RESISTANCE TO ENEMY INTERROGATION, INDOCTRINATION, AND EXPLOITATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-04491A000100060005-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 27, 2001
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: August 1, 1967
• Content Type: REPORT

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Chapter 6
RESISTANCE TO ENEMY INTERROGATION, INDOCTRINATION,
AND EXPLOITATION
6-1. (U) Introduction:
a. General. A detailed analysis of prisoner
handling by various powers discloses a pattern
that has been reduced to three specific processes.
Communist methods are considered typical
and are used for purposes of illustration.
(1) Interrogation. The extraction of infor-
mation from an individual that can be used
to serve the cause of the communist society.
This information can be, and often is, military
in nature, but it is not limited to items of prime
military significance.
(2) Indoctrination. The process of re-
educating the prisoner in the communist
doctrine and political position in relation to
current events, with intent to convince him,
through "logical reasoning," that his own
country's cause is not in the "peoples" best
interests. The potential in this area is nearly
unbounded. On the one hand, it can be con-
version of a man's belief, in which he is led
to aspire to the communist cause; or to a lesser
degree, it can so confuse the prisoner about
his previously held beliefs that he will willingly
or unwillingly become , the servant of the
communists.
(3) Exploitation. The use of the prisoner
and his captive status, as well as the results
of interrogation and indoctrination, for such
purposes as labor, propaganda, hostage value,
and subversion.
b. Prisoner's Obligation. A prisoner is obli-
gated to resist the efforts of his captor to capital-
ize on these processes. This obligation springs
from a number of sources. They include the
traditions of his Military Service, his oath to
his country, and the clearly stated obligation
in the Code of Conduct. It shall be the military
purpose of the prisoner to continue the fight
and to recognize that only the terms of combat
have been changed. The battle must be fought
with all the courage and devotion that the man
can muster, and his determination and obliga
tion to win the fight must not be diluted.
6-2. (U) General Purposes of Communist
Processes:
a. Military personnel who are unfortunate
enough to become captives of an enemy,-
despite their best efforts to remain free, can
realistically expect to experience all three proc-
esses as an integral part of their captivity.
Documented records fail to disclose any in-
dividual case where such processes were not
attempted. The procedure given priority, and
the degree to which the processes are applied,
will vary with the particular situation and the
needs of the communist captor at the time.
A factor in an enemy's determination to apply
coercive pressure is any weakness discovered
in the physical or emotional makeup of the
prisoner.
'b. Several factors will determine how in-
tensely the processes are applied; for example,
the prisoner's rank and military function.
Experience shows that communist states con-
sider that successful exploitation of a prisoner
of higher rank increases the acceptability and
plausibility of the product. They are also prone
to feel that an exploitation project that could
undermine the US will to conduct or continue
to apply a military program that has been
particularly effective is worth almost any
effort.
6-3. (U) Communist Techniques. Communists
have demonstrated numerous techniques in
attempting to achieve interrogation, indoctrina-
tion, and exploitation. These techniques vary
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from subtle forms of psychological pressure to
more obvious forms of outright torture. Isola-
tion is a frequently used technique, with
elements of physical and mental duress. It may
be in physically cramping quarters, constant
darkness or light, without visual or oral com-
munication with others (including guards).
The result is boredom, monotony, and mental
and physical fatigue. Other techniques such as
the threat of execution, use of drugs or hypnosis,
and beatings, and how to counter them are
covered elsewhere in this manual and in
Military Service and command publications.
6-4. (U) Resistance to Interrogation :
a. The Prisoner's Responsibility:
(1) The captor can be expected to mount a
continuing program to elicit information from
the prisoner. This program may be conducted
overtly or covertly, and the areas of interest-
have virtually no boundaries. Prisoners of
higher rank, and those who are responsible for
sophisticated weapon systems, will be subjected
to the more intense efforts. However, all
personnel may properly assume that they have
some information that will be useful to the
enemy. At the very least, the information they
possess can be used against them in the exploita-
tion process described below.
(2) The Code of Conduct, DOD Directive
1300.7, 8 July 1964, and Military Service
directives specify the area of response to an
interrogator and clearly state the prisoner's
responsibility in this regard. All prisoners must
confine their answers to the prescribed limits.
The approved responses are based on com-
prehensive study of the experiences of US
military personnel held captive by hostile
powers and are tlesigned to:
(a) Deny military information to the
enemy.
(b) Protect the prisoner from the ap-
plication of pressures based on information
that the prisoner has furnished.
(c) Protect the prisoner group as a
whole by restricting any insight that the enemy
may be able to acquire about one prisoner based
on data procured from another prisoner.
(d) Protect the basic interests of the
United States in conducting military and
political operations to counter enemy attempts
at domination.
(3) In the situation outlined in a(1) above,
the means of carrying out the obligation is
basically the same. Every prisoner must with-
hold the information that he possesses by
limiting his responses to those cited in the
Code of Conduct and the pertinent Military
Service directives. It should also be made clear
that the prisoner is authorized to discuss matters
of personal health with his captor. (However,
see Paragraphs 6-4d and 7-4.)
(4) The prisoner must be aware that the
enemy interrogator very well may have exten-
sive biographical data on him. The fact that
the enemy has the information does not
release the prisoner from his obligation to
comply with the Code of Conduct.
b. Guidance Provided by the Military Services.
Each of the Military Services has published
guidance pertaining to the techniques of
interrogation practiced by communist bloc
countries. These techniques and the purpose
behind them do not vary significantly from
one country to the next. Similarly, all Military
Services outline standards of personal conduct
best suited to discourage continued interroga-
tion. Each Military Service is responsible for
training its personnel according to their needs
and the capture potential of the individual.
The Military Services are further responsible
for dissemination of approved responses within
the guidelines prescribed by Paragraph 6-4a.
(See also Paragraph 2-4e.)
c. Effectiveness of Drugs and Hypnosis. The
search for effective aids to interrogation is as
old as man's need to obtain information from
an uncooperative source. The notion that drugs
or hypnosis can illuminate hidden recesses of
the mind, help to heal the mentally ill, and
prevent or reverse miscarriages of justice has
been exploited in the press and popular litera-
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turc. The result is it highly embellished picture
of what these methods can do. Actually, there
is no documented history of communist captors
using either drugs or hypnosis on US military
personnel. However, because of the abundant
reference to these methods available to military
personnel, a clarification. of the subject is
deemed advisable.
(1) Used on uninformed and anxious
prisoners, drugs or hypnosis could prove to be
an aid to interrogation, but nothing more. If
the prisoner is aware of the limitations inherent
in their application, both techniques may be
considered ineffective. Their effectiveness is
often the result of the prisoner's attitude. A
prisoner who has lived under stress conditions
for some time, and who is faced with the
threat of drugs or hypnosis, or who encounters
an environment where their use is suspected,
may tend to be influenced by the situation and
resign himself to some form of automatic
compliance.
(2) The threat of drugs or hypnosis can of
itself be somewhat effective in raising the
threshold of suggestibility. The actual adminis-
tration or application of valid or psoudo-
narcotic or hypnotic stimuli may increase the
suggestibility level still further for an unpre-
pared individual. It is also important to note
that the subject emerges from drugs or hypnosis
(real or imagined) with the feeling that he has
revealed a great deal, even when he has not.
A well-managed interrogation program might
well allude to such guilt feelings to capitalize
on any success that is experienced.
(3) It is also manifestly true that successful
hypnosis depends on a positive relationship
with the hypnotist, and this relationship is
alien to the interrogation environment.
(4) In summary, drugs and hypnosis are
ineffectual for interrogation purposes when the
subject is strongly inclined to maintain emo-
tional control. Any individual who can with-
stand the rigors and stress of classic (and
competently conducted) interrogation in a state
free of drugs or hypnosis can do so in the state
induced by such exotic measures. The essential
resources for resistance are deep seated, and
strong beliefs or positions will not be altered
by these methods.
d. Limiting Responses to the Enemy. While the
prisoner cannot require the enemy to stop their
interrogation, his limited responses will make
clear that their continued concentrated efforts
will be futile. The limiting of communication
with the interrogator should also extend to
personal information, as this will deprive the
enemy of data for the exploitation process.
e. Benefits of Resisting. The restriction in
DOD Directive 1300.7, which states that
further responses are made on the prisoner's
own responsibility, is based on two considera-
tions:
(1) To protect the interests of the United
States, and
(2) To reduce the amount of data that the
enemy might be able to compile on any prisoner.
If each prisoner acts to further the second
consideration-which is to his own advantage-
he will automatically further the first one.
6-5. (U) Resistance to Indoctrination:
a. Indoctrination is one of the communist
techniques of waging war. It consists of half-
truths, calculated lies, and appeals to reason,
all devised to best serve the cause of the indoc-
trinator. Its purpose is to make the prisoner
doubt the soundness of his country's cause.
The prisoner must understand this. It will make
it much easier for him to ignore any appeal the
indoctrination may have.
b. The prisoner cannot hope to stop the in-
doctrination by any direct action of his own.
He can, however, contribute directly to its
failure by refusing to be drawn into debates
with the indoctrinator, and by refusing to ad-
mit that he has participated in operations that
are in any way spurious or suspect. He should
also reiterate his unswerving faith in his own
cause. Such avowals have a twofold impact:
they discourage any impression that, he is un-
certain of his cause or that his beliefs can be
modified. They also tend to reinforce the pris-
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oner's personal resistance, so that he can readily
meet his obligation-which is to remain stable
and continue the fight.
c. Above all, the prisoner must understand
that the indoctrinator's goals are alien to his
own, regardless of the attempt to make them
sound similar. Communist ideology and the
American way of life are completely dissimilar,
and, in many ways, incompatible.
6-6. (U) Resistance to Exploitation:
a. Purpose of Exploitation. The purpose of
exploitation is to derive some value from the
prisoner. When used by a skillful captor, it may
be difficult to recognize and resist, but the pris-
oner must make every effort to do so.
b. Prisoner of More Value Alive Than Dead.
Being of potential value to the enemy can be
advantageous to the prisoner since his captor
is less likely to use severe measures. Every
prisoner should realize that he is of more po-
tential value to the enemy alive than dead.
c. The Chief Value of a Prisoner. The values
of military prisoners are summarized as follows:
(1) Value as a Source of Military Informa-
tion. Interrogation for military information, as
discussed earlier in this chapter, is perhaps the
most obvious component of the exploitation
process. Most personnel have been aware for
most of their lives that it is the practice of the
captor to interrogate prisoners and the duty of
of the prisoner to deny disclosures. How well
this duty is carried out depends on the individ-
ual determination of each prisoner.
(2) Value as a Labor Force. Prisoners have
been called upon to work during captivity and
would doubtless be required to in the future.
To date, however, exploitation in the form of
labor has not been significant.
(3) Value as a Hostage. The broadest defi-
nition of the term "hostage" applies in assessing
a prisoner's value as a hostage. It is undeniable
that communist nations are aware of the ex-
treme importance the IJS attaches to its mili-
tary personnel who are being held against their
will. They realize that the United States exerts
maximum effort at all times and under all con-
ditions to regain its people. Concessions to effect
their release have been granted in the past and
may be granted in the future. Knowing this,
the communist nations are prone to use all
means at their disposal to exact a price for the
return of US personnel.
(4) Value as a Political Tool. Communist
countries value the prisoner most as a political
or propaganda tool. The captor acheives success
by employing the exploitation process so in-
sidiously that a debiliated captive often does
not realize what is happening. The process can
take many forms, and may, at the time, appear
ridiculous to the prisoner. He may be sure,
however, that the procedure is calculated and
that the captor has a specific use for the results
of his effort.
d. Pressure to Make Statements Favorable to
Communist Cause:
(1) One aspect of communist exploitation
that has occurred in every experience US
personnel have had with a communist capitor
is the eventual requirement for the prisoner
to make statements either favorable to the
communist view, or unfavorable to US in-
terests. Attempts to acquire such statements
have taken a number of forms. Coercion has
been used to obtain oral statements for broad-
casts or recordings for assemblies, or written
statements for various printed media.
(2) In all cases examined, the persuasive
techniques applied seemed to the prisoner at
the time to be logical and valid. In large
measure, this is the result of the capitor's
continuing effort to lead the prisoner to believe
that he holds the power of life or death over
him and his fellow prisoners. Since the prisoner
sees little actual evidence to refute this con-
tention, the position seems rational. However,
the fact remains clear; the intrinsic value to
the capitor of holding the prisoner outweighs
the temporary value of obtaining a propaganda
statement.
(1) The restrictions on written communi-
cations imposed by DOD Directive 1300.7 and
further delineated in Chapter 7 are designed to
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serve the best interests of the prisoner as well
as the United States. In addition to safeguard-
ing military information and denying the enemy
a source of propaganda harmful to the US,
these restrictions protect the prisoner against
possible use of his written statements as evi-
dence of alleged war crimes committed prior to
capture. Nearly all communist countries have
made a reservation to Article 85 of the GPW,
under which they claim the right to deny PW
treatment to persons convicted of war crimes.
Under this reservation, once a prisoner is
convicted of such crimes, he may be treated as a
common criminal and deprived of all rights
under the GPW, including appeal of the con-
viction to a higher court, confinement with
other PWs, visitation by the ICRC and the
Protecting Power, receipt of mail, and repatria-
tion. Moreover, in cases where a prisoner con-
victed of a war crime is sentenced to death,
the communists do not consider themselves
bound to notify the Protecting Power that the
death penalty has been imposed or to stay the
execution of the sentence for six months after
such notification, as required by the GPW.
(2) The Code of Conduct and DOD
Directive 1300.7 specifically prohibit the making
of "oral or written statements disloyal to my
country and its allies or harmful to their cause."
The prisoner who categorically refuses to make
oral or written statements not in the best in-
terest of the United States is aiding his own
cause.
(3) It has been the practice among
communist captors to require PWs to include
in their letters statements attesting to favorable
treatment received by them as a condition
precedent to the right of corresponding with
the next of kin. Under these circumstances, the
prisoner must insure that he does not include
any statements in his correspondence deroga-
tory to the US.
f. Retaining Confidence in US Efforts in
Behalf of Prisoners. Realization that his country
will continue its efforts to obtain his release
and will provide for the support and care of his
dependents gives the prisoner additional in-
centive to resist the enemy's exploitation
efforts. The United States will negotiate
through all available channels for the release
of prisoners, and any statement by the captor
that his country has written him off must be
considered false and designed to increase the
prisoner's apprehension and/or despair. To the
prisoner, the conduct of negotiations might
seem slow, but he may be sure that no program
of the US Government carries a higher priority.
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