DESCRIPTION OF HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS(Classified)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-04718A001000020004-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2000
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: REPORT

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DESCRIPTION OF HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS
SOUTH BUILDING ATTIC
25X1A9a
25X1 Monday., 20 July 1953, of TSS and CIA
Assistant Safety Officer, W ea fire an eafety survey of the East and Central
Areas of the South Building Attic. The following statements concerning the
exist hazards du e
e and location of the operation were given by
25X1A9a
a. Room 4201 is a laboratory containing inflammable materials
such as acetone, alcohol, chloreform, benzene, ether and
about sixty gallons of acids (nitric, sulfuric and hydro-
chloric). He stated that in case of fire, or as a bi-product
of a semi-automatic experiment, phosgene gas could be produced
from chloroform. This is a very deadly ex-war gas. There
will also be a 208 cu. ft. acetylene tank and a 208 cu. ft.
oxygen tank used in this room.
b. A mixture of potassium di-chromate and sulfuric acid is used
in Rooms 4201, 4007, 4019 and 4013. This material is used as
a glass cleaner and is capable of Beverly burning personnel
if the container shoed upset or crack. These rooms contain
between two and five gallons of this material in porcelain or
pyrex containers.
c. The danger of cyanide gas is present in Rooms 4201, 4202, 4007
and 4013 at all times. This gas is very deadly and could be
produced by fire or laboratory accidents. Only a small concen-
tration (1 to 2000) of this gas is needed to be considered
deadly.
d. Rooms 4201-A, 4009-A, 4013-B and 4011 are small photographic
rooms which would probably only prcduee nauseous organic
nitrogen compound femmes.
e. Room 4202 is a storage room for the various laboratories
throughout the central and east sections of the attic. There
are 400 different.-.:compounds stored in this room which w give
approximately 16,000 possible combinations. said 25X1A9a
that there was no question as to the deadly pose ty of the
fumes that would be produced in case of fire or accident.
Cyanide, bromine and hydrogen fluoride gases, all of which are
very deadly, would probably be formed. There are 50 gallons
of the following inflammables stored in this room: ether,
petroleum ether, hexane, benzene, toluene, carbon di-sulfide,
alcohol collodion and 2 lbs. of magnesium. There are also
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25X1A9a
25X1A5a1
20 gallons of acids and 9 lbs. of cyanide crystals. Mr.
- further stated that one pound of cyanide and one
gallon of acid would form a lethal dose for the entire area.
f. The entire east area, which has a maximum of 25 persons, is
affected by each of the eight individual rooms that make up
the east area. This is caused by the fact that the air-
conditioning unit will pick up poisonous fumes and recirculate
them throughout the entire area in approximately 18 seconds.
claimed at the time of installation
that this unit was a 90% return supply system.
g. The east area is secured by means of a vault door located near
the east stairwell. The lock on this door is of a type that
can be looked from the outside trapping personnel within since
this is their only escape route.
h. Immediately outside this vault door, and on the opposite side
of the hall at the stairway, is a large air-conditioning unit
and the motor for the elevator. A fire in either location
would probably eliminate all possibility of egress for personnel
in the east section.
i. The central section of the building consists of 12 rooms and
has a maximum of 16 persons in the entire area. The same
situation exists in this area as in the east section. Every
room in this area affects the other rooms in the section
because of the air-conditioning unit.
J. The east vault door of the central section is similar to the
vault door securing the east section. However, there are
normally two routes of egress for personnel in the central area.
k. Rooms 4007 and 4013 are the same type as Room 1,01 and have
approximately the same quantity and type of hazardous materials.
1. Rooms 4017 and 4019 make up a small laboratory where small quantities
of inflammables and acid are stored.
25X1A9a mo stated that all chemical laboratories should have
safety showers to aid in'the removal of acids that might be
spilled on personnel during an experiment or as a result of an
accident.
n. Refrigerators used for storage of ether should have interior
lights removed, be entirely spark proof inside and have external
switches to lessen the danger of explosion.
o. Room 4021 is used as a carpentry shop. 4 gallons of paint and
1 gallon of turpentine are stored in metal cabinets.
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p. If there were a power failure, the entire attic area would
be without light or air conditioning. Since there are no
outside windows in this attic, light and ventilation could
be a major hazard.
/s/
CIA Assistant Safety Officer
CONCURRENCES
/s/
25X1A9a
Chief, TSS/SAD
/s/
25X1A9a
Deputy e , Peearch Analysis Branch
SO: JBM/jg (27 July '53)
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25X1A9a
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FIRE AND SAFETY SURVEY REPORT
AREA INSPECTED: Central and East Sections, South Building Attic
DATE INSPECTED s 20 July 1953?
25X1A9a INSPECTED BY: Assistant Safety Officer, SO
Intelligence Officer, TSS
PURPOSE:
1. To determine the existence of any fire and safety hazards and to
make appropriate corrective recommendations.
FINDINGSs:
2. See attached Description of Hazardous Conditions.
RECONDATIONSs
3-a. Signs should be placed on the doors at both east and west stairways
reading "DANGER-POISONOUS. GASES AND ACIDS". This would warn both guards and
firemen of the hazards involved in fighting a fire in these areas*
b. Oxygen masks should be hung on the walls adjacent to the East
Section entrance door and the east and west entrance doors to the Central
Section. A sufficient number (at least one to a room) of oxygen masks
should be hung in each room of these two attic areas to afford protection
against poisonous fumes.
c. Emergency lights that would automatically turn on with a power
failure should be installed in each room and corridor of the attic.
d. Emergency out-off switches for the air-conditioning unit should be
strategically installed throughout the attic area.so that the spread of
poisonous fumes could be slowed in case of a fire or accident.
e. Safety showers should be installed in all laboratory rooms in
sufficient number to insure adequate protection to personnel. The rooms
requiring safety showers are as follows: 4201, /407, 4019, 4013 and 4202.
f. The locks on the east door of the Central Section and the door
to the East Section should be modified so as to allow personnel to unlock
them from the inside. This will eliminate the possibility of trapping
personnel in these areas.
g. The wood shelving in Room 4202 should be replaced by metal shelving
and all inflammable liquids stored in closed metal cabinets. The acids in
this area should also be kept segregated from both the inflammables and
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the other materials in this area.
h. All refrigerators used to store materials such as ether should be
completely spark-proofed so as to avoid the danger of explosion. If ether
itself is to be used extensively, then all electrical outlets, apparatus
and fixtures should be spark-proofed.
i. Wherever it is probable that poisonous or explosive vapors will
be present, exhaust fans should be installed to carry these fumes away
from the building.
J. Action should be taken to afford a secondary means of egress to
personnel in the East and West Sections of the building. Either a window
at each section with outside fire escapes or an inside escape hatch with
stairs to the third floor should be installed.
k. Inflammables, acids and poisons should not be stored in such large
quantities as were found in these attic areas of an office building.
1. If it is at all possible, this entire operation should be re-
located in a more suitable area where the number of persons affected by
accidents would be limited and where ventilation and egress would be
greatly improved.
CONCLUSIONS
4. The combination of dangerous materials and poor location makes for
extremely hazardous working conditions for personnel in South Building and,
in particular, for those in the Central and East Sections of the attic.
Steps:ihould be taken immediately to minimize the existing hazards or
relocate the entire operation in a less populated area with the approved
type of equipment and storage facilities normally connected with a
chemical laboratory.
/s/
25X1A9a
25X1A9a
CIA Assistant Safety Officer
Attackmzent: Description of Hazardous Conditions
SO:JBM//jg (30 July '53)
Distribution
Orig -
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1 -
1 - D. et en___'
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25X1A9a
 STA;IDARD FORM NO. 64 {0
? Of ce A1&fhbFA**00/0 fHb- RgRI;E 7 -$OVERNMENT6
Manager, West Area
Acting Chief, Safety and Protection Branch
Safety and Fire Prevention Survey
2430 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
DATE: February 15, 1954
In Reply Refer To s 3PBPS
At the request of superintendent, State 25X1A9a
Group, our office participate ?n a survey of the fourth floor area
of the captioned building. The attached report and recommendations
are self-explanatory.
It is
suggested that a copy of this report be forwarded
25X1A9a to , Safety Officer for the agency involved for his
information. Undoubtedly you will be working-closely with 5X1A
and others in'his agency towards ultimate solution of the ser ous
fire and safety hazards noted.
Encl.
/a/
25X1A9a
lit No- ------- a~ ~-__-
I~..i. .,i3 :Y1Y
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REPORT OF SURVEY - 2430 STREET,. ?1.W., WASHINGTON, D.C.
117
Date of Visit: December 8, 1953
INSPECTOR:
TITLE: re even on gineer
25X1A9a
Purpose of Visit: To conduct a special fire service visit and to consult with the
representatives of the occupying agency relative to the adequacy of exits, as well
as fire prevention and protection for the 4th floor storage and laboratory area.
Persona Contacted: M rintendent
25X1 A9a and other representatives
0 occupy agency.
Coditiq Found:
A. Construction and Protection
Building is of fire resistive construction normally three stories in height
with attic. Within recent years the attic area has been remodeled and divided
into several laboratory, shop and office rooms and a storage room for chemicals
and flammable liquids.
Partitions generally throughout the attic are of plaster and cement asbestos
board construction. Doors to the rooms are of light wood construction. Two
masonry enclosed stairways are installed. The entire attic area is air conditioned.
A fire alarm system has been installed and a good supply of first aid fire
appliances are conveniently available. No automatic sprinkler protection is pro-
vided however.
Due to strict security requirements special vault type looks have been in-
stalled on the exit doors through which egress would be affected. This type of
look is electrically actuated for personnel leaving the area during the normal
daytime working hours. When an individual, either deliberately or accidentally,
moves the dial on the outer side of the exit door, the lock is actuated and
personnel in the rooms are trapped until freed by someone who knows the combina-
tion of the look. In this area personnel could be looked and/or practicallyr
trapped, for some period of time as there is no other way out except through a
small door which leads to a roof ledge. This is a situation which has actually
happened. Often under these conditions occupants are not aware they are looked
in and should an accident involving chemicals occur under such conditions un-
doubtedly they would be unable to leave the premises.
Occupar,.29: A large research laboratory together with small offices and a storeroom
are located in the East end of this area. The remaining portion is used for mis-
cellaneous laboratory, research, shop eta. space.
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Store. room: A small room constructed of cinder block with a wooden door is
located adjacent to the research laboratory near the main exit door. The only
ventilation provided for this room is through a slatted louvre located at the
lower portion of the south wall of the room. No automatic fire protection is
provided. This storeroom appears to contain rather large amounts of flammable
liquids and hazardous chemicals.
Ventilat on: Ventilation and air conditioning is of the recirculating type.
Prooceseds The nature of the experimental and research work conducted in the
laboratory introduces a severe potential accident or fire hazard. This would
also be brought about in the event of fire or accident in the storage room.
In this connection it was indicated that severely toxic gases might possibly
be generated by chemicals coming in contact with acids, organic materials, etc.
This might have far reaching and particularly severe results.
Discussion: A discussion was held on the site with representatives of PBS and
the occupying agency relative to the safety and the evacuation of personnel in
the event of fire, explosion or other accident particularly those in which deadly
gases are liberated. Exits were discussed and a survey was undertaken to deter-
mine whether additional emergency exits could be provided. The installation of
emergency exits to the roof through dormer windows was suggested bat it appeared
that this would be a costly procedure and would offer little or no-solution to
the problem as personnel evacuating in this manner would be stranded on the
roof with no means of getting down. Then again, if strict security were imposed
on these emergency exits, the name as on the present regular exits, no advantage
would be gained. After much pro and con on the problem it was decided that
representatives of PBS would submit a report with recommendations to alleviate
the situation.
Sener1: Flammable liquids, Chemicals, acids, etc., such as those stored and used
in the area offer a potential rather than an active hazard. The latter occurs
only when the containers are accidentally dropped and broken; when accidents
occur during processing and should the storage room be involved in fire. Under
such conditions the hazard will depend upon the character of the chemicals
and flammable liquids, handling or mixing operations, amounts in storage, etc.
To correct this potentially hazardous situation which might well result in
a serious accident, fire or explosion the following recommendationo are offered:
RECQM2ENDAT IONS
1. Laboratory activities and the storage of flammable liquids,
chemicals, acids, etc., constitute a serious fire and accident hazard
in the area in question, It was indicated also that there exists a
particularly serious exposure with respect to the possible liberation
of lethal or toxic gases which might involve occupants and the public.
Therefore, it is suggested that these operations be relocated in an
adequately equipped and'protected separate building, one story in
height removed from the District of Columbia and/or other residential
or congested area preferably in a remote urban location.
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2. As a less desirable alternate method of correcting the
situation the following steps should be taken:
A. Storeroom (1) Relocate the present storeroom to the S.E. or N.E.
corner of the 4th floor,, preferably the N.E. corner.
(2) Divide the relocated storeroom by erecting a fire
resistant wall to separate chemicals that are not
compatible.
(3) Install a C.o.2 automatic fire protection system
in the storerooms.
(4) Provide adequate natural or mechanical ventilation
for these storerooms.
(5) Install self-closing, fire resistive doors to the
storerooms with a raised sill at least 4" high.
(6) Provide electrical fixtures of the explosion proof
type in accordance with the National Electrical Code.
(7) Limit the aggregate supply of f1e able liquids to
10 gal. and store in approved metal safety cans in a
metal cabinet against outside wall of storeroom.
(8) Limit the amount of chemicals and acids to provide
a reasonable degree of safety.
B. Repearch X"= -
(1) Rearrange the air conditioning to prevent the recir-
culation of hazardous gases to other portions of the
building. It is suggested that the air conditioning for
the laboratories and the storeroom for chemicals, flam-
mable liquids, eta. be independent self-contained systems,
which, would not distribute gases throughout the entire
floor and/or other parts of the building in the event of
accident. If this cannot be accomplished a remote control
switch should be installed at some readily available loca-
tion to shut off the air conditioning equipment immediately.
(2) Install tight fitting self-olosing doors at the
entrance to the research laboratory to swing'in the
direction of exit travel.
0. it Doors: Replace present corridor and stairway exit
doors secured by vault type looking devices with an
entirely new door which would offer security and provide
an exit in case of extreme emergency. In this connection
it is suggested that the replacement doors be constructed
with full plate glass panels extending to within eighteen
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C. W~ doors (continued)
(18) inches of the floor. These doors could be equipped
with vault type locks, etc., and also be provided with
metallic foil which would transmit an alarm in event of
unauthorized entry. An axe should be provided for breaking
the door glass in an emergency.
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25X1 A9a Chief, General Services Office, Building &
Maintenance & Utilities Branch
SAD Memo #275
28 Apr 54
Attn : Mr
Chief, TSS/SAD C-ocwm nt Boo- -------- mod; /
Thru Chief, TSS rwu a'iun a to CIa3s- 1`I
El 0"Prisslf ed
Safety and Fire Prevention Survey Cho!god Tot TS 'S C
R'? l-
Reference: 3PBPS dtd 15 Feb 54 Date, -- ---Sow Z - Cye
HR 70 dtat -------,,07M
1. This Division has examined carefully the referenced Safety and
Fire Survey and the recommendations accompanying it. Some of the recommen-
dations have already been accomplished, others we feel might well be'accom-
plished, and some we feel should be given no further consideration.
2. Listed below you will find our comments on the recommendations in
the subject survey. Reference numbers found refer to the page, paragraph,
and subparagraph on that survey.
a. Recommendation 1 (page 2): We do not feel that we can comment
on this recommendation in more than a general way. We do agree that
the functions now being carried on in. the subject area might well be
relocated; however, this is not a decision which we are in a position
to make. Beyond concurring with the general thought, we have no
oomments*
b. Recoxcnendation 2 (page 3):
Subrecomuendation 1: This recommendation suggests the relocation
of the present storeroom to either the Northeast or the southeast
corner of the fourth floor. We do not feel that the movement of
the storeroom can be agreed to by this Division as this move would
place the storeroom in the one case on the other side of the
clerical offices from all operational personnel. Relocating the
storeroom in the other suggested corner of the building would
virtually necessitate the entire reconstruction of that end of
the building which would not only involve the normal expense but
would further require the relocation of large quantities of fixed
laboratory benches and their accompanying pipes, sinks, etc.
Subrecomunendat on 2: This recommendation deals with the
division of the storeroom by a fire resistant wall whose purpose
would be to separate chemicals that are not compatable. In this
Division's opinion very few chemicals are compatable with one
another. We seriously doubt that any such separation of chemicals
into compatable groups could be made. We. have, as a result of a
prior survey, removed all acids from the current storeroom to
another storage area. We have further separated all inflammables
and placed them in an all metal cabinet equipped with eliding
Metal doors./
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metal doors. Further separation appears to us to be impossible.
Subrecojwndation as This recommendation deals with the instal-
lation of a CO automatic fire extinguisher system in the storeroom.
We are in complete concurrence with this recommendation.
Subreconanendation 4: This recommendation deals with the
provision of adequate natural or mechanical ventilation for the
storeroom. We are in complete concurrence with this recommendation
but wish to point out that, in our opinion, this room cannot be
naturally ventilated as the entire fourth floor area is wholly
dependent upon an air conditioning system for any ventilation
whatsoever. We do however, feel that the installation of a
mechanical ventilation system, which services this storeroom only,
would be an excellent move if it proves to be feasible from the
construction standpoint.
Subrecommendation 55: This recommendation deals with the
installation on the storeroom of a self-closing, fire resistant
door with a raised sill. We have little opinion on this recommen-
dation beyond the statement that the wooden door currently used on
the storeroom is little less of a hazard than the plaster board
wall which separates the storeroom from the ball. It would seem
to us that if you are going to install a fire resistive door, some
consideration to installing a fire resistive wall should also be
given. It is felt that this entire recommendation might better be
solved by the installation of the automatic fire extinguisher
discussed in subrecommendation 3.
Sundation 62 This recommendation deals with the
installation of explosion proof electrical fixtures. It has our
complete concurrence.
Subreag endatjo? 7: This recommendation deals with the
limitation of the amount of flammable liquids which are to be stored.
We feel that we have already reduced the amount of inflammable
solvents to a minimum point consistent with our mission. Further
reduction would necessitate the construction of an additional
storage area somewhere in, or in the immediate vicinity of, South
Building. The procurement time needed to replenish these solvents
is so long that certain minimum stocks must be maintained in the
area at all times.
Subrecommendat~ .ion 8: This recommendation deals with limitation
of the amount of chemicals and acids. The same statements given in
subrecommendation 7 are applicable here.
o. Recommendation 2b (page 3): This recommendation deals with the
reconstruction of the air conditioning in the research laboratory to
prevent recirculation of hazardous gasses. This recommendation has,
in a way, been accomplished by the installation of remote control shut-
off switches so that air circulators may be rapidly shut off in an
emergency/
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25X1A9a
25X1A9a
d. RecdendAti n 2e (page 3): This recommendation deals with
the replacement of corridor stairway and exit door with a new door
composed of full plate glass panels which may be removed with an axe
in case of emergency. This Division is willing to concur with this
recommendation but wishes to point out that any such move would, of
necessity, have to be approved by TSS Security
Officer.
3. This Division stands ready at any time to discuss in full detail
any of the above recommendations or our comments on theca. If such a
discussion is desired please do not hesitate to contact either myself or
of this Division.
Attachments:
1
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee w/attach
1
- Chief, TSS w/attach
1
- Chief, TSS/L&SO w/attach
25X1A9a
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- TSS/ADMIN ( w/attach
1-TSS/SADw/atta
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Originators frd
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Chief, DD/P/TSS
Director of Security,:,
Relocation of TSS/SAD Facilities Presently Located In
South Building Attic.
1. On 20 July 1953, the CIA, Asst. Safety Officer accompanied by
25X1A9a TSS, completed an inspection of the central and
east se ons o South Building attic. As a result of this inspection,
a paper entitled "Description of Hazardous Conditions, South Building
Attic" was prepared by the CIA Asst. Safety Officer and was concurred
25
25X1A9a in by Chief, TSS/SAD and Deputy
Chief, TSS aeara ys s Branch. This desc p ?on con ed state-
ments to the effect that there are potential hazards from cyanide,
bromine, hydrogen fluoride and phosgene gases. A fire or explosion
could possible change these potentials into a very active hazard. The,
description further stated that the various laboratories in these areas
use the following explosives and/or inflammables
alcohol
acetone
chloreform
benzene
ether
tank of acetylene
tank of oxygen
2. As a result of the inspection of South Building Attic, a formal
Fire and Safety Survey Report was prepared. This report contained recom-
mendations designed to minimize the hazards existen-in the area. One
of the reeomuenddations made was to relocate the operations, if at all poa-
bible, to a more suitable area. Copies of this report were forwarded on
12 August 1953 to Chief, Technical Operations, TSS, and to the Chief, GSO,
for necessary corrective action.
3. At the request of the Asst. Safety Officer and with the approval
25X1A9a of TSS Liaison and Security Officer, arrangements were
e or an nspee ion of the area on 8 December 1953 by a PBS Fire Pre-
vention Engineer. As a result of this inspection, a report was prepared
and forwarded on 15 February 1954 to the Manager of the West Area (PBS).
Copies of this report were made available to the Space, Maintenance andly
Facilities Branch, LO, and to TSS/
in class. []~
t. 9 t
TS S
70.2 =11?;`'~
r~ii 7a++
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1
ined by the Asst. Safety Officer through the courtesy of 25X1 A9a
obt
a
25X1 A9a - TSS. The primary recommendation contained in this report sug-
gested the relocation of this operation in a separate one story building
removed from the District of Columbia, or other residential congested
areas. A preference was indicated for a remote urban location. The
report also contained a "less desirable alternate method" of correcting
the hazardous conditions found in the attic.
4. With regard to the alternate recommendation, 25X1 A9a
Chief, TSS/SAD, prepared a report dated 28 April 1954 showing which
moot
steps have been taken to ocmply with these recommendations., the inflammable
noteworthy of these being the segregation of acids and
liquids from the chemical storerooms.
5. With due consideration to the previously noted facts, it is
determined that this operation must be relocated to comply with the
primary recommendation of the General Services Administration, namely,
to relocate the laboratory in a more suitable and less densely populated
area. This move will not only lessen the possibility of serious effects
to Agency personnel and the public, but to the Director of Central Intel-
ligence who is to occupy apace in this building. The imperative need
for completely secure and safe office space for the Director is, of
course, of paramount importance. It is therefore requested that the
laboratory be moved to suitable quarters before the DCI moves to South
Building.
Sheffield Edwards
25X1A9a
SOsJB4/sf
Distribution
orig & 1 Addressee
2 - Chrono
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