never possesses an active arsenal without at least some obsolescence. I mean obsolescent in the sense that certain tasks simply can- not be accomplished against opposition or must be undertaken at excessive risks and costs. There is one inescapable conclusion from this discrepancy between requirement and capability. It is this: the future strategist has the potential choice of an entire technological spectrum of weapons. At least several weapons systems will be able to do the same task. Because of the technological potential available to both sides, he will have to decide whether to select a faster or slower weapon, an explosive with greater or lower yield, a weapon of endurance or of stealth. Should he guard against high or low level attack? Should he dispense with manned bombers in favor of missiles? Should he select an earth satellite "anchored" approximately 21,000 miles above its target to de- Approved For Release 2004/12/17 :bP78-03921 A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 SECRET liver nuclear firepower - or should he use a submarine from which to launch a missile? In practical terms the strategist can select only a limited number of systems from this entire technical spectrum, which will grow as we progress further into the scientific era. Strat- egists on the other side have to make similar eliminations. The chances are that the choices may not be identical because of different strategic objectives, production capabilities, opera- tional doctrines, concepts of defensive warfare, and so forth. In turn, because the choices probably will be different on both sides, the possibility of surprise and other major military in- itiatives will increase. Therefore, intelligence must forecast, in ample time and cor- rectly, the enemy selection so that proper defenses can be de- signed. Of course, the choice of the enemy may impose the need for counterweapons, which may have a feedback against our original weapons choice. It is necessary to insure that the relationship between what we actually have and what we require to counter the enemy's principal threats is such that we are not accepting undue risks. If we made a poor or overly narrow selection from the spec- trum, if intelligence fails to guide the research and develop- ment community concerning the enemy's probable selections, we might invite attack, provide inadequate defense, and jeop- ardize life and liberty. But if our intelligence is keen and our armament effort generous we might ensure peace for the period of the technological cycle. We are in a conflict which has and undoubtedly will endure for decades but which at present is changing complexion. Gen- eral J. F. C. Fuller coined the term "machine warfare" to de- scribe World Wars I and II. This expression no longer fully applies to future "technological warfare." I am afraid that the Communists have shown a rather sophis- ticated understanding of the strategic problems involved in this new form of technological struggle. They seem to understand interrelations between social conflicts and technical and eco- nomic competition. More than that, they are organizing them- selves to achieve an overwhelming strategic posture in the tech- nological realm. They are girding to win the technological race against the US. Whatever the disadvantages of a dicta- torial system, their regime responds to rapid decisionmaking. Approved For Release 2004 t T CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : RETDP78-03921A000300190093-4 In this area, we do not seem to have matched their strategic comprehension. We are said to have made the decision never to strike the first blow. At the same time we have neglected to introduce sufficiently into our thinking the fact that if the opponent is allowed opportunity to achieve a broad tactical suc- cess through an initial blow, the retaliatory strategy must be more costly and complicated in order to compensate for the risk and loss which could occur at the outset and weaken the retaliatory force before it goes into battle. Under the postulate that the enemy strikes first, defense must be more expensive than under the postulate that we shall not surrender the initiative. It follows that we must not be re- luctant to pay the price of our security against an opponent to whom we present the gift of the deliberate surprise attack. The technological race has engulfed us exactly as a fast flow- ing river occasionally catches the unsuspecting oarsman. Such a situation cannot be met and overcome by preaching to the river, by throwing away the oars, or by using only one of two hands. In such a situation, all skills and all strengths are needed to ride out the rapids and not get smashed against the rocks. The fundamental conclusion I want to leave is that the tech- nological race, because of various economic limitations and po- litical climates, may not be won by any super power engaging in the competition, even with all its strengths. But this race very well may be lost by a country which fails to put its con- tinued best efforts into the challenge. It is to a large extent the duty of the national intelligence community to explain to our nation's leadership the true na- ture of this strategic problem. I pray that we will not fail in this task which is indispensable not only to our survival but to the survival of civilization. Intelligence has been getting the facts about the Soviet Bloc, or at least enough of them to enable many right decisions to be made. But we have not been able, often enough, to get our information and evaluations accepted and acted upon. The somber fact is that as professional intelligence people we have not entirely grasped the meaning of protracted conflict in the nuclear missile age. I believe it not unfair to state also that as professional intel- ligence people we have been disappointingly slow in under- Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : ?DARBP78-03921A000300190001-4 Arnroved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 SECRET standing the nature of the pressing problems which are con- fronting us. Only too often our categories of analysis and esti- mates still reflect the strategic realities of a passing age. We know all about the deposits of even the least important raw materials, but we may miss major scientific discoveries. Our battle orders of the infantry are considerably better than those of earth satellites. We are adept in measuring floorspace, but we are rarely engaged in comparing lead times. We are able to refine our calculations of weapons yields to the first decimal, but the analysts worrying about Soviet neuropsychology have yet to break through to the national estimates. We produce mountains of "data," but our progress in data handling para- phrases Lenin's title, "one step forward, two steps backward." We are considerably better in post mortems than in warning. Our understanding of man's greatest resource, time, has re- mained fuzzy in most areas. All in all, although we often express our conviction as to how important intelligence is to national security, we ourselves have not quite realized the crucial position we are occupying in the present power struggle. It is really the effectiveness of intel- ligence which, together with the effectiveness of our scientists, is the basis of technology. Beyond the development phase, in- telligence is either a multiplier or a divisor of military strength- in-being. It is the one "weapons system" which by necessity is in constant touch with the enemy, regardless of whether there is war or peace. And in war, of course, intelligence re- mains a key condition of success. But we must elevate our sights beyond the old saw of intel- ligence being the "first line of defense." Intelligence is the fac- tor which should make defense economically practical, tech- nologically superior, and strategically victorious. In the mis- sile age, intelligence literally will merge with the decisive weap- ons system, lest the missiles be entirely ineffective. But intelligence will not be able to do this job unless it comes of age as a technological system in its own right. We must get the equipment our ubiquitous, instantaneous, and ency- clopedic mission requires. We must have the forces to operate these tools. We must develop utilization techniques which are at par with or better than those equipments. And we must be able rapidly to feed our information to all users. Approved For Release 2004"t 1f: CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 SECRET lA-RDP78-03921A0003001900% 4 One feature will remain unchanged: the ability to think. Electric computers and space telescopes are no substitutes for common sense and judgment. Reasoning by false analogy, preoccupation with minor problems to the detriment of major issues, emphasis on decimals and disregard for the large magni- tude, wrong philosophies about the rules of evidence, delusion- ary procedures such as the piling of estimates upon estimates - not to mention normal human failings such as prejudices, wishful thinking, parochial interest arguments, and subver- sion - all those will remain possible in the era of technologi- cal warfare. The machines, even the electrons, are no better than the brains they are designed to serve. It is gratifying to think that when the machine proves to be inadequate - for example, because it may take three months to "program" it - common sense and "conventional thinking" still will be called upon to take its place. The plain fact is that the machine, however good, will not replace the analyst. The machine will make the human brain a more powerful tool - this is the main reason we need it in intelligence. Intelligence technology is indispensable for the rapid handling of thousands of data and for the reduction of innumerable variables to manageable factors. This technology is the key to speed, coverage, and accuracy; to computation; and to experimentation with, and testing of, our conclusions and estimates (for example, through "gaining" techniques). But intuition and insight are necessary to make the ma- chines work. In turn, intelligence technology will make its greatest contribution if it allows deeper insights and ever more creative intuitions. Man has remained the key factor in tech- nological warfare, as he was the key to victory when rocks and clubs were the most powerful weapons. Military, or in a broader sense, conflict intelligence will be at its best when it is based on brain intelligence : IQ's plus wisdom. Pending the dawn of the technological age in intelligence, we should face up more courageously to the facts of life, how- ever bitter. As a nation and as the core of the Free World alliance, we have been underrating the danger for more than twelve years. Why was intelligence not more reliable? Why did we fail to see the obvious? Our own thought patterns and our intel- Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : ?LRGRDP78-03921A000300190001-4 AADroved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 SECRET lectual isolationism have proved to be far more dangerous enemies to our security than the Iron Curtain and the ominous developments behind it. Approved For Release 200: CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/1 2~gN g 8-03921 A0003001900?1-4 CONCEPTS FOR A PHILOSOPHY OF AIR INTELLIGENCE Lewis R. Long I should like to set forth certain concepts for air intelligence that I feel would vitalize an air intelligence philosophy and could lead to an air intelligence policy and doctrine consistent with the dominant role that air power must play in the years to come. I make no claim of originality in all these concepts; nor do I consider that they alone would form a sound air intel- ligence doctrine. However, together with the valid concepts contained in the doctrinal manuals, they would, I am con- vinced, provide better guidance to the field than has hereto- fore been available. I should like to emphasize that all the concepts presented are meant to be applied within the framework of one overrid- ing concept for a philosophy of air intelligence - that air intel- ligence is geared to air power in a nuclear age and that it has the same predominant characteristics as has the air force - range, speed, mobility, flexibility, and penetrative ability. Because air forces have the capability of flying to any point on the globe and returning to any desired location, air intelli- gence must provide basic information to guide such flights in peace or in war. Because air forces exert a dynamic impact on all forms of international relations, air intelligence must be pre- pared to expose for the scrutiny of air commanders the entire structure of other nations and to advise and assist in the deter- mination of air strategy and policies. In the established principles for the successful employment of air forces it is considered that the air forces are an entity. Even so, air intelligence must be considered indivisible and re- sponsive at all levels of operation to employment as a single aggregate instrument. Air intelligence must be employed for the attainment of a common objective, which -in essence - is to contribute to the security of the nation. Air intelligence provides the key to proper employment of the air forces in ex- ercising the initiative in many different conditions of interna- tional relations, in taking advantage of different opportunities Approved For Release 2004/I 2/l]- Y f'-03921A00030019M ..WHRP PAGES 31-50 Approved For Release 2Q j3 .f J -RDP78-03921 A000300190001-4 as they occur, and also in creating. opportunities in which bene- fits to the US may accrue by the utilization of air forces in peace or in war. Air intelligence must also guide the air force in ex- ploiting the principle of surprise, in order to attain both mili- tary and psychological advantages through speed, deception, audacity, originality, and concentration. For the present, air intelligence must concentrate on indications of imminence of hostilities, without neglecting information on capabilities and vulnerabilities of potential enemy countries. This concentra- tion of effort not only will contribute to the security of our forces but also will provide guidance for combat operations if war is forced upon us. Finally, air intelligence must be care- fully coordinated through proper control. CONCEPT NUMBER ONE. Intelligence agencies are never more at war than in periods of nominal peace. The logical out- growth of this concept is, of course, the fact that the success of the initial phases of war (and in this thermonuclear age these probably will also constitute the decisive phases) will de- pend on the quality of intelligence produced in peace. Most people can understand and pay lip service, at least, to the lat- ter idea, but they balk completely at a rational consideration of the first one when it comes to providing tangible support needed by the intelligence structure. I have never, in peace- time, seen an intelligence staff at any echelon that was not undermanned, overworked, and restricted in its operations by a lack of real appreciation on the part of the command for the goals the intelligence section had set for itself to accomplish in the light of the command mission. At all echelons intelligence staffs must have adequate num- bers of the best qualified personnel, maximum equipment, facil- ities, and funds; maximum freedom of action; and coequal status with other major staff elements. It can be categorically stated that if the air force intelligence structure had all the support it could profitably employ - and fully justify - in peacetime, its resources would be ample for any type of war we might become involved in. Let us now analyse each of the requirements (personnel, ma- terial support, freedom of action, and coequal status) in terms of what other writers have had to say, bearing in mind these three basic intelligence missions : to provide timely warning of the imminence of hostilities (whether on a total or limited war Approved For Release t2EWiAi1lA-RDP78-03921 A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 CONFIDENTIAL 33 basis); to provide detailed knowledge of the capabilities and vulnerabilities of potential enemy nations and of friendly and neutral nations; and to provide the best possible intelligence as to the intentions of foreign nations, particularly those that are our potential enemies. PERSONNEL. During wartime, all the services drew heavily on civilian professions for manning intelligence posts. Law- yers, insurance adjustors, investigators, police enforcement of- ficers, scientific and technical personnel, and teachers were put into uniform; and, by and large, these people carried the intel- ligence workload of the services. By and large, too, their con- tributions compared favorably with those of professional mili- tary people. There have been numerous attempts made to identify the qualifications for intelligence personnel. Farago 1 lists ten major groups of traits which "the good spy is supposed to possess" in order to qualify for that particular aspect of intelligence work. For the most part, these same traits could be used as a starting basis for selection of personnel for other intelligence tasks. First of all, his morale must be high and he must be genuinely interested in the job ahead. Second, he must be energetic, zealous, and enterpris- ing. Third, he must be resourceful, a quick and practical thinker. He must have good judgment and know how to deal with things, people, and ideas. He must be pro- ficient in some occupational skill. Fourth, he must be emotionally stable, capable of great endurance under stress. He must be calm and quiet, tolerant and healthy. Fifth, he must have the ability to get along with other people, to work as a member of a team, to understand the foibles of others while being reasonably free of the same foibles himself. Sixth, he must know how to inspire collaboration, to organize, administer and lead others. He must be will- ing to accept responsibility. 1 Farago, Ladislas, War of Wits (NY, Funk & Wagnalls Co., 1954), p. 187. Approved For Release 2004/1 2/1Q'Qt f)&MPM-03921 A000300190001-4 A proved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 34 CONFIDENTIAL Seventh, he must be discreet, have a passion for ano- nymity and know how to keep his mouth shut and pre- serve a secret. Eighth, he must be able to bluff and mislead, but only when bluffing and misleading become necessary. Ninth, he must be agile, rugged, and daring. Tenth, he must have the ability to observe everything, to memorize details accurately. He must be able to report on his observations lucidly, to evaluate his ob- servations and relate them to the greater complex of things. MATERIAL SUPPORT. I should like to stress the importance of allocating the maximum in equipment, facilities, and funds to intelligence work in time of peace with a quotation from Sun Tzu,2 the Chinese military oracle, whose writings on the art of war in 500 B. C. have influenced military thinking down to this day. Hostile armies may face each other for years, striv- ing for victory which is decided in a single day. This being so, to remain in ignorance of the enemy's condi- tion simply because one grudges the outlay of a hun- dred ounces of silver in honors and emoluments is the height of inhumanity. One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present help to his sovereign, no master of victory. Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer, and achieve things be- yond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge. In speaking of the cost of the British secret service as a whole (both positive and counterintelligence), Seth noted : In 1913 the Secret Services cost 46,000 pounds; in 1939, 500,000 pounds; during the recent war 52,000,- 000 pounds annually; and in 1953, 5,000,000 pounds. . . . It is worth many times this amount, for though the American, French and Russian (secret) services 2 Sun Tzu Wu, The Art of War (Translation by Lionel Giles, Introduc- tion and notes by B/G Thomas R. Phillips, Harrisburg, Pa., The Military Service Publishing Co., 1944). 2Ronald Seth, Spies at Work, London: Peter Own Limited MCMLIV, p. 202. Approved For Release iYOIVgIi4TIS-LA-RDP78-03921 A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 CONFIDENTIAL 35 are now more extensive than at any time in this cen- tury, British secret service still maintains its lead in performance and results. Farago gives a somewhat different order of magnitude for British expenditures for intelligence. He said that the 1954 budget was three million pounds and that this amount was the highest in the entire history of the British Secret Service. He pointed out, however, that this figure is deceptive because it represents only allotments from public funds and he adds: "The bulk of Britain's intelligence revenue comes from private funds, such as dividends of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, some of whose shares are held by the Admiralty." 4 Farago then gave an indication of what US military services are spending for intelligence. In fiscal year 1955, the Army asked for $54,454,000 for intelligence, and for fiscal years 1952- 54, inclusive, the Army spent a total of $176,400,000 on intelli- gence. Yet this represented less than one-half of one percent of the total Army budget.5 Then, stressing his thesis that the cold war is a "War of Wits," Farago pointed out relative ex- penditures for intelligence in the Continental Army and in the services today: 6 Between 1776 and 1781, George Washington spent approximately eleven percent of his entire military budget on intelligence operations. The fact that today we spend less than one percent of our peacetime mili- tary budget on these same activities shows how little effort is being made to solve the "friction" by intel- lectual means rather than brute force. From the contacts I have had with various British intelli- gence officers, visits to JIB (Joint Intelligence Bureau) and some of the intelligence officers of the Air ministry, and from comparing the results of British intelligence with those of USAF intelligence, I am certainly inclined to agree, at least partially, with Seth's last statement for the quality of British intelligence production is invariably very high, and the quantity compares favorably with that produced by the much larger USAF intelli- gence staffs. The British traditionally have been willing to Farago, op. cit., p. 50. Ibid., p. 51. ? Ibid., p. 345. Approved For Release 2004/12/1QOi5RMBPW&03921 A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 36 CONFIDENTIAL spend a great amount of money, time, and effort in the collec- tion of intelligence information, more, perhaps, than most modern nations. They have not, in other words, weighed re- sults obtained by intelligence efforts on a completely pragmatic basis, as we "practical Americans" are inclined to do; they know that one cannot package intelligence results on a "pound-for- pound" basis. So for the past two hundred years they have been preeminent in the field. This is not to say that they have not made serious mistakes; but, by and large, their intelligence estimates have been remarkably sound. Moreover, they have used periods of nominal peace to extend and consolidate their intelligence activities, not only for the purpose of preparing for the next war but also (what is even more important) pre- paring for the peace to follow. FREEDOM OF ACTION. As background for a discussion of the need for granting maximum freedom of action to air force intelligence, I should like to quote the following passage from the Report of the Task Force on Intelligence Activities: 7 Effect of Diplomacy on the Over-All Collection of In- telligence. The task force has recognized the incompatibility in method between the practice of diplomacy and the more direct and active operations incident to the col- lection of intelligence and the conduct of cold war. While all contribute to the end in view, conflicts be- tween them must be resolved, usually on a high level, and always in the national interest. It must be real- ized that diplomacy is not an end in itself; that while political ends must be served and unjustifiable risks avoided, the collection of intelligence is a vital element in the fight to preserve our national welfare and ex- istence. Instances have come to the attention of the task force where too conservative an attitude has pre- vailed, often to the detriment of vigorous and timely action in the field. Although the foregoing comment was made in connection with a discussion of the intelligence activities of the Depart- Intelligence Activities, A Report to the Congress, by the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, June 1955, pp. 42-43. (Hereafter referred to as "Task Force Report.") Approved For Release g@ 4 TI A-RDP78-03921 A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 CONFIDENTIAL 37 ment of State, it is every bit as applicable to air intelligence As to the Department of State because the air attache system, which is a major contributor of intelligence information, func- tions as an integral part of the State Department's Foreign Service. It is altogether appropriate that, generally speaking, diplo- matic considerations take precedence over the collection re- quirements of the attaches. Nevertheless, within the frame- work of that principle (which is a part of the principle of civil- ian control over the military establishment), it should be ob- vious from the implications of the Task Force findings that a less conservative attitude toward opportunities for collection of intelligence information should permeate not only the diplo- matic service but also the military establishment. I shall not devote much attention to detailed suggestions for carrying out intelligence operations. My concern is with the promotion of principles that would provide the type of climate in which competent people, using their innate intelligence and ingenuity, can devise an infinite number of ways in which to collect and produce air intelligence - ways which must, of course, be within the framework of US national objectives at all times. Nevertheless, I feel very strongly that we should take a page out of the British Secret Service book and put our intelligence collection efforts on a basis where they can pay their own way, at least in part. This would be a long-term proposition and it would be impossible of achievement under the existing regimentation that governs all business enter- prises in which the government is officially engaged. COEQUAL STATUS WITH OTHER MAJOR STAFF ELE- MENTS. There is, as far as I can discern, no rhyme nor reason in subordinating intelligence as a staff section to operations. My biggest objection to the subordination of intelligence to op- erations lies in the fact that the operations officer is automati- cally placed in the position where he frequently makes purely command decisions. The intelligence officer is supposed to advise the commanding officer as to what the enemy can and probably will attempt to do that would interfere with the ac- complishment of the command mission. The operations officer is supposed to advise the commanding officer as to what his own forces can and should do. The commanding officer is then in a position to weigh both his own and the enemy's Approved For Release 2004/12/lC(DQU EIgHPP&03921A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 38 CONFIDENTIAL capabilities and to make a sound command decision as to command action. It is totally wrong for the operations officer to make such a decision, for the commanding officer is thereby deprived of the full value (and probably full information) of enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions. Zacharias, commenting on the fallacy of subordinating, told the Con- gressional Committee investigating the Pearl Harbor disaster that one of the organizational deficiencies which was a con- tributing factor was: 8 That the planning officers were allowed to take over the Intelligence function of evaluation. This resulted in individuals without a full knowledge of the Japanese or their psychology determining what the Japanese might do. This practice applied not only in Washing- ton, but also at Pearl Harbor, where the erroneous con- clusion was reached by the planning officer that there was no chance of an air attack on Pearl Harbor. CONCEPT NUMBER TWO. Success achieved by intelligence in peace will determine the outcome of the war. General Kuter stated: 9 In jet-atomic warfare there will be no room for gross errors of judgment. There will be no time, should hos- tilities start, to correct mistakes in the types of forces that we have provided, the manner in which they have been organized and trained, or the way we fight. And the terrible penalty for failure could be quick and com- plete defeat. Many factors are involved in any satisfactory an- swer. But one thing is sure. The question cannot be answered satisfactorily unless we have the proper doc- trine, and unless the doctrine is accepted. For years the US has believed that its greatest military po- tential lay in its industrial might. The validity of this belief was demonstrated in World Wars I and II and again in Korea. We can be sure that any Soviet attacks against this country will be planned to destroy not only our retaliatory force but also our industrial potential. Thus we can see that "no longer 8Zacharias, p. 253. ? Kuter, Lawrence S., Lt. Gen., "No Room For Error," Air Force Maga- zine (AWC Curriculum Handout #36-4-a, 24 November 1955). Approved For Release @M~laiRI;IRIA-RDP78-03921 A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/1j 0 hNV7A- 03921A00030019000 94 will the US or any other country be able to build up its mili- tary forces and rely on its industrial potential after the war has begun." 10 Intelligence must be developed before war breaks out if it is to influence our preparations, provide a foundation for our planning, and guide early phases of operations. It is true that Mr. Allen Dulles, present Director of the CIA,11 achieved un- precedented success in the history of espionage with the intelli- gence network he established in Germany, operating from Switzerland, during the war. . . . Through this network Mr. Dulles managed to start a conspiracy within the high command of the German armies in the south and to bring about the surrender of the very army on which Hitler was de- pendent for the prolonging of the war from behind the legendary "Alpine redoubt." However, the situation in Japan was a far different matter. Through shortsightedness and perhaps ineptitude and inex- perience, the US had failed to establish the groundwork for an effective espionage system in Japan, notwithstanding the fact that Zacharias and other authorities on Japan had been aware of the need and had advocated such prior planning. In view of the steadily deteriorating relations that existed between Japan and the US right up to the surprise attack against Pearl Harbor, this failure to develop, in advance of war, a workable system for systematic collection (in Japan) of intelligence in- formation during the war that most intelligence personnel were sure was virtually inevitable is an extremely black mark against the US intelligence agencies of that time. Moreover, this country made no serious effort to establish an intelligence net within Japan during the war because it was felt that the effort was far too great in relation to its possible value. Farago pointed out that it is a virtual impossibility ".. . to set up a local network in an enemy country under wartime condi- tions. . . ." 12 [Allen Dulles' success notwithstanding] 10 Thomas K. Finletter, Power and Policy, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., p. 256. Farago, op. cit., p. 183. Ibid., p. 182. Approved For Release 2004/1 2/120 -03921 A000300190001-4 proved For Release 20rJ0N 12/17 :ILIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 41T C How can we account for the fact that, against all reasonable odds, the US did establish a satisfactory espionage net in Ger- many after war started but failed to do so in Japan, its other major enemy? I suggest that the reason lies, among other factors, in the accessibility of Germany before the outbreak of war. In other words, more Americans and individuals from Allied nations had contacts before the war in Germany than in Japan. Interestingly enough, the Soviets failed to re-establish within Germany an adequate espionage net : . . . when their original. network, known as the Rote Kapelle or Red Orchestra, was smashed. They managed to create such networks only in countries of their wartime allies, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and in neutral Switzerland, tra- ditional battleground of international espionage.13 The Soviets did achieve remarkable success in Japan (remem- ber the Sorge espionage case?) 14 It seems to me that there is a direct correlation between the accessibility of a potential enemy country just before the outbreak of hostilities and the proba- bility of being able to establish (or re-establish) and maintain an espionage net in that country after war breaks out. What does this mean, as far as the US is concerned at the present time? If it is difficult to penetrate the Iron Curtain today, it will be even harder when war breaks out. Therefore, we must go all-out to penetrate it, and to establish many strong, diversified, and versatile nets as soon as possible. We cannot do this under the existing limitations of personnel, equipment, and funds. Yet maximum reliance must be placed on the ability of intelligence to decide by whom, when, where, and in what strength the US may be attacked. The responsibility of the Directorate of Intelligence (ACS/I, since 1 July 1957), USAF, is to develop this information regarding our suscepti- bility to air attack - this in an air-nuclear age. CONCEPT NUMBER THREE. Air intelligence must, on a con- tinuing basis, encompass all aspects of power in foreign na- tions (political, economic, and psychosocial, as well as mili- tary), both in the present and in the historical perspective. Moreover, it must speak out on matters of national strategy. 18 Ibid., p. 182. 14 Ibid., pp. 163, 166, 179, 181, 212, 219-220. Approved For Release C 1411?NTIA1A-RDP78-03921 A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12CONC A-RDP L8-03921A000300190001-4 Heretofore, air intelligence (as well as army and navy in- telligence) has confined itself primarily to an evaluation of the military power of foreign nations. The National Security Council has directed the air force to interest itself primarily in intelligence of foreign air forces and has assigned responsi- bility for covering other aspects of national power to the other US intelligence agencies. It has long been an American tradition that the military establishment should remain free from the "taint of politics." As a result, the military has shied away from any contact with political problems. This even reached the point before World War II where few of the regular military establishment exer- cised their constitutional right to vote in elections. This fear of military domination in our national life stems, of course, from our inherited distrust of all forms of tyranny and autocracy. Before the time that military power became inextricably tied to the other forms of national power, perhaps even as late as the First World War, this attitude may have had some validity in our national consciousness. However, Clause- witz would not have subscribed to the complete separation of military thinking from the remainder of national life and activ- ities. He pointed out that war is merely an extension of na- tional, political policy by other means.' Hitler demonstrated his conviction that war is merely a "mopping-up process" by capitalizing on the gains made by his fifth column. Certainly the Marxists have from the beginning showed the world by word and deed that the line of demarcation between politics and military action is extremely nebulous. It can and probably will be argued that air intelligence should "stick to its knitting" and concentrate on ascertaining the strengths and weaknesses of foreign air forces in the tradi- tional fashion (in which the army is supposed to develop intel- ligence on foreign ground forces; the navy, on foreign naval forces; the air force, on foreign air forces; and the State Depart- ment and CIA, on foreign political and economic strengths and weaknesses). However, as it is air power that will have to carry the brunt of any initial contacts with the enemy, as well as continuously to seek out and destroy all aspects of the enemy "Karl von Clausewitz, General, On War (Translation by O. J. Mattij s Jolles), Washington, D. C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1950, p. 16. Approved For Release 2004/1 2/1 ONRIDE RM-03921 A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 42 CONFIDENTIAL warmaking potential and will to fight, air intelligence must have the capability of advising the Chief of Staff, USAF, where and when to hit the enemy in order to hurt him most. It seems incontrovertible to me that we have reached a place in history where the military establishment, particularly the air force, must concern itself with political problems (as well as the economic and psychosocial problems) - the traditional American feeling in the matter notwithstanding. General Samford, Director of Intelligence, Headquarters USAF, agreed on this point, in response to a question asked by the writer, following his lecture to the Air War College. He stated, in effect, "There is a growing community of thought that the mili- tary establishment should get into the fields of political and economic warfare, as well as psychological warfare." 16 Air in- telligence, obviously, must be in the vanguard of this new approach. CONCEPT NUMBER FOUR. Intelligence must take a dy- namic approach. In speaking of the fact that data on the Soviet Bloc are inadequate, the Task Force Report on Intelli- gence Activities considered that security measures adopted by the Communists have been exceptionally effective, particularly in comparison with American security measures, which make it relatively simple for foreign nations to collect vital secrets. The task force admonishes, however: . . . The information we need, particularly for our Armed Forces, is potentially available. Through con- centration on the prime target we must exert every conceivable and practicable effort to get it. Success in this field depends on greater boldness at the policy level, a willingness to accept certain calculated politi- cal and diplomatic risks, and full use of technological capabilities.17 Opportunities to increase air intelligence coverage of Soviet capabilities and intentions include: a. The increasing of our clandestine operations and efforts to infiltrate the iron and bamboo curtains from all peripheral countries, taking maximum advantage not only of border- Samford, John A., Major General, "Objectives for the Use of Force," lecture to Army War College, 2 January 1956. 14 Task Force Report, op. cit., p. 69. Approved For Release ZO4MOPJtRIT(AAI6-RDP78-03921 A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/1 2//b4+ RNpr 8-03921 A000300190004134 crossing techniques on land and by air drop but also neutral shipping and US submarines, particularly in the Arctic Ocean and the Black Sea coastal areas. b. The establishment of contacts with and provision of sup- port to (in return for services rendered) agents from among known governments in exile, such as those from the Baltic and East European Satellite nations; the known 10,000,000 Chinese living outside China, as minority groups throughout Asia; all known religious organizations, business firms, and govern- mental agencies throughout the Free World having dealings with the Soviet Bloc; all known visitors to Soviet-dominated territory, such as trade union officials, scientists, airline and shipping crewmen, and others; and all defectors from iron cur- tain countries. c. The attempt to bribe, intimidate, subvert, or otherwise cause Soviet and Satellite diplomats, government officials, tech- nicians, or visitors abroad to "double" for us upon their re- turn - or to defect and remain in the West. d. The making of surreptitious photographic penetration flights with high capability aircraft at irregular intervals, to cover peripheral areas. e. The purchase of controlling interest in the most active Western firms having dealings with the Soviet or Satellite na- tions in order to use these firms to collect intelligence informa- tion, spread favorable propaganda, subvert Soviet and Satellite nationals, and otherwise create situations behind the iron and bamboo curtains that would be favorable to the West. f. The employment of such outstanding historians as Alfred J. Toynbee; political scientists, as Professor William M. Mc- Govern and Dr. Robert Strausz-Hupe; geographers, as G. Don- ald Hudson; ethnologists, as Margaret Meade; and authorities on Russia and Communism as Dr. Marc Szeftel and Mr. James Burnham. The individuals named represent only a few of the potential list of qualified consultants; the profound and detailed knowledge of foreign peoples and areas in their re- spective professions that is possessed by people of this stature would furnish a wellspring of ideas of inestimable value to air intelligence. In addition to enriching the staff with people of this caliber we should hire outstanding representatives in the advertising and public relations fields (preferably those having experience in foreign areas), who can assist the factual experts Approved For Release 2004/12/1(ZOI96t 15lPI1-03921A000300190001-4 A roved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 44 CONFIDENTIAL in packaging the ideas we want to use in our "War of Wits" with the Soviets, this struggle for the minds of men. CONCEPT NUMBER FIVE. Intelligence should be used as an offensive weapon, one capable of influencing the outcome of either the cold war or any hot war, peripheral as well as total. Although there are no apparent indications that the Soviet Union, during the next few years, intends to take action of the sort that would surely precipitate another world conflict, we must be always on the alert to the possibility that such a con- flict might arise through miscalculation on their part. The dangers are greatest in the peripheral areas, where Satellite peoples might get out of hand and take action "from which we cannot retreat without disaster; then the chances of keeping war limited are very remote." "I The difficulty is not in the lack of desire to exercise such restraint, but in the fact that the things we stand to lose are of such great value that there is no chance of limiting phases of conflict. To have mutual understanding and agreement be- tween enemies is essential if conflict is to be localized. What does this mean to air intelligence? Simply this : we must pro- duce intelligence on every facet of enemy life. To do this, air intelligence should control or at least coordinate all air force agencies that to any degree operate in enemy territory or attack behind enemy lines or perform other than strictly military operations in areas that may become the scene of battle or in areas where, in the cold war, the air forces encounter Com- munist influences. CONCEPT NUMBER SIX. Intelligence must be used system- atically. Commanders, policymakers, planners, and opera- tions personnel at all echelons must rely upon, then plan, then act not only upon intelligence but also upon intelligence recom- mendations - within practical limits of our own capability and feasibility of such recommendations. We have long expressed as a principle of intelligence the concept that it must be supplied to the interested command in time to be of use. Unfortunately, in intelligence circles there has not been, it seems to me, equal emphasis placed upon submission of intelli- gence to the commander and his staff in such a form and so convincingly expressed that it will receive the prompt attention Approved For Release 9i4.i i?IRlti cLA-RDP78-03921 A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12~6 Nfi-5lj R 8-03921 A0003001900gj-4 and responsive command action that it warrants. Stressing the need for reducing the margin of error inherent in any human undertaking, General White pointed out the need for educating our planners and our leaders. He said that poor command decisions and inferior or unimaginative staff work would nullify the tremendous effort that has gone into develop- ing an extremely expensive air force. He added: . . . Superior employment of air weapons must be based on complete understanding of the nature of air warfare, the political and military context within which the air forces are operating, and a sound but imaginative understanding of targets and weapons.19 There also has been entirely too little emphasis on the con- cept that command plans and action should be based on in- telligence. This has not always been the fault of intelligence. Nevertheless, too often in the air force, particularly, operational plans have been prepared with absolutely no regard for thQ intelligence estimate of enemy capabilities and intentions that these selfsame plans were designed to counter. In my experi- ence as a staff officer at various echelons of command, there have been few instances in which command war plans, emer- gency plans, or operations plans have actually been geared to the intelligence that gave rise to the necessity for such plans. More often than not, the intelligence annex is merely prepared at the same time as the basic plan and the other annexes and all are stapled together at one time. The proper procedure, and the one that we in intelligence at USAFE (US Air Forces in Europe) were finally able to sell to the planners, should be this. The intelligence estimate of the situation is prepared first and given to the commander and to all his staff agencies in advance of the planning cycle. The basic plan and all the annexes (including the intelligence annex) are then prepared simultaneously, with a view to countering the threat indicated in the intelligence estimate. I believe this failure to take the intelligence estimate into consideration at every stage in the planning cycle in the mili- tary establishment stems by and large from an American pre- White, Thomas D., "The Current Concept of American Military Strength," AU Quarterly Review, Vol. VII, Spring 1954 (AWC Cur- riculum Handout #56-2-B, 22 November 1955). Approved For Release 2004/12/11ZOt51abP-03921 A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 bb CONFIDENTIAL dilection for ignoring in the policymaking cycle available in- telligence regarding the capabilities and intentions of actual or potential enemies. It seems to me that the intelligence family must find some way not only to improve the quality of its product but also to stimulate an acceptance of that product and a willingness to act upon it. The process of making positive recommendations by intelligence for command action would, I believe, materially improve this situation and would lead to a command acceptance of a principle advanced by General Ridgway, when he was Chief of Staff of the US Army. He stressed the fact that the present world situation makes it more important than ever to have com- plete information upon which to base economical deployment and effective employment of army forces, as well as to avoid sur- prise (obviously the same principle applies to all military forces). General Ridgway stated: "Adequate intelligence con- stitutes the fundamental basis for the calculation of risks, the formulation of plans, the development of materiel, the alloca- tions of resources, and the conduct of operation." 20 CONCEPT NUMBER SEVEN. Intelligence must continuously estimate enemy intentions as well as capabilities and vulnera- bilities. One of the biggest reasons that commanders at times have made their own estimates, rather than accept those of their intelligence officers, is simply that the intelligence officers havebeen unwilling to "go out on a limb" and estimate enemy intentions. Before the early 1930's the "method of intentions" was used by the US Army. It was a method used by the elder von Moltke. Shortly before 1936 the American Army adopted the "method of capabilities," which had been the method used by Napoleon.21 Admittedly the "method of intentions" is a difficult one and, for the inexperienced intelligence officer, nonhabit forming be- cause the probability of error is extremely high. Success for this method depends not only on an intimate knowledge of the mentality of the opposing commanders as well as the tactical doctrine of the enemy but also upon such intangible things as the physical and mental condition of the opponent, his normal reactions, and reasoning processes. On the other hand, the "Farago, op. cit., p. 8. 21 Command and General Staff School, "Military Intelligence," p. 7. Approved For Release RT.1 tA-RDP78-03921 A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : C ENDP78-03921A0003001900943,-4 CONFIAL "method of capabilities" takes into consideration all lines of action open to the enemy. It does not discard any possible line until the enemy's dispositions are such that, even though he desired to adopt that line, he is physically incapable of doing so. Thus it strives by elimination to reduce the possibility down to one - the only one line of action which the enemy can take. This is the ideal, as far as intelligence is concerned, but it is seldom reached. CONCEPT NUMBER EIGHT. Intelligence is no longer a func- tion of command, except at the higher echelons. All of the services (particularly the air force) have traditionally paid only lip service to the principle that intelligence is a function of command. This has been amply demonstrated by a lack of provision for suitable intelligence staffing between World War I and World War II and by a demeaning of intelligence func- tions. My reasons for believing that intelligence should no longer be considered a function of command at all echelons are different from either of these. In the first place if an all-out global war should occur, the US intelligence operations should be centrally controlled. Sec- ond, the entire intelligence process cannot reasonably be car- ried out at all echelons; therefore, even in a prolonged period of cold war, air intelligence operations must be, if not actually centrally controlled from Washington, at least concentrated in a small number of locations where the complete intelligence process is directed by one individual. Unquestionably, in the past, commanders of squadrons, groups, wings, even air divi- sions and air forces occasionally may have felt a twinge of conscience because they have been unable to see their way clear to carry out all the intelligence functions that manuals said they should, from collection through dissemination. These individuals may now draw a sigh of relief, as I view it; for in the air force, their primary intelligence function is to dissemi- nate down to the troops air intelligence that has been received from higher echelons. It may be argued that I am hereby cutting the rug out from under the principle I previously expressed - that the intelli- gence officer should not be subordinated to other staff officers but should report directly to the commanding officer. On the contrary, in these lower units, and even when his recognized Approved For Release 2004/12/1 QOi%RLQ l PW-03921 A000300190001-4 A roved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 CONFIDENTIAL duties are in accord with his actual duties, I still feel that the intelligence officer at every echelon of command should remain responsible only to the commanding officer or the chief of staff, and not to any other staff officer! He must maintain this inde- pendence of other staff considerations in order best to present to his commander the most complete intelligence picture and the most reasonable intelligence recommendations, even though he himself may not have developed either the intelligence esti- mate of the situation or the recommendations based on it. At the major air force command levels there is no question in regard to major staff level standing for the intelligence officer as intelligence should continue to be for his commander a complete function of command, in the traditional sense. At the lower echelons, intelligence would still be a command re- sponsibility, but rather more in the "special staff" tradition than the "general staff" concept. CONCEPT NUMBER NINE. Major headquarters staffs should get out of the operational aspects of intelligence to the maxi- mum extent possible and should confine their attention largely to policymaking and flash or spot estimating functions. This concept is closely related to some of the thinking indicated in the discussion of the preceding concept. Compared with the present tables of distribution, the intelligence staff of Head- quarters USAF and the major subordinate commands would be relatively small. These staffs, however, would be comprised of highly qualified personnel, representing the maximum intel- ligence capability in the air force. Their functions would be primarily policymaking, inspection, liaison, and estimating. They would be prepared to give flash estimates of indications of the imminence of hostilities and spot estimates, as required by the commander and his staff. They would exercise staff supervision not only over the intelligence activities of all sub- ordinate units of the command, but also over the collection and production activities of the intelligence centers belonging to the command; these centers would perform the operational aspects of the intelligence process for the entire command. CONCEPT NUMBER TEN. Air Intelligence (to include coun- terintelligence) must keep under continuous review and, to the maximum extent possible, must downgrade and publish its files concerning enemy capabilities, activities, and intentions. Approved For Release QQQ4j1 j.I,rQIA-RDP78-03921 A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/1 2/l j6t &-[W.f -03921 A000300190001--4 49 What I am proposing is nothing less than declassifying cer- tain carefully selected items of intelligence and counterintelli- gence regarding Soviet activities and providing such informa- tion to the American public on a planned basis. Let the Amer- ican people get this information, but from authoritative sources and not from newspaper columnists. Probably the most violent opposition to this proposal will come from some of my fellow intelligence officers, because tradi- tionally, intelligence has had a moral responsibility to protect its sources, and rightly so. Nevertheless, intelligence files are bulging with information that represents such a conglomera- tion from so many sources that no one source could possibly be harmed by its disclosure. Let us substitute this type of infor- mation for at least some of the detailed data on our own mili- tary establishment that we now hand out so freely. I am confi- dent that the public reaction to this policy would, in general, be very favorable, and that in the long run, the story of air power and the capabilities of the air force to safeguard the security interests of the US can be made synonymous in the minds of the American people. So let's stop giving aid and comfort to our potential enemies and start a program designed to discomfort them on a global scale - by informing and arousing the American public and the rest of the free world with factual knowledge of Soviet ac- tivities and intentions. For example, an article in the Sep- tember 1955 Reader's Digest discussed the disturbing story of the manner in which the Communists, who had infiltrated the military services and governmental structure of Iran, were pre- vented from taking over the entire country by the merest ac- cident. As a result of the investigation, it was disclosed that five hundred Iranian officers were implicated in the plot, in- cluding numerous high-ranking individuals in both the Army and the police departments.22 This story, terrifying in its implication for other countries, would, I submit, have had a much stronger impact on public awareness of the Communist threat to the world today had it been officially released by a government intelligence agency, rather than by a commercial writer. This is the type of run- Joseph A. Mazandi and Edwin Muller, "The Hunch That Saved Iran," Reader's Digest, September 1955, pp. 59-60. Approved For Release 2004/1 2ICC0IJEIRl3f F 418-03921 A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 50 CONFIDENTIAL of-the-mill basic intelligence available to the services which should be released to the public as soon and as fully as is prac- ticable and, in any event, before some sharp news reporter can capitalize it. CONCEPT ELEVEN. All air intelligence concepts must be con- sidered dynamic, kept under constant review, and revised to meet changing world situations. It follows that air intelligence philosophy must be considered in its broadest sense as a con- stant search for principles. The doctrine and policies result- ing from this process must be changed as new concepts are developed. In this context, General Kuter provides another valid con- cept for developing an air intelligence policy, although he was applying it in the larger sense to the whole spectrum of air force thinking. "A true air doctrine accepted and exploited is the key to a sound military policy. We have the doctrine, now we must exploit it in a common strategy." 23 We don't, as yet, have an air intelligence policy or doctrine in writing, but if USAF will adopt that last admonition of General Kuter's as the basic air force intelligence policy, it will be only a matter of time until we have an air intelligence doctrine - one on which the commands may then soundly base their own intel- ligence policies. Approved For Release 2@WAijffN1CY,t-RDP78-03921 A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190051-4 SECRET DEVELOPMENTS IN AIR TARGETING I. THE MILITARY RESOURCES MODEL The basic objective for air targeting is to present measure- ments of the ability of the enemy to take actions which threaten our national security. These measurements must be presented in such a way as to guide our action against the enemy's strengths. This objective is usually broken down into subobjectives which illustrate clearly its breadth and com- plexity. Expressed in terms of courses of enemy action which are unacceptable to the US, these subobjectives are, in descend- ing order of importance: 1. To deliver atomic weapons against the US, our forces abroad, and our allies. 2. To resist the penetration of his airspace by our air forces. 3. To develop and produce potentially decisive weapons or weapons systems. 4. To conduct large-scale land and naval operations against our forces and our allies. 5. To develop and maintain the economic, political, and psy- chological strengths necessary to support prolonged military operations. With the development of new weapons and weapons systems, however, and the resultant capability of a single aircraft or missile to deliver the equivalent of millions of tons of TNT on one mission, the analysis and presentation of the strengths supporting the first three subobjectives have assumed ever- increasing importance and urgency. This compression of fire- power in time brings the realization that the decision in future wars may be reached in a matter of hours or days at most. Old problems have been accentuated and many new ones cre- ated by these developments. For example, selection of target systems to achieve the subobjectives time-phased in the order shown above is no longer sufficient. Analysis must produce not only a priority of targets within each subobjective and target system, but also an indication of how many of them MORI/HRP PAGES 51-64 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : SECAMP78-03921A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 5 SECRET must be attacked to achieve the objective. Thus analysis by increments in time and space is becoming an essential element in the targeting process. The complexity of these problems and the speed with which they must be solved have led to the introduction of new statis- tical methods and of new machine computing techniques into the targeting analysis process. For example, immediate assessment of the damage and contamination effect of a given attack will be necessary in order to determine the destruction required of succeeding attacks. This involves a continuing evaluation of target priorities and of net offensive strengths throughout an air offensive until a decision is reached. Two- sided war-gaming offers the best possibility for providing the answers needed for this and similar problems. Because of the time element and the great volume of data required by the new statistical techniques, high-speed electronic computing is essential. By this process hypothetical but highly probable military situations in both peace and war can be examined and tested for the types of detailed targeting information needed by the analyst to guide and evaluate target selections. Only in this way can the total targeting effort truly be said to pre- sent measurements of the enemy's strengths in such a way as to facilitate action against them. During the last several years it has become increasingly apparent that mathematical "Monte Carlo" and "input-out- put" type models offer a new and promising technique for "war- gaming" and for analyzing a nation's economic and military resources for targeting purposes. The rapid advances in the speed and data handling capacity of modern electronic com- puters have now made these models feasible for application to many air targets problems. The purpose of the mathematical models is the selection of targets for optimum forestalling of enemy courses of action. This requires the models to answer the following questions in order. 1. Present situation a. What is the size and composition of the enemy mili- tary establishment (military resources) ? b. What is the size, composition, and productive ability of the enemy economy (economic resources) ? Approved For Release 2004t'/4ffr CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 SECRET 53 c. What levels of military action will these resources sup- port? 2. Mobilization capability a. What would be the size and composition of enemy military resources and economic resources after an all-out mobilization period of x months? b. What levels of military action would these resources support? 3. Evaluation of damage a. For any specified bombing attack what would be the yield and location of all exploding weapons? b. Given these explosions what would be the size and com- position of the post attack military and economic resources (including population) ? c. Given the post attack resources what level of enemy military action could be maintained? 4. Recuperation What would be the size and composition of enemy mili- tary and economic resources y months (or days) after the specified attack, taking into account repair, rebuilding, con- version of other facilities, and new construction? For "war-gaming," that is, estimating net offensive capabili- ties, the above questions must be asked about our own country as well as about the enemy country. The system of mathematical models which would answer these questions is shown schematically in Figure 1. The air battle, the damage, and the contamination models would answer questions 3a and b above. Discussions of these models are planned in subsequent issues. The remaining questions concerning the present, post mobi- lization, post attack, and post recuperation capabilities of the military and the economy are the province of the military re- sources model, which includes economic resources. Procedurally, the military resources models determine the number and size of missions, both offensive and defensive of various types, which each country can carry out in a given span of time. This information is fed to the air battle model which together with the damage and contamination models deter- Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : MA IDP78-03921A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 54 SECRET M-DAY D-DAY MILITARY RESOURCES MODEL MILITARY RESOURCES MODEL DAMAGE MODEL AIR CONTAMINATION MODEL BATTLE MODEL DAMAGE MODEL CONTAMINATION MODEL MILITARY RESOURCES MODEL MILITARY RESOURCES MODEL Approved For Release 2004,Rkif- CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : k- 78-03921A000300190001-A RET 55 mines the military, economic, and population resources re- maining in each country after a period of air battle. The dam- age information is in turn fed back to the military resources model which determines the number, type, and size of missions which each country can carry out after the first phase of air battle. The process is then repeated for later phases of the air battle. If the models can, as is believed possible, answer the ques- tions posed we have an exceedingly powerful tool not only for target selection, but also for estimating the capability of a country to carry out military action now and in the future under various conditions and assumptions. The testing of alternative target systems in the first and succeeding phases can lead to the choice of the optimum target system for any of several different strategic situations. When then, is the military resources model and how is it de- signed to answer the questions put to it? The military resources model is an input-output model. This is a kind of mathematical model about which it has been said, it is much easier to understand what it is expected to do than how it does it. What the military resources model is expected to do is to estimate the capabilities of a military establishment and its supporting economy to carry out military action. The essential problem of making this estimate is that everything must be considered simultaneously. It is not enough to know that the capacity of the aeroengine industry is so many engines per month. One must also know whether there is enough steel (or electric power, copper, petro- leum, ball bearings, and so on) to produce these engines while at the same time the tank, gun, shipbuilding, ammunition, and many other key industries (including reconstruction in a post attack period) are also requiring steel. Furthermore, not only the direct demand for steel must be considered. The aero- engine industry consumes not only steel but also aluminum, electric power, transportation, and many other inputs, the pro- duction of which also requires some steel. In short, to know the capabilities of one industry we must account for require- ments of all industries for a vast range of raw materials, labor, capital equipment, components, goods in process, transporta- tion, and communications. Input-output models are a tech- nique for doing just this. An input-output model shows for Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : GOGRE P78-03921A000300190001-4 Abpproved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 JP SECRET each industry (or military activity) the requirements for sup- plies from each other industry.' The military resources model consists of three sub-models or grids; the military grid, the economic grid, and the transpor- tation grid. The economic grid is in turn broken down into geographical regions which are related to each other by the transportation grid. The military resources model can be illustrated schematically. ECONOMIC GRID Each of these grids consists of an inventory of resources and a table of coefficients in the form of inputs required per unit of output. For the economic grid the inventory of resources is the capacities of all producing industries. The table of coeffi- cients shows material, labor, and capital inputs per unit of in- dustrial output; for example, kilowatt hours of electricity per ton of aluminum and tons of aluminum per heavy bomber air- craft. The military grid shows labor, equipment, and supplies required per unit of military activity; for example, tons of fuel per flying hour, number of aircraft per wing, tons of ammuni- tion (by type) per division month, and so on. Its inventory of resources is the number of military units of each kind and their associated equipment. The transportation grid has as its output units of transportation capacity on a regional basis. This grid acts as a restraint on both the economic grid and the military grid as transportation can be a bottleneck or restraint both in the economy and within the military structure itself. 1 See Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 1, No. 4, "The Role of Interindustry Studies in Economic Intelligence," Robert Loring Allen, p. 97. Approved For Release 200,M(Z': CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 SECRET 57 Without knowing the full complexity of the statistical and computational procedures (which is awe-inspiring) the reader can now visualize the operation of these grids in answering our initial questions. The military grid shows for a given set of military forces the level of combat actions that could be main- tained if the economy provides all the supplies the military re- quires. The coefficients of the military grid determine the re- quirements of the given level of combat actions from the econ- omy. The economic and transportation grids determine how much of these supplies can be forthcoming from the existing inventory of economic resources. At the present time the economic grid of the Soviet Bloc has been largely completed. It has been constructed in two parts-one covering the USSR and European Satellites and the other the Peoples Republic of China. For the European Bloc the grid distinguishes 240 producing industries or sectors and their materials, components, capital equipment, and labor inputs. Five test runs have been made and evaluated.2 On the basis of the evaluation of these test runs, application of this grid to certain types of live air targets problems is now be- ing undertaken. However, a substantial data improvement research program is going concurrently. The military grid has been under development for about nine months. It is expected that test runs of this grid will be made in the summer of 1958. The- transportation grid has been under development for about six months, and it is expected that test runs of this grid will be made in the summer of 1958. The construction of this grid is being undertaken on two fronts. The first involves the geographic disaggregation of the economic grids in terms of local regions. The second consists of the development of a transportation grid based on these regions. To date, 159 re- gions covering the USSR have been designated, outlined, and coded. The transportation net has been divided according to these regions and the terminals and links within each region coded and catalogued. The 159 regions correspond to Soviet oblasts wherever possible in order to take advantage of the data Distribution of these runs has been made throughout the intelli- gence community. A few copies are still available for interested readers. Approved For Release 2004/12/17 :3MRDP78-03921 A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 58 SECRET on production and transportation published by the Russians. The effort to gather Soviet source information for the grid is linked to a concerted effort to gather applicable data, both classified and unclassified, from all other available sources. The enormous complexity of the computations involved in model analysis makes hand calculation completely unthink- able. In the economic grid for the European Soviet Bloc, for example, there are per unit of output of each of the 240 sectors the commodity input requirements from each of the other 239 sectors. This will be further broken down into 159 geograph- ical regions. Thus the number of coefficients to be simultane- ously processed theoretically could be of the order of 240 x 240 x 159, or about 9 million.3 For any major problem millions of individual arithmetic steps may be involved. Modern elec- tronic computers, however, can perform this job. The revolu- tionary aspect of these computers is the speed with which they can file, sort, recall, and manipulate large masses of data. These partially routine steps in arriving at intelligence esti- mates on large areas, such as the Soviet Bloc, have always been time-consuming and cumbersome. For the more difficult an- alytical problems, electronic computers together with mathe- matical models provide the analyst with a tool for considering and holding in juxtaposition a great many more of the ele- ments of the analysis than formerly was possible. This tech- nique does not, by any means, eliminate the human judgment factor. Rather it is believed that it will prove to be a powerful tool in assisting intelligence analysts and planners to make better judgments, and to be able to make them more rapidly. Some of the more specific applications of the military re- sources model to air targets problems are presented below. 1. Enemy Capabilities The military resources model can be used to assess the capability of the economy of the Soviet Bloc to mount and sus- tain elements of military strength during a pre-attack period under varying Bloc objectives, policies, and assumptions. The government is constrained to work its available resources and within technological relationships. If it wants a jet medium The number is actually smaller since many of the coefficients are zero. Only a machine, however, could remember which ones are zero. Approved For Release 2004/4 eWETCIA-RDP78-03921 A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CI REDP78-03921A000300190001- bomber regiment it must provide planes, bombs, crews, air- bases from which to operate, and so on, in specific quantities. If a ton of steel is needed the government must see that steel mill capacity, pig iron, scrap, coal, labor, and so on, are avail- able in the correct amounts. If more steel capacity is needed it must provide the steel, concrete, machinery, and so on, in the right quantities and types to construct a new steel mill. These resource restraints and technological relationships are set out comprehensively and in detail by the military resources model. The ability of the economy to support the mobiliza- tion of desired combinations or "mixes" of air, land, and sea forces can be measured. A typical problem would be a deter- mination of the maximum "balanced" air, land, and sea forces which could be activated in a specified mobilization period with specified stockpiling and capital expansion policies. In addi- tion to measuring the maximum activation of combat units, the economic grid can be used to determine under a variety of Bloc policies and objectives the maximum capability to pro- duce specific weapons such as guided missiles and H-bombs at specified times. However, the economic-industrial grid does not take into account any restraints or bottlenecks that might develop within the military structure itself. Therefore, the outputs of the economic grid are fed into the military grid as inputs. The military grid is then used to assess the capability of the Soviet Bloc military structure to mount and sustain, during a pre- attack period, elements of military strength fully prepared to engage in combat activities required by given strategies. The ability of the military structure to support desired combina- tions or "mixes" of air, land, and sea combat activities can be measured under varying Bloc mobilization objectives, policies, and assumptions. In addition to measuring the maximum combat capabilities that can be sustained, the military model can be used to determine the capability of the military struc- ture to put into operation specific weapons, such as guided missiles, within the available military resources, that is, trained personnel, missile sites, logistics, and repair facilities. The transportation grid would then be used to establish any transportation restraints or bottlenecks which might develop within the economy or military structure itself. Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : GEC- 1P78-03921A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 60 SECRET 2. Effects Analysis Following their use in pre-attack situations, the three grids of the military resources model can be used to determine the capability of the Bloc economy, military structure, and trans- portation system to re-mount various types of military strength in the post-attack period after air attacks of different scope and intensity. The analysis can be applied to various time periods after the air attack. In very short periods of time only the military, or possibly the military and transportation grids might come into play, as the answers needed would be the avail- abilities within the immediate military structure of the Soviet Bloc to re-cycle air attacks and to sustain ground and naval action. These answers would be in terms of availabilities of aircraft, runways, fuel, men, and ammunition to produce flying hours, and the needed inputs to produce ground division months and units of naval action. The longer the time period involved the more industrial and economic resources must be analyzed and brought into play as supporting military re- sources. In the analyses of recuperation periods of over a few months the economic-industrial grid is heavily drawn upon. However, the model as a whole is designed to cope with imme- diate post-attack military assessment, as well as long range economic and industrial recuperation assessment. 3. Selection of Air Targets One of the outstanding advances of the model-computer technique is the possibility of rapidly testing a great variety of simulated air targets problems, using various assumptions, and considering air attacks of varying magnitude and scope. Opti- mum air target systems can be developed for a variety of cir- cumstances as a result of repeated running of both pre-attack capabilities problems and post-attack air target effects prob- lems (a. and b. above). The resources such as airfields, mis- sile sites, storage, supply, repair facilities, and industrial and transportation installations which prove to be limiting factors or bottlenecks in pre-attack mobilization problems and in the re-mounting of combat activities in the post-attack period be- come the air targets. The same techniques applied in simu- lated problems would, of course, be applied to actual hot war problems. Approved For Release 200q tN : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : SCRD 78-03921A000300190001- 4. Feasibility Testing The necessity for balancing the internal flows within the matrix of an input-output model make this type of model par- ticularly suitable for testing the internal consistency of either announced Soviet Bloc plans or of US intelligence estimates of Soviet Bloc military or economic growth patterns. For exam- ple, the internal consistency of either Soviet Bloc plans to mount military strength or US intelligence estimates of Soviet Bloc military growth plans can be tested. Estimates inde- pendently projected for various types of air combat strength can be tested one against the other in order to determine whether or not the total projected strength estimate is internal- ly consistent and whether or not such total strength can be sup- ported by the Soviet Bloc military structure. The economic grid can be used to check production estimates independently arrived at for various military end products to determine whether or not the production pattern so established is eco- nomically feasible. The transportation grid should be of great help in checking estimates of Soviet Bloc transportation pat- terns and capability. 5. Mobilization Indicators The military resources model can be used to establish indi- cators of mobilization build-up. By testing the model under various assumed mobilization conditions certain economic changes as well as changes within the military structure can be identified as indicators of partial or complete mobilization. Specific changes in the use of resources can be identified as in- dicating specific types of mobilization. 6. Intelligence Collection Indicators In using the military resources model to solve a series of simulated air targets problems, certain areas of economic and military activity will be shown to be of critical significance to the capability of the Soviet Bloc to mount and maintain mili- tary strength. These critical sectors are those on which it is most important to obtain accurate, current data for targeting purposes. Thus the priority list of air targets intelligence re- quirements can be sharpened, and emphasis can be placed on the collection of certain key military and economic data. 7. Inputs for Operational Models The military resources model is to be used to translate any given over-all military strategy into requirements upon the Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : 666P78-03921A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A0003001.90001-4 62 SECRET economic-industrial, transportation, and military structure for the creation of military formations and military resource ele- ments together with the necessary military supporting activi- ties in both pre- and post-attack situations. Operational models such as the air battle model, currently being tested, serve to indicate these requirements in a realistic manner. The military resources model is designed to provide appropriate inputs for these operational models in the form of units of com- bat capability and to reflect the output of operational models in changing requirements upon the military structure. Thus the military resources model can define the maximum levels of combat activity possible within the limitations of the Bloc mili- tary and economic structure at any specified time. 8. Data Requirements , The validity of problem solutions provided by the military resources model is dependent upon the accuracy of the data inputs as well as the logic of the mathematical design of the model. Each of the component parts of the model - the eco- nomic grid, the military grid, and the transportation grid - has its own data requirements which must be initially assem- bled and subsequently kept up to date. The economic grid contains a classification of economic ac- tivity in the Soviet Bloc in the form of three submatrices or grids; the commodity input grid, the capital input grid, and the capital expansion grid. The data requirements of the com- modity input grid or matrix consist of the commodity inputs per unit of production for each of the 240 sectors of the matrix. These sectors cover most of the commodities produced in the Bloc. The data requirements of the capital input matrix con- sist of the inputs of capital equipment and labor per unit of production of each of these same commodities. The data re- quired by the capital expansion matrix consist of the com- modity and capital inputs necessary to increase available cap- ital by one unit. The data described above are in the form of technological coefficients which reflect the technological rela- tionships currently operating as the economic restraints in any desired mobilization or recuperation by the Soviet Bloc. In order to reflect fully the flexibility of the Soviet Bloc economy in meeting mobilization or wartime requirements the data in- puts must reflect not only production processes currently in use but also the alternative processes which could be used to Approved For Release 20044 kgf. CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 ~E -DP78-03921A0003001900BJ-4 break bottlenecks, or stoppages resulting from air attack. Thus the economic grid requires the introduction of all practical alternate input coefficients in order to establish realistic tech- nological restraints. Because production technology changes with the passage of time, these coefficients must be continually scrutinized to insure that they reflect current technology. In addition, changes are necessitated in the classification of com- modities and capital equipment in the light of experience gained in using the model for various types of problems. Those economic sectors which prove to be the most sensitive to mobi- lization or recuperation demands may require a more detailed or disaggregated classification in the model, whereas less vital sectors may be further aggregated. The running of a simulation on the economic model requires, in addition to the technological coefficients, data on the eco- nomic resources available to the Soviet Bloc for the time period being considered. Thus for each of the 240 commodity groups in the grid, current data on Bloc capacity, inventory, and for- eign trade must be assembled. The data requirements of the military grid of the model parallel those of the economic grid, but pertain to military activities rather than economic activities. As previously men- tioned, the output of the military grid, equivalent to commodity outputs in the economic grid, is in units of frontline activity, for example, flying hours of a specific type of bomber. For each such military activity data on inputs of other military activities as well as inputs of industrial commodities must be determined. In addition, for each unit of military activity the requirements of military capital aggregated in the form of "resource elements" such as airstrips, naval bases, and repair facilities must be determined together with the inputs neces- sary to expand a military "resource element" by one unit. As in the case of the economic grid, input data for alternative processes of producing a unit of military activity must be assembled and all coefficients in the grid must be kept in accord with the most modern logistical processes used by the Soviet Bloc. In the running of simulations on the military grid, data on total Soviet Bloc capacity, inventories, and possible incre- ments from foreign trade for each of the military activities in the grid should be available for the time period under consid- eration. Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : ( R iI'78-03921A000300190001-4 Aooroved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 SECRET The introduction of transportation factors into the military- resources model requires an analysis of the Soviet Bloc eco- nomic and military commodity flow structure in terms of geo- graphic regions, thus greatly increasing the data needs. For each region the types and amounts of transportation facilities available must be determined in order to establish the freight- handling capabilities of each region. For example, the analysis of the USSR railroad system, currently underway, requires for each terminal, link, and region estimates of the terminal motive power and freight-car handling capacities, rail-link capacities, and regional car-day requirements. In addition to these trans- portation data requirements, the Soviet Bloc production and consumption pattern must be established by geographic region. This task requires the identification of the types and amounts of economic and military capital facilities, or "resource ele- ments," available in each region. In addition, the Soviet Bloc "bill of goods," or final demand for military and civilian goods, must be determined by geographic region. The regional con- sumption of goods for military, government, and civilian use as well as the regional consumption of construction materials and producer durables must be estimated. Only when all these data are introduced into the military resources model can the transportation restraints, or "bottlenecks" under specified mobilization and recuperation conditions be identified. The data problem is formidable, but considerable progress has been made, and. new sources of data are being found and exploited. The data requirements for the model-machine tech- nique do not represent a marked change from the require- ments of traditional methods of analysis. However, the rigor- ous analysis made possible by this technique or method simply makes existing data deficiencies more apparent. Moreover, this technique has the additional advantage of enabling the analyst to identify those specific data requirements which are the most crucial in target analysis by subjecting the data to various types of sensitivity testing, e.g., the variation of coeffi- cients, and data aggregations. The model also offers a means of testing the reliability of coefficients in the light 9f known output patterns of past years. It is believed that these various testing techniques will contribute to a sharpening of the pri- ority list of intelligence collection requirements. Approved For Release 200VgL27r: CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001- RET 65 HORRIBLE THOUGHT The headshrinkers' literature is full of remarks about the efforts of mankind to avoid thinking. As a matter of fact, I rather imagine that a very small proportion of the brainpower of the most creative thinker alive is ever devoted to creative thought. In our society a fairly large proportion of this small amount of creative thought is devoted to finding ways to help mankind avoid thinking. Games, alcohol, tranquilizers, TV, and business routine can all be used to help an individual fill 24 hours a day without ever having a creative thought. We like cliches because they help us sound confident without thinking. This does not mean that the average man is idle. On the con- trary, he is probably a very active and useful citizen. As a matter of fact, idleness is generally abhorred because it leaves a vacuum that is an invitation to thought. You and I may be exceptions to this general pattern in some small degree, but I want the reader to recognize that if this paper contains one small original thought, it will be here only as a result of tremendous psychic effort spent in overcoming my own urge not to think, and that if this thought, in its turn, stimulates any creative thinking in the mind of the reader, it will be only over the opposition of your shrewd and dogged sub- conscious which tries so hard to protect you from the rash act of thinking. Having drafted this challenge to the reader's subconscious, I now propose that we think about some of the problems of in- telligence. (I almost said "look at some of the problems of in- telligence." This just goes to show you how my subconscious abhors the sound of the word "think.") To pose the problems that I would like us to think about, I want first to go back into a little intellectual history. Some of the readers will be much more familiar with the events that I am about to describe than I am, but here at least is my version. In the early days of the postwar intelligence effort, the at- tention of the intelligence community was focused primarily on the interpretation of surface phenomena. Some of the MORI/HRP PAGES 65-7q Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : SBAREDP78-03921A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 66 SECRET questions at issue were almost unbelievably naive. For ex- ample, there was not complete agreement on the general nature of the Soviet Communist system, and there was a great deal of discussion about the role of local Communist parties; some peo- ple feeling that these were indigenous parties, and other peo- ple feeling that they were part of the Soviet apparatus. Dur- ing this period there was no agreement concerning standards of analysis in the intelligence community. At one extreme, some people used biased and emotional arguments without re- gard to system. At the other extreme, some people claimed that local Communist parties were not part of the Soviet ap- paratus because there was not enough evidence on this question to settle the matter in a court of law. As time went by, how- ever, the intelligence community more and more came to accept the standard techniques of political sciences, economics, soci- ology, and so forth, and attempted to conform to academic standards and rule of evidence. General agreement on standards of thought tended to shift the major problems inintelligence into the realm of facts. If it was agreed that a given situation should be interpreted by the use of the techniques of economics then the size of the gross national product of a country involved in the situation under study became an important fact, having great bearing on the final analysis of the situation. The intelligence com- munity, therefore, went through a period several years ago in which major questions of the fact were important issues. Some of us remember the blood and sweat shed over the numbers of Soviet planes produced, the size of the gross national product of Communist China, and the adequacy of the Chinese rail- roads. The list could continue ad infinitum. The focusing of the intelligence community on major ques- tions of fact led to the development of additional techniques for the establishment or verification of facts. Some of these techniques, like the factory markings program, could be gen- erally understood and accepted throughout the community. Even in this field, however, and in related fields involving so- phisticated statistical techniques, acceptance of the new meth- od was neither immediate nor complete. Other techniques of analysis in political and social fields also left some members of the intelligence community gasping in their wake. At this point, the intelligence community entered a stage which will Approved For Release 2004 fAtT CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 SECRET 67 always be with us to some extent. It is the stage in which arguments about fact are caused by the technological gap be- tween the informed and the uninformed analyst. This is a gap that training and experience have narrowed considerably and which probably can be narrowed even further in the future, but it probably will exist to some degree as long as some parts of the intelligence community develop new methods and new ways of thinking and other parts of the intelligence community lag in knowledge and understanding. It is not necessarily a bad phenomenon. It at least means that somebody is out in front and doing some thinking. It keeps the other fellows on their toes. As a result of over 10 years of development, the intelligence community has now reached a high level 'of sophistication in the application of standard techniques of analysis to intelli- gence problems. Subsidiary methods such as style of writing and the manner of presentation are excellent. The community seems to have learned how to produce very good answers to intelligence problems without generating an undue amount of internal friction. All this is cause for considerable pride and satisfaction. As good as we may be, however, we are obviously not good enough. We have just seen a classic example of one of our major outstanding difficulties in the question of US policy to- ward the launching of the Soviet earth satellite. There was no failure of intelligence to report the facts relating to the Soviet satellite program well in advance of the event, and intelligence also pointed out that this event would be of distinct advantage to the Soviet Union in the field of political prestige. Intelli- gence had done the job our customers normally expect of us, and yet in a real sense, the US was caught napping. The US prepared a plan of what to do after the Soviets had launched a satellite, but we did not take any action or even decide to take any action before the event. In other words, our planners did not fully recognize the magnitude of the blow the Soviet launching would give to our prestige. It would be very easy for us to sit back smugly and blame the unfortunate consequences on the policymakers, who were adequately informed in advance but who did not take adequate action in advance. Could it be that we have not yet established adequate confidence in our product in the minds of our consumers? Could it be that the Approved For Release 2004/12/17 :SRDP78-03921 A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 68 SECRET fault still lay with the intelligence community? Could it be that we have not yet devised the proper method of presentation which would permit us to say "damn it, we mean it!" If we are willing to recognize that it is possible for intelli- gence to "fail" even when it is shrewdly accurate and timely, we might find further food for thought in looking at the prob- lems that we are being shrewdly accurate and timely about. They tend to be problems that have a fairly immediate practical application. No one could object to our tackling such problems. When one looks for analysis in depth or in terms of long-term trends, however, we find that it is generally lacking in our for- mal publications. The bold analysis, the sharp intuition, the long step ahead, and the provocative ideas are generally found in informal bull sessions; in "think" pieces that have no true status; in the internal staff memoranda of ONE, OCI, and so on; and in some of the briefs and background material used by the DDI on an ad hoc basis. They are almost never found in the formal papers put forward by the community for the sober guidance of our planners and policymakers. There are strong conservative influences in our present sys- tem of producing intelligence which would tend to resist change in anything involving method and type of analysis, form of presentation, and so on. Might we not be at a point of develop- ment, however, where we need to make a quantum jump in the conduct of intelligence? Is there any way in which intelligence can learn to say better "we mean it," "these are the problems that may arise in consequence," "these are the decisions that must be decided?" How can we extend our analysis in time and depth beyond present dimensions and yet carry with us the conservative elements in the intelligence community? There might be changes in organization or in the mechanics of presentation which might improve our impact on the formu- lation and execution of national policy. These things should be explored, but no such changes could create, by themselves, the change in the intellectual and visceral impact of intelli- gence that we must aim for. The only sure way to conduct national affairs with greater wisdom is for the responsible of- ficials to think smarter thoughts. There is no mechanical or organizational substitute for brains. Intelligence is an im- portant and integral part of the process by which we conduct our national affairs, and intelligence officers, therefore, have a Approved For Release 2004k~IT CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : E~~-1 I P78-03921A00030019000094 tremendous responsibility to apply themselves to new ways of thinking which will give us a more brilliant insight into the dynamic world and our constantly changing place in it. The real area in which we must seek improvement, there- fore, is in that related to analysis. Perhaps we must learn to pose a different kind of question to ourselves. Perhaps we need to learn to think on a different time scale. Perhaps we need to develop even more new methods of analysis. Perhaps we need to do some combination of all of these things, and many others as well. There are probably many different ideas that should be ex- amined. Here is a sample of the kind of thing that we might think about. Might it not useful for us to engage systemati- cally in backward analysis from hypothetical cases? For ex- ample, intelligence predicted the launching of the Soviet earth satellite and said that it would have unfortunate consequences. But let us suppose that several years ago we had posed the fol- lowing question: "What would be the impact on the policy situation of the US and on its prestige if the Soviet Union were to accomplish some technological breakthrough which would support a Soviet claim for Soviet supremacy in the field of sci- ence and technology?" If we had had this sort of analysis, it might have been possible for us to point out in a much more meaningful manner the way in which the Soviet missile pro- gram and the development of a Soviet earth satellite might place the Soviet Union in the favorable situation envisaged in our hypothetical analysis. We could pose other similar ques- tions such as : "What will be the effect on the world political situation when Soviet industrial production equals US indus- trial production?" "What would be the consequences if all of the `third force' groups backed by the US came to power and `right wing' parties disappeared?" "What would the world look like after 20 years of disarmament and `peaceful coex- istence?'" Analysis of these questions might put a vastly dif- ferent light on intermediate developments leading toward the hypothetical situation we have posed for ourselves. There is undoubtedly room for improvement in our work, but unfortunately as we get better and better, we have more and more justification for continuing to think and do exactly as we have been thinking and doing. This is more and more justi- fication for not thinking creatively about improvement. We Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : 66C1JP78-03921A000300190001-4 A roved For Release 2004/1 17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 E ET know, however, that there will always remain an important challenge to us in intelligence as long as the US does not act to accommodate itself adequately to world developments. What do you think that we should do about it? Approved For Release 2004 tZ/jjT: CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : -ETP78-03921AOO1O! ELINT A SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM Charles A. Kroger, Jr. During the initial phases of the Battle of Britain] a German bomber, relatively safe under cover of darkness, flew over the blacked-out landscape head' for Lond n., At a specific mo- ment)the bomber dro` T! ombs, w c$'a c rately hit their target, and another successful German Luftwaffe attack was history. Electronic advancements by the Germans made this possible. British interception and analysis of this new elec- tronic bombing, device countered the Germans' success and continued Q render less effectivevery subsequent electronic advantage the Germans developed. In a parallel manner ,the Germans developed a highly effective electronic intelligence effort directed against the Allied raid orginating from Britain. This phase of electronic intelligence, utilizing electronic means to determine enemy electronic capabdi.tie,., began in England just before World War Tana has been an ever increasing effort which today is called ELINT. ELINT is a coined word for the process of electronic intercept and analysis or electronic intelligence - a process about which very little has been written. The intelligence officer, unless he is in the electronics field himself, has had little contact with ELINT. By directive 1 ELINT is defined as: "the collection (observation and recording), and the technical processing for later intelligence purposes, of information on foreign, non- communications, electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than atomic detonation sources." In simple* -terms, ELINT is the detection and analysis of radiations from foreign electronic devices for the purpose of extracting information of value to intelligence. Just as a flashlight radiates a beam of light observable human eye, electronic devices emit or radiate nonvisible, rion- audible radiations which are detectable and recordable, using electronic devices just as the human ear hears sound. This interception or collection of enemy radiations is the first stage of ELINT. The formal definition restricts ELINT to "noncommunica- tion electromagnetic radiations other than atomic detonatioll'ORI/H RP PAGES 71-83 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 :1 RIkTbP78-03921 A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 72 SECRET sources." This means that ELINT is responsible for all radia- tions except those used in voice or other communications such as radio or telegraph and those resulting from atomic sources. What other kind of radiations are there? To--name a few with. which ELINT deals, there are radiations from missiles and mis- sile guidance devices, radiations from developmental labora- tories and field testing- stations working on electronic devices, radar, navigational aids, anti-aircraft and aircraft gun direc- tion, air-to-air or air-to-ground identification signals? and so on. "Technical processing for later intelligence purposes" means subjecting the collected ELINT raw data, usually in the form of beeps on a magnetic tape or wire, to a detailed analysis by use of complex electronic equipment. This equipment permits the analyst to hear with his ears, to see on an oscilloscope, to measure very accurately, to photograph, to compare with standards and to investigate the intercepted signal in as many ways as are necessary to identify the characteristics of the foreign device. When the "technical processing" is completed 3 the technical analyst can pass to the intelligence analyst de- tailed information on the location and capabilities of the for- eign device. The intelligence community can then combine this information with other knowledge to estimate the over-all competence and possible intentions of foreign powers. For a technical look at what ELINT really is let us turn for a moment to basic physics. Here we remember that electro- magnetic energy, like light, travels in waves. These waves vary in length and form a spectrum. We are all familiar with the rainbow with its colors ranging from red, having waves of 760 millimicrons in length (400 million megacycles/sec), to violet, with waves of 385 millimicrons in length (800 million mega- cycles/see). This color spectrum is a part of the electromag- netic spectrum. The radio portion of this electromagnetic spectrum is used primarily for communications and military weapons. Currently, the military weapons use radio waves varying from a few thousand cycles (waves per second) up to 100 kilomegacycles (one hundred billion waves per second). The following diagram illustrates the position of the radio and color spectrums in the over-all electromagnetic spectrum and an expansion of the radio spectrum showing the bands where different Soviet electronic devices radiate. Approved For Release 2004/1j'tCIA-RDP78-03921 A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17: S P78-03921A0003001900073 Approved For Release 200412/17 :$BVP78-03921 A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 74 SECRET For a specific example of how ELINT works, let us_ take a__ simplified look at Soviet radar. Soviet radar devices radiate electronic impulses at certain frequencies and in definite beams searching the sky for long distances and great altitudes for any object that may be present. When these impulses strike an object they bounce off and return to a ground or airborne re- ceiver which calculates the length of time between emission and reception and the strength of the signal received. From thi -tl e Soviet radar operator can generally tell the size, speed, direction, altitude, and other pertinent information about the unseen object. Our Strategic Air Command, with its retalia- tory mission, urgently requires every possible bit of information on Soviet radars - particularly on their location and capa- bility. This is where ELINT goes to work. By intercepting, amplifying, recording and analyzing an enemy radar signal or pulse,.. ,can learn all about it. By studying the type of radi- ation, its modulation (AM, FM, pulse) its pulse repetition rate, pulse duration, pulse shape, its radio frequency (position on the electronic spectrum), its antenna pattern characteristics, and so on, we can identify the radar, compare it with known information, ascertain its range, location, use, and other essen- tial information required to evaluate its capability as a radar and its susceptibility to countermeasures. This same process of ELINT pertains to any and all enemy electronic devices including airborne intercept devices used by guided missiles, guided missile launchers, fighter aircraft, long- range and short-range navigational aids, ground controlled in- tercept height finders, anti-aircraft and aircraft fire control radar, blind bombing devices, electronic radiations emanating from scientific laboratories or production plants,.aii'so-on. What do these radiated signals sound like? Frankly,they sound like noise or radio static during a thunder storm T--- --fact, before the more euphonious term of ELINT was coined, the British called it "Noise Listening" and, during World War II, had a "Noise Listening Bureau." Although ELINT is a very complex field - constantly looking beyond present knowledge of electronics to fulfill its role of pro- viding timely information on new foreign electronic develop- ments, it need not be pushed aside as too complicated to be understood. Because of its complexity, some members of the intelligence community are inclined to throw up their hands lease 2004t,tfr?T CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 SECRET 75 and ignore this potential tool. However, ELINT is not too difficult to comprehend or use, nor is it an end in itself, but it can contribute essential, accurate information to the intelli- $ence process. F Scientific intelligence and, in particular, ELINT, or electronic intelligence, had its start in England immediately before World :'War II. Early in 1939 the British Committee for the Scientific i no n e . g ca o of new German weapons. One scientist, Dr. R. V. Jones, was appointed to look into the matter. Before he even started his task the war broke out and in June 1940, Dr. Jones, after con- siderable study, concluded that the Germans had developed a radio beam by which their bombers could operate over England regardless of weather, darkness, or cloud cover and still be most accurate in their blind bombing. This beam, just a little more than one-half mile wide, passed directly over London. Based on Dr. Jones' conclusion, steps were immediately taken to find any possible countermeasures. A Royal Air Force search air- craft was outfitted and it accomplished its mission of looking fQr_and - detecting this German beam. Technical analysis of this information provided the radio frequency and other char- acteristics of the beam, thus permitting the British to jam it and render it . ineffective. Henceforth, many bombs intended for London fell harmlessly on the open countryside. This in- terception and analysis of an enemy electronic radiation (later known as Knicklbein) was the birth of present day ELINT. The Germans altered their beam system and soon began using a better system utilizing intersecting beams referred to as the "X" apparatus, which provided greater accuracy. These beams were at a different frequency than Knicklbein, requiring new search and analysis before the British solved this new threat and took countermeasures. With the "X" apparatus, the bomber flew along an electronic beam while its position along the beam was observed from a German radar station on the continent. When the bomber was over the target, it was told to drop its bombs By now Britain's ELINT capability of inter- cepting and analyzing this electronic information was quite effective and continued to grow in scope and importance throughout the war. During World War II theUS_jhade extensive use of electronic intercept devices in - i the acific- and European Theatres of Approved For Release 2004/12/17 :5E R PP78-03921 A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 76 SECRET Operation. Special USAF and Navy planes equipped with ELINT receivers ferreted out the secrets of German and Jap- anese antiaircraft radar and aircraft warning devices. From the use of such planes the word "fgr,'' was ~ oined- a term presently applied to aircraft equipped to inves iga a enemy electronic radiations. Among the most deadly weapons di- rected against the Eighth Air Force were the German antiair- craft guns which were equipped with extremely accurate radar directors known as "Wurzbergs." The close formations of American aircraft made a juicy target for the more than 16,000 German antiaircraft guns. By use of radar intercept equip- ment (ELINT equipment) information was obtained which per- mitted the use of jamming devices, and thus the one-billion dollar investment of the Germans in their Wurzberg radars was jiterall)ruined by the countermeasures made possible through ELINT. Knowing we had this capability, the Germans began a frantic search for non-jammable radar equipment, but the war vi as.cver before they succeeded. Following World War II there was a period in which interest in ELINT, as in many wartime activities, tapered off. Some effort continued but the real push to provide intelligence on electronic advancements in other countries was not initiated until the USSR clamped down its Iron Curtain. Since that timhe collection and analysis of electronic signals radiating behind the Curtain has been the constant goal of ELINT. Since the birth of ELINT in 1940 the effort has grown in size, cost, importance, complexity, coverage, and capability, and, like most scientific efforts, is making yesterday's limits, today's capabilities. Electronic intercept, to use one connotation of ELINT, pro- vides factual information. Unlike the collection of much in- telligence information where we are forced to rely on word of mouth, memory, or integrity of source, electronic radiations are intercepted and recorded by machine. If a signal is being radi- ated it can be recorded and later reported accurately even by someone who doesn't understand all that he is doing. Because of this factual nature, ELINT has provided substantiation of many intelligence estimates based on other intelligence processes. During World War II, Air Force B-24 aircraft and radar- equipped Navy Catalina aircraft were assigned the job of locat- Approved For Release 2004/igd&fiCIA-RDP78-03921 A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RRETDP78-03921AO00300190001-4 SEC 77 ing enemy radar in the Pacific. They spotted and pinpointed Japanese air-warning sets scattered all the way from the Solo- mons to the China coast. A few days before the Leyte landing in October 1944 one of the ferrets discovered a new Japanese radar on Suluan Island at the mouth of the Leyte gulf. As this radar commanded the approaches to the Leyte coast line it was necessary to eliminate it and this was done on a com- mando raid by the US Rangers. Currently, ELINT is providing the Strategic Air Command with the intelligence it requires on the location and range of Soviet radar. Through ELINT, information is acquired on the method, capability, and limitations of Soviet long-range navi- gation systems upon which their atomic bombers rely. Soviet missile tests are monitored by ELINT and the point may soon be reached where, by interception and analysis of the telemeter- ing signal from Soviet missiles, we will acquire missile per- formance data vital to our National Intelligence Estimates. (Telemetering is the electronic system used in missile testing which records, codes, and transmits to ground test stations such things as missile speed, flight path, guidance, skin tempera- tures, and other behavior characteristics of the missile in flight.) Since early in World War II_ the Army, Navy, and Air Force each hexpended varying degrees of effort on ELINT, and in 1952 the Central Intelligence Agency entered the ELINT field. Although much of this individual endeavor was valuable, in 1954 better organization was given to ELINT - organization on--a national level. The lack of proper dissemination of val- uable intelligence produced by one organization but not always readily available to the others in the community was noted as a serious problem. When this situation came to the attention of the National Security Council a study was made, and National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 17, entitled Elec- tronic Intelligence (ELINT) was issued (in May 1955). NSCID-17 established the first national policy for ELINT and it is still the basic authority for the national ELINT program. It directed that : a. The US Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) shall be the national policy body for ELINT. Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : COK-REP78-03921A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 78 SECRET b. The Department of Defense and the Central In- telligence Agency shall be responsible for their respec- tive ELINT collection activities. c. The technical processing of all ELINT shall be accomplished in a jointly-staffed center administered by the Department of Defense. d. All data collected by the collection agencies shall be made available to the National Technical Process- ing Center (NTPC). e. The NTPC shall effect the fullest and most expe- ditious processing possible and furnish the results to the interested agencies. The present national organization for ELINT is rather com- plex, with many interlocking organizations and many formal and informal coordinating committees. The important con- sideration is that each of the services and CIA is free to run its own collection operations designed to furnish information it alone requires, but is, expected to submit all collected data to the NTPC subject only to the minimum delays necessitated by prior exploitation for urgent tactical or operational purposes. One can immediately see the strong vertical organization for ELINT within each major component. It should also be appre- ciated that much horizontal collaboration is being accom- plished by joint participation in such organizations as the NTPC and AFOIN-Z in an effort to coordinate individual activi- ties into a national ELINT program. In October 1953 a study was made of ELINT in CIA. This resulted in the appointment of an Agency ELINT staff officer and in the preparation of an Agency ELINT program which the Director of Central Intelligence approved on 29 May 1954. Within the Agency ELINT is organized generally as follows. The Office of Scien?ific Intelligence develops targets and requirements for ELINT collection, furnishes scientific and technical guidance to Agency collectors, and performs the tech- nical analysis and collation of ELINT with all source material in the production of scientific intelligence. The Clandestine Services conducts a continuing review of the, potential and ca al~jl ties for covert ELINT collection, implements peci =c clandestine activity in response to approved ELINT require- Approved For Release 2004gg 1E7T: CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : c P78-03921A0003001900017-A nients, and coordinates US ELINT clandestine activities with foreign governments. The Office of Communications arranges for research, development, and procurement of ELINT equip- ment as required to support clandestine ELINT collection. The CIA ELINT Staff Officer advises the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and appropriate operating components on the formulation, implementation, and coordination of ELINT plans, policies, and programs. On the national level, much work has gone into summarizing what each organization requires in the ay of information on enemy electronic developments. This sizeable' task has re- sui.%ed in a formal statement of the currently definable Specific ELINT Collection Requirements (SPECOR). This collection guide is based on the priority of the National Intelligence Ob- jectives. It has been disseminated throughout the services and CIA field units for guidance as to what information the intelli- gence community requires and in what priority. To realize the need for an adequate requirements system, consider that the ideal ELINT system is one capable of collect- ing all signals of interest and extracting all of the useful infor- mation from each signal. This is neither possible nor prac- ticable, -ho ver. The questions of just what signals are of interest and just what information about them is needed must be answered in the light of the gaps in our intelligence. Thus, as in other branches of technical intelligence, ELINT is faced with the problem of relating scientific techniques to intelli- gence problems. In general, ELINT targets fall into two major categories. The Army, Navy, and Air Force, charged with the military de- fense of our country, are primarily concerned with the location and capability of all enemy radar ,,on a current. basis. This is referred to as the Radar Order of Battle (ROB). The Air Force, for instance, must know where the heavy concentrations of enemy radar are so that its planes can either skirt the area or take proper countermeasures. The largest portion of inter- cepted enemy electronic information falls into this category of maintaining an adequate radar order of battle. CIA, on the other hand, is primarily interested in scientific break-through, or in not being surprised by new enemy electronic develop- Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : ARTP78-03921 A000300190001-4 8Approved For Release 2004ECRE7 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 ments. This means that most ELINT effort is directed toward the interception and analysis of new and unusual electronic signals. Naturally in the course of searching for new and un- usual signals, much order of battle information is received. This serves, in addition to supplementing the services opera- tions, as a basis of comparison to determine what is new and unusual. The ELINT objectives of first priority to CIA relate to those signals which have yet to be intercepted or for which the radiating source has yet to be seen. Specifically, the targets are as follows : a. Those non-communication signals which are, or are suspected to be, associated with the Soviet or Satellite ability to deliver atomic or other weapons of destruction - that is, guidance or telemetry signals associated with missiles, airborne navigation, and bombing systems. b. Those non-communication signals which are or are suspected to be associated with the Soviet or Satel- lite ability to defend their countries against the deliv- ery of atomic or other weapons of destruction -that is, early warning, ground-control intercept, gap-filling radars, surface-to-air weapons systems, airborne weap- ons systems, ground surveillance systems, jammers, and so forth. c. Those signals occupying an unusual portion of the radio frequency spectrum not normally associated with Soviet or Satellite equipment. The equipment involved in ELINT is elaborate and com- plex. To make matters worse, the higher _ up the frequency spectrum you go the shorter your intercept range becomes, and the present trend toward higher frequencies means that ELINT equipment must get closer to the target or be designed with greater ranges, both of which approach the impossible. ELINT equipment falls into two main catagories: collection equipment (airborne, maritime, fixed station, or agent-carried) and analysis equipment (used on the ground to reproduce, readout, and analyze the collected information). Basically, the major components of an ELINT collection system are the antenna, receiver, recorder, direction finder, and analyzer. Approved For Release 2004 WtT CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 SECRET 81 The antenna corresponds to the human ear. It is that com- ponent which first detects a signal. It is, of course, desirable that the antenna be very sensitive or, as we say in ELINT,"ehave high antenna gain.' This permits the maximum intercept range. The ideal antenna system would have the following characteristics : a. a continuous and fixed broad area coverage, b. very broad electronic spectrum coverage, c. very high gain, d. inherent capability for giving directional in- formation. These requirements are not all compatible. In practice it is necessary to compromise in order to gain a workable system. The decision as to which of the desirable characteristics can be safely compromised, and to what extent, is based on the fre- quency range of interest and also on the specific ELINT target under consideration. For instance, broad area- coverage may be obtained by either of two means - a broad beam antenna fixed in space or a narrow beam, scanning antenna. The first method demands a sacrifice in gain; The second limits the time coverage of any part of the total area. Following receipt of the signal by the antenna it is passed to a receiver. The function of the receiver is to convert trans- mitted information available at the antenna into a form that can be measured and recorded. Basically1two general types of receivers are in use today - the superheterodyne and the crystal video. The operating characteristics of each receiver may be outlined as follows: Superheterodyne - slow scan. a. inherently high sensitivity, b. good frequency resolution, Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : iMP78-03921A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 82 SECRET c. prohibitively long search time in many cases. Crystal video - wide open. a. low sensitivity reducing maximum probable range, b. frequency resolution problems, c. search time considerably less than the super- heterodyne. From the receiver the signal goes neat to the recorder where the signal is stored on magnetic tape or wire. There are two main reasons for recording signals. A permanent record of the signal is required for future analysis and for records, and on signals of short duration or higher complexity the operator may not have enough time or capability to evaluate the signal parameters before the transmission is ended. Direction-finding equipment issometimes utilized during the interception of the signal. It displays incoming signals on an oscilloscope or other azimuth-reading device giving the direc- tion of the arrival of the signal. Analyzers in the ELINT collection system are sometimes used during interception to provide a preliminary observation of the type of modulation and to measure the repetition rate, dura- tion, and general shape of signal pulses. Signals are usually presented by a cathode ray tube (similar to a television screen), which provides a moving picture of the shape, size, and nature of the incoming signal pulse or wave form. The pictures are usually photographed as a permanent record. It should be pointed out that ELINT collection devices need not be huge as are those used in ground, sea, and some airborne operations. Quite to the contrary, considerable use is made of miniature equipment no larger than a book. ELINT collection equipment is usually designed for the specific situation in- volved, whether it be a 60-foot parabolic antenna on the ground or a tiny unassuming, ~and-carried package. The major comphts of an ELINT analysis system vary greatly with the purpose of the analysis. Order-of-battle analysis is often done automatically by IBM-type equipment. The analysis that CIA performs is not for order of battle but is to identify new and unusual signals. For this, man-operated equipment is required and an analysis position contains at least Approved For Release 2004 k//&: CIA-RDP78-03921A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/17 -SE-DP78-03921A0003001900gi-4 I EARPHONES RE DU EN CY TO PLAY TAPE LOCATION ON FROM NECOR OCR FRED ENCY SPECTRUM NUMBER OF AND SIGNAL BEAM WIDTH SPACE BETWEEN ANU ROTATION AND/OR 51GNALS NOD PATE the following fundamental equipment: a tape transport used for duplicating or monitoring; a counter that measures and illustrates the modulation frequency; an ink-on-paper recorder to draw a continuous trace of the signal amplitude; an oscil- loscope, which permits observation of the wave form; a vibra- lizer to display modulation frequency components versus time; filters to separate signals; a rapid-advance movie camera; and a host of other equipment to permit the analyst to scan great volumes of tape and film to separate that minute portion which, upon detailed analysis, may prove to be a new electronic devel- opment. It is hoped that this basic discussion of ELINT will provide a general concept of this complex scientific intelligence process. It should be realized that in the interest of readability many points have been simplified and technical details omitted so as not to confuse the non-technical reader. If one considers that one-third of the cost of a modern fighter aircraft goes for electronic equipment and that most of the electronic devices which make up this equipment radiate sig- nals, then one begins to understand how much there is to learn of Soviet capabilities by examining their use of electronics. This also applies to ground and sea weapons, including missiles. Recent news reports of Soviet developments in the scientific field demonstrate how heavily the Russians are relying on elec- tronics and how advanced their development is. The Soviet earth satellites with their radiated signals are a responsibility of ELINT. ELINT must continue to intercept and to analyze Soviet electromagnetic emissions preferably in the research and development stages in order to keep abreast of Soviet electronic advancements and to attempt to predict future capabilities. Approved For Release 2004/12/17 :F&f4~ttP78-03921 A000300190001-4 Approved For Release 2004/12/a XE-0392lA0003001900%4 REPORT ON HUNGARIAN REFUGEES Guy E. Coriden The Hungarian Revolution of October 1956 provided an un- precedented opportunity for the collection of intelligence on a Soviet Bloc country. Each of the many facets of intelligence activity played its role. Every known Free World and Bloc intelligence organization was involved. Every Hungarian refugee who could toddle was a potential target for an intelli- gence-minded group. It is obviously impossible, therefore, to claim with good conscience to tell the "intelligence story" of the Hungarian Revolution. It is also impossible to get the many participants to agree on which of the many efforts was the most fruitful. This, then, will be the account of one activity - the collection of the intelligence information and material from the Hungarians who were admitted to the US. Other operations will be mentioned only as they are considered pertinent. Because the opportunity was unique, certain adap- tations in intelligence collection methods were required to take full advantage of it. The object was to extract the maximum amount of intelligence at a minimum cost while still abiding by decent rules of human conduct. As the methods used were necessarily determined by the processing and resettlement pro- cedures as well as by the official US Government attitude to- ward intelligence exploitation, it might be well to begin with a brief historical background. The story of the revolution has been told many times, prob- ably best by the UN in its massive report. The outbreak took place on 23 October 1956, and in the months following, it is estimated that 188,000 Hungarians found refuge in Austria and 18,000 in Yugoslavia. As of 1 September 1957, approximately 35,000 of these refugees had accepted asylum in the US. In early November 1956, when it became apparent that a massive influx of Hungarians was going to have to be resettled, it was decided that Camp Kilmer, New Jersey, would be the processing center for all of the refugees. Because the installa- tion was an Army camp, the Army was charged with the initial responsibility for coordinating the resettlement effort and pro- viding all of the housekeeping services. On 12 December 1956, MORI/HRP PAGES 85-93 Approved For Release 2004/12/11Eh 'L03921A000300190001-4 Proved For Release 2p AO&ly~A-RDP78-03921 A000300190001-4 however, the President appointed a civilian Committee for Hungarian Refugee Relief under the chairmanship of Mr. Tracey F. Voorhees. This Committee has coordinated all activ- ities in connection with "Operation Mercy." In the process it utilized the services of more than 20 volunteer and govern- mental agencies. From the arrival of the first refugees on 21 November 1956 until early May 1957, when Camp Kilmer was closed, transportation was provided by 214 MATS flights, 5 Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS) ocean voyages, and 133 flights chartered by the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM). The Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization and the Public Health Service performed the functions necessary for admitting aliens to the US, and various charitable-religious agencies arranged for most of the resettlements. Part of the job of fitting the individual's skills to available employment opportunities was performed by the National Academy of Sciences and the US Employment Service. The processing and resettlement was handled with an amazing degree of efficiency, and the sympathetic attitude of the Ameri- can people was so sustained that by early May it was possible to close Camp Kilmer. About 32,000 of the refugees had been dispersed to various parts of the country, and those remaining are being shuttled through the St. George Hotel in Brooklyn. Lest the cursory nature of this account convey the idea that this was a simple and smooth process, remember that the operation involved the complete transplanting to the US of a large number of participants in a violent revolution who had lost most of their possessions and who had little or no knowl- edge of the English language. Only 6,500 of these could come under any available immigration quota. The rest were ad- mitted under the Attorney General's discretionary authority, and the rules were established and changed several times. Indeed, methods and procedures were developed, abandoned, and reinstituted many times in the early days of the operation. Also the prevailing attitudes, both official and public, changed appreciably over the months. In the early days the primary concern was to provide a humanitarian welcome for the vic- timized Hungarian people. Every effort was made to avoid incidents which might cause unfavorable comment. This atti- tude was motivated by a genuine sympathy and admiration for the Hungarians and a determination to take full advantage of Approved For Release Yll