PERSONNEL PROBLEMS IN THE EVENT OF A NATIONAL MOBILIZATION.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-04718A000400180011-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 14, 2000
• Sequence Number: 11
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMM?AMUM TO:
Acting Executive, CIA
SUBJECT:
Personnel Problems in the Event of a National
Mobilization.
REFERENCE:
(a)
(b)
Acting Executive Secret memorandum dated
12 July 1950, same subject.
Proposed OPC memorandum to JSPD, Subject:
Mobilization Assignments, OPC. (attached)
Executive ReQj.s ry t
C- ldls~
1. Based on a telephone conversation between the Acting Executive,
CIA and Acting Deputy Chief, Staff III/OPC, on 18 July 1950, it is
OPC's understanding that it is DCI's intent as stated in reference (a),
para. 1, not to make any approaches leading to the consummation of
agreements on the above subject to either the Selective Service
System or the Department of Defense until a general mobilization has
been declared. OPC believes that agreements with Selective Service
and the Department of Defense should be made immediately for the
following reasons:
Selective Service:,
a. Some of our employees are presently liable to the
draft and may be called any day. OPC's efficiency may be
considerably hampered should the services of its employees
be lost to the draft.
b. If the mechanics of special CIA draft boards are not
established until mobilization has been announced, the time
and energies of CIA personnel will be required for this task
at a time when their efforts could be more profitably spent
in other directions. Setting up the mechanics at the time
of mobilization rather than now will be made more difficult
in that the full energies of the Selective Service System
will be strained to the utmost at that time.
c. The confusion that will exist at the time of a
general mobilization will be such that some of our employees
may be actually drafted before the proper machinery has been
set up, with resultant loss of efficiency, danger to security,
and possibly actual loss of personnel.
DeDartment of Defens
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Department of Defense:
d. Several reserve officers whom OPC hopes to secure or retain
in the event of mobilization have already received their
mobilization assignments to other branches of the Service
and some are being ordered to extended active duty. It
is essential to OPCIs war plans that such individuals be
immediately available to CPC in case of emergency.
Serious damage to OPC's operations and the compromise of the
security of several individuals may take place unless pro-
vision has been made in advance of mobilization for the
secure handling of the war-time assignments of these
reservists.
f. Several regular officers occupy key positions in
OPCts organization. Arrangements must be made now for their
mobilization assignments to OPC if a serious disruption of
OPC's activities is to be avoided.
2. Para. 2 a of reference (a) gives the Personnel Director
planning responsibility for the "preparation and coordination of the
desired agreement with the Office of the Secretary of Defense". OPC
believes that it should share this responsibility so far as OPC is
concerned. The JSPD has been established for the purpose of helping
OPC solve such of its problems as relate to the Defense Department.
OPC believes that discussions with JSPD at the planning stage will
facilitate and expedite the completion of final arrangements with
the Defense Department. Prior to receipt of reference (a), it had
been OPCts plan to make its approach to JSPD simultaneously with
CIA's approach to the Secretary of Defense. Reference (b), attached,
had been prepared by OPC as its instrument for preliminary negotia-
tions with JSPD, and OPC still believes that it should initiate
discussions with JSPD at once, as outlined in reference (b), with
the hope of establishing agreements that will protect OPO.
3. OPC concurs in general with paragraphs 3 a and b of
reference (a), but recommends that the interim period be made no
longer than is necessary to establish agreements with the Secretary
of Defense and the Selective Service System. It is believed that,
for security reasons, the mobilization arrangements for many individ-
uals, either reservists or regular military, who are now occupying
covert positions, can best be made by OPC through existing channels.
OPC therefore requests the privilege of deciding which cases require
._ ._OPC concurs
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4. OPO concurs with that section of para. 4 requiring that
"lists of individuals desired for designation for assignment to OSO
and OPC in case of national mobilization, for whom there is no current
T/0 authorization, will be prepared by those offices and delivered to
the Personnel Director as soon as'practicablett. It is assumed that
the Personnel Director will make the necessary arrangements for secur-
ity clearances so that the individuals on these lists will be available
for duty immediately on announcement of mobilization. The final
sentence of reference (a), para. 4, prohibits further action pending
further instructions from the Director, so far as negotiating agree-
ments with either the Department of Defense or the Selective Service
System. As has been indicated above, OPC urges that immediate
approaches be made to both these organizations and that negotiations
with JSPD be undertaken at once.
Assistant Director for
Policy Coordination
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