FOREIGN RADIO REACTIONS TO THE KOREAN SITUATION AND THE PRESIDENT'S DECISIONS, NO. 4 & 5

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-04864A000100100054-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: R
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 11, 1999
• Sequence Number: 54
• Publication Date: July 2, 1950
• Content Type: IR

0 r
Ap roved dL1WWA 999/09
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION FROM
FOREIGN DOCUMENTS OR RADIO BROADCASTS
COUNTRY
SUBJECT pa 3r.N I iO RXACTion to T$S KEN
HOW
ST?tJITIQN A J PRSSTD1E'S DECISIONS,
PUBLISHED die Broadcasts
WHERE
PUBLISHED
DATE
PUBLISHED 30 Jhae e 2 July 1950
LANGUAGE Several
No.4h5
U01001
REPORT NO.
CD NO.
25X1A2g
DATE OF
INFORMATION 30 Tume - 2 July 1550
DATE DIST.
NO. OF PAGES
fitly 19 Q
SUPPLEMENT TO nO-T-L.1,112,
REPORT NO. 113,114
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMA ION
SOURCE TBIB (This strictly faetuai report is based solely en monitored fereilaa radii bread-
easts reeoived in Washiagtea up to 7 a s.., 2 July 1950. It rept?etwoos the
6th sad 7th of a series of reports prepared is respeaso to a spi~eial request.)
! !R 4, l July 19 0
St ids s T. date, available meaiterod fereiga radio broadcasts yield only cue Csas n .ist
referee to the Prosideat's 30 JMaae aaaouzee# ;t autheriziag the use of Amari Tara. grsrand forte i
in Korea.. T]eis sexes frem.Seviet-seatrelled Berlin whisk sites the Prosidoat'i lateit
decisiea as t'' tker "proof" of %ke aex -familiar Soviet-C.i ist ehargo that U Z. "aggression"
in Korea had been thoroughly and deliberately prepared. Otherwise, comments fFosn Soviet-
Communist sources add few new eleeraents to their propaganda line. They continu to associate
the American "aggression" with the need for intensified efforts in conjunction with the
Stockholm-Appeal "peace campaign."
Western-oriented radios have reported the announcement very briefly, and at yet without
comment. Prior to the announcement, however, several sources considered that 'such a decision
would be "inevitable." Other comment on Korean developments indicates concern with their
-effect on the united Nations.
Broadcasts from. India, Rapt, and Indonesia continue to emphasize their neltrality. Be160e
broadcasts, avoiding comment, merely report events at lake success.
WBdT 21s' TAE UNIT~9 NATIONS?" Although Soviet Satellit+p adio8 are all cri't'ical of the
alleged American attitude toward the U.N., the clandestine "Free Greece" radio is manifestly
contemptuous. It declares that the.Charter has become "a piece of paper used by Truman to
gat the rust off his bayonets." Albanian and Polish broadcasts, insisting that Washington
has struck a heavy blow at the Charter, recapitulate Soviet efforts to augment the authority
of the United Nations. Warsaw reiterates the Soviet contention that the U.N. .solutions
are not binding since "at the present moment the Security Council is not functioning." The
LONDON DA1 WORK RI argues that the West "bas reduced the once-respect. Security Council of
the United Nations to a discredited American-controlled rump" by preventing the participation-
of the Soviet Union. A Stockholm broadcast, rejecting the idea of active Swedish pwticipatida
CLASSIFICATION
STATE
ARMY
A
NSRB
FBI
Approved For Release 1999/09/01 : CIA`RDP78-04864A0001001,OOQ54,-
 Approved For Release I 999/09/0'R:Effi QP7d& 4864A0001 v b -0
RESTRICT)
in the Korean fighting, fee.. i6re is a aeriouu ; ~ 3 sits; that Ares-}i +r de f = ptner=ts may
"lead to the country's membership, in the U.N. being ttansf "-4 into a sort of "-e facto
membership of a widened Atlantic Pact." But it also quotes A NBLADLT ?;ndc r ing the State.
Department's argument that past pbrformanoe shows :Yee Soviets do not alms inl t pret
abstention to mean a veto in Security Council del.ibe :,ations, and as :Finding the t Soviet
efforts to. "sabotage" the U.N. have failed. Other ag..be~:?aa `broadcasts express tl:e belief that
the American decisiveness in Korea will lead to a c engthen.ing of the., United I.ations..
WHAT OF THE "PEACE CAMPAIGN"?: Interest in th) effect of Korean developer to crk the
Soviet camcmtaist peace ga.i in indicated in both C .ist and Western b oadoests.
The North Korean radio reports that the All-Korea National Coamaoittee of Peace ]'artisans has
appealed to the World Peace Committee in Paris "to take appropriate steps" in he light cf
American intervention. (This appeal adds a new charge to Pyongyang's list of xnvid.i.atis
stories about the United States; it emphasizes that, despite the fact that the President
did not announce American air cover until 27 June, American aircraft engaged Lk "'brutal
bombings" of urban and rural areas in North Korea "from, the very moment the Sys can Rees
traitor gang launched the in'reion.") Soviet=controlled German sources are alrio repcreted to
be calling for greater "activation" of the "peace campaign." And Radio Moscow contitssaee to
invoke Korean events as a fundamental reason for signing the Stockholm 'Peace" Appeal; but
its allusions in this context are still relatively temperate compared to the vtuperaa ciori
evinced in comment from other Communist media. Western sources reflect cynicitua over the
"peace campaign."
WHAT OF THE ATOM BOMS?: Again there is only one monitored mention of the ?. nom ba ab in,
material about the Korean situation. The French Coe unist B1dANITE declares t; At the U.S.,
faced with the problem of supporting a South Korean army "surrounded by the boastility of
the people, can find only one solution: to destroy not only the people but tb r army. Hence
the plan of using the A-bomb, a mass extermination weapon." This alleged plan however, is
not elaborated.
WWW 5, 2 July l
,950
Ste: The President's 30 June decision authorizing the use of American ground forces
in Korea has been reported in monitored foreign broadcasts; but so far there ha ere boe:
surprisingly few comments. Nor have there been many comments about the progr. a of tie
wean fighting. But several Communist sources have tentatively injected into :heir
propaganda the idea that the North Koreans will eventually be successful and t: hat, in
Moscow's words, "(imperialist) military adventures bring nothing but complete eilurs."
Ho Chi Minh's Vietnam radio has finally broadcast its first comments on the K.o ? an situation.
They mirror, without a single distortion, the established Communist version of events.
Pyongyang has finally taken explicit note of the President's decisions in a vi