CLANDESTINE SERVICE SENIOR SEMINAR

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP78-04497A000100030034-8
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
5
Document Creation Date: 
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 28, 2000
Sequence Number: 
34
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
April 23, 1969
Content Type: 
MF
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PDF icon CIA-RDP78-04497A000100030034-8.pdf213.16 KB
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Approved For Relea~ 2001/08/28 :C4497AOOOr,~A030034-8 23 April 1969 MEMORANDUM FOR: Coordinator, CS Senior Seminar SUBJECT Clandestine Service Senior Seminar REFERENCE Memos, Same Subject, dated 17 March and 17 April 1969 1. The following comment takes off from the premise that the purpose of the Senior Seminar series is to identify CS problems and to draw upon the arecumulative experience of senior officers to analyze problems and seek solutions. From this premise it follows that the agenda of each seminar will be shaped to some degree by the experience and knowledge of those attending it. I recommend that, having identified the participants in the seminar, the background of each be reviewed to determine what knowledge, experience and special interests each officer has which could be profitably drawn upon during the seminar. This review should in- clude apersonal interview with each officer. 2. On the basis of the information thus gathered the Coordinator would develop an agenda which would strive to take advantage of the backgrounds of the senior officers who are about to gather together for four weeks. The agenda topics could then be assigned to specific officers to develop and to act on as discussion leaders. Such assign- ments should be made well in advance of the opening of the seminar to give ample time for preparation. Each discussion leader in turn might assign sub-topics to be developed by other members of the group, drawing where possible on the expertise of the individual officer. This approach implies that the subject matter of each seminar would be developed by those participating in it and therefore would vary from one seminar to another. The controlling ~.~ ~ V '~+y ~ r1. Approved For Release 2001/08/28 :CIA-RDP78-04497A000100030034-8 Approved For Rele 2001/08/ - P~8-04497AOOO~p030034-8 ~, philosophy, however, would require emphasis on problem areas in the CS. It is conceivable that a seminar could be conducted without any outside participation; however, it is evident that guest experts should be located and brought into the seminar dis- cussions as needed. 3. The following comments are keyed to the suggested agenda for the first seminar as contained in reference memorandum: The U. S. and the World Today - No specific suggestions here. One day is insufficient for any depth of discussion but should be adequate to set the stage if appropriate outside speakers are obtained. The CS in a Changing World -This topic lends itself to an approach by regions with synthesis at the end. Each divi- sion, perhaps, could discuss the question in terms of the significant changes which affect operations, operational climate, targets, requirements, etc. New problems should be isolated and approaches which have been tried as well as those which are only in the planning stage should be presented. Presuma- bly, a number of the new problems will be common to all regions. A few may be peculiar to only one country or region. Common denominators and rational generalizations may lead to progress toward solutions. The National Security Process -With the Nixon adminis- tration security system just getting its initial shakedown, this topic is appropriate and timely. It would seem to require guest speakers including one or mare from outside the Agency. A description of the system with visual aids seems appropriat e. Then, follow-up with specific examples of how it works based on actual foreign policy and national security problems that have arisen since the first of the year. CIA. Today; The CS Mission -The memorandum under reference says this topic is included as a brief adjunct to the national security process to insure that seminar participants are aware and up-to-date on elements and programs of the Agency which have potential relevance to problems to be dis- cussed in the following weeks. In this writer's view, it would Approved For Release 2001/08/ &178-04497A000100030034-8 Approved For Relea~ 2001/08/28 : ~~F~,7~497AOOO~p030034-8 be well to determine beforehand whether any significant pro- portion of the participants. are unaware of the Agency's present-day role. I would suspect that most of the officers are operating on the basis of outdated information received in briefings years ago. For example, I think there is a place here for a presentation on technical collection in considerable depth, including visits to NSA and NPIC. All our senior officers should have an up-to-date appreciation of what is going on in the technical collection field in order to be able to consider human resources in proper perspective. Up to two days could be devoted to this subject. Career Management -This term seems vague. Does it mean career planning? Perhaps the section should be called "Management of Operational Personnel. " Management is a popular topic these days but it is sometimes hard to define. I would suggest the seminar ask itself three questions: (1) How well are we doing in placing the right man in the right job? (2) How well are we preparing the man for the job? and (3) How ~~~~~T Approved For Release 2001/08/28 :CIA-RDP78-04497A000100030034-8 Approved For Release 2001/08/28 :CIA-RDP78-04497A000100030034-8 ~ ~C~EY `~,': good are we at recruiting potential CS officers in the first place? It seems to me that these three questions are basic to the identification of whatever problems there may be. If the answers are that we are not doing some of these things very well, then we have a management problem and the seminar discussion can proceed from there. I do think that the paragraph under reference is rather too negative, imply- ing that we aren't doing much of anything well. A mare posi- tive approach might be to attempt to determine what we have learned about personnel management and ask ourselves what needs to be changed. Some other questions are likely to arise.' F'or example: (1) Is it necessary for the CS to adhere to the "average grade" principle and the strait jacket which it imposes? (2) The CT Program should be examined in the light of whether or not it should be taken over completely by the CS, including recruit- ment and training. (3) It is said that the CS lags behind other agencies in the promotion of its officers. I would suggest the following figures which apply to FSO promotions be correlated with CS promotions. I am sure the comparison would be strik- ing. 1969 1968 1967 To Class One 38 21 38 To Class Two 54 40 74 To Class Three 91 8I 103 To Class Four 124 104 146 To Class Five 140 141 250 To Class Six 92 58 123 Approved For Release 2001/08/28 :CIA-RDP78-04497A000100030034-8 - Approved For Relearn 2001/08/28 :CIA-RDP78-04497AOOO~p0030034-8 SECRET ANALYSIS OF 1969 FSO PROMOTIONS Av. Age Numbers Number Number of Those Av. Yrs. Promoted Officers in Class Promoted in Class From Class 2 38 449 47.9 3.9 >~~ (49.7) (3. 7) From Class 3 54 676 43.7 3.9 (46.5) (3. 5) From Class 4 91 646 41.2 3. 5 (41.2) (2. 6) From Class 5 124 561 34.5 1.7 (34.4) (l. 3) From Class 6 140 420 30.4 1.3 (30.1) (l. l) From Class 7 92 299 27.1 1. 1 (27.1) (l. 3) >~~ Parenthesis represent average of total in class. Recruitment of Soviets - We have no special comment here. ~' There are experts galore in this field. Success still eludes us. We in WH feel that there is still not enough emphasis on basic preparation for recruitments; that is, on the building of bridges to the target. We also advocate a stationwide approach to the Soviet target instead of leaving it up to the SB section of the station. Approved For Release 2001/08/28 :CIA-RDP78-04497A000100030034-8