PLANNING FOR CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS UNDER EMERGENCY CONDITIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-04718A002700030085-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2000
• Sequence Number: 85
• Publication Date: November 9, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON. 25, D.C.
November 9, 1950
*OMB Waiver Letter In ERU File*
TO THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND ESTABLISHMENTS
SUBJECT: Planning for continuity of operations under emergency
conditions
113
In the spring of 1949 the National Security Resources Board requested
the General Services Administration and the Bureau of the Budget to make
studies and recommendations for use in developing a plan to provide for
the security of the Nation's Capital. The larger agencies"in the Executive
Branch participated in this work.
Last August 30, the President recommended to the Congress the initial
requirements of a dispersal program which provided for the construction
of permanent office buildings in Maryland and Virginia within commuting
distance of Washington but removed from each other and the central area
at distances sufficient to minimize the vulnerability of Government
operations in the event of a destructive hostile attack. This would have
permitted the transfer to dispersed locations of about 20 percent of the
personnel now concentrated in the congested central area and the vacating
of most of the unsatisfactory and hazardous temporary buildings therein.
The President contemplates the resubmission of this matter to the Congress
at an early date.
Meanwhile, the unsatisfactory conditions which the President sought
to correct are becoming more and more critical with the increasing
intensification of the national security effort. A constantly increasing
number of employees is being crowded into already fully occupied offices;
`the inflammable temporary buildings continue to be occupied to capacity;
congestion in the central area is growing; and, most important of all,
vulnerability to disruption of operations is increasing with the growing
concentration of emergency functions in the central area.
The problem to which your attention is invited and concerning which
your assistance is requested has two aspects, one dealing with planning
for effective measures to assure the continuity of Federal functions in
the event of devastating attack; the other is the more immediate question
of providing additional office space in the Washington area to allow for
the expansion of the national security program. Effective planning for
continuity will depend primarily upon two determinations consisting,
first, of classifying functions with a view to assigning priorities
from the standpoint of their importance to the total national effort in
the event of war; and second, of deciding on the physical locations where
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these functions should be performed; i.e., in the District of Columbia
and adjacent areas (central area), in a location within commuting dis-
tance from Washington (dispersal), or in a location completely removed
from Washington (decentralization). The most practical method for
meeting the space situation during the next two years appears to be the
permanent removal from the seat of Government of organizational units, or
parts therebf, the operations which could be performed at distant loca-
tions without significant loss of efficiency.
Specific recommendations on priorities and proposed locations for
headquarters functi ons are now requested, with particular emphasis given
to the feasibility of either-dispersing or decentralizing those functions
which have been assigned a high priority. In considering these matters
the following limitations should be borne in mind:
Dispersal will no doubt be found preferable to
decentralization in many instances, but it may not be pos-
sible to complete the construction of permanent buildings
in the Washington dispersal area before the winter of 1952.
Decentralization to locations outside the Washington
dispersal area should be considered only on a permanent
basis.
Protection of personnel, records, and equipment in
present buildings can be provided only partially, the
extent depending on a study of each individual structure.
Detailed plans for other measures necessary to assure continuity of
operations will not be required until the over-all plan for the Executive
Branch has been approved and the agencies notified of the locations
assigned for the performance of designated functions. Pending this notifi-
cation, however, each agency should give serious thought to other measures
deemed necessary and prepare instructions which could be formalized on
short notice, providing in particular for the delegation of provisional
authority to be assumed in an emergency. These matters are discussed in
further detail in the second section of the attached outline of planning
factors.
The assumptions, as approved by the National Security Resources Board
and the General Services Administration, which may be made in preparing
plans are listed below.
1. Washington will remain the seat of Government.
2. A devastating attack may occur without any warning.
3. No additional Federal office buildings will be constructed
in the central area, but new buildings will be provided in
the dispersal area.
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The temporary wooden buildings constructed during World Ware I
and II will be vacated.
5. Office apace will be provided for those organization units
the functions of which can be performed in completely removed
locations.
6. Bomb-proof or bomb-resistant shelter will be provided for
personnel stationed in the central area.
7. Protected space will be provided for the preservation of
valuable records and equipment which cannot be duplicated
or transferred to locations outside the central area.
This study should be completed within 30 days and proposed plans
transmitted to the Bureau of the Budget. Following receipt of this material,
arrangements will be made for discussions with representatives of the
National Security Resources Board, the General Services Administration, and
other interested agencies. As the result of these reviews, agency proposals
may be modified after consultation with?the proponents.
It is the opinion of the Chairman of the National Security Resources
Board, in which I concur, that the importance of this subject warrants the
immediate designation of a high official whom the agency head can hold
responsible for the effective direction of all required planning and for
liaison with the Executive Office of the President and the General Services
Administration. If you will furnish my office with his name and telephone
number, I shall arrange for Bureau representatives to confer with him
promptly with a view to rendering all assistance possible.
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CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS
OUTLINE OF PLANNING FACTORS
The purpose of this outline is to assist agency staffs to make a
specific approach to planning for assuring the continuity of Government
functions in the event of attack. The outline consists of two sections,
the first covering those points which should be reported on within 30 days,
and the second calling attention to other matters to which serious thought
should be given with a view to reporting thereon when requested at some
later date.
The report on the subject matter in Section I should be made in the
form indicated by the attached exhibits A. B, C, and D. Four copies are
desired on sheets measuring 16" by 21", the original to be on number 48
bond.
S E C T I O N I
As stated in the letter to the agency head, to which reference should
be made, effective planning for continuity will depend primarily upon
two determinations consisting, first, of assigning priorities to functions
and, second, of deciding on proposed locations.
Assiting Priorities
Regardless of subsequent plans which may be made concerning proposed
physical locations of organization units, it will be necessary first to
analyze the several functions which the agency performs with a view to
determining their relative importance. By this is meant their importance
or contribution to the total national effort in the event of war--
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a broader concept than "national defense." In making this analysis,
factors relating to the assurance of continuity, such as physical location,
delegation of authority, and other necessary protective measures, should
be excluded from consideration.
In analyzing and reporting on priorities, the following points should
be included:
A. Organization unit, function performed. and priority
assigned. No. 1 representing the highest priority
B. Reasons for assigned priority
1. National impact of the function.
a. Defense aspects, if any.
b. Economic, welfare, or other aspects.
c. Relationship to other functions deemed important.
(1) Within the agency.
(2) With other agencies.
Proposed Location
The determination of physical location is of vital significance to
the achievement of continuity of functions. The alternatives to be con-
sidered are whether a given function shall be performed (1) in the
District of Columbia or adjacent areas (central area), (2) in a location
within commuting distance of the District of Columbia (dispersal), or
(3) in a location completely removed from the District of Columbia
(decentralization).
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C. Proposed for location in the central area
Although a certain amount of physical protection can be provided,
many of the installations in the central area will be vulnerable to attack.
Accordingly, commencing with those assigned the highest priority in "A"
above, a searching analysis should be made of the agency's functions with
a view to determining which ones must of necessity continue to be per-
formed in the central area instead of in locations elsewhere. Particular
attention should be given to the feasibility of conducting operations in
the Washington dispersal area, with retention of some office space in the
central area if that proves necessary.
The following outline covers some of the points which should be
reported upon with respect to each function studied. Others will no
doubt occur to agency staff.
1. Organization unit, function, and priority assigned.
2. Reasons for remaining.
a. Relationships with the President, the
Executive Office of the President, and
the Congress.
(1) Reasons for direct contact.
(2) Frequency of contacts.
b. Interagency relationships.
(1) Necessity for direct contact;
identify agencies.
(2) Frequency of such contacts.
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(3) Reasons why these relationships could not
be maintained if operations were to be
performed in the dispersal area, provided
adequate facilities for communication with
the central area offices were furnished.
3. Buildings in which located, personnel and space occupied in
each building.
4. Protection of vital records.
See bulletin of October 31, 1950 from the General
Services Administration to the heads of Federal agencies
on the subject, "Protection of Indispensable Operating
Records for Emergency Use."
5. Protection of specialized equipment.
Identify any specialized equipment., essential to the
performance of the function, which could be replaced only
at considerable expense or long delay. An itemized list
of "Specialized Equipment" used in the performance of the
function under study should be attached to Exhibit B.
6. Additional personnel and space estimated to be required by
July 1, 1951.
D. Proposed for location in dispersal areas
Before proceeding with this analysis, the remarks which follow herein
under the heading "Proposed for Decentralization" should be reviewed.
The following outline is suggested for use in analyzing and reporting
on functions subject to dispersal.
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1. Organization unit, function, and priority assigned in
A above.
2. Reasons for dispersing instead of decentralizing:
a. Relationships with the President, the
Executive Office of the President, and
the Congress*
b. Relationships with other agencies which
it is believed will remain either in the
central or dispersal areas.
3. Buildings in which located, personnel and space occupied
in each building.
4. Protection of vital records.
See bulletin of October 31, 1950 from the
General Services Administration to the heads of
Federal agencies on the subject, "Protection of
Indispensable Operating Records for Emergency Use."
5. Protection of specialized equipment.
Identify any specialized equipment, essential
to the performance of the function, which could be
replaced only at considerable expense or long delay.
An itemized list of "Specialized Equipment" used in
the performance of the function under study should
be attached to Exhibit C.
6. Additional personnel and space estimated to be required
by July 1, 1951.
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E. Proposed for Decentralization
Since decentralization would contribute to the achievement of the
over-all objective of this study, its possibilities should be carefully
reviewed. Clearly, the removal of personnel, records, and equipment
to existing office space elsewhere constitutes the most immediate means
of relieving the present critical space situation in Washington. However,
decentralization should be proposed only for those operations which could
be conducted on a permanent basis, and without significant loss in effi-
ciency, in locations completely removed from Washington. With few
exceptions, this will amount to accelerating wherever possible the normal
decentralization process in the interest of improved acninistration which
has been under way for several years.
In analyzing and reporting on proposed decentralization moves, use
the factors outlined in D above whenever appropriate.
SECTION II
Although a plan for the physical location of organization units
will be developed from information requested under Section I, it must be
realized that permanent buildings in the Washington dispersal areas may
not become available for upwards of two years. Pending notification of
locations assigned for the performance of designated functions, serious
thought should be given to such interim measures as should be taken to
assure continuity of operations in the event of a devastating attack
without warning. Foremost among these are delegation of command
authority and protection of vital records and specialized essential
equipment. Others will no doubt occur to a~~
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3.
SECRET
1. Delegation of command authority
Delegation of provisional command authority should comprise plans
for assumption, in the event of attack, of both intermediate and top
command by key officials located outside of the central area. As
indicated in the letter, a directive on delegation should be drafted
iich could be formalized on short notice if required.
2. Protection of records
See bulletin of October 31, 1950 from General.Services
Administration.
Feasibility of duplicating or removing specialized essential equipment
from the central area
In special instances, the purchase or construction of duplicate
equipment to be kept in stand-by condition in some other area may
be justified after full consideration has been given to alternative
protective measures, including the shifting of operations using
such equipment to another area.
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Organization its or rerta thereof p.
within h1n Wsed for location
within the Di?trict of Columbia or adt aentareaao
(Hama of Agency)
Org2niZatIon units or parts thereof
Subject: DronDead for ocetion n dja .eel areas
(Otherwise eeme outline ae for Exhibit B)
(Hams of dgency
Subject: r arts =ft proposed
=== ion on a beau
(Otherwise eame outline as for Exhibit B)
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Reasons for prbmeed ~t u
(I_
 CONFIDENTIAL ($ I
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? CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
INITIALS
DATE
ADD/A
3
4
5
FROM
IHITI A S
DATE
1
Deputy Chief, Admin. Services
19 Mar
2
3
=APPROVAL 'i INFORMATION [I SIGNATURE
[:~-FACTION C DIRECT REPLY C J RETURN
=COMMENT PREPARATION OF REPLY E DISPATCH
{CONCURRENCE C_I RECOMMENDATION C_ FILE
REMARKS: Inasmuch as you are now the CIA liaison
in connection with the dispersal plan, assume you
will want to reply to this. Attached A3,copjftf
letter4sent to Bureau of Budget in response to
the communication of 9 November 1950.
MIM
FTOVp~ T?RQ2/05/pgS P78- A-ttMQQ17Q80
'.+r 30.4
SEP 1947
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TRANSMITTAL P
19 March 1951
DATE
TO:
Chief, Administrative Services
BUILDING
ROOM NO.
North
201
REMARKS:
FROM: Comptroller
BUILDING Central 1
ROOM NO. 209
EXTEND ON
445
ORM NO. 36-8
SEP 1946
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