KIDNAP RANSOM INSURANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-04722A000200020004-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 4, 2000
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: REGULATION

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C ON IF L) MW AL
ilxtAFT CA
TO i All Diplomatic and Consular rests
171t04 s Department of State
SWECTt Kidnap Ransom Insurance
The Department has been informed that a reputable foreign inaurance
firm has recently solicited some of our poets abroad, offering insurance
against kidnapping and ransom, with certain limitations and conditions.
Clearly, the purchase of insurance in a personal prerogative and ex-
pense. However, the concept of kidnap insurance at personal expense
suggests a number of problems, assns of which transcend the interests of
the individual. Among these problems in the obvious question of utility.
To date, moat kidnappings involving diplomats have been motivated by
political considerations.-to embarrass local authorities, to gain publicity
or to secure the release of so-called political prisoners. Demands for
cash ransoms have been relatively rare, although it is known that terrorist
groups short of operating funds do ro and kidnapping as one nource of
money.
Aside from being of questionable value, however, kidnap ransom
insurance may actually prove to be counterproductive. General knowledge
of the availability of such insurance as a potential source of easy cash
CItOtfi 3
Downgraded at 12-Year Intervals;
It not Automatically Declassified.
CO1XDE1 TXAL
Approved For Release 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP78-04722A000200020004-0
 Approved For RelewSe 2001/08/29: CIA-RDP78-04722AODM0020004-0
COt7FID T xAL 2
almost certainly would increase the vulnerability, not only of the
insured but of hire family and eolloa,guca as well. Moreover, it would
probably broaden the risk by introducing an incentive to the strictly
criminal kidnapper or extortionist who, so far, has not been much of a
threat to our personnel abroad.
Other factor,, to be conaiderod include the degree to which the payment
of ransom might interfere with the legal authority and ronponsibility of
the host government to deal with crimes of this nature. There may well
be situations in which, for any of a variety of reasons, it may be im-
prudent,to bow to a kidnapper's demand. To the extent that ransom money is
known to be readily available, the bargaining position of the principal
negotiator is weakened. Further, the involvement of additional parties,
such as the underwriter in the event ransom is paid, with the attendant
complication of interests, can only add to the natural pressures and strains
which must be anticipated in the iunediate post-kidnap time frame.
Any discussion of this subject which may be held at addressee posts
should, for obvious reasons, be very closely held.
0/Syta 3antila=ltm 0 ? Mr. Macomber
C leaarancere t
AID/AG/SLC M Mr, Mileski USIA/IOS ? Mr. McMictaol
~~~ .. 0/A - Mr. Donlan
L/0 - Mr. Lyorly CIA
CONITIDIsWTIAL
Approved For Release 2001/08/29 : CIA-RDP78-04722A000200020004-0