PROGRESS REPORT - I&SO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-04007A001000040034-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2001
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: December 31, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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OGRESS REPORT - I&SO
1950 - December 31, 1951)
The Security Prograu: l ,.based upon the concept that a penetration of
the CI: , is a No. I target af, all foreign intelligence agencies of subversive groups
Within the United S atesAe J au--r aix ad4&^ the direct protect on from penetration or
compromise of every employe document or in-
format.ion which could tend to disclose r intelligence t izatelligen sour es
and methods. In addition to posit,we anti-penetration defense , the program :;asst-.
I:ro ~,i continuing controls an : policy guidance to our personnel to avoid inadvertent
cl a; tires, ,compromise of mate :iai outside the Agency, and leakage of bits and
r
'activities to forei~,n
es of information which may give a definite picture of
intelligence analysts,
ups i a?~i.nrg the utmost in t orou:a .ates /in investigation of applicants, "he
i vesti ative aids, perfection in guard `,s; ste ws, protective devices and con
r than the leadership in this field
.?o1s, we . z.rx a that real security is no bet..to
a 5 ' " s d by supervisors at every level, no:r' than the degree of personal securit%,-,
responsibility- assumed by the mass of h dividual employees.
This Progress IRepokt of t a,e`Inspectiori and Security Office will consider
e ti.. t' y operations du in;,g the period fro-en the standpoint of r sajor security ?unct c~:a.3s
r ci~aa' d and. performed rather than tl'ae\adrninistxative organization used. (-'t
fun:: t .cnal p L`esentatioa omits the confueI .. of administrative compartmentatioza on
,a "need to known basis necessitated itself' y security factors. 4h' folio dXld,T: are
the rmsmajor s;~c:urity- operations of the_ i&SO: i'
5cr :eflin and vetting of personael
of personnel
a rmplo-yee controls
Physical Security controls
1.'olicy controls
las, cction
ounteer-intelligence 1asearch and Action
operational Support
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 Indoctrination includes the initial Security and Agency indoctrination of the
employee, the guidance to'h a s`thro gh Security Regulations and a series of inter-
views such as departure interviews before going overseas, debriefings on return
from overseas or special assifnmeet security advisory interviews upon his request
can official or personal problems; and exit interviews upon his termination. The in-
doctrina.tion as a i Phole of the e iployee has improved during the period by the four-
day .Agency Indoctrination inaugurated by the Director for Training. 1', Th.is, in
addition to being an efficiency and -morale factor, is a definite security improvement
in reducing security breaches through ignorance or naivete. On the other hand, the
initial security indoctrination needs improvement. Due to lack of suitable, auditorium
space and due to the great influx of employees the ability to give careful personal
indoctrination by both I&SO and their own supervisors has not been as thorough as
when the agency was small. Again, security leadership-and supervision at all
levels has not been as good during this period due to the operational pressures.
p
Employee controls within the U. S. require an increasing amount of effort
by this office as the Agency grows! These controls at .first )seem somewhat re-
strictive to new r en:m.hcrs, and as mentioned above considerable indoctrination is
necessary to enforce them.. `Under this category come all the personal problems
ranging from the major consideration of cover down tor individual problems of
attezd.ance at courses, auuthorji'ship. of articles for publication or arrests and court
actions for minor offenses. Deep cover persons offer no great problei-n as they are
n.otor should never be brought near 'outer buitdin?;FOai? " re handled personnally by
case officers,, ilowwfe-ver, the mass of light official cover personnel now being.-; re-
cruiteci pose rX.Aany ._probieems~ The cover situation for these people has deteriorated
to some extent during the period but by the Fall of 1951 a general tightening up i.atr J,
correcting the situation.
Overlapping into the functions of policy, lndoetrinatioo., and employee con
trot is the principle of anonymity which this office believes essential to security
e great 'ulk of caur people. Mention of our people by name in the Press and
artacles either written by them or about them may in themselves contain no classi
fied iiAformation but as a part of the "patternee made up by foreign analysts a. ight
become of definite value. In some cases it renders the persons forever ineligible
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s yob aye>~
of being -suet abroad on even a sex ai-covert basis. The growth of the A,gency and
t of the press a,.,Id public make difficult a. common sense enforce-
the obvious inte rre%
e a: is pro-
ment of the principle of a;xaoaa a city. f ;e c s Fe being aken to in~prov
cedure,
A.
It is in employee control n abtts rs that a paternal or should we say fraternal
aap'A r o,aach by Security is imperative.. There have been numbers of cases ranging
from mental breakdown to personal disaster where the positive -help of Security is
necessary to avoid chance of security risk to the Agency," We have found during
the year that this type of positive help has increased the Confidence of the employees
U&SO and causes their to come to us voluntarily with their problems.
Physical ecor ~~""~?~ nts ols~
During the period, the number of CIAO buildings increased iro
This large number of building m ai.n of theca widely selaa rate d, creates a definite;.
security hazard which has been reported Many. tier es. The cost of the guards alone
amounts to approxib nateiy 70 8 000 annually. The additional transportation and
courier systems necessary to maintain such a widespread installation is not only
costly but creates many risks in transit of documents and in collection of Classified
waste, etc.
Notw,,Athstaandin;:, the space difficulty, the physical security controls have
kept up % ith the increase in the Agency. The Sea guards on duty with CIA are paid
at grades higher than other GSA . guards and they have all been security investigated.
?; ile these guards are not of the highest type the physical security system is
based capon the cornbin, ,tion of the guard at the door, the badge system, the rcgu1a '
ions imposed upon employees in not leaving classified information exposed, and at
night on the combination of restricted entrances, guards, locked safes, and -nightly
aa4>laections of premises not only by tue' nards but by our own ni ;let security officers.
Proportionally, security violations such as open safes and exposed classified
material have definitely decreased during the period.
Improved techni al aids tea physical security such as microphone detectors,
etc, have been more widely used. Great improvements have been made of methods
of destruction of class f>e i C'1 s ste,
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Policy Cont'rols.,
ty policy is of course a part of each of the other functions. How-
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icy problems have required closer security liaison with the i ajoa defense agcncies25X1C
eve, we have found our overall policy problems greatly magnified. Major policies
which have been handled include dissemination of inLelli e ce to our own government
departments and the interchange of specific intelligence with foreign governments.
It is believed that we are on a sound basis to date in this respect altho gh the decision
as to what and to horn to give . our information will always be a, delicate one. These
of the government. During the period this office: also engaged in actual security
Inspection is an integral, part of a security syste to provide overall
exar ination of each function and to provide the capability of separate examianation
of the component parts as well as specialized Investigation when directed. TIe nc ?`
for increase in Inspection activities became apparent during the period and better
facilities were provided. Howeer, a s: core thorough inspection procedure is still
nee ded, aimed principally at basic security practices outside oi askba.~a ton and as
an r; ssistance to Senior Representatives and Chicle of Missions abroad, I&SO has
provided a number of trained security officers to our field missions in 1951 and
many more are, planed. It is next important to follow up on these peg. sons through
corres x ondence and by visits in order to help them to coordinate their problems
and to i rovidew necessary assistance a. d more uniform policy guidance. Other
inspection functions are most varied ranging fro-Ax physical and personnel security
s, xrveys of contractor s? plants, security surveys of covert and overt U. S. installa-
tions, major administrative investigations ordered by the D I or Deputy Directors.
The inspection function is not yet completely carried out and a more c
program is required.
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-arch and Acttton:
The x ea ors and z aea a' gyres necessary for counter-intelligence have ke,"ht
pace with the growth of the Agency. The development of oust own Investigative
and re eren ' a4 indices containing many ,thousands of names cros's-indexed
for co .ntsr..:ntelligence purposes has been of great assistance not only in screening
but to study of possible c 3unter int iligence problems. The use of our investigative
agents on cozasatea intent er..r w 6rk'i curtailed due to the tremendous applicant
case load and will only be remedied when d r investigative capabilities are increased
to adequate size as planned. Direct and highly profitable count er-i.ntelli gence
liaison has bee set up with other major investigative af.:~eacies and with certain
civil authorities. Research. and study.of our files and of the various "'patter'ns''
involved in possible counter-intelligence problems has been given more emphasis.
r NO soe;o net ?a: tioi s of lip ;en c. y have been discovered during this period,
entrance
ened " out before
e
r although a number of possible penetrations have been a~scr
non has been
t
a
onz du gyp. tat other ha ads no real evidence o s.z irnpo t nt i en
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re
.
that there a: lust be some Penetration and can not be coanpsacenad on t-.- sco
f
Nevertiie e; s. the Agency has not had one case of an alleged subversive brought
before the Con press or before the public by allegations in the 1~ recs.
Operational Su',,'.)Tport*
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Despite the pherionnenal growth of the Agency during this period,
it has been possible to maintai a sound Security rograma which
probably has the highest standards in government. There are weaknesses
we know of, and improvea ;cents we must make. There is much credit
due to our leasers and to the bulk of our ernployces. Basically security
rests with the and it is not an easy virtue. This office is proud of and
grateful. for the support it has received. We are a young agency and
much better than we realize. The boy has gone through adolescence
and has become a pretty sousd guy who has a great future if he co .tinues
to keep his eye osa that ball
SHEFFIELD DWARDS
Colonel, G
Assistunt Deputy/Inspection & Security.
SECUEffy
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