PROGRESS REPORT - I&SO (OCTOBER 1950 - DECEMBER 31,1951)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-04718A002700130004-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 11, 2001
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECURITY INFORMATION
PROGRESS REPORT - I&SO
(October 1950 - December 31, 1951)
The Security Program is based upon the concept that a penetration of
the CIA is a No. 1 target of all foreign intelligence agencies of subversive groups
within the United States. Our aim is the direct protection from penetration or
compromise of every employee, building facility, equipment, document or in-
formation which could tend to disclose our intelligence and our intelligence sources
and methods. In addition to positive anti-penetration defense, the program must
provide continuing controls and policy guidance to our personnel to avoid inadvertent
disclosures, compromise of our material outside the Agency, and leakage of bits and
pieces of information which may give a definite picture of our activities to foreign
intelligence analysts.
Assuming the utmost in thoroughness in investigation of applicants, the
.a# -best investigative aids, perfection in guard systems, protective devices and con-
is no better than the leadership in this field
al securit
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exercised by supervisors at every level, nor than the degree of personal security
sponsibility assumed by the mass of individual employees.
This Progress Report of the Inspection and Security Office will consider
security operations during the period from the standpoint of major security functions
required and performed rather than the administrative organization used. (A
functional presentation omits the confusion of administrative compartmentation on
a "need to know" basis necessitated itself by security factors.) The following are
the major security ope~.((rations of the I&SO:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Screening and vetting of personnel
Indoctrination of personnel
Employee controls
Physical Security controls
Policy Controls
Inspection
Counter-Intelligence Research and
Operational Support
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 in rerl'ng security_brea.ch s. t hough ignorance or naivete. On the other hand, the
initial security indoctrination needs improvement. Due to lack of sul a e-auditorium
space and due to the reat influx o emp oyees the ability to give careful spersonal
__ Provement
x oral -ractor;- i-sa~..dp..inite_... _q~- X. im
addit te-e3rig-arrefficiencp- - - It
Indoctrination includes the initial Security and Agency indoctrination of the
employee, the guidance to him through Security Regulations and a series of inter-
views such as departure interviews before going overseas, debriefings on return
from overseas or special assignment, security advisory interviews upon his request
on official or personal problems, and exit interviews upon his termination. The in-
doctrination as a whole of the employee has improved dur period by the four-
d y Agency Indoctriratn inaugurated by the Director for Training. This, in
in oc rmation b b h I&SO and their own supervisors has not been as thorollgh as
when the Agency was small. Again, security leadership and supervision at all
levels has not been as good during this period due to the operational pressures.,, k?
Employee Controls:
Employee controls within the U. S. require an increasing amount of effort
by this office as the Agency grows. These controls at first seem somewhat re-
strictive to new members, and as mentioned above considerable indoctrination is
necessary to enforce them. Under this category come all the personal problems
ranging from the major consideration of cover down to individual problems of
attendance at courses, authoriship of articles for publication, or arrests and court
actions for minor offenses. Deep cover persons offer no great problem as they are
not or should never be brought near our buildings and are handled personnally by
case officers. However, the mass of light official cover personnel now being re-
cruited pose many problems. The cover situation for these people has deteriorated
to some extent during the period but by the Fall of 1951 a general tightening up is
correcting the situation.
Overlapping into the functions of policy, indoctrination, and employee con-
trol is the principle of anonymity which this office believes essential to security
for the great bulk of our people. Mention of our people by name in the Press and
articles either written by them or about them may in themselves contain no classi-
fied information but as a part of the "pattern" made up by foreign analysts might
become of definite value. In some cases it renders the persons forever ineligible
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E!CURITT MIFORMATI*
of being sent abroad on even a semi-covert basis. The growth of the Agency and
the obvious interest of the press and public make difficult a common sense enforce-
ment of the principle of anonymity. Measures are being taken to improve this pro-
cedure.
It is in employee control matters that a paternal or should we say fraternal
approach by Security is imperative. There have been numbers of cases ranging
from mental breakdown to personal disaster where the positive help of Security is
necessary to avoid chance of security risk to the Agency. We have found during
the year that this type of positive help has increased the confidence of the employees
in I&SO and causes them to come to us voluntarily with their problems.
Physical Security-Controls;
During the period, the number of CIA buildings increased from X9A2
This large number of buildings, many of them widely separated, creates a definite
security hazard which has been reported many times. The cost of the guards alone
amounts to approximately $706, 000 annually. The additional transportation and
courier systems necessary to maintain such a widespread installation is not only
costly but creates many risks in transit of documents and in collection of classified
waste, etc.
Notwithstanding the space difficulty, the physical security controls have
kept up with the increase in the Agency. The GSA guards on duty with CIA are paid
at grades higher than other GSA guards and they have all been security investigated.
While these guards are not of the highest type, the physical security system is
based upon the combination of the guard at the door, the badge system, the regula-
bions imposed upon employees in not leaving classified information exposed, and at
night on the combination of restricted entrances, guards, locked safes, and nightly
inspections of premises not only by the guards but by our own night security officers.
Proportionally, security violations such as open safes and exposed classified
material have definitely decreased during the period.
Improved technical aids to physical security such as microphone detectors,
etc. have been more widely used. Great improvements have been made of methods
of destruction of classified waste.
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has required many extensive physical security surveys and
subsequent institution of security controls. We are finding that this Agency needs
legal authority to organize its own police force within its own installations and a
proposal has been submitted for such authority. For example, at the X1A6a
and through the cooperation of the State of Virginia such a force
is now in existence. SECRET
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SECURITY INTORMATIOS
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SNUR INfl1RMAIIQN
Policy Controls:
Security policy is of course a part of each of the other functions. How-
ever, we have found our overall policy problems greatly magnified. Major policies
which have been handled include dissemination of intelligence to our own government
departments and the interchange of specific intelligence with foreign governments.
It is believed that we are on a sound basis to date in this respect although the decision
as to what and to whom to give our information will always be a delicate one. These
policy problems have required closer security liaison with the major defense agencies
of the government. During the period this office also engaged in actual security25X1 C8a
countries. Other recurrent and vital policy issues on which Security must give
guidance have been cover problems all the way from light cover in the-to 2(1A6a
types of deep cover to be used by major operational projects abro45X1A6a
Other definite security policy problems arise in every aspect of our intelligence
operations and include the basics of planning, mounting and execution of each pro-
jec. During the period, sound security policy was not used in a number of pro-
jects and certain grave errors and compromises have resulted. While a part of
this can be accepted as unavoidable, better control and leadership at various levels
is beginning to show an improvement of this cane`ton.
Inspection:
Inspection is an integral part of a security system to provide overall
examination of each function and to provide the capability of separate examination
of the component parts as well as specialized investigation when directed. The need
for increase in Inspection activities became apparent during the period and better
facilities were provided. However,- a ..more thorough inspection procedure is still
needed, aimed principally at basic_security practices outside of Washington and as
an assistance to Senior Representatives and Chiefs of Missions abroad. I$zSO has
providedT-a nuii~iEer of trained security officers to our field missions in 1951 and
many more are planned. It is next important to follow up on these persons through
correspondence and by visits in order to help them to coordinate their problems
and to provide necessary assistance and more uniform policy guidance. Other
inspection functions are most varied ranging from physical and personnel security
surveys of contractors' plants, security surveys of instal(-1A6a
tions, major administrative investigations ordered !ytFeR or D epu y Directors.
25 Durin the period our Inspection Division has performed physical security
The inspection function is not yet completely carried out and a more com-
plete program is required.
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11 SECURITY INFORMATION
Counter-intelligence Research and Action:
The means and measures necessary for counter-intelligence have kept
pace with the growth of the Agency. The development of our own investigative
files and reference indices containing many thousands of names cross-indexed
for counter-intelligence purposes has been of great assistance not only in screening
but in study of possible counter-intelligence problems. The use of our investigative
agents on counter-intelligence work is curtailed due to the tremendous applicant
case load and will only be remedied when our investigative capabilities are increased
to adequate size as planned. Direct and highly profitable counter-intelligence
liaison has been set up with other major investigative agencies and with certain
civil authorities. Research and studyof our files-,and gf the__various ",patterns"
involved in possible counter-intelligenc problems has been given more emphasis.
No a 25 penetrations o the Ag.en y_haue_bee , xs overe,t~._ r ng this period,
although a number f_pgssibl" enetrations..hav..e._been "s.cree.ned" out be'ore entrance
on duty. On the other hand, no real evidence of an important penetration iiaseeri"'~
found by us or been reported by the FBI. However, the I&SO goes on the assumption
that there must be some penetration and can not be complacent on this score.
Nevertheless, the Agency has not had one case of an alleged subversive brought
befor_e_the ongress or before_ the public by allegations in the Press.
Operational Support:
A major task of I&SO during this year has been operational support of
the various offices of the Agency with particular reference to the clandestine di25X1C4d
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SECURITY INFORMATION
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SECRET
SE ITY II1FO!MATION
Despite the phenomenal growth of the Agency during this period,
it has been possible to maintain a sound Security Program which
probably has the highest standards in government. There are weaknesses
we know of, and improvements we must make. There is much credit
due to our leaders and to the bulk of our employees. Basically security
rests with them and it is not an easy virtue. This office is proud of and
grateful for the support it has received. We are a young agency and
much better than we realize. The boy has gone through adolescence
and has become a pretty sound guy who has a great future if he continues
to keep his eye on that ball.
Colonel, GSC
Assistant Deputy/Inspection & Security
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