INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY ACTIVITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-04007A000300030020-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2000
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: September 20, 1945
• Content Type: REPORT

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'RUMOR:GE ANT) SECURITY ACTIVITIES
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_Septather 209 1945
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REPORT ON um VRELLICINCT AUD SECURITY .
ACTIyMTES OF TiE GOVERNMENT
- ? The purpose of this report ts to discuss and propose a plan
for the organization of our foreign intelligence and security
intelligenoe activities in the postemr period. It results from
studies by staff of the Bureau of the Budget conducted throu4lout
the war,
The war has occasioned a hasty and unplanned development and
expansion to tremendouS proportions of the foreign intelligence
activities of the CoVermnent, No One believes they can continue on
the same scale. in the, postever period. On the other hand ne one
believes that-we can eafely permit our foreign intelligence activities
to 'revert to the -equally unplanned basis that existed in -the pre?
war period.
At the outset t it is necessary to be clear about the meanings of
? "intelligence" and "eecurity intelligence" as used in this report,
Foreign intelligence has to do with our knowledge about foreign
peoplee their resources; capabilitieo,5.and intentions, It includes
all that is significant about particular countries or ares, which may
have a bearing on. our relations with and policies toward them and an
their relations with and. policies toward- the United States, in point
of time it encompasees the future insofar as that is possible v as
well as the present and the past. It embraces what we need to know
about foreign peoples o countries and conditions in order that our
relations with:them may be conducted in such a manner as to give the
naximum protection to and furtherance of our national interests.
Seeurity. intelligencii) (or counter intelligence) includes cur
knowledge about activities directed .frem within or without the United
? States which are inimical to . our internal security, The purpose of
security intelligence Is to be aware of all unfriendly or hostile pc
sons movements; and ideologies which ,constitute a threat or a potential
threst in 'order that steps may be taken to safeguard against them when
they become threatening. Security?intelligence is thus simply a special
kind of total intelligence,
? The reason 6 for treating security intelligence as a separate but
special.eategory of intelligence are brought out further later in the
report?,
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.1.PAPV4.071 Priqr te-R:P?4 grtrk2E
In 1939 the principal source of thformation about foreign peoples,
places or affairs -was the State Department- missions abroad.? Through
rieorg,anizz-Ition Flan No no the. infonaation.gathering activities of the
Commerce and Agriculture Departments had -been coordinated by the State
Departmnt. Some personnelom other agencies were assigned to the ?
Foreign Service as attashes zAnd matters of reporting were coordinated
between the State Department? and the Department involvad? as for example
Commerce (Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce), Interior (Eureau of
Minos), Agriculture (1.1ureau. of Foreim Agricultural Relations) Arid
others,, COITtuunication was through ?State Department facilities? The ?
military and naval attaches, Of which there wore then. less than a score,
enjoyed slightly grw ter freeclom of direct reporting to their mgericIes,
Compared to current info2mation gathering activities ebroad, our
activities in 1939 were indeed modest? They dids, however, produce
a volume of reports containing 'a -math of useltil and reliable inforad-
t ion But the conversion of this information into int elli gen c e was
hampered by a number of cs.usesi, including some basic wenicnessQs in our
structure in Washington. The most significant of these ineakneeses from
the standpoint of future planning are disoUssed in the following, orders
la The ? inadequacy of the intelligence facilities in
the dopa rtmen ts a
2. The lack of coordination of intelligence among
departments.
3.. The Over-amphasis on security intelligence at
the expense of more basic intelligence. "
40 The lack of central facilities to serve the Presi-
dent or top-level groups-0
Inadeouact_9f IntelliPence Facilities in the Departments
The principal weakness of our pre-war i;ituation lay in the lack ot
adequate central facilities in the various departments in Washington to
direct the selectivity of reporting, to gear the reporting to actual
operational needs, or, . equally as important, to evaluate the incoming
material and distill out the significant trends This had Several
effects Which should be noted in planning for the future organization
of our intelligence activities? -
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pAlure to determine neerAs. One of the principal results of -
inadequate or totally lacking Irballigence facilities in the departments
'as the failure to determine what the requirements for intelligence
were. As a result the facilities that were available for reporting
information were not well utilized.
In tae War and Vavy Departments p standing tastructions for -eporting
were in the form of index guides merely cataloging and assiving file
Lumbers to all conceivable subjects without any selectivity.
In the 3tste Department directives on which tae missions based
their reporting were prepared in any office of the Department as current
problems arose and in some agencies outside the Department.
pifileplty in rmarni2ang fonds. Another of the? results of in-
adequate central facilities in the departments was the difficulty in
recognising trends. In the State Department for clample reports floWed
directly to groups already burdened with the heavy responsibilities of
forming policy and initiating action,. where9 after being reads they were
filed in a central file along with the sdministrotive,papers of the De-
partment. Some of these groups built up staffs of analysts to extract
the incoming information. in genera, however the result of this method
of handling the flow of foreip information was that the Department in
Vashington dealt almost solely with current news. The cumulative effect
of these .bits of current neva was apparent only insofar as the report
itself pointed out the trond, or as the action or policy-making officers
followed the trends personally.
Departments such as Commerce and Agricultare did have staffs to
analyse or accumulate incoming information. With those reources thlY
produced foreign intelligence which was principally,of use to those
bodies of the public which they served& Comparatively little attention
was given, however, to the necessity of being able to recast their data
on short notice for use by other governmental agencies, especially in
time of emergency.
In the War and Navy Departments some small central facilities ex-
isted? but their inability to recornise signUicant trends was hampered
by,a number of reasons? of which their hyper concern with defensive or
security intelligence will be discussed later.
Ingls of_o721::71ll,_po,r,splgtive. Another result of the lack of
adequate central facilities was that no group was organized to analyze
reports from the point of view of a department as a *whole. In the State
Department, for example, where no central facilities existed? the
action-taking or policy-forming officers tended to concern themselves
primarily with information pertinent to the geographic area or, in
few cases, subject field (as Commercial Treaties? Communications? etc.)
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for vhich they vere responsible as operating of:flea/sc. In addition
anch of the reporting concerned. current events end developments. In
the War and Navy Departments, research techniques vere not utilized
to analyze information and. the csntral staffs were reduced to such a
level as to make impassible the handling of any volume of significant
material except to distribtite it in the form in which it came 'in.
CoorliastioaX 7,1*e13.1.9m92
The lack of any central intelligence activity in the State De..
pt,\ rtment and the provision of only small staffs in the armed services
limited coordination of intelligence among these departments practically
to the single feature of mutual eXchange of individual reports. As
late as 1942 some of this exchange me still being handled through
formal letters in which the Secretary of State "had the honor of trana.
mifting" to the Sec rotary of Vier the attached report. The result was
that on matters involving more than one of the c3epartments, no means
,existed to 'provide for a pooling of all available intellitencer, Pearl
Harbor, simply as one examples is less a failure of any one department
than of the inadequacy of our total intelligence operation. The recent
publication of white )?apers, showing that all the information necessary
to evaluate the' -situation via s in our fil es s only con firms the fact that
we did not have .efficient facilities to convert that Information into
intelligences nor sufficient means for bringing it into play in all the
places where it could have been used.
FreV,ecttpz for Securipgi,ptellitlenct
.In addition to being inadequate and poorly organized, .the
existing in the ?5ar and Navy Departments p and to some extent in the State
Depaitment, were principally engrossed with intelligence of a defensive
or security nature concerning dangerous or hostile individuals whop
actually or potentially might be engaged in espionage? sabotage, or
subversion. ? Had this been recognied and had plans been made to build
a Oover'imsntwde program for security purposes around other resources ?
already existing, and separated (except at the very top level) from the
operations designed to produce more basic intelligences one of the
weaesses of our subsequent and present basic intelligence proram
might have .been .avoided.
The predilection. in an agency for securing intelligence concerning
"undesirable" individuals nimkens the securing, of more fUndamentel in
tellig,ence by that agercy. At a time when the armed services might
have been accumulating (through the organized reserve and other available
sources) the mass of inlbrilation soon to be needed to fight e global vrar?
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they Were using most of the limited personnel available in cresting
an a maintaining a large file of undesirable individuals
in the development of .the reserves, the tendency Iras to secure
officers whose interest or skills were those needed. to support a pro,-,
gram of this sort of intellig,ence. The importance of this- kind of
intelligence loomed ? So large (at the expe.nse of real military intelli?
gence) that the, service intelligence agencies resisted successfully all
attempts of forward4,looking officers to transfer negative or defensive .
:Intelligence oporatiorie to such offices as that of the Provost Marshal
General. trther injuly1) 1939? When it was clear thLt war ,in arope
was inevitable, the armed forces plan for intelligence was to obtain,
through a Pr.,,sidential lett er9 the -creation of an interdepartmental
.committee? including the BL The purpose of this committee waal
to
.intonsiiy investigations of individuals potentially or actually engaged
in espionage); sabotage, or subve.,Tsiono- The committee was, until the .
creation of the Coordinator of Information in July 19410 the only inter.*
departmental mechanism for mobilizing ,our intelligence services to meet
the responsibilities which in a fen short years were to be thrust upon
us. As a fnrther ralection. of the extent to which the emphasis on
security intelligence had inhibited ?even, an awareness of our lack of
real positive intelligence, the armed forces viewed this cognittee gs
being all that was necessary and aided by the State Department fought
the idea of a. Coordinator of Information from the moment the plan was
discussed.
Lacy ,,qtqs-p tzal,),,14-cilitios to Sc?,rv?e the Pre,Adent
Even if the departments had organized the strongest facilities
possible, for their own purposes, the resultant total operation could
still have been deficient with respect to intellie:ence needed at the
very top of the Government. On matters involving the bringing, together
of information in all departments to thms light on determinations
affecting our total nattonal policy, Our intelligence results were
not ath,,quate,
It is significant that when the President's needs for objective
and penetrating analysis of the then threatening foreign score became
acute, he was foreed to rely on ,individuals acting as special observers
and reporting directly to him. This is not to imply that many of the
operating officials in the Government were not aware of what was
he,ppen:thg or of its significance to us?? nor that the. State Department
and aimed services did not have informed opinions Inam which to advise
the, President. The point is that the President should not have been
forced to rely solely on such opinions, no matter how informed they
might be. Nether he should have been able, in addition, to have access
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to the 111.ctss carefUily .ana3yzed and 'so presented that his own oon?
clusionp could be drxistrh. Some means for coordinating intelligence
itself? as well as the. judgments Of the resPonsible advlseress is
necossary? With such coordinations deo5.sions on matters of high
national policy can be made not alone on the basis of the opinion
of the operating officials? no ratter how well .informed? nor on infor?
mation alone no matter how re3.iables but on all available intilli
gence fully evaluated and properly presenttrl,
Fogans1.29.,and :Ztesent
In the latter stages of our preparation for national defense and
.the early .stages. of the wars a vast (t4.4pansion- of the functions of.
Government in international matters ? IN13 s undertaken., Lend leases c.xpanded
activities in south Americas export control and later economic warfarei;
alien property controls, freezing and foy.?eigri Lands controls psychological
warfaros all sipalized the development of ihoilities to produce quickly
the kind of intelligence necessary to conduct the operation concerned.
Officials in the 'State Department acting largely on their own
tiative because of the Depa'rtmentos lack of centra/
stimulated the creation of opemtions in such agencies as FCC%
The Air Forces, lacking facilities of its (rail, finding the MIS
deficient? and having no central source to which to refers was forced
to canvass the Government in search, of information to assist in the
selection of bombing targets.
Other large projects to obtain n-formation on weathers terrains
medical and sanitary conditions, food and crops, habitss etc., were
initiated,, CAA, Public Health., Coast and Geodetic Surveys the Anti?
trust Division of Justice's PAW, the Weather Bureau and many others all
contributed their share as sources of information.,
Travellers, officials of companies pith foreign plants or burrIness,
scientistss rt,.,Nftgees? university staffs libraries, the vast body
of the pliblic Ivith inform:Ition use.ful to our growing needs was tapped,'
Cur Wartime! development as thus characterized by t endonEl
expansion of information and intelligence activities in many of the
normal agencies of Government, as well as by creation of large
operations in the new war agencies themselves.
This expansions however., took place primarily in the collection
of information. The many rie.7 sources mentioned above were tapped by
many differant agencies. A mass of raw information flooded in
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and :through liaison ay.,:annonentss, fanned out 3.n multiple copies to the
many ag,encies, The expana5.ola that took place was not in accordance
with any Government-wide plan. The weaknesses of our- pre-,44ar pattern
were therefore carried into our war-time organization. In addition,
the lack ota total plan and of.any authoritative mechanism for coordi.
nating the' operations otthe many agencies involved, has become a
problem of such mapitude that it has become of equal .priority as the
other we in demanding, a solution
Successful post,mar intelligence will not be achieved without
first considering the 'needs of the manyl departments cone ern ed, nor
without finding ways to cooranate their activities to the end that
maximum result is achieved with the minimum of expense and e, ffort.
This need to achieve a well integrated Government.wide intelligence
program is urgent and goes beyond the problem of merely disposing of
duplication., Almost four years of war have revealed the tremendous
resources of information that exist in the Government and among our
nationals? Only by the *nest u.tilizAtion Of our entire resources,
not only for the collection of information but for its analysis? tabu-
lation, and assembly into useful forms, can our intelligence achieve
the quAlity of performance which will be vital to our fIrture socur3.ty
and position in international affairs.
Conclusions
We must ,provide .for a more adequate intelligence operation than
we have ever had before. The verr. brief analysis .given above points
to the lessons which must be taken into account in planning for the -
future organization of the GOVOMMent s intelligence activities?
There are four major conclusions pointing to the need for early
action and two of secondary or longer range import. tach conclusion
is discussed belovo, ?
Mar Wiftnra0VP5lers:Ondn-g-g-T.ate2-1-1Maq
F.101110 of the difficulty of achieving needed improvement in our
intelligence operations in the past has been the relative newness of
ntelligence as a function of Government and the absence of a common
understanding even of ?;\ilant intelligence is. To some, "intelligence"
is a tainted word identified solely with espionage and intrigue. To
others it is identified as a kind of information of military or
vtartime use sole1y ti11 others think of it as applicable only to
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high strategic or national security cmestionm. Such 'misunderstanding
has caused many of those lihos e active participation is vital to the
.development of more?adoquate intelligence open:It:tons in the future
to feel that it is a subject of no concern to them and to view with
tzepidation proposals looking toward a strong postwar program.
Our needs for foreip intelligence have broadened beyond the point
there they ,can be met by the activities of a single 5zxtelligence agency,,
Nor do they fall into simple mutually exclusive subject categories
such zs "rcilitery,00 "naval?" "economic," and 'political " which permit
easy a ssipriment of, .responsibilities among a few intelligence agencies.,
Nor are they limited to special or "secret" kinds of foreigt informtion.
Rather t they rest on the necessity for understanding 11211y foreigp
events? to know all the facts which motivate foreign nations and
peoples and, to have 3n;edily accessible- in useable form a mass of .
factual information to assist in the shaping of intelligent policy
and action at all levels there decision is mado or influenced, or whore
action is taken, They will be met 9 therefore? only by concerted and
widespread activities which utilize to the llest the tremendous rex-
sources existing within the Government and among our nationals,,
It may won be that the spread of. COUTIcth Understanding as to whet
intelligence is, what purpose it can serves and how the intelligence
operation relates to the action taking or policy forming operations
will contribute as much to the accomplishment of a more effective total
intel3.1gence'program. for the Government as the prescribing of specific
organizational panacezs. .
1.1111-1-,ET,Le t1-19 Dcaa...rtntnts2f Level
It in commonly accepted that our intelligence operations have not
been on a par with those of other nations,, This has given rice to a
considerable number of proposals for the creation of a single super-,
intelligence organization not connected with any of the dopartTrente
The difficulty with such proposals is that they are based on a limited
view of what intelligence is and on a misunderstanding as to the role
an intelligence operation must play.
Them might be sane justification for such extreme centralization
if all policy and action affecting our foreip relations atid our national
defense or rational interests were centered at the top of the Goverment
and if intelligence were merely the tapping of special sources to report
and interpret current developments,
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? These matters. are not so centralized? Our foretell policys,. for
oxample,, is not, made up alone of -considered. announcements dealing with
hiel level matters It is made every day in the thousand and one
actions and decisions that are taken at all levels. The intelligence
needed to assint wise .decisions and support informed action must pro-
duce. a knowledge and understanding of all the factors involved?
Ri
thert it must 'be at hand? --Extrene centralization of the intelligence
operation is. no more worIcablo than .would be the centralizing in one
agency of the job of producing all statistics for the Goverment, The
intelligence operation is handmaiden to the action-taking and policy-
determining groups. It lqu.*t be. sensitive to their needs,. it must have
handy the mass of original doeuments and material on Which its studies
are based while it may secure much assistance from others outside it
rrinist be responsible to the place of decision? A department which will
be held responsible for its decisions and actions must in turn be able
to hold accountable to .it the operation which, produces 'Intelligence
on which those decisions and actions w1U in parts be based,
' The principal foreign intelligence operation* of the Government
therefore should be vie.vcd as being organized at all places where de-
cisions are made and action takenp' namely at the dope rtmental? or lower,
level?
fonwp* 0; sewItItY
The emphasis in the pre-war period on intelligence related to the
activities of hostile or undesirable individuals has already been
commented upon. It is a conclusion of our studies that the or gJ nizstion
of our Axture intelligence programs should provide for the separation
of security Antelligmee operations from those engaged in producing the
more basic categories of intelligence?
The collection and evaluation of secur5.ty intelligence (sometimes
referred to less descriptively as "counter intelligence") recauit^eu the
use of skills and a point of view not desirable in the' production of
other forms of intelligence. If we are to make proper judnents as to
there our interests lie and what we can do to further them in the post-
war period we will need to have intelligence which gets at .f.nrldl...naeritals
and is not colored by a point of view that attempts to segregate peoples
simply into friendly or hostile categories It has been said that be-
fore the war Gennany had more "friends" in this country than did DeglnnO0
Certain:1,y German intelligence, following the speeches and actions of many
of our "prominent perscnE.,"v could easily so conclu.de. And yet we went
to war. Tn our evaluation of foreign affairs: we should take every pre
caution against being similarly misled? Our mist:tons with Inssian
Argentines Spain, China need to be viewed in terms of the points at which
our interests coincide or clash as nations and ,peoples/, and not solely in
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terms of vhther the "lvaders"?in theso countries are "friendly" or
"hostile."
This does not impi thdt we tU riot need to. organize facilities
to follow the activities or unfrloylay individualsp at home as vtell as
Abroad p nor to conduct programs to counter their activities? Nor is
it intended to imply that .some a1nificant intelligence will riot be
developed, as a result of thritse programs. -
- it does impl,yp however, that within the departments having responsi..
bilitios for producing both security intelligence and basic foreim
tell:.LEY,oncep the two operations rhould beseparated. 1Nhan both ar 0 larger
for example9 they should not be under the same head. Rirther 9 a framework
for 'die development and coordination of such security intelligence activi..-
ties with the internal security prognuils which they serve should be' pro-
yided apart from that whose purpose it Will be to develop the basic intelli-
E,fence essential to our future foreign programs and international responsi-
bilities,
coo.S&-!ilOan of .T2Pt917-tggaPP And ie(40AY PReW:Rtign
To the wealmesses of our pro-war activities the expansion of these
activities due to the war has added the weakness of lack of coordination
of intelligence operations. The same lack of an over-all plan that
characterized the expansion of our 'general intelligence activities 2.a
responsible also in the security intelligence field for a failure to
build around existing pro gra M s and resource p for a pie? C.-VI legis/a-
tive program and for overlapping ,responsibilities and duplication in
operations.
The most obvious result of this lack of coordination is the
tremendous wastage of money and .effort, Possibly of evim greater 1.111.,
portanco? however? is the fact that the uncoordinated competitive pro-
grams of the various agencies dilute the few aval3abl aiiled personnel
and result at times in no one of the agencies having on hand the Dill
background of in formation of value to the subject under aralysi.sr,
Another effect of great si.gnificance is the false .sense of authenticity'
frequently created by repetitive reporting of the same information.
This arises from the fact that in the absence of a Government-wide opeys-
tional plan? each agency engages to receive all ayailablo raw material
directly., . This has been responsible for interviewing of the Same private
Individuals by as many as twolye different departments or unite of de- ??
partments. It is also responsible for the "liaison officer" and the
"round table" at which each agency, by reading all the incoming materials,
can secure copies for itself and issue reports paralleling those of
?thee agemcies,
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This overlap cannot be corrected by assigning responsibilities by
kinds of intelligence, as "economies" "military," "naval," "political,"
etc.. It can only be solved by assigning operating- responsibilities.
In each case the agency of greatest competence, ease of. accomplishment, -
or primary-interest should be designated as the agency' to be responsible
for e specific operation, but with the proviso that the operation be
conducted so as to safeguard the interests of any or all agencies. Thus?
while it might be the mast feasible arrangement to have the FCC monitor
certain radio messages of interest to other agencies, it is inappropriate
for that agency to attempts as it did at one time, to create an e;dencivo
intelligence organization to analyze such materiaA.
? The principal agencies presently engaging in intelligenco activities
have made efforts to improve coordination. . In the absence of any
authoritative machinery to accomplish the development of operating plans
by which all the agencies would be bounds such attempts have resulted
only in "ad hoc" arrangements.-
The:Joint Intelligence Committee -composed of representativos from
State,'FIliks OSS, MIS (Ncr Department), ONI (Navy Department), and A2
.(Army Air Forces) represents the most important of such arrangzments.
A quotation from a paper, prepared by the Joint Intelligmcs Committee
paints the best picture of its inability to coordinate operations.
"The Joint Intelligence Committeevs mission, however, is confined
to the Joint Chiefs: of Staff organizations is not binding even on
those depa'rtments represented by theJoint Chiefs of Staff, and
lacks clear administrative authority to coordinate the intelligence
activitios of its member agencies. During the war a series of
mLpedients such as the Joint Intelligence Publishing Boards the
Joint Topographical.Committoe? the Joint Intelligence Collection
Agencies andothers have with more or loss success, relieved
various situations where lack of coordination was most conspicuous.
NoWever, there does not exist any -agency which can state
authoritatively which intelligence subjects arelc at any given
times of most importance to the interest of the United States; or
in responsible for seeing that important gaps in intelligence
are filled."
Study of our experience during the war has shown that without an
authoritative coordinating mechanism acting in the interast of the
Government as a whole, the responsibility of a department-for the conduct
of n. intelligence operation to serve the needs of 'other departments
cannot: be established. -Unless such mechanism is provided, therefore,
our future Government?wide Intelligence activities will be characterised
by the same compartmentation, competitions -and expensive operation as
at presont.
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The various -ad hoc type of interdepartarental committees used
during the virar have served to promote cooperation but have been -unable
to effect real. coordination. Yurtheri the conaittees so Created have
been more con Ce:I'X'2 ed with exchanglng intelligence and information thai.
In coordinatin g oprtiotv4 It :ts perhaps unreasonable to expect
that they should2 i Vie17 of the newness of intelligence on the scale
necessary in wa rtime and in view of tht . absence of any pressure or
neoesSity to achiove remits economically.
0::porience with ,an independent agency such as the
Coordinator of Information at the 117fvol of the Executive Office of
the President indicates a corresponding inability of such mechanisms
to achieve coordination of operations,.
Mile departmental facilities for the production of intelligence
should be streno;thened4, and should be chiefly relied on to meet our
foreign intelligence needs:, .there is a related need for some C (a/ tl'al
chinery to coox-Onate the intelligence operations of the Government
through the development of specific operating plans? Similar machinery
is flooded to develop an integrated security and security intelligs,nce
program', ?
? g1410. 4ovel r,!9',4qT. Il'9014onn
.
The conolulliOXIS discussed above relate principally to the
?strengthaning or organizing Of intelligence operations -within the
Departments and to means of coordinating them on a Govemment-olicle
basis,' The need to provide some 'oentralbed 'professional intoilfk.genoe
operation at all /evele there decisions are made or action is taken has
been pointed out.
Not a13. the 'decisions or- actions of the Government fall into
categories that permit their handling by the departments alonc,, The
President too should have. facilities for securing access to the facts
underlying possible courses of action with -respect to thoseodeolsione
of national policy cutting across departmental lines which he alone
roist make. This need e,7-ot-mds beyond the President as a person and
Includes all those 1ndividualF4 groups, interdepartmcoto3_ or inter-
Intional bodies?, vih;tch make decisions above, the level of the departments
as such,
This need is apparent to many observers of our present deficiencies.
In some cuarterss, however:, there is a tendency to view this need on
being our solo or principal ones, and to conclude that what is needed
is the continuation on a immanent basis of some such large scale centrol
operation as eoctsts now in the Office of Strategic c3erviceso Such a
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conclusion fails to take into account the fact that the principal
intelligence operations of the Government must be organized at the
point where decision is made. It does not recognize the le.,,cding
role of the 3t3te Departmcmt as a staff agency to the President,
It further fails to take into account the growth and improvement that
has occurred in the departments and the further improvement that can
be achieved.
In 19390 when the Coordinator of Information (predecessor to 03.5)
was first organized? its principal role was to bring some order out of
the conflicting intelligence being produced in the departments in
order that the President and the already-envisioned Combirn.d and Joint
agencies would have but one place to which to turn. It was at first
considered to be but a secondary responsibility of this agency to
engage in intelligence operations on its own except as might "fhcilitate
the securing of information not now availqble to the Government"
(Presidential letter of July ll 1941).. The extensive pro:zram? not
only of collection of information but of independent evaluation., mhich
subsequently grew up in COI is a direct result of the inadequacy at
that time of the departmental programs-, Such development was therefore
vital to our wartime needs and COI (now OSS) has undoubtedly blazed
new trails and raised the level of competency of our totel intelligence
opHration. However? the war agencies in other fields than inteiligence
uninhibited by past weaknosses? staffed with new personnel (many of ?
them of the type not available to Government in peacetime)? and vcc.th
practically unlimited fonds and freedom of action, can lay claim to
the same aohievement, We cannot, howevers, continue a complete strocture
superimposed on top of the normal structnre of Government beyond the
period when our rar needs demand it. The problem is how to capture
that which is good and to integrate it into the normal framework of
the Government. Had our intelligence base been strong lAhen war comt
upon us, COI would not have had to build inde,endent facilities,
Eowever, to continue such facilities in the Arturo will tend to
perpetuate the very weaknesses that must be corroctedo
The Improvement of intelligence operations in the departments and
their coordination as one Covernment-vide program will provide the
principal facilities through which this high-level need can be mc'60
However, it may be desirable to anticipate the need for some ndditional
central facilities to provide or secure the intelligence needed at the
top of Goverment. Such independent central staff as may be require(1?
however, can be small., since it could rely very lar;ely on the produoi,
of research and analysis in the departments and mill not engage in
large scale original research and analysis itself, Its responsibilities
would be to secure and harmonize intelligence, to reconcile conflicting
intelligence, and as envisioned in the JIG paper already quoted to
"mobilize the resources of all agencies in the fulfillment of an urgent
intelligenoe requirement,"
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None of the individual ,intelligence agencies of the Government
can hope to engage, independently of the resources that exist elsc.
where in the Governmentl) in all the operations which conceivably could
bo justified to serve its needs., Similarly in the development of
central facilities, the purpose of which will be to coordinate inte111.-
gonce operations, care should be taken that such flilcilities do not en-
gage in operations which can be performed at the departmental level.
Even with such oare, however, it appears desirable to anticipate
the establishment of some operations at a central level. This report
attampts only to illustrate some of the kinds of operations which might
be centralized? The fall development of plans for the eventual central
operating program might well wait on the creation of central planning
facilities to develop such plans. .
Whether this country should engage in secret intelligence activities
(espionage) in the post-war period is a policy decision which is beyond
the scope of this report. nUch activity, if undertaken, should be
principally conducted centrally and where permitted in the departnents
should be rigidly superVisod centrally?
Special intelligence, involving the interception of communications
without the knowledge or consent of the sonder? and the use of crypt?
and other forms of analysis .raises similar questions. Here the case
for central direction of such activities (should they be undertaken in
the post-war period) is particularly strong because of the extreme
difficulty of dividing up operations, the groat cost involved in ?
duplicating services? and the potential shortage of available skilled
persOnnel.
With regard to files and, maps' Of common widespread use, especially
of'a strictly factual or data type, the evidence of extreme duplication
now inherent in the present' picture would seem to demand centralization
at least of indexing it not of the files themselves. The theoretical
advantngea of centralization are frequently offset by the practical
difficulties inherent in removing the intimate working tools too Par
from the operation they serve. The British, houover, have csntralized
some files with reported success, and perhaps we can too, if the proper
framework ie created for their operation? Here, too, the precise solu.
tion can best be developed by the central planning facilities already
suggested.
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9q119,NPIAPng.
sumina,rizo. then? there are six conclusions of Nvilich four are of
primary iraportance and priority' for action .and two are of a secondary
nature on. which the, need for action is not yet stifficiontly established
and therefore can be deferred.
1. There must be a more widespread underStanding of intelligence
and a more widespread particiption in the development .and'implementa..?
tion of plans for improved. intelligence in Government.
1 2. The principal intelligence operations of the 0oVernment should
be organized at .the point where decision is made or action taken, i.e.,
at tha departmental, or lower, level rather than in any central agency.
3,, The basic intelligence operation in each department should be
organized apart from the .operation producing security intellig?ice.
There is a need for some interdepartthental coordinating machinery to
develop an integrated Government-mide security and security intelligence
program.
4. To insure optimum results 'front departmental intelligence
' operations, there is. a need ?for some central interdepartmental coordi-
nating machinery to develop through. specific operating plans, an In-
tegrated Government-wide general intelliunce program.
5. It may be well to anticipate a need for central facilities to
secure intelligence needed by the Prosident. If, separate facilities
are found necessary, however, such intelligence can be produced
principally through intelligence available in the departments. Any
smaL1 central facilities subsequently found desirable or necessary should
not engage in large scale initial research and analysis .
6, There may be SOMO need to centralize certain operations common
to all agencies or which for policy reasons may best be performed
centrally. The determination .of the kind of, central operation 'which will
be needed must await hi& policy decision with respect to certain of the
operations Nhich would lend themselves to central direction and operation.
A decision with respect to other of the operations which might fall into
this category can await the study and development of plans by the central
coordinating body provided for in 4..
AfpcommendOlon,
Many of the specific changes in internal organization that are
indicated from a consideration of- the conclusions, are of interest or
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concern only to one departdent.. Recommendations applicable to a
single department are presented in broad terms only when thoy are
of general interest ox' to illustrate the broad principle involved.
Recommendations concerning proposed change, or action of common or
over-all concern, are, however, presented in some detail.
The greater portion of this section of the report is thus de-
voted to the proposed central coordinating machinery. This should not
lead to the assumption that the creation Of central machinery is viewed
as the most important step to be. Of far greater importance is ,
the creation of strong departmental organizations particularly in the
State Department, and the separation of security intelligence operations ?
from the more basic intelligence operationsespecially in the atate,
War, and Navy Departments.
Moro Wideepread pnderetandimeclUtWlleence
Throughout this memorandum it has been noted how vital to a more
adequate Government-wide foreign intelligence program isa more wid&-
spread understanding of what intelligence is, how it is produced and
how the intelligence agency relates to and serves the action-taking
or policy.edetermining groups. No specific recommendation is possible
Conduct of the Intelligence Qgerntion at the Departmentol Level
? Each department (and in some cases subdivisions of departments)
which has important responsibilities in international matters including
our national defense, or which has public responsibilities for pro-
viding foreign information should provide for a competent foreien in-
telligence operation.
The kind of facilities which will be required in the various de-
partments and their size will vary. Except in the case of departments
with major responsibilities, such as the State Depertment, the facilities
can be quite small.
In each case, however, some provision must be made for the
following functions:
l. The carefUl determination of the departments actual require-
ments. This determination will require the development in each depart-
ment of a Planning Staff. The requirements of the department will need
to be expressed in accordance with a standardized terminology and
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elassification of intelligence and till need to be stated in sufficient
detail to guide reportingsneither by activities of the department itself
or of other departnents on which the dorertment may rely for information,
2. The systematio cataloging and utilization of all possible
sources to supply the needed information or intelligence,
1, The thorough analysis and evaluation of information through
research techniques. In this way ney information is tested winst
the aconmulated knowledge and established facts of the past.ard a
complete and digested picture is available in which each pertinent
piece of relevant infOnnation is present and in theright place with
the thole so interpreted that conclusions can be.drTmn and trends are
visible.
' -46 Careful dissanination of the resultant evaluated product
rather than the?mere distribution of incoming reports "of interests"
The intelligence office must be responsive to the needs of its deport-
ment and see that those needs are supplied in. full and when needed. -
On the other hands it must protect the department from the-voluminous
flood of casuals Unrelated and unevaluated reports or scraps of in-
fonmatiOn. Just as a department expects its statistical office to
analyze.? tabulates and summarize data and point to its significances so
in its search for knowledge of foreign nationss peoples, conditions or
events it must look tp it intelligence office to do a similar job on
the raw material- of foreign information.- -
Our wartime experience has sham:I.:that the need for foreign infor-
mation and intelligence in any department?Anr exceeds the ability of
its intelligence office to secure or produce without the utilization
a facilities that exist elsevihere.? In each cases thereforcs whether
the Intelligence facilities provided in a department are large or,
omalls.the responsibilities of such groups should include not only
responsibilities to their departments but to a total Government program
as well.. In the latter category- are.responsibilitios such as (1) to
participate in the planning of a Government-tido programs (2) to inter-
pret the needs of their agencies to the other agencies on thich they may
tc;ly for evaluated summary intelligencep (3) to review thp adequacy of
coverage and competency of result with respect to intelligonoe obtained
through other agenciess (4) to Serve as the liaison point bTtween.thcir
agencies.andothe intelligence groups of other agencies. In generals the
departmental intelligence units should only establish such indeperdsmt
facilities for collections evaluation or dissemination as are consistent
with their roleina Govornment-3wide program.
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.? The success of our -post--war intelligence, operation rests ex.
the creation within the State, Department of an intelligence operation
with responsibilities such as those sta.-ted above. The creation of
centralised intelligence operation in the State Department would not
only pro-vide that Department with facilities it has long needed, In
P.ddition it would serve' to provide the place where leadership of. the
Government-wide intent g er. (.s.:e activities would be centered,,
The intelligence operations of the War and Navy Departments need
to be readjusted to post-car needs? - The war has been responsible for
an emphasis on current nevs as exemplified in daily situation reports
and on operational intelligence as reflected in the large scale order-
of-battle operations? Neither the organizations nor the staffing have
been fully developed 'to servo the purposes of active War and l'kevy De-
partment participation in .interdepa rtmental discussion of high future
policy? In the Navy Department as an illustration9 the entire, intelli,-
gence mission is stated to be. in support of the fleetc, , In neither of
the two Departments has sufficient emphasis been given to research and
analysis nor has prov3.sion been trade for all available information to
be brought together at ono point for evaluatiOn, khrthero, as already
pointed out both still, permit an over emphasis on security intelligence
to interfere with the full development of more basic intelligence.,
?
- Other Departments such as Commerce and Agriculture_ need to recast
their intelligence organizatione so as to become participating groups
in a total Goveznmentroido foreign intelligence program,
sPeurM. Tat415-R,Tice
The security. intelligence activities either at home or abreacip
serving internal security prupodes should, be separated organizationally
from the more basic intelligence activities5, except for the mutual ex-
change of highly .evaluated and SUMnarised reports of eel-10ml import (not
merely of "cases"),? It is further recommended that an integrated
security program including the security intelligence activities that
support' it _be planned for the Government as a whole,
The implementation of the first recommendation will require action
in a number of departments not necessarily simultaneously, ? _
In the State De pa rtm t for ems)] pie ,? the creation of new central
intelligence facilities should not be accompanied by a transfer of
activities now centered in the Office of Controls in the .Division of
Foreim Activities CorreXation.
In the Navy Department some separation haF.1.-been undertaken by the -
creation of new intelligence facilities in the Office. of the Commander
in Chief apart from the Office of Naval Intelligence which is the
princ ja wDepartment o.rmanization concerned with security and security
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intelligence. . Mese new facilities offer the .possibility of becoming .
tho.nuoleus for expanded basic Intelligence operation in the post-
war era when the needs. for .strictly operational intelligence will be
greatly curtailed irrespective of whether the ffice of the Commander
in Chief is retained or.not. The role of ONIvhowevert as the central
staff agency for security matters is not clear, and a number of related
activities? not. only in the Bureaus and Auxiliary Services but in the
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations itself, are not now coordinated
under a single head or staff unit.
In the War Department, too, some separation has- resulted from
the reactivation of the Office of the Provost Marshal General.,'The
predilection for continuance in the field of security intelligence,.
however, still permits the Military Intelligence cervice to become
too engrossed with matters that could be further centralized outside
MISQ Further, because of its organizational Ptcement the PMG cannot
be folly effective as a staff agency to coordinate all security matters?
In both the War and Navy Departments the separation ofthe'security
intelligence operation and the more basic foreign intelligonce operation
should be furthered and the security intelligence and the various forms
of internal security operations be more closely coordiqted,
.The implementation of the second recommendation trdla rwlAire the
creation of an interdepartmental coordinating committee described
below?
Coordination of Intellenceoand Sqopority,Qperationq
To insure that the intelligence and security activities of the
Government, carried on by a number of agencies o fulfill all the national
requirements, that they are developed as a total program producing the
maximum result with a minimum of duplication, overlap and confusion and
that adequate planning is accomplished for their expansion in any future
emergencyp it is recommended that two interdepartmental oups be or-
gani2ed under the leadership of the Departmcnt of State
The one group which would consist of the Assistant Secretaries
of Stat e, War, Navy and Commerce would compose an interdepartmental
intelligence Coordinating Committee It would be concerned with developing
an integrated Covernment-wide foreign intelligence program. It also
would be concerned with planning for the future.
The other group, consisting of the Assiatant Secretaries of State,
War, Wavy and Treasury and the Assistant Attorney Ceneral? would comnose
an Interdepartmental Security Coordinating Committeec, It would be
concerned with developing an integrated Government-wide internal security
program and of an integrated Government-wide security illelligence pro-
gram. It also would be concerned with planning Dor the future,
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These two groups by direction of the President arid by means of
planning condaoted by . permanent, staff of their on working through
subcommittoes,including represents.tiVes.of any apency of interest .
.c.,ither as customer or contributors -would develop a series of si.3e-cific
operating pians Thosc,,, plans would srv as cmmon directivea for
the assiovErnt of operating responsibnitlea among the. departmental
ntelligence ard security agencies, The =ruler in which such planning,
-would be conducted will b,a the same in both the security coordinatir
committee and in the intofligence comittee, and is described boloi?,
EIrcept as discussed :later under "gondnt Ct,tntrnl.
the committees vaould have no responsib13.1tie3, for the pro6uction of
intelligence itself nor for the conduct of operations,, Rather their
responsibilities would consist of the following
,To develop a detailed and clear 6-tatenent, of the national
Intelligence objectives. and requirements and of the
national security requirementss, including those of all
departments and agencies,>.
2,, To eletormine the means ,in terms of actual operations for
meeting the rational intelligence and national security
requirements6
. ,
To assigni, through-a. series of specific operating plansi,
opera ting respon sihU.ities to the various departrnents.,,
30
11,,, ? To review the adequacy and economy of the total intelligence
- program of the Government and, of the total security progxam
.of the Government?.
To develop taxie legislation and. other instruments in
- readiness for the- adjustment of the intelligence and the -
security programs in the event :of emergency or other changed
conditions,
The above list Of responsibilities.. describes in effect the steps
in planning,, The visible result of Such planning and, thenefore,, the
principal concern of the committees would be the operating plan itself,.
Each operating plan when issued woul,1 reflect the determination of the
appropriate committee under. each .of the first three- continuing and
long range responsibilities shown aboves, 1,e.,? the re,quir6inent3, the
means for their accemplishment4, .and the .specific operating AeSigrillientS
L1OCAted to the various deprtnient$ and agencies? 11% f.1.41 I su p the
spec1fi3 operating .plans would be directives to the departments and
geneic s? The depart4ncnts and a gerloies woulA z,,,djust their operations
.to conform tn them,
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?Opentiu_planp. A typical operating plan when published should
contain such matelAil as the following: the Subject, arm, or kind
of operation covered by the plan; the specific requirenent covered
by the plan; the scope of the plan; provisions of the Ooerating Finn
(operating requirements, ansignments, eta.) as reporting? tabulation
and filings, evaluation and dissemination.
Such planning would not be accomplished overnight. Nor, if the
committees were to be effective, could they wait in tiny brood field for
the accomplishment of full planning before issuing a specific operating
plan to effect an obviously needed change,
lat1mate/y0 specific operating plans would be published by thl
intelligence coordinating committee An at least tho following xubjects
or categories of intelligence: Geography; 1?tonomics,' Finance; Armed
Forcer;; Government, Politics and National Policy; Transportation and
Communications; People and Social Forces; Technology and Scientific
Development,
These broad categories, however, arc made up of lesser categories.
Long before anything like a total Government-wide operating plan in
one of these c,ategories is complete, operating plans would have bsen
determined upon and published in subdivisions of the category. The
total operating plan for economic intelligmce, for example, would
require plans in such subjects as Industrial Plant and Potential;
Resources; Trade and Commerce; Labor Supply and 1,hp1oyment; and others,
Similarly thenoperating plan coven-1ra intelligtnce concerning People
and Social Forces vill require plans on Population and Characteristics;
Living Standards; Cultural Standards and Customs; and others.
Other types of specific operating plans would also be developed in
connection with cortnin kinds of operations (unrelated to any
category of intelligence), Thus plans would be developed as needed for
such opersAions as the monitoring and interception of foreign radio or
communications; the nIngle or uombined collection of information through
sources of interest to a large number of agencies (such as the Inter-
departmental Committee for the Acquisition or Foreign Publications!, the
Technical industrial Intelligence Committee, the Survey of Foreign
Fzports? etc.); and interdepnrtmental procedural mnttors such as the
standardization or joint operation of files? distribution and liaison
problems.
- Similarly the operating plans of the security coonlinating
committee would encompass not only the various aspects of security in-
telligence including the filing of such intelligence, but aln3cn the
various security operations such as border and harbor patrol, port.
security, censorship, preventive investigation, security advisory
services, etc. ?
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P1Rnn1nq 'ARM An essential element of these central coordinnting
committees is A fall-time planning staff, Specialiste not only in
skills of 4dministrative analysis but with a knowltdge of the iiold
to inhich they will be assigned would ultimately be required in each of
the major subjects or cateories of intellipence including security
Intelligence as yell na in various kinds of intelligence and sevurity
operations, These specialists should not carry departmental responsi-
bilities but should be assigned to reasonably permanent duty with the
committees Providing for this staff will be a special concern of the
State Department but should be a responsibility of all the agencies
represented on the top two committdos.
Each mjor subject or kind of operation in which an operating
plan is nccessary9 should be assigned as a continuing responsibility to
n muriber of the planning stoff,, The member of the central planning
staff would call upon each of the many agencies which has an Interest
in the matter assigneds, either As A consumer or as a contributor
to designate one-person to represent his agency in a continuing ond
responsible capacity in Olo development and Implementation of an
operating plan covering the matter assioned, The agencies of interest
would in almost all eases Include many agencies not just those repro
.-
sorted on the top committees themselves,
? These groups would constitute the subcommittees to discharge the
responsibilities for planning and for reviewing p as a continuous
assigmnents, the adequacy and economy of all activities in the subject
or kind of operation assigned ? A member assioned from the control
planning staff should serve as chairman of each subcommittee The
rePponsibility for its effectivonoss and for much of its herd rorkl,
,enculdfall on him,
- Current problems; including thatoof dupliaationi, may. not always
be the most important matter for the subcommittees to.concentrate on,
The chairman of each subcommittee should not permit the handling of
currant problems to put aside the long range responsibility of that
subcommittee to develop a complete plan of operation in its subject.
or kind of operation
ThroUghoutl? the'ultimate'goal should be kept in mind of a serits
of specific operating planes,' prescribing a coordinated pro in -which
all activities essential to the ihtelligence and security -requironents
' are provided fors, and In which the operations and facilities of all
agencies are used, to the maximum t6 serve the needs of other agencies,.
-gpirct Secx,Aaxl. The two committees should be served by a
- common seoreiarif:i-wkoh would provide for. orderly procedure through
standard agenda and minute keeping systemso The secretariat should
take the minutes in each subcommittee and Maintain the files of the
committcm,
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The need to provide for some facilities to serve grsups at a level
above the departments thaaselves is one -which should be a ntlelp.stecl ?
but action Is not 110TV recomiended.
With the principal intelligence activities of the Government being
? carried on in the depsrtments in accordance with a planned and coordi?
nated programs,' such intelligmce as moy be needed at the top of the
COW 3.11.111 en t ..Cdan bc prsduced through or sicured from the intelligence
? operations in the c1F.quartment? The State Department. would provide the
principal facilities fox. bringing to lotaT.' on any high level problem
the total intelligence :2vallable anywhere in the Governiamt,,
S`hould it later be found, however. that independent facilities
are desirable td serve- the President in the occasional instance in
- which he may wish direct and' immediate-.access to the intelligence
involving a matter of high decision? these facilities, which should
be orpnized in his own -office, can be smell and need not engage in
large scale initial research and analysis on original ra4 materials?
Conduct of gITItrYtlARNA19N%
The strengthening of intelligence acti.viti es in the depa rtm ants
and agencies and their coordination by a central planning staff are
the principal means of providing a total operating serving the total
national neods. Central facilities should not be createds, thereforai,
to enge in operations which Can be performed at the departmental
lev4i1?
The planning conducted by the two cooidinste.committees may
result in .a decision that some types of operation may be found to be
practicable only if Operated centrally or under strong day to day
ent ral directiom It is recommended that any such service as is
thltermined to require centralization:, ,be conducted as an interdepArt?
mental sevie a under the appropriate coordinating committeu?
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