STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE [Vol. 5 No. 1, Winter 1961]

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Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RIIIIT7181203192TA000300270001-5 CONFIDENTIAL STUDIES INTELLIGENCE 013 NO. 221:g..5.2.02./61 mx. No. :OLDER NO. 1:22 TOTAL DOCS HEREIN _L.: VOL. 5 NO. 1 WINTER 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF TRAINING Approved For Release 200 1f ..? RI CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIA Approved For Release 2005104113 -03921A000300270001-5 *NM All opinions expressed in the Studies are those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the official views of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Office of Training, or any other organizational component of the intelligence community. WARNING This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans- mission or revelation of which to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. Approved For Release 2077MLIA.-RD2.71-03921A000300270001-5 CONFIDENTIAL1 CONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2005/04/ ? - - 21A000300270001-5 STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE EDITORIAL POLICY Articles for the Studies in Intelligence may be written on any theoretical, doc- trinal, operational, or historical aspect of intelligence. The final responsibility for accepting or rejecting an article rests with the Edito- rial Board. The criterion for publication is whether or not, in the opinion of the Board, the article makes a contribution to the litera- ture of intelligence. EDITOR EDITORIAL BOARD SHERMAN KENT, Chairman LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON Additional members of the Board represent other CIA components. *crawl I Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP-7-8-04024A000300270001-5 CONFIDENTIAL 25X1 25X1 25X1 25)(1 Nrn cm-ri ilei-daireasinithiteirlibd5M l=" ? P78-03921A000300270001-5 CONTRIBUTIONS AND DISTRIBUTION Contributions to the Studies or communications to the editors may come from any member of the intelligence community or, upon invitation, from persons outside. Manuscripts should be submitted directly to the Editor, Studies in Intelligence, Room 25X1 2013 R & S Building and need not be coordinated or submitted through channels. They should be typed in duplicate, double-spaced, the original on bond paper. Foot- notes should be inserted in the body of the text following the line in which the reference occurs. Articles may be classified through Secret. 25X1 25X1 25X1 For inclusion on the regular Studies distribution list call your office dissemination center or the responsible OCR desk, For back issues and on other questions call the Office of the Editor, P78-03921A000300270001-5 25X1 25X1 cONFIDENTIAL Approved For Release 2005/04/44WRDP78 0321A000300270001-5 CONTENTS CLASSIFIED ARTICLES Page The 1960 Studies in Intelligence Award faces 1 Great Frusina Revisited: The Problem of Priority Posi- tive Intelligence Wallace E. Seidel Redesign for an obsolescent intelligence organiza- tion. SECRET The Yo-Yo Story: An Electronics Analysis Case History Charles R. Ahern 11 Reconstruction of a Soviet missile-guidance system. SECRET Psywar by Forgery Alma Fryxell 25 Black intelligence support for Sino-Soviet propa- ganda. SECRET 25X1 WM" Approved For Release 2005/06161 25X 25X MORI/HRP PARTS OF THIS PAGE A0300270001-5 14/13_7) Approved For Release 2005/ ? - P78-03921A000300270001-5 SECRET 25X1 UNCLASSIFIED ARTICLES Page Galahad: Intelligence Aspects . . . Charles N. Hunter Al Combat intelligence, command problems, and the OSS contribution to Merrill's Marauders. Machines and the Chinese Name . . . . Standards for the wanton romanization of charac- ters. The Progress of Pinyin A new endemic standard Chinese language system. Edward Bancroft (@ Edwd. Edwards), Estimable Spy A high-level penetration that duped Benjamin Franklin. A29 A35 A53 Intelligence in Recent Public Literature World War II A68 The Economic War A72 Miscellany A75 Approved For ReleaseSMCW 25X1 78-03921ANNWOMTS OF THIS PAGE I13: CIA-RDP 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 SECRET, THE 1969 STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE AWARD The first annual Studies award of $500, for the most signifi- cant contribution during 1960 to the literature of intelligence, 25X1 has been made to issue. Although other contributions were considered more significant in the historical sense, of broader general interest, or more immediately applicable in the work of the community, 25X1 submission represents best the kind of construc- tive thinking that the Studies especially desires to promote. Among the several other candidates earnestly considered for 25X1 the 1960 award/ \ printed in tne winter issue, is aistinguisneu as particularly meritorious. Approved For Release591011/0A/13 : CIA-RDP 25X1 78-03921A000300270001-5 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 SECRET The evolution of intelligence as knowledge demands a redesign- ing of intelligence as organiza- tion. GREAT FRUSINA REVISITED: The Problem of Priority Positive Intelligence Wallace E. Seidel In 1949 Sherman Kent referred to strategic intelligence as "the intelligence of national survival" 1 and elsewhere, more lexicographically, as "high-level foreign positive intelligence." 2 This paper is focused in its particulars on one aspect of the highest-priority positive intelligence problem of today, that of the Soviet long-range ballistic missile, especially the ICBM. In a larger sense, however, its subject is the change that has taken place during the past decade in the kinds of knowledge that constitute strategic intelligence and the meaning of this change in terms of what kind of organization and activity is needed to produce the intelligence of national survival. The New Knowledge When we first visited Great Frusina with Mr. Kent, the evaluation of her strategic stature was presented as requiring knowledge of "the situation, the non-military instrumen- talities, the force in being, and the war potential" of the state.3 Now, little more than ten years later, the development of ther- monuclear weapons and missiles able to carry them half way across the earth in a matter of minutes has put a different face on the last two of these concepts: the Soviet force in being has taken on overriding significance as a constant threat to our national survival; and the mobilization of war potential, on the other hand, is now largely bereft of meaning in the context of the general war. The enemy's military research and development programs and his plans for making new ' Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, p. 212. ' Ibid., p. 3. Ibid., p. 44. ApprovecISIEGIRkilease 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-A MORI/HRP PAGES 1-9 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 SECRET Great Frusina Revisited weapons operational have replaced his mobilization potential as a factor in his strategic stature. The effect of these changes on the nature of strategic in- telligence activity is to elevate the strategic importance of getting what used to be considered military departmental in- formation?order of battle?on the force in being, and to re- duce radically the time factor in all our intelligence-policy equations, both for force in being and for weapons under de- velopment. In "the long-range intelligence of. . . grand strat- egy" 4 the time range has been greatly compressed, both for those who decide the policy and to an equal or even greater degree for the collectors and producers of the intelligence. The U.S. decision makers are currently faced with the prospect of nuclear missile forces which can effect virtually immediate de- livery of an almost annihilative blow and for which there is as yet no active defense. Mr. Kent could state a decade ago that "as a general propo- sition every country knows a great deal about all other coun- tries' forces in being and a great deal about most of their weap- ons." 5 As every intelligence officer concerned with the prob- lem today knows, the verity of this generalization with re- spect to Soviet guided missile systems leaves much to be de- sired. The critical thing is that the decline in the quality and quantity of our information on the enemy's weapon sys- tems, in being and under development, is occurring at just this time, when U.S. policy makers require a more immediate and greater fund of information than ever before. This was the point of President Eisenhower's statement of 25 May 1960, following the loss of the U-2 and the collapse at the Summit: Our safety . . . [demands] effective systems for gathering infor- mation about the military capability of other powerful nations, especially those that make a fetish of secrecy. This involves many techniques and methods. In these times of vast military machines and nuclear-tipped missiles, the ferreting out of this information is indispensable to free world security.? Another time compression in the new strategic intelligence, besides the prospective suddenness of attack and potential " Ibid., p. 212. " Ibid., p. 47. New York Times, May 26, 1960, p. 16. 32kpproved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921fianT0270001-5 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 Great Frusina Revisited SECRET brevity of war, is the continuing acceleration of change in military technology. To the policy maker this brings a two- fold problem?higher rates of obsolescence and increased costs for weapon systems. The U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Na- tional Policy Machinery has pointed out: The statesman of a century ago was given more than a genera- tion to adjust national policies to the change from coal to oil in the world's navies. But today such adjustment must occur, in his- torical terms, overnight. An example: National security planners had scarcely begun to adapt policy to the fact of fission weapons in the world's arsenals, when the vastly more destructive fusion weapon entered upon the scene. . . . While the pace of technologi- cal change has quickened, the cost of failure to make appropriate policy adaptations has risen?exponentially.7 These "appropriate policy adaptations" are dependent upon information which only the intelligence community can pro- vide. An intelligence problem of such magnitude and com- plexity cannot be solved with the order-of-battle apparatus of a decade ago. A third point at which time is a factor is in the process of translating a weapons system idea into the reality of a field capability. Here management control techniques and planning have succeeded, despite greatly increased complexity and an esoteric technology, in compressing the development- production-operation cycle in varying degrees, according to the state of the art and the urgency of the requirements. The USSR, as well as the United States, has employed such or- ganizational techniques in its missile programs and thus fur- ther shortened our lead time in the strategic intelligence problem. Although we have been thinking here primarily about im- mediate prospects in the ICBM field, it must be recognized that our new strategic intelligence problems are neither unique thereto nor likely to diminish. The ever accelerating rate of technological change has already thrust similar prob- lems before us in such areas as anti-submarine warfare, anti- missile weapons, and space systems for war and peace. 7 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Sub- committee on National Policy Machinery, Report No. 1026, 86th Con- gress, 2d Session, "Organizing for National Security," (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1960) , p. 13. ApprovectsIEErtRk6lease 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-3 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 SECRET Great Frusina Revisited Organizational Patching A recognition of the fundamental change in the character, increase in the importance, and decrease in the availability of the positive intelligence necessary for the strategic equa- tion leads us to revisit the analysis of intelligence as organiza- tion. In doing so we may profit by using Mr. Kent's criteria to ask ourselves some pertinent questions. Have we been "will- ing to undertake heartbreaking reorganization when the bal- ance sheet so indicates"? Have we permitted units or organi- zational forms to achieve "a vested interest" in what is no longer pertinent to our priority problems? Have we achieved the "fluidity of structure" and "the ability to shift power . . . as unforeseen [or even foreseen] peak loads develop"? s The organizational history of intelligence research compo- nents under the impact of the Soviet missile problem does re- veal an effort to adjust to the new situation. In CIA, for ex- ample, the question of Soviet technical developments in the missiles field was attacked ten years ago by organizing a Guided Missile Branch within one of the divisions of the Office of Scientific Intelligence, and before the decade was half over that branch had itself become a division. Outside the field of technical development, in order to meet the more pressing need for knowledge of the Soviet missile force in being or in immediate prospect, there was meanwhile organized a small Guided Missile Staff in one of the economic research divisions of the Office of Research and Reports to study Soviet production of the weapons for issue to the armed forces, and by the end of the decade this staff had become one of the largest branches in that Office. It managed to harness enough experience to supply some of the information of broad scope required for national estimates on the Soviet missile program. And most recently there has been an effort to pool both scientific and economic intelligence resources in a Task Force devoted to the Soviet LRBM program, particularly the ICBM threat. Helpful as these adjustments are, I submit that they rep- resent half-way measures, an ad hoc response of vested inter- ests rather than the heartbreaking reorganization for a uni- fied weapons system approach to the whole strategic problem that would demonstrate fluidity of structure. Even the "Task " Kent, op. cit., pp. 76-77. 44pproved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921/MA1O0270001-5 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 Great Frusina Revisited SECRET Force," really only a coordinating mechanism, is not a device that can weave together the scientific and technical research done by one component and the study of weapons system programming, costing, production, and operational deploy- ment done by another. The continued division of line control and supervision still prevents any integrated approach to the research problem. To conceive the kind of organizational measures that could, and in my view should, be taken, we might draw by analogy , from outside of intelligence, from the typical development pro- ; gram for the missile system itself. This, like the missile in- ( telligence problem, has all, the attributes of complexity, spe- cialized knowledge, high priority, and unmatched urgency. Here specialists organized according to their component of the problem work on assigned tasks with no certainty whether and how soon they will be accomplished. Nevertheless the requirements for each task are so organized and the specifica- tions for each component product so calculated that all will be compatible in the final assembly, the finished system. It is therefore necessary, as the program proceeds, continuously to modify the design of the overall system as the original re- quirements for individual components cannot be met or on the other hand are modified by favorable findings that had not been foreseen. To carry out such a program requires cen- tralized planning and line control of contributing components working as an integrated team,, so supervised as to assure that all elements being developed at any given time will be compatible in the system as then conceived. The missile intelligence problem, indeed the entire Soviet strategic intelligence problem, requires a similar set of organi- zational controls. The endless adjustment of its interwoven elements can be achieved only by Central definition of the objectives of individual intelligence components engaged in research, support, and collection and a constant evaluation of their progress toward these objectives. The integration of the complex and specialized tasks involved cannot be relegated to a committee, a special assistant, or a "gadfly" with any hope of carrying out an effective program. It can be accom- plished only by a working organization composed of special- ists from the several components and a management center with the power of direct control. ApprovedWrilkilease 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-i Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 SECRET Great Frusina Revisited The House Divided We have seen that the nature of strategic intelligence knowledge has changed considerably, particularly in its time component, and that the compression of time has been ac- companied by an increase in substantive complexity and spe- cialization which our research organizations have failed to counter with a planned and integrated program. We have also noted a decline in the quality and quantity of informa- tion on the enemy's strategic capabilities in the weapons field, a decline for which there has been a tendency for those en- gaged in intelligence research to blame those engaged in col- lection activities, and vice versa. The fault lies rather in an imperfect understanding of the nature of the problem. At the heart of this problem, as far as the CIA effort is con- cerned, lies the fact that the Agency is a house divided be- tween intelligence collection and intelligence research. Mr. Kent noted a decade ago that the segregation of covert col- lection activities was dictated by the need for secrecy, and he pointed out that "unless this clandestine force watches sharply it can become its own worst enemy. For if it allows the mech- anisms of security to cut it off from some of the most signifi- cant lines of guidance, it destroys its own reason for exist- ence." In today's highest-priority intelligence problems, I suggest, the segregation of intelligence collection from re- search is a luxury we can no longer afford. The difficulties of integration are undoubtedly manifold and great, but they cannot be more cogent than those of continu- ing to stumble along our separate ways. First among these is that of compensating for the time compression we have noted, of meeting the urgency of the key problems. Segregation re- quires the interposition of a duplicative liaison structure, with an inevitable loss of precious time and in many instances an attenuation of the specialized substantive data required for the intelligence product. Second, collection resources cannot be brought into full play on the esoteric, complex, and chang- ing requirements for data without interaction between the progress of the research effort and the peculiarities of collec- tion tradecraft. Finally, the insulation of research specialist from collection specialist prevents the comparative analysis of Ibid., p. 167. ?Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A808800270001-5 Approvedfor ReJease 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A00030027001- Ureat i-rusma Revisited btLRE I collection resources essential to an integrated, centralized, problem-oriented effort and to coordinated planning research for such an effort. In a word, the segregation of the collection activity can but prevent a truly integrated approach to the priority stra- tegic intelligence problem. Its need for secrecy must be weighed against the urgency of this problem. In the inte- grated research and collection effort with the best-known ac- complishments of the recent past, the U-2 program, the risk to our national security was considerably greater than in any ordinary covert collection operation one might conceive. Yet secrecy was forced to yield to need, and relatively large num- bers of both research and collection personnel worked to- gether on the centrally directed task. Agency and Community The change in the character of strategic intelligence has had a marked effect on departmental intelligence organiza- tions, activities, and policies, and these would be fruitful sub- jects for separate discussion in detail. After more than a decade of central intelligence, however, CIA is legally and by established precedent the only organization whose primary business is intelligence coordination and integration. It is therefore the proper one to take the lead in solving the stra- tegic intelligence problems of today, which, however analo- gous to the order of battle of a bygone era, transcend in their implications and complexity the responsibilities of any single departmental intelligence organization. If the Director of Central Intelligence is to advise the National Security Coun- cil on these topmost questions of national security, he must have an organization capable of providing him with the re- sults of integrated collection and research. The matter has become too large and complex for post facto integration through the intuitive applications of staff officers and the ad hoc considerations of joint committees. As the Director of Naval Intelligence wrote recently, "This is a critical level of intelligence production . . . where intelligence usually trig- gers the broad changes in defense policy that can set off a whole series of national programs." 10 " Laurence H. Frost, "Intelligence as a Support to and a Responsi- bility of Command," ONI Review, Vol. 15, No. 9 (September 1960) p. 388. SECRET 7 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 Ap_proved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 SECRET Great Frusina Revisited In our quite proper concern in recent years with the threat of Soviet economic and political offensives, we should not lose sight of the ultimate fulcrum of strategic power, as pointed out by a recent study prepared for the Foreign Relations Com- mittee of the United States Senate; As long as the cold war continues, American foreign policy must be based on a defense policy designed to ward off Soviet threats against the free countries of the world. While military defense needs to be supplemented by economic, psychological, and other policies, the provision of adequate appropriate military strength is the precondition of free world security." The provision of adequate military strength is in large part dependent upon adequate intelligence about Soviet weapons systems, present and prospective; and the provision of this intelligence, we have suggested, requires a problem-oriented program bringing together existing research and collection resources into a centrally controlled unit. There is still one further requirement. This unified organi- zation must contain, as an integral part, a working-level group concerned with problem analysis and planning. This type of unit, analogous to the R & D and "Advanced Projects" units in the creation of weapon systems, has been conspicuous in the intelligence community by its absence. There has been a tendency to put the planning function on the policy manage- ment level, in isolation from the detailed substantive realities. The planning group here contemplated is one of experts, con- versant in detail with the problems of today and of tomorrow. It must be not only substantively qualified but at the same time cognizant of the comparative capabilities of the resources it can call upon to accomplish its objectives. Its work must be at a tempo corresponding to the urgency of the problems it has to deal with, and its solutions must be given force by rep- resentation in policy management. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 86th Con- gress, 1st Session, United States Foreign Policy, "Developments in Mili- tary Technology and Their Impact on United States Strategy and For- eign Policy," A Study Prepared at the Request of the Committee on Foreign Relations by The Washington Center of Foreign Policy Re- search, The Johns Hopkins University, No. 8 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1959) , p. 1. Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921kkROIT CO270001-5 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A0003002Rn5 Great Frustna Revisited Such an integration of intelligence planning, production, and collection should provide for the definition of objectives, a rapid response to requirements, the constant evaluation of progress, and adequate control over a dynamic process. It should make possible a more economical and thorough exploi- tation of our finite resources. It would not, of course, guar- antee success; but with current organizational forms clearly an impediment to success, a refusal to reorganize would aug- ment the possibility of failure, along with the prospect of higher expenditures and greater risks. It is time for us to give new meaning to the production of "high-level foreign positive intelligence" and bring all our resources to bear on the first-priority national intelligence ob- jective through positive action. Soviet security is only half our enemy; the other half is the flight of time, our most pre- cious commodity. Whether we shall waste it or use it wisely seems in large part to depend upon our ability to recognize the deficiencies in our current efforts and overcome our pa- rochialisms. Upon our success or failure could ultimately hinge the survival of the nation. SECRET 9 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 SECRET Exemplary but unusual history of the detection and reconstruc- tion of a Soviet missile-guid- ance system. THE YO-Y0 STORY: An Electronics Analysis Case History Charles R. Ahern Electronic components are a critical part of modern weap- ons systems, less dispensable than some of their more obviously important features. It is possible to conceive of an air de- fense system without interceptor aircraft, for example, but it is not possible to conceive of one without electronic devices, systems, and techniques. Intelligence on the electronic por- tions of Soviet weapons systems has therefore become a key item in our knowledge of these systems. Here is a case history of community teamwork in gaining such intelligence on an un- precedented type of radar control for surface-to-air missiles in the Soviet air defense system. The story features a con- certed effort to obtain observations, an imaginative analysis, a lucky break, and an excellent follow-through by research and development. Herringbones and Ventilators In the early 1950's U.S. and British intelligence posted a lookout for signs of the Soviet deployment of surface-to-air missiles in readiness for defense against air attack. Toward the end of 1953 some unusual road networks were seen out- side of Moscow, which, although they did not have the an- ticipated configuration of missile sites, were at least located at points where missile installations might be expected. As the pattern of these locations began to develop a more intense search for them was made. By the autumn of 1954 quite a number of reports consistently described the networks as com- prising three more or less parallel roads a mile long inter- sected by some ten cross roads about a half mile in length in a herringbone pattern. There was nothing in the reports that would particularly excite the curiosity of the specialist in elec- tronics intelligence. SECRET 11 Approved For Kelease 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001:,5_ muil/HRP PAGES 10-2 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 SECRET The Yo-Yo Story Pt/tr. Figure 1. Herringbone Road Complex During the last quarter of that year U.S. and UK attaches began to report details of other features around the herring- bone complexes in the Moscow area. In September a British observer, without making specific reference to it in the body of his report, indicated in a sketch that there was a "barracks area" some distance away, more or less in line with the axis of the herringbone and connected with it by a road. After a couple of weeks this report was amplified and a different pos- sible barracks area located. The original "barracks," accord- ing to the revised description, seemed to be a long grass-cov- ered bunker with a concrete hand-stand at one end. The observer noted that large ventilators at this end of the bunker flapped with what seemed extraordinary violence, even when the fairly high wind blowing at the time was taken into con- sideration. A week later, when two U.S. attaches were a half hour out from Moscow on a plane bound for Leningrad, one of them noticed an unusual installation on the ground. It had a look of newness and activity about it. He didn't get a very clear impression of any buildings on the site; his eye was caught by the motion of two large wheels installed in a pit with a ramp leading down to them. Each wheel, he reported, was like a thin yo-yo, with twin flat disks spinning at an angle to the horizontal. He estimated their speed at about 60 rpm and said they appeared to wobble on their axes. He had difficulty describing the nature of this wobble; it appeared to be a kind of "even undulation throwing the outside edges [of the disks] a foot or two from their planes of rotation." His sketch is shown in Figure 2. 4proved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921AaMT3270001-5 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 The Yo-Yo Story SECRET Figure 2. Observer's Sketch of Yo-Yo S.ECRET 13 Approvea ror Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 SECRET The Yo-Yo Story This report proved to be a remarkably accurate description of the device thereupon nicknamed the Yo-Yo,1 considering that the observer had only five or ten seconds to take in the details of something never before seen or heard of. His com- panion on the flight, seated on the other side of the plane, had in the course of the trip spotted one of the herringbone sites, and when he returned to Moscow a few days later he reported it in response to the standing order for observations on these. When the two men checked their observation times they realized that the Yo-Yo and the herringbone had been seen simultaneously, and that there might be a connection between them. They astutely guessed that the Yo-Yo might represent some kind of missile guidance system, and this com- ment in the report brought it to the attention of electronics intelligence analysts. A month later, about the beginning of December, British observers riding on a train southeast of Moscow noticed a fenced area with a microwave antenna on a pole at one end. In the center of the enclosure there was an earth bunker with one open end facing the pole. There they saw a "double ro- tating disk array," each disk, they judged, about ten feet in diameter and making about 120 revolutions per minute. The plane of the disks was inclined at about 45 degrees from the horizontal. The observers had the impression that the disks either had serrated edges or were polygonal structures given a disk-like appearance by the rotation. In February 1955 this same site was observed and photo- graphed by U.S. personnel. Their photography was not of a scale or quality to convey any clear idea of the shape of the Yo-Yo, but their observations, erroneous in part, did correct and refine some of the earlier information. They reported that the two disks were each about 20 feet in diameter and about 12 inches thick. They thought them both vertical, at right angles to each other. They were not sure whether they were double, and if so whether the two halves rotated in the same or opposite directions. They estimated the rotation to 'Soviet Bloc electronics items are assigned nicknames, as opposed to code names or cover names, to provide a common nomenclature in the collection and production of intelligence. These nicknames are selected and agreed upon on a tripartite basis among electronics intelligence representatives of the United States, the UK, and Canada. 4proved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921M6KW0270001-5 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 The Yo-Yo Story SECRET 11 Figure 3. Sketch of Disks Seen One on Edge and One Full-face. be about 40 rpm and stated that there was no wobble, an opti- cal illusion of one being given by the viewing angle and the serrated edges. Figure 3 is a sketch supplied with this report. At this stage it was by no means clear that the herringbone complexes had anything to do with missiles. No missile had been seen on the sites, and the road arrangement would have been equally suitable to housing development or crop or am- munition storage. Even if they were surface-to-air missile sites, it was not firmly established that the Yo-Yo was uniquely related to them. Further, there was nothing about the Yo-Yo to indicate that it was an electronic device; the reports on it did not even convey any clear idea of what it looked like. One offhand opinion received from British experts was that it might be a rock crusher. Nevertheless, under the good-humored assumption that "if no one can figure out what it is, it must be electronics," the Yo-Yo reports were laid before the joint gatherings of com- munity electronics specialists at that time sponsored by the old Military Electronics Working Group. Beginning in Janu- ary 1955, the Yo-Yo was brought up at each meeting of the MEWG for many months. For the present, however, there was little that the electronics analyst could do but speculate as to what the observers had really seen and request more detailed information, especially photographs. By the summer of 1955 it had become more or less clear that the Yo-Yo did bear a specific relationship to the herring- bone complexes. The herringbones were arranged so that their length was always along a radial line from Moscow. The Yo-Yo bunker was situated on this same line, centered on the herringbone, and always about a mile nearer to Moscow. The SECRET_ Approved For Kelease 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001155 Approved For Release 2005/04/13: CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 SECRET The Yo-Yo Story Yo-Yo itself was invariably at the herringbone end of the bunker. But the true shape and appearance of the Yo-Yo re- mained uncertain. Early in August 1955 a packet of photographs was brought to CIA electronics analysts. Picturing a Yo-Yo southeast of Moscow, they had been taken, happily, from several different angles. These photographs revealed, at last, what the Yo-Yo really looked like. The observers had for the past year been more or less correctly and accurately describing what they had seen, but the descriptions were incomplete. The "disks" were truncated equilateral triangles assembled in pairs in the Star of David configuration. There were two such assemblies, one in the vertical Moscow-herringbone plane and the other (of which an edge is visible in the accompanying reproduc- tion) at right angles tilting up 45 degrees from the horizontal toward the herringbone. The early "violent flapping of the ventilators" and wobbling wheels were now comprehensible optical interpretations of the two assemblies in rotation. Analysis and Synthesis The analyst, as is usually the case in electronics intelli- gence, thus found himself confronted with a fully developed Soviet device deployed in the field. In these circumstances his task is one of unravelling what the Soviet designer was Figure 4. Photograph of Bunker with Yo-Yos at Right End Awroved For Release 2005/04/13: CIA-RDP78-03921A0VetkT270001-5 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 The Yo-Yo Story SECRET attempting to achieve, the reverse of the original design proc- ess. Whereas the Soviet designer is given a set of performance specifications and proceeds by selecting available techniques, components, and production processes and by making the in- evitable technical compromises to reach his final design, the analyst must work backward from the finished design to ar- rive at the designer's objective. In this process he must also take care that his thinking is not controlled by concepts of how an item would be designed in the United States: the So- viet concept of equipment use is usually quite different from ours, at least in electronics. In the absence of any similar, previously known piece of equipment from which to extrapolate, the analysis of the Yo-Yo problem had to begin with a basic assumption as to the general purpose of the device?that it was designed to control surface-to-air missiles launched from the herringbone area (though no missiles had yet been seen) . Granted this assumption, the problem became that of figuring out how mis- siles could be guided by an apparatus with such an appear- ance as that shown in the photos and the placement and be- havior described in the observer reports. The analytic point of departure was the consideration that, however the Yo-Yo worked to guide the assumed missiles, it would have to provide information with sufficient accuracy on both the missile's tar- get and the missile itself in three coordinates?range, eleva- tion, and azimuth. In virtually all surface-to-air missile guidance systems this tracking of the missile and its target is done by a system of radar antennas, say of parabolic form, that point toward mis- sile and target and focus beams of radio energy on them, much as a searchlight does with its visible beam. Before the Yo-Yo photos were received the possibility could not be ruled out that it too was such a large parabolic reflector imperfectly observed and poorly described; but the form shown in the photos was clearly no conventional variety of antenna sys- tem. All the available descriptive information indicated that the Yo-Yo disks retained their relative position while rotat- ing. This meant that only the edges of the disks could point upward and away from Moscow, the direction in which radar antennas should be looking for enemy aircraft and should guide missiles to attack them. The straight sections of these SECRET Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A00030027000117-5 Approved For Release 2005/04/13: CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 SECRET The Yo-Yo Story edges seemed the most likely portion for antenna apertures. This reasoning provided the germ of a solution. The straight sections were about 20 feet long and perhaps 8 inches wide. An aperture of these proportions could be ex- pected to produce a transverse fan beam about 30 times as broad in the plane of its short dimension as in that of its length.2 Given the orientation, arrangement, and rotation pattern of the disks, it appeared that on each rotation of each two-disk assembly six of these narrow beams, one from each straight edge, would scan a volume of space extending above and beyond the herringbone complexes. The size and num- ber of the apertures had apparently been one of the require- ments on the mechanical designer: since six would have made a huge, unwieldy single disk, he had divided them between two Star-of-David triangles. The six beams from the tilted Yo-Yo would thus scan the air approaches to Moscow in azimuth and those from the ver- tical assembly would scan it in elevation. Both sets could provide range data on any target or missile in the volume of space scanned. With the whole volume covered, the antennas would not need, like a searchlight or parabolic radar, to stop scanning in order to follow a target or the defense missile, but would provide position data on these in the course of continued scanning. In such a system, therefore called "track-while- scan," memory devices would be needed to develop the track by maintaining continuity of information during the inter- vals between the individual antenna scans. Such devices were considered possible. A series of calculations, based on guided missile performance requirements as well as radar needs, were then undertaken. Guided missile analysts furnished estimates of the probable range of Soviet surface-to-air missiles and the size of their warheads. The former provided limits for certain technical characteristics affecting the range requirement of the radar; the latter helped define its accuracy requirements. In all, two dozen or more technical factors entered the calculations. These had to be weighed against one another in reaching the compromises that are always forced upon the system designer: The dimensions of the beam are inversely proportional to those of the aperture that produces it. Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A666?66270001-5 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 The Yo-Yo Story SECRET for example, if the operating frequency were too low, accuracy would be poor and transmitter power requirements excessive; if it were too high, the rapid scanning rate of the antennas and the narrowness of the beams would make too few pulses hit the target. As the design for a missile guidance system evolved from this process, a check was made with analysts in the field of vacuum tubes and other electronic components to insure that it did not call for techniques or components beyond Soviet capabilities. Finally a design was established that took into consideration the missile, the operating principle of its guid- ance, the technical characteristics of the radar, the accuracy of the system, and its anticipated capabilities. One task remained?to re-examine the entire solution against any possible alternatives in the light of all reports and photographs, inquiring whether everything reported could be accounted for in the solution and whether anything required by the soluticn and not reported would seriously weaken it. Each alternative solution that came to mind failed to account for some aspect of the reported data or required a capability on the part of Soviet technology that appeared unreasonable. One suggestion, for example, was that the Yo-Yo antennas would simply radiate energy to illuminate the target for a homing system in the missile. Such a system might work, but because of the discontinuous nature of the radar signal it would require the inclusion of memory devices in the horn- ing gear of each missile. This elaborate provision seemed un- likely. Furthermore, the homing illumination theory was inconsistent with the configuration of the Yo-Yos: a single pair of disks should give adequate illumination, so the two at right angles to each other would be an unnecessary compli- cation. Testing the tentative answer to a problem is a fairly stand- ard procedure, but testing this answer was a particularly de- manding task because of its startling implications. If it was right, the Soviets had not continued in the direction taken by the original German wartime development of surf ace-to- air missile guidance nor in that of postwar Western efforts, which were based on extensions of the German work. Instead, making a clean break with precedent, they had arrived at a design that was inherently capable of dealing with multiple SECRET 19 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 SECRET The Yo-Yo Story targets simultaneously. The data on the target or targets were apparently translated automatically into missile com- mand guidance; there were no indications of a homing system on the missile. This analysis, which required some three weeks from the time the photos were received, was made the basis for a Pro- visional Scientific Intelligence Report incorporating its conclu- sions and presenting a list of probable technical parameters.3 The publication of the report would ordinarily have been the end of the matter; but the Yo-Yo story is unique. For one thing, the report found, with its unprecedented conclusions, a by no means unanimous initial acceptance among the ele- ments of the intelligence community concerned with elec- tronics and guided missiles. For another, it was brought in December 1955, through a series of steps initiated by Army intelligence, before the Technical Advisory Committee on Elec- tronics of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Development, and the Committee recommended that a project be initiated to build a prototype or mock-up of the Yo-Yo as therein conceived. The mock-up technique, used during World War II, had led to an assessment of the capabili- ties of the German radars and was invaluable in developing electronic countermeasures to foil them, but its use had not been common in the decade following the war. In March 1956, at about the same time it became fairly well established that missiles were actually emplaced on the herringbone complexes, the mock-up contract was let through Army Ordnance and work on it begun. Exploitation of a Break Meanwhile the Dragon Returnee Program had been work- ing on repatriated German scientists and technicians who had been taken to the U.S.S.R. after the war. Many of these gave information of some value to electronics and guided missile intelligence, but it appeared that the Soviets had carefully kept the German electronics specialists insulated from de- velopmental work in military electronics, especially in the heavy radar field, where the results of Soviet efforts were be- coming increasingly evident from other sources. After sev- 'Provisional Scientific Intelligence Report, CIA/SI 51.-55, 6 Oct. 1955, "YO-YO, A Possible Soviet Missile Guidance System." 2Rpproved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921Mg60270001-5 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 The Yo-Yo Story SECRET eral years of experience with returnees, the chances of find- ing one who knew about the development of specific high pri- ority electronics items were privately judged at about one in ten thousand. In the fall of 1956, however, a year after the publication of the Yo-Yo analysis, one of the Dragon returnees, Christian Sorge, who it was thought might have information on a dif- ferent missile system, called attention during his routine pre- liminary debriefing to a new development on which he had worked from 1950 to 1952, a system for guiding surface-to-air missiles called the B-200. He said that it used a very strange- looking antenna system, which he then sketched on a sheet of paper for the interrogator. The interrogator, looking at Figure 5. Sorge's Sketch of B-200 Antenna the superimposed equilateral triangles Sorge had drawn, re- called the published Yo-Yo analysis and realized with consid- erable excitement that Sorge had knowledge more important than had been supposed. As the preliminary debriefing con- tinued, the identity of the B-200 with the analytic concep- tion of the Yo-Yo was established at some dozen points. The intelligence community now organized a team of spe- cialists to assist in Sorge's debriefing. Their efforts brought out more and more technical details, especially of the memory portion of the system, the complex electronic tracking cir- cuitry made necessary by the adoption of a guidance system dependent on the discontinuous data of scanning antennas. It was this critical part of the B-200 system, fortunately, that Sorge had worked on. By the time his debriefing had SECRET 21 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 SECRET The Yo-Yo Story been completed he had provided many new insights, as well as having confirmed some 25 or 30 facts hypothesized in the analytic reconstruction. One curious reaction to the initial correlation between the analytic report of October 1955 and Sorge's information had been the suspicion that the report might have fallen into KGB hands, who through Sorge were now feeding it back to the interrogator. This fear was quickly dispelled by the amount of detail and consistency in Sorge's data. Sorge said that he and several others, having signed con- tracts with the Soviet authorities for additional work in 1950 and 1951, had been assigned tasks on the B-200 system, which had apparently been conceived by 1949. In addition to the details of circuit designs, he described some of the testing programs for the prototype that began in 1952, and his in- formation was supplemented by that from some of the others who had returned. But in 1952 they had all been removed from B-200 development and placed in non-sensitive activities for a cooling-off period of three or four years prior to repatriation. Follow-Through by R&D The group of specialists assisting in the debriefing of Sorge included personnel from the Diamond Ordnance Fuze Labora- tory, the contractor for the Yo-Yo mock-up project. As de- tails of the tracking system and other portions of the B-200 were brought out by interrogation, they were promptly in- cluded in the development work, effecting important changes in its direction. As a major example, although the analytic report had hypothesized a separate computer for each mis- sile-target engagement, the DOFL people had decided that the Soviets would use a single large digital computer. Sorge's statement that separate analog computers were in fact called for in the design now brought about a timely reorientation in the mock-up project. It was fortunate that the project was already contracted for and under way when Sorge appeared: at least a year and perhaps more was saved by having a re- search team assembled and working on the problem before being overwhelmed by such a volume of detailed information. As it was, the development project, begun in April 1956, did not yield a prototype installation that could be tested until early in 1958. The results of the test program showed the 22 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921W)50270001-5 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 The Yo-Yo Story SECRET Soviet B-200 to constitute a major technological advance in radar tracking systems. An additional surprise was that it performed much better than expected when tested against electronic countermeasures, jamming; but the technique of dropping chaff was effective against it if properly employed. The B-200 was found to have an angle accuracy as great as 0.05? on strong targets and a range accuracy of 25 yards; this meant that missiles in the range of 20 to 25 miles would not need a homing radar of their own. Its low-altitude capa- bility was much better than the Germans had estimated, being limited only by the terrain around the installation. The ability of the system to cope with multiple targets was confirmed; the ability of one installation to direct as many as 20 or 25 simultaneous target-missile interceptions, as claimed by the Germans, seems to depend only on whether the Soviets choose to provide the necessary computer for each interception. Thus the Yo-Yo story, which began with the reports of a few alert observers who noticed some unusual installations in 1953 and 1954, ends with the tests of the mock-up system in the autumn of 1958. It raises some interesting questions, for example how quickly the Sorge information would have been believed if the Yo-Yo sites not been seen, reported, and analyzed. Even with the analytic report in hand, some of the specialists involved in the debriefing doubted much of what Sorge said in the early stages. The approach of the analytic report itself, the setting out to design a Soviet elec- tronic system on the basis of its physical appearance, was unique; it succeeded largely because the design was so differ- ent from anything theretofore developed. The concern of electronics analysts about the new Soviet guidance system has remained undiminished, because our in- formation on its internal workings ends with the 1950-1953 period, and what the Soviets may have done in the interven- ing years to improve its performance is a continuing problem. Several studies have considered what improvements could be made in the B-200, but no intelligence information has come to light on any that have been made. And now the recent appearance of a second-generation missile guidance system, Fruit Set, which might be loosely described as a mobile Yo-Yo, is tending to push the original B-200 into the background. 23 ApprovecIsPPFielease 2005/04/13: CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 SECRET Case study of how the Sino- Soviet Bloc intelligence services provide black support for overt psychological warfare themes. PSY WAR BY FORGERY Alma Fryxell There is nothing new about the use of forged documents in the psychological warfare operations of the Sino-Soviet Bloc intelligence services, especially in pursuit of particular aims within a single country; West Germany, for example, has been flooded with them for years. But the years 1957 and 1958 saw a noticeable increase in internationally distributed propaganda-by-forgery supporting the general Bloc objectives of discrediting the United States and other Western countries and of promoting division in the West. For these two years and the first half of 1959, 18 such forgeries surfaced in fac- simile have been discovered, and a number of other instances wherein the text of a purported document was quoted without attempt at reproduction or a document was at least falsely reported to exist makes a total of 32 cases available for study from this period. Some of these were sniper shots at individual important targets, without relation to any of the others and usually without any further follow-up; but most of them-25?were interconnected into nine distinguishable series, and some formed rather elaborate progressions in prolonged campaigns given heavy play in the overt propaganda media. The false documents were many of them originally surfaced in the overt Bloc media, but a greater number were planted, especially in the underdeveloped countries, in small "independent" newspa- pers subsidized for such purposes or otherwise controlled. Sev- eral were transmitted to their targets through diplomatic channels and a few by covert mailing. The orchestration of these varied media in a coordinated campaign requires central direction. We know that black propaganda is a function of the Bloc foreign intelligence serv- ices under close direction from high Party echelons. It is SECRET Approved ror Kelease 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A00030027$204 u /HRP PAGES 25-51 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 SECRET Psywar By Forgery possible that the entire Bloc show is directed by a unit of the CPSU Central Committee and run by the KGB through its liaison officers with the other services. Single Documents An example of the isolated false document is provided by the most recent of the cases in this period, the only one con- cerned with Black Africa. On 4 March 1959 the Hungarian press agency MTI transmitted in French to its outlets in Eu- rope the purported text of a document signed by the prime minister of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Sir Roy Welensky, and by the "head of the European organization of Central Africa, Alfred Finsent," 1 which declared that it had been officially de- cided to transfer African nationalist prisoners "to another concentration camp where all those who would not express their resolution to break with African nationalism would be exterminated." MTI explained that this meant the Hola camp in Kenya, and reported further: The African prisoners involved number about 80,000. If, after interrogation, they refuse to disown the Nationalist movement they will be thrown into ditches called "poison wells" filled with poisoned water. Within a few days the poisoned water will pene- trate the body and kill. . . . The Cairo bureau of the Kenya African Association states that according to their knowledge, 35 Africans have already been exterminated "experimentally" by this pro- cedure . . MTI's sensational disclosure of this perhaps too heinous plan was not picked up and used, as far as we know, in other media during 1959. A more ambitious single-shot effort was made in June 1958 by the Czech intelligence service. It forged, with accurate duplication of format and style, an entire issue of Ceske Slovo, a bona fide newspaper published in Munich by Czech ?gr? and mailed it black from Munich and Vienna to current and former subscribers, using one genuine mailing list it had ac- quired some years earlier by unknown means and another recently obtained by burglarizing the Ceske Slovo offices. The 'Apparently a bad transliteration from Cyrillic through Arabic, along with a garbled title. Alfred Vincent was chairman of the Organization of European Members of the East African Central Legislative Assembly. Neither Cyrillic nor Arabic has a c, and Arabic has no v. *proved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921k6ff30270001-5 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 Psywar By Forgery SECRET forged edition carried anti-West propaganda and announced that the newspaper was going out of existence because its edi- tors were disillusioned with the West. In an exceptional fol- low-up, articles from it were quoted as authentic not only by the official Rude Pravo but by Party papers in Austria and Luxembourg and a non-Party Chicago monthly, Svobodne Ceskoslovensko, that follows the propaganda line of the Czech regime. The Western CP organs are generally not used in the distribution of Bloc forgeries. A particularly dangerous kind of forged document was put into the mail on 5 July 1957 by the Hauptverwaltung Auf- klaerung, the East German equivalent of the KGB, which in January of that year had been assigned psychological warfare as a major operational responsibility. In France that sum- mer one of the biggest news stories was the killing of the Strasbourg police chief's wife on 17 May by a bomb mailed her husband in the guise of a gift package. There had been mailed at the same time and in the same Paris post office a batch of particularly vicious hate-letters to French officials and private citizens in Paris and Alsace-Lorraine, and the conviction was growing that these and the terrorist bomb stemmed from the same source. The letters, demanding the return of Alsace-Lorraine to Germany, were one of several series of Nazistic letters and leaflets signed "Kampfverband fuer em n Unabhaengiges Deutschland," an organization since determined to have been invented by the HVA for agitatory purposes (and given a fraternal plug in a May 1958 broadcast from Radio Moscow warning the French against it and imply- ing that it was secretly supported by the West German gov- ernment). The single document mailed on 5 July 1957 was a deep and dexterous thrust evolved from the fictitious Kampfverband's campaign. Addressed to a high French official in West Ger- many, it was a forged letter from Elim O'Shaughnessy, head of the Political Division of our Bonn embassy, calling the State Department's attention to the activity of German reactionary and ultranationalist groups and recommending that the U.S. Government support these groups and use them. Having been delivered thus simply to its target, the French government, the forgery was never published or replayed in any way. It was convincing enough to have caused genuine damage in U.S.- SECRET 27 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 SECRET Psywar By Forgery French relationships?except that it had been typed on the same machine as some other HVA psywar productions. The remaining four individual cases were mere allegations of the existence of incriminating documents, made once and not repeated. One concerned the Near East: on 1 December 1958 the Czech press agency CTK attributed to "the Cairo press" a report that the new Sudanese government had found among the old government's papers some secret documents showing U.S. bribery of high Sudanese officials. The other three were targeted in the Far East and appeared in the Bom- bay Blitz, a Soviet-controlled "independent" weekly?a State Department directive to Ambassador Bishop in Thailand that he "screen the loyalties of the King and his government mem- bers"; a secret pact between Premier Kishi and Secretary Dulles "to permit use of Japanese troops anywhere in Asia"; and a letter from Chiang Kai-shek to President Eisenhower warning that "every third soldier" in the Nationalist army was disloyal. The Taipei Cables and Indonesia Blitz was also the vehicle for an extended if not very so- phisticated series of facsimile forgeries devised to take advan- tage of the 24 May 1957 riot at the American embassy in Tai- pei. On 14 September it prepared its readers for the forgeries by reporting rumors that Ambassador Rankin was in trouble and might be dismissed because some of the embassy's impor- tant secret documents had been lost when the premises were raided by the rioters. In its issue of the following week it re- produced the first of these documents, two cables to Wash- ington wherein Ambassador Rankin discusses with some obliquity the methods to be used in assassinating Chiang and others in his entourage and recommends the murders be dis- guised as accidents. The text was couched in allusive terms for the sake of verisimilitude, but in its accompanying com- ment Blitz removed any uncertainty its readers might have had about its meaning and left nothing to their imagination. This is the usual Bloc practice in the surfacing of verbatim forgeries; but the rest of the Taipei series used less subtle texts. The next issue of Blitz, 28 September, reproduced the head- ing and first lines of two fabricated cables from Ambassador R3proved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921AiAS?6b270001-5 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 Psywar By Forgery SECRET Allison in Indonesia to the Department, as "repeated to Tai- pei," and quoted their full texts. One urged increased aid, including combat units from Formosa, for dissident Indo- nesian movements; the other reported progress in intrigues to overthrow Sukarno and gave directions for packaging arms shipped from Formosa and Malaya to the Darul Islam. The same treatment was given the final item in the series, in Blitz' 12 October issue. Beginning on the same page that disclosed the Kishi-Dulles secret pact, there was reproduced ft" LIIJ zi Zo: LLI mc A A. 0 P. tv9A A 1 8 2 0 04 W 1.31 ? . A El Eq p n S .6.51 Lii Zi a 8 x 8 4.45C 44r, .4" SE_CREI 29 Approved For elease 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 SECRET Psywar By Forgery a cable from Washington which deplored the tendency of SEATO members exhibited at its Canberra session to use the pact to obtain economic aid, reminded U.S. ambassadors that "control over the armed forces of the Asian members of SEATO remains our prime objective," and outlined steps to keep the local governments in line. Blitz apologized that the ?????????????????????? American Plot To Overthrow Sukarno Noon of the if Sir Moho- rade against is surpassed honesty and the industrious lig people of young boys the victims by of Karaehl ry of our land e grabbed and occupy, they rising the peb- ma and shoot. !Mate arrests on have been no day. The 11111e in OCeil. 10, condemned this Security by the Pahl- "Insaf" nsaf"- wrote governments tnt on this ter- It the time e the so-called 1 India. Humbug pocrisy TELEGRAM RECETVED OiOa,5 Our efff 0490 ed 0.1bataat 0i? 9, la KIP sia Ta soar.. fe. LIU or Palk en. 10$1. 413. nee. 00,1 4.5 we ,ccela raftetiettC.1:::"' PROOF POSITIVE FROM TAIPEH DOCUMENTS HONGKONG: The machi- nations of American gangster - diplomacy which has made concerted bids to overthrow the government erf_ President Sukarno in Indonesia and replace it by military a 11 d communal stooges early this year were reported in BLITZ at that time. Now irrefutable proof mmes n. hand in the shape of documents which were lost by the United States Embassy at Taipeh follow- ing the riots in May. (Photo. Melt to legisv ? copies of the documents relating tg. The medic- to the US plot to liquidate Chiang P.1103. Of? v Kai-shek were published last week "olffc occv in inairz?nciiiim. and yet they The first of these is a copy M ',petal. what r military out. Tile . Enille''gram from the American issy in Djakarta to the State 14. Those who Department which was sent to the American Embassy in Taipeh. '1,??",,-,7;;;;."?e?, The telegram is No. 473 of March 19, 1957 received in Taipeh on March 19 at 5-20 P.M. Its text M as follows:? The following telegram has been sent in the Department awl is repeated to Taipei: hatt Noon MP ai al it, '?*"4. sh Atrocities In Oman Front A Cocrespondent Pritish Military Authorities in Bahrein 4/3, March in, 5 11.M. Masjmni leaders again insist on the necessity of increasing military aid to the DI and forces now operating in Suma. tea, West Jaya and elsewhere in Indonesia. In view of the grave deterioration in the position of these forces they request that such aid should not he Malted to the delivery of arms and ammunition and suggest the transfer of units from Formosa to help the DI forces. Can our Ambassador In Taipei ascertain if It Is possible to expert n favourable decision on this question? ALLISON. The second telegram is No. 490 of March 26, 1957: The following telegram hnet been sent to the Department and is repeated to Taipei. 490, March 26, 9 p.m. Four telegram Na. 1176 of March 22 inn. Masluini tenders have already taken the additional measures to deepen the political crisis. With the support of the indivi- dual already known to you (This appears to be a reference to Dr. Mohommed Hotta - lbditor). Nets* was able to m- eters a definite refusal from his party's central executive to join the new government, Sialtrir has guaranteed full support for the Masiumls by the PSI both la overturning the Natipnal Party and in forming a new government under the eontrol of the Masjumin and their sup- porters, and also in the wove to discredit Sukarno. As already repseted, a )otat reasuitotiro committee to unify and eo-onllb nate these efforts will he not urn In Djakarta in the very near future. It will include represew Wilms of the central executives of the PSI nod Masjund. I think that with the help of Into agents in the armed forced Wehrle" wit be able to get eon. trot of the array and replace Nmention by Subroto. Simbolon is suggested as Deputy Chief of Staff. In my view. assistance to the tnilitary councils in Sumatra must be increaued through the available channels. In the event of the Masiumis' failure to SAES power, a Sumatran government could be formed which would then break with the central government. The individual known to you will on no ad- vice tour Sumatra next month Is establish personal contacts with the leaders of the Banteng anti Garuda military councils of the DI and Tit forces. He was mpplied with additional money for this purpom. Please inform the appropriate quarters of the Dared Islam leaders' request that arms sent to them front Formosa and Malaya must carry no trade mark and should be mord in containers used locally for awl. cultural machinery, Wanks, owned food and the like. ALLISON. These espies Of the telegrante speak for themselves. Not only does US diplomacy seek to sub. vent the government of Indonesia by buying off stooges but by .transfer of units from Formosa to help the DI forces.. Even Buell a minor detail as the camouflage to be used for packing American arms In not ornittod APproved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A66066270001-5 ? Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 Psywar By Forgery SECRET TELEGRAM RECEIVED ow m to DEPARTMENT WIN Parch 21, 1957 N.- 1109 WASHINGTON Code' OTE Receltsit Namh 25. 11 nat. AMERICAN ENBASSY? TAIPEI 1109, March 21, 1209 "taw SECRET The naoila Pact: geaulte of the Canberra Session The recent mission of. the Council of the Senile Pact has rewealed a tendency on khe pert of anme its mem.n ea. an Thailand, Patti.. .and the Philippines to use this Organization ...madly aS ata additional source pr economic Profit 01 Subversion ?Ovh,r,, In Taipei. Document LONDON: Startling infer- asation has reached London that Japanese Pre- rnier Kishi and U.S. Secre- tary of State Dulles signed a secret military agreement during Mr. Kishi's visit to Washington in last June. I can reveal exclusively to BLITZ that the agreement allows Use 'by mutual consent' of Japa- nese armed forces in military operations 'In any part Of the Far idast'. The U.S.. in return, threw a sop to the Japanese Government by agreeing to the establishment of a U.S.-Japanese Joint Security Committee to supervise military. co-operation between the two countries. The actual signing of the ag- reement between Mr, ihtlieti and Mr. K WO took place on June 20th, but I understand thsettssions on such 0 pact had been going on many months before. Probably this agreement is what Mr, iDtitien doo, when he. Said at a pre once soon after Mr. Xi: that resalts of the in' "much more" than tit boned in the Pint con Japan./ recent electii United Nations Secant tinder American pate: Violation. of the "gi agreement" by which t Central European should have had a seat an American reward fi good -behaviour. . Any such .agreeMent fleet a. parallel for A EiaenhoWer Doctrine ft die East, bringing an threat tb tilr entire' A neut.- It is also an ex the current; American substitute its own inf Britain's ectst: ThC ? 1.0Celit vied to the ,Tapanese Foreign 'Fltjtyama' got a- very here, in spite of his of ,the purpose of the ;to. feost; AnglosIapan shift and co.ciperation. keeping a wary eye o Protestations: of fele should India. International Gangster isi Of American Embassies HONG KONG: "We must strengthen the posi- tions of our friends in local governments and support. those who are being less affected by nationalist kieas" directs a telegram from the State Department of the United States to its embassies in Asian coun- tries. The copy of this telegram No. 11119 :kited March 21. which was Ins: by the American Embassy during he riots in Taipeh last May, dhows the rotes, LO diteloniatic privilege Is being aisised, Military Nature Of Treaty The other four important ponds the instructions make are: "the strengthening of con. .11. tat. with leaders of the opposition parties who show au. dmislanding of the tasks facing the free world," 2. 'Maitre. upon those in power ? that their position directly depends on their loyalty to the United Status," RAMESH SANGHVI BLITZ'S FOREIGN COMMENTATOR THE SOVIET BABY MOON, revolving round our earth at nine hundred kilometers inethe virgin space and completing eaehl revolution in approximately ninety-six minutes heralds a new age in the history of human race. With the firing of the rocket which sent the Baby Moon in the out r space an epoch ended. A long, long age when hum ns were bound to the earth has passed away. The glory of Hits epoehtd achievement goes generally to El,: vitality and vigour 0 It it man hand and hulk.. mind. However, particular] it is to Me eternal credit the Soviet scion., and engin cring,, of the countleso men and women in the Sovielland Mai this dream of the Soda* Anea enoi First, mankind has broken the eitains binding it to the ealth. The unknown space beyond is /IOW within Hs reach. We have spetulated about the cosmic world, given names to the various planets and, on the basis of meagre and indirect evidence, formed certain beliefs. AS this will soon emne to nn ow. text was incomplete because "the lower portion of the second page of this telegram was torn off during the riots." After some months' delay the items in this Taipei series were given further play to vulnerable selected audiences. The story of Rankin's plot against Chiang was broadcast to Taiwan by Radio Peking on 30 December. The State Department's cabled views on SEATO were picked up at the turn of the year ApprovedsKFVelease 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A00030027000'n Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 SECRET Psywar By Forgery by the pro-Communist weekly La Patrie published in Bangkok, the capital of the only proper Southeast Asia mainland mem- ber of SEATO. On 3 February 1958 Radio Moscow added de- tails implicating Ambassador Cummings in the U.S. subver- sion of Indonesia documented in the forged Allison cables and broadcast an account of it to the United Kingdom. On 6 April the Djakarta Berita Minggu, another controlled "independ- ent" weekly, announced that the authenticity of the Alli- son cables had been confirmed, and Peking's news agency NCNA carried this confirmation in its English-language trans- mission for Europe. This late replay of the Allison cables merged them into an- other series concerned with Indonesia. The outbreak of open rebellion there in early 1958 brought new specific and heavily played charges that the United States had planned the revolt and was covertly giving it military support. On 22 March Blitz told its readers that U.S. officers at SEATO headquar- ters in Bangkok had been ordered to submit immediately an opinion on the construction of U.S. atom bases in Sumatra: It is known here that a Top Secret agreement has been con- cluded by the Indonesian separatists with the SEATO and Ameri- can groups, which provides for both SEATO and U.S. bases in "free" Sumatra. This agreement was finalized after secret talks which took place recently in Tokyo between Col. Sumunal, representing the "Separatist Government" of the Ussain-Shafruddin rump, and representatives of the U.S. Embassy. This report was followed up on 15 May, in the Rangoon weekly The Mirror (a third controlled "independent"), by the text of a letter said to be from rebel leader M. Sjamsuddin to Ambassador MacArthur, evidently on the subject of imple- menting the atom-base agreement. It began: Your phone call proved to be real magic. The meeting . . , was very useful. We have agreed on practically all the details. Now, I hope, ties will remain permanent and we will receive all necessary materials without delay. Soon, however, it became necessary to counter the effect of the United States' publicized friendly negotiations with the Sukarno government, and a new forgery was promptly launched to show that the U.S. public attitude was merely a smoke-screen. On 8 June The Mirror printed the text of a pur- ported letter from naval intelligence chief Rear Admiral Lau- ?,proved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921AtiM0270001-5 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 Psywar By Forgery SECRET rence Frost to the rebel leader Kawilarang, telling him "not to despair just because the U.S. issued statements expressing on the surface 'no interference' in the Indonesian civil war. We will continue giving assistance to you through Taiwan and the Philippines and other channels." After two weeks this story was repeated in a chronic Indonesian vehicle for plot charges, the "independent" Djakarta Bintang Timur, and its version was carried by the Chinese NCNA and a week later in Soviet domestic broadcasts. We happen to have some details on the mechanics through which such counterfeit texts would be placed in The Mirror or another of the half-dozen receptive Burmese papers. The KGB rezidentura at the Rangoon embassy would receive them from Moscow in Russian, translate them there into English, and pass them in this form to the more or less controlled press outlets. The papers would do their own translating into Burmese, but the rezidentura would check the published texts against the original Russian and report any variations to Moscow. Expansionist Israel A most complex and enduring misinformation series using the full orchestra of rumor campaign, diplomatic whispers, planted intelligence information, press allegations, and pub- lished forgeries began half a year after the abortive British- French-Israeli invasion of Egypt. In mid-March 1957 rumors began circulating in official and diplomatic circles in Paris that the French and Israeli General Staffs were working together on a plan for a new joint action against Egypt. When the rumors were traced it was learned, first, that they had no foundation in fact and, second, that all traceable such tales had a single local point of origin?one Andr?lmann, director of a small "independent" weekly, La Tribune des Nations, but notorious as a pro-Soviet propagandist. During the first weeks of April these rumors were complemented by intelligence re- ports received from Lebanon and from Italy to the effect that France "was launching a plot in cooperation with Israel." The Italian report said that "the Israeli press has not mentioned the matter, but details are being discussed publicly." On these subtle foundations the campaign was openly elab- orated in the fall. On 12 October the Bombay Blitz carried SECRET Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A0003002700013-5 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 SECRET Psywar By Forgery a long article exposing "Israeli plans to dismember the Arab states and organise an empire": A Blitz correspondent in a West Asian country had an opportunity of getting acquainted in detail with a secret strategic plan of the Israeli General Staff. We may be able to publish the plan in full in future. . . . It envisages military operations against the countries bordering on Israel. . . . In general, the Plan provides for the annexation of the territory bounded by the Suez Canal, the River Litani and the Persian Gulf. . The scheme takes into account the circumstance that Israel will not be able to rely on victory if she acts alone. In this connection, assistance on the part of the U.S.A., Britain and France is envisaged beforehand. The Plan especially emphasizes that "the U.S. is interested in a clash between Israel and the Arab States" and that "the U.S. interest in the strategic points of the Middle East is explained by the striving to strengthen her positions in this oil-rich area." A month later, in fulfillment of its promise, Blitz put out a 78-page booklet, entitled Dagger of Israel, containing the "Strategic Plan of the Israeli Army for 1956-57, translated from the original in Hebrew." This document, an obvious fraud, is a rambling, badly written tract with the details given in the October article as its propaganda climax. The book had been in preparation, according to its introduction, since March, i.e., the time when the "French-Israeli General Staff" rumors had appeared in France. After this the drive apparently went into winter quarters, but it was renewed the following spring. On 4 April 1958 Mikhail Stepanovich Rogov, Counselor of the Soviet embassy in Paris and a KGB officer, told a Western diplomat?who of course told his government?that the USSR was currently "worried about increased French-Israeli political and military cooperation." The next day Blitz took up the refrain, with slight variations: Diplomatic circles at Tel Aviv report that the Israeli Armed Forces command iq elaborating jointly with the French Army Gen- eral Staff a so-called "Plan of Preventive Hostilities" against the UAR. . ? . Meantime, Israel is frantically seeking other al- liances. . . . The Americans are now helping her to an alliance with the anti-Arab NATO member Turkey. U.S. involvement, not to be left thus subordinate, was the main burden of another Blitz article on 19 April reporting 443roved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA7RDP78-03921AMN270001-5 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A0003002kagT5 Psywar By Forgery that Secretary Dulles had announced in a closed session of the House Foreign Affairs Committee "that the United States would support the demands of the Ben Gurion Government on enlarging the territory of Israel at the cost of the Arab lands." Recounting the year-old rumors of secret joint planning by the French and Israeli General Staffs, Blitz said that the U.S. Government had been kept fully informed of the plan by both the French and the Israeli government. In October the secret Israeli strategic plan surfaced a year earlier by Blitz was included, as a ten-page excerpt, in a I47-page book published by the State Publishing House for Po- litical Literature, in Moscow, under the title The State of Is- rael?Its Position and Policies. Presented as a "history of Is- rael and the Zionist movement," the book as a whole is a vicious propaganda attack, of the misinformation variety, against the State of Israel, all of its political parties except the CP, and "the Zionist bosses"?the United States in particular and the West in general. It seems to have been designed for use in Communist study groups, assuming a Marxist-Leninist viewpoint on the part of the reader. But its similarity in other respects to Blitz's less comprehensive Dagger of Israel is great enough to present the possibility that both manu- scripts were prepared in the same place, if not written by the same individual. It is notable that rather crude material like this Israeli plan and Admiral Frost's reassurance to the In- donesian rebels, designed for unsophisticated targets in Asia and the Near East, is deemed suitable for the more knowl- edgeable but carefully warped Soviet audience. In November a new edition of the book Arab Dawn published by Blitz carried the author's statement that he had learned in October, in Beirut, "of the latest in the series of Anglo- American plans to 'cut Nasser down to size,' which France has since endorsed." The plan, "scheduled to take place next spring or earlier," provided for Western action against Leba- non, Iraq, and the Sudan. In addition, however: A supplementary plan has been attached to the main project. The supplementary document introduces the latest plan of the Israeli General Staff to take over the West Bank of the Jordan River by means of a swift blitzkrieg. The Israeli plan, which ap- parently has the approval of the CIA, the British Ambassador in Beirut and the U.S. Ambassador in Tehran . . . is built around the SECRET 35 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 SECRET Psywar By Forgery possibility of either the flight or the assassination of King Hussein of Jordan in the near future. The "Israeli General Staff" canard, now enshrined in an of- ficial Soviet publication, can continue indefinitely with varia- tions its role as a part of the Bloc psychological warfare arse- nal. On 13 April 1959 the Turkish Foreign Ministry denied with protest a report published in the Moscow Red Fleet that the Chief of the Israeli General Staff had come to Ankara to- ward the end of March and held secret talks on the question of Turkey's support of Israel for an attack against the Arabs, especially against the UAR, in the near future. Other Near East Forgeries Alleged U.S. intrigues against the UAR, a side-line in the elaborate Israeli effort, were the whole theme of a shorter but equally important series of forgeries. On 9 April 1958 the clandestine Bizim Radio, located in Leipzig but broadcasting in Turkish as from Turkey, carried the following "news item": Report from Cairo?The American State Department has sent a secret directive to its envoys in the Middle East with a view to overthrowing the UAR. The directive points out that Soviet in- fluence in the Arab countries has increased owing to Soviet recog- nition of the UAR and urges the envoys to use every means to spoil Soviet-Egyptian relations. On 26 July, a fortnight after the Iraqi coup, a document answering to this description was published in facsimile by the Cairo daily Al Ahram. It purported to be a State Depart- ment "circular letter" over Assistant Secretary Rountree's signature, cabled on 17 April to diplomatic missions in the Mid- dle East. Explaining that any apparent softening of U.S. pol- icy toward the UAR was merely a tactical device, it stated that one of the principal aims in the Middle East was to destroy the UAR by splitting it into its original Syrian and Egyptian components, to stop the growth of Egyptian influence, and to spoil Soviet-UAR relations. This forgery was apparently thought convincing enough to be given rather wide play in the overt Bloc media, most heavily to domestic and Near East audiences but also to Europe and South Africa. On 2 August Blitz carried it, making explicit the supposition that the incriminating document had come to light in Bagdad as a result of the Republican coup. In De- 36 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-039210270001-5 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 Psywar By Forgery SECRET ...).72411 fill 4hJ3 140.U.4.3c0;ILI 4.0414'4.024 4:41,) LOLoydo. . O,fr kyi ;Xi .1.0 Ql.)1141 j iii4)1.: .a.U1 04 ter joi 0 44A ets:q, 93L.IJ30 4;:ar 11.1 43.1 J91 Lol 4.;4.6.?.....a?,1../...,k1 4.411.."3 is j3 CA..4 4*jte Lig Ati..r.:stii LILA; uji 412;11I Lse CA viOi 6111. 6,-LA asitJi II .Aa...tai 0.4) Zw51.3 5A3 j1.63 ??????????????...? IINGTELEGRAM AMERICAN EMBASSY, BAGHDAD ?,25o CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY INFORMATION :'OLAFF (2) >67 WASHINGTON CONTROL 2279 RECD: April 18, 1958 10 40 AM .*TION: BAGHDAD, CIRCULAR 11 April 17, 5 30 PM This circular letter is being sent by the State Department to all U.S. diplomatic representatives in the Middle East on the sub;ect of the United Statee-policy in regard to the United Arab Republic. The State Department reaffirms that the basic objectives of the U.S. policy in relation to the U.A.R. remain unchanged. It stresses anew that.expansionof Egypt's sphere of influence is counter to the Joint Resolution of the Congress on the Middle East, strengthens Arab nationalism, encourages anti-Western and particularly anti-American tendencies in the Middle East and Africa, undermines the Baghdad Pact, an important link in the strategic network of the free world, and impairs the position of Israel the interests of which the U.S. can In no way ignore. 2. The lact that actual control over the transportation of Middle East oil to Europe both through the Suez Canal via all the _pipelines to the Mediterranean is now cone , rated in Cairo seriously endangers American _interests in this area. The U.A.R. is now'In'a position to exert pressure upon the U.. and other western powers. This possibility can become a formidable weapon in the hands of Presidedt Nasser if he happens to fall bac, on the Soviet bloc in the future. tst.ei Jt?A At 4:Q4, I FIRST PAGE OF ROUNTREE CIRCULAR SECRET 37 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 SECRET Psywar By Forgery cember, when Rountree visited the Near East, Radio Cairo and NCNA revived the story again. The Rountree circular, like the Taipei cables, did look more or less like the real thing, but it could not stand up under close examination. Its "Confidential/Security Information" classification was one discontinued in November 1953; there is no "circular letter" in Department nomenclature, and a "circular instruction" is not transmitted by cable; its num- bering was bad, a real Circular 11 having been transmitted nine months earlier; the form on which it was typed had been replaced in August 1955; State messages are not signed by an Assistant Secretary but only by the Secretary or Acting Secretary. Operational carelessness is also evident in Bizim Radio's having described it eight days before its purported date and three months before the Bagdad coup was supposed to have made it available. The Rountree forgery was followed up in late March and early April 1959 by one other, sent anonymously in photostat to some papers and parliament and government members in the Near East and passed around in intelligence circles there. It was ostensibly a letter from Under Secretary Robert Mur- phy assuring Ambassador McClintock in Lebanon that "Nas- ser is not the man we shall support" since "you are right to note that we have nothing in common with Nasser and his kind" and adding, with obvious reference to the UAR and Iraq, that "You certainly are aware of what I have in mind when I say that after the snakes devour each other, the jungle be- comes safer!" It was never published or otherwise replayed. The presence of U.S. troops in Lebanon in 1958 had been the occasion for another brief false document campaign. On 11 August Radio Bagdad reported that "in Lebanon, Saeb Salam has received a cable from four American paratroopers ex- pressing their desire to volunteer for service in the people's forces." The cable was never produced nor the story elab- orated, but on 25 August the outlawed Beirut Al-Masaa sur- faced a forged letter addressed to members of the U.S. Army Task Force in Lebanon and signed "John H," purportedly an officer in the 79th U.S. Engineer Battalion. This American of- ficer, after a salutation which showed that he was given to the use of Briticisms like "79th Engineers" and "officers and lpproved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921AMS60270001-5 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 Psywar By Forgery SECRET other ranks" and to solecistic military abbreviations, wrote as follows: I arrived together with a group of American officers from Munich on 27 July in a Globemaster aircraft. . . . A few days ago we re- ceived orders to remain in Lebanon for 15 months to safeguard the peace and security of the United States. There are also plans to undertake large scale works with the object of transforming the airfields of Rayack and Kolein't into American atomic bases; furthermore, 5 rocket launching pads will be erected along the Lebanon-Syrian border. More atomic weap- ons will be dispatched soon to Lebanon, and Beirut harbor will be transformed into America's principal naval base for its Near East- ern Fleet. One cannot fail to realize that the object of all these preparations is to wipe out the millions of Arabs who are struggling for their national independence. . . . That is why I am asking you, my comrades, to demand that we be withdrawn from Lebanon to the United States quickly, and if we truly love our country we should return there without further delay. American officers and troops: Don't allow yourselves to be fooled; don't allow yourselves to become involved in military adventure for the benefit of any of the war- mongering factions! The Chinese NCNA, picking up this story, credited the il- legal Beirut Al-Masaa for it; but Soviet media?TASS, the Daily Review of the Soviet Press distributed by the Soviet In- formation Bureau in Moscow, and a widely broadcast Radio Moscow commentary?introduced it with only the phrase, "It has become known here," and they gave the writer's name as "Johnson" rather than "John H," apparently having been furnished a different draft of the forgery. Irresponsible U.S. Atom Pilots The black support of propaganda campaigns aimed at Eu- rope was more sophisticated. The principal series began with a Khrushchev statement possibly designed for the purpose, possibly only later recognized as exploitable. In his interview with Hearst and two other American journalists on 22 Novem- ber 1957, Khrushchev stressed the danger inherent in a con- tinuous airborne, nuclear-armed SAC alert and continued, ac- cording to TASS: When planes with hydrogen bombs take off that means that many people will be in the air piloting them. There is always the possibility of a mental blackout when the pilot may take the SECRET 39 Approved i-or Kelease 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A000300270001-5 SECRET Psywar By Forgery slightest signal as a signal for action and fly to the target that he had been instructed to fly to. Under such conditions a war may start purely by chance, since retaliatory action would be taken immediately. . . . In such a case a war may start as a result of sheer misunder- standing, a derangement in the normal psychic state of a person, which may happen to anybody. . . . Even if only one plane with one atomic or one hydrogen bomb were in the air, . . . it would be not the Government but the pilot who could decide the question of war. Some five months later, on 7 May 1958, the official East German Neues Deutschland reproduced what purported to be a letter dated 27 March from Assistant Defense Secretary Frank B. Berry to Secretary McElroy reporting that 67.3 percent of all USAF flight personnel had been found to be psychoneurotic, a condition which led to all sorts of phobias, unaccountable animosity, and other irrational behavior. Ex- cessive drinking, drug-taking, sexual excesses and perversions, and constant card-playing were mentioned as further evidence that "moral depression is a typical condition of all crew mem- bers making flights with atomic and H-bombs." Although perhaps convincing to the man in the street, this forgery was full of errors. The letter format would hardly have been used for this kind of report. The vague "group of experts" said to have reached the medical findings would have been named, and no such obscure and ineffectual corrective measures as "further improvement of aircraft equipment" would have been proposed. There is much wrong military terminology?Internal Zone, Air Force Command and AFC, the Patuxent River AFB (Md), the Cooke AFB (Calif). More esoterically, Dr. Berry happened to be away on an official trip on the date of the letter; and finally, it was typed either on a machine assembled in composite from several different makes or one of unknown foreign manufacture. The letter was widely publicized in the overt media, espe- cially to European audiences. After a month the Delhi Times, perennial purveyor of Bloc propaganda, replayed it, and this gave TASS and 12vestia reason to run it again, crediting the Delhi Times. After almost three months more, on 30 August, the Bombay Blitz carried it, explaining that it had been pub- lished "early this month" in Neues Deutschland: the replay copy fabricated for Blitz had apparently been delayed in 9pproved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78-03921A86660270001-5 Approved For Release 2005/04/13: CIA-RDP78-03921A0003002Megr5 Psywar By Forgery meurotker ,Rauschgift- ;en Prozent, das heft mehr mien an Psychtnearose 3esatzungen jetty Flug? ierstorfhomben an Hord kreisen, von dr Arktis ler Sowjetunioi fliegen dem Alarm airsteigen. taatssekreldr lerry er- fir unzureicheid in der :ontrolle en Inklen. folgenden Woilaut: mg der Fill? th threat- Insprochene do. Ferven- !to Ptinten ii not Nevigaloron len Luftwaffe rceibt, daft ore, die zu smon der- d needled hate-, folgende Snstmenung, 1,07 Arm Ills nterkentinentalts FlUgen: !Ind sys'ematistAce Genoa tchr haufig selbt wdhrend tonal narketiscler Drown 0000- and larihunna- texuello Aossel.cifungen Mil: extreme itrilickeit ala inditein Karterspiel. dische Depressiot on tOpt. alter Iletatztum.mitglicder, Atom- und lrossersleff- nehraen (steer such Sone Pbzialkapilel deo heigettig- ire der tnedizin schen Un- ten meinv Kellego end ido ortreter der Luftwaffe dar- t exit welchen Mitteln dor (Fortsetsunn atif Seife r-V?din ern crieg" gegen DDR Otfessclung eines mit {der Atemwaffen gefithrter die !PLR gerichlet spitcht M seinen) Artlkel chkeit vines trlogarn", also eveletionaren Putsches in 'Sm Konterreoolution, Ngl i1101.1. werdr zraachst die swehe ?zu llilfe ellen, abet Trtippen 0bet die Grease ?n werelen, womuf Streit- nnlikpaktes soungen, es kileme deb bet tiorlichen Feklieungen our en slag, Journalialen Man- i die ?Welt" nelini an der diem Lehre von berrenstrn boginne ?die. harschends {Vests]. au voirden. Auch oh in seinem jiingaten AuG reign Affairs. in ?din Lehr- moglichat begrolYten rlYen erklart herzigen Erkil-ungen, so end in Kope !PO, warom Bon eine Gip- .\??, unti tiAg Zus.,1,14,1mmme.n \ Deer Mr. Smaller/a I wish he afore metal the millanialea.Mien darted ea In Marano. with yea imateetione of all officere end Mama Stationed overeem end in the Internal Zorn he. been casplead. I encl.. herewith the detailed repo. tkts =toot- ???????ve? by ? ??????01 ????r.? /...atne Myself or the ainataity I wish to make normal amoral att ebservations this connestien NYS gave yea attention Vu the fell i a:La eccerding to the intim* ate by the expera. Per mot OS all or.. webers that have mare.. aw ea...Ma Wan free puma. neural, It is an Impressive flare na Dana fail a ear. Maim The report indicael that the Marion is *mural], aver, man the officers .0 airmen earring mersens as .11 ea wag tame 10 the - Strinegic Me Canna of the Internal. Zone. (Str further Maraninise will deal oaly with 310 latter category.) 2. Mmt 'tel.'s In general is the conentioe of emanate.. - vhich in 'Worn, af cum Made its an-erasion 11 exceeeiro apreselien- ability, in notion. Intleneately control". by tte entleet.? vb-Uo tin all arts of phobia., articular,' Sn flight Paid, a all a tdeterinnl syndromes me fits of unaccountable ...malty. 3. Mar an ....tonal thoreeeds ete47 OttO. data on bile mane . have ascertained that the accidents tnnt bare mama claim the ant Ms maths on Sidney et the Cooke LFB ad at the Patuxent gime An (Bd.) Le 5.11.5 pan.0l l'ira 5. aa ct?il nanletiee and a name of Maar cams have occured out so each for the reeson? of "5-b.05e1 re.31nres a at. to laYchic deficiency 00 the ?rev n. the rutty SI the cas.? of the ramie ereatrela af the nem,. epilog oaths the pilot. aed aviators of Ye Mr Coeval ledioans that th? chief factor. conacire ku ach ? cadition are the following ? great Mr.. particularly at. to inthrenMiliadel nhmfihet smaasive ard eyelet., me cf alcohol