CRITICAL INDICATORS IN YUGOSLAV-COMINFORM PROPAGANDA: FIFTH REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-04864A000200050007-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 1998
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: October 5, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE- AGENCY REPORT NO.
INFORMATION FROM
FOREIGN DOCUMENTS OR RADIO BROADCASTS CD NO. A-1644.1
COUNTRY Yugoslavia and Soviet Satellite
SUBJECT CRITICAL INDICATORS IN YUGOSLAV
C( INFORM PROPAGANDA-. EIFTH ,F
HOW
PUBLISHED
WHERE
PUBLISHED
DATE
PUBLISHED
LANGUAGE Several
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE
OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF ESPIONAGE ACT E0
U. S. C., 91 AND 32. AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION
OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PRp-
HIBITED BY LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.
SOURCE. a
DATE OF 24 July-
INFORMATION 1 Oct. 1951
DATE D I ST. ;a " October 1951
NO. AF PAGES 5
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO. 0
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION'
25X1A
A continuing quantitative analysis of military charges against Yugoslavia broadcast by.
the Cominform radios to their own peoples and to'Yugoslavia during the past year
(and with particular attention to the past -ten weeks) indicates:
1. No marked Satellite propaganda intention to step up the
war of nerves against Tito insofar as Satellite home
audiences are concerned.
2. No' further sharpening (quantitative or qualitative) of
the campaign, initiated last suer, which. emphasizes
Yugoslav resistance to Tito?s military preparations.
3. No important shifts in other hostility indicators.
A survey of Satellite military propaganda attacking Tito during the past year reveals
a sizeable increase in only one type of char a--namely, in statements that Yugoslavs`
are resisting Titoist military preparations (including charges of guerrilla activity),
'hese'resistance-to-aggression charges leveled off in late June, after asteady two-
.-
months increase, Since then, they have remained at about the same level, although
weekly variations have been high. There has been no growth in those resistance
charges concerning guerrillas and Army personnel, both kinds of which are more
threatening that allusions to general civilian resistance.
Calls for, as opposed. to descriptions of, resistance to aggression have all but dis?
appeared during the past month. Guerrilla charges--all highly routine in nature--have
diminished. And there have been no allusions at all to the existence or possibility of
"civil war.",
During the past ten weeks, there have been no marked changes in the following hostility
indicators
Charges related to Tito?s armed forces
Military self-strength statements.
Satellite denials of Yugoslav assertions about Satellite
military preparations.
Unusually threatening-sounding statements. (Fat they
continue to appear in isolated instances.)
MOM CENTER
AFIEq t rpfl y JOB _ ~~
CLASSIFICATION SECRET
NSRB
FBI
S ,W
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U& IICATORS III YgChA~t~C"~IrP -
25X1 A6C This report, s ucceedi ag -of 31 JULY 19`il, censiders only Satellite charges
of a military nature, charges which, most directly and most con incin.g y aim at
creating psychological tension. it continues a series of detailed quantitative
studies of current military charges based on ceumting and analysis at sentence
level.
I. t oo ti0 .s
During the past ten weeks Satellite radios have continued their relatively high
attention to Yugoslav resistance to Tito?s military preparations~* Within this
frame of reference, however, there are few propaganda shifts suggestive of more
threatening intentions, psychological or military That evidence is as follows
ao jaonitudg., Since late June Satellite claims of resistance to
Yugoslav military preparation: have more or less leveled off,
although there is considerable weekly variability. Before that
time--which coincides with the 3rd anniversary of Tite?s break with
the uremlin_,- here charges mounted consistently for seven con-
secutive weeks 0 Thus, while resistance-to-aggression claims now
constitute a large part of the war-of-nerves propaganda concerning
Tito (about one-third of the total of such propaganda)y Satellite
propagandists have shown. no desire to increase tension even more
by continuing to increase the nber of these claia o
b4 grooms esistingyn Four maim groups are said to be resisting
Tito 9 s preparations for 'ar, according to Cominfon radios. These
groups are-. civilians, youths (refusing to undergo pre-military
training), Army personnel, and guerrillas. Discussion'of Army and
guerrilla resistance presumably implies the weakness of the Yugoslav
regime more convincingly than does discussio's of resistance by youths
and civilians generally. Allusions to Army resistance have certainly
not increased in the past four weeks o Attention to guerrill.as??
always low-=has declined in. the past four weeks as compared to the
previous two month period when partisan charges first reappeared.
These facts-reveal no tendency to shift, attention from the less
threatening resistance groups-to those whose resistance could be
most dangerous to the regime--guerrilla groups and most especially
the Army,
c, falls fog Pesistanceo Coincident wit a lasts er Increase in
resistance-to-aggression claims, Satellite transmitters for the first
time specifically is ued .alls for resistance as contrasted to the
more usual descriptions of resitanceo Such calls were most
frequent from mid-July to mid-August. Never very numerous (maximum
week-. 24 out of a total of 506 for all, resistance-to-aggression
claims), such calls in the six weeks since then. have been, practically
non-.existent (seven calls in six weeks). These fig r?es suggest that
the calls (some of which were practically phrased in terms of orders)
were interjected at the beginning of the whole resistance-te-aggression
campaign to sparkplug the general theme, Their near-absence now might
further suggest the campaign has assumed a more routine character in the
minds of Satellite propagandists o
25X1 A6c * See - for a detailed discussic n- of this topic since its rise to prominence
during the suaer^ a
1 t is not the border Satellites Who
stin
t
i
ere
g
n
The source of these calls is
als for resistance, but rather the Czech radio.
h
ese app
are responsible for most of t
Some 13% of all its allusions to resistance to aggression were represented by such
calls. For Albania, Bulgaria, and H nga.ry, the like figure was 506% each, The
comparable fignure for the Rumanian radio was only 4%, despite the fact that it
broadcasts more resistance claims than the, others n
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d. Q:.ali.ta.t .ve.. ..:_.s-,- tekisi .C< kf ee~.at e-to-te,-A eS-wio G:.a e;
Efforts to increase t1 e effectiveness and convictiot. of resistance-to-
aggression prepa; a:.ada can be reflected. in several ways not dealing with
the actual nature of the contention. Such efforts may involve such
qualitative elements as. newness or aanique;ness the mount of detail;
association with a current even-t,; and appearance in 'xnew?s items" (as
contrasted with ce entar:es). Examination of the resistance-to-
aggression claims witch, respect to these qualitative indices reveals
that.
(1) The percentage of claims about resistance to Yugoslav
military preparations in news items is quite low-about 5%
(2) only 5% of the claims are explicitly linked with
events usually exploited in the military context.
(3) Between 15% and 20% of the claims are new. This is
undoubtedly related in. part to the relative recency of
the campaign centered on the resistance-to-aggression
theme. Nonetheless, it represents a considerable effort
to be original and hence convincing-more so, at any rate,
than is true of armed forces charges* against Yugoslavia,
only 6% of which have been new. Ii. recent weeks, however,
the proportion. of new claims relating to resistance to
aggression have not increased..
(4) Resistance claims containing details are fairly
numerous. (Detail is defined to include references to
place-names, quantities, proper names, and time.) Currently
about one out of every four claims of Army resistance to
Tito contains a detailed or specific element. This ratio is
higher than specificity ratio normal to armed forces charges
and again appears to indicate a special effort. Recent weeks,
.however, show no upturn in this ratio.
e. Allusions to " .i.vil AML., As yet Satellite transmitters have in no
way referred to the probability or actual existence of "civil war." The
type of claim most nearly approaching this subject is that relating to
guerrilla actions. Eves, within the small number of guerrilla claims
voiced by Satellite radios, however, there is little evidence of a
desire to picture the widde91p:read growth of such a movement, which could
in time lead to the props nda development of a, civil war argument.
Quite the reverse is true., With the exception. of a few general
references to "large numbers" of people taking off to fight in the hills,
most of the guerrilla claims to date have centered around two incidents of
alleged guerrilla actions. Satellite radios hark back to these
incidents again and again, as does Radio Moscow. This pattern is in
marked contrast to allusions to civilian resistance which abound with
numerous examples and varied incidents. It almost seems as if the propa-
gandists have been specifically restricted to these two alleged incidents..
Satellite propaganda has yet to make a convincing case out of its
guerrilla charges, as for example by naming guerrilla leaders, citing
details as to numbers involved, locations of operations, and the like.
The potentialities for developing this theme thus remain intact for
possible future use.
The term "armed forces charges" as used throughout this report refers to a group.
of charges relating to supplies, equipment, training, strength, and operations of the
Yugoslav Army.
See paragraph IT for examples of some of these charges.
First broadcast in the fall of 1950 was a report of a "massive armed. rebellion"
of workers in Cazin against whom Tito suit the 3.79th regiment. Many of the soldiers
reportedly ,joined, the successful workers. During the past. ?aaxax er an incident
allegedly occurred in which "a group of youthful partisans engaged 4ankovicas.men
for eight hours "; a.. partis,,m succeeded finally in escaping and. telling the story
of the fight.
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II. ? raed~ 'car es: 0ha . , q
Since" the end of July there has been no increase in the total number of charges
related to the. armed forces--including equipment, personnel, and operations--nor
is there any .increase in the portion of' these, charges beamed to the Satellite
home. audiences. Charges of an operational nature remain at their constant low
level--currently about 3.5% of all armed forces charges--and most of them are re-
lated. to general and non-detailed assertions regardin maneuvers. For exemple,
since the end of July there has been only one charge broadcast to Yagoslavia)
regarding operations beyond the Yugoslav borde ^s, This was made in the context
of Tits?s interview with Marguerite Higgins.
During the past 10 weeks there has been somewhat less emphasis on charges related to
arms, equipment, strategic roads, etc., than in the previous period; but there has
been an increase in charges related to personnel, particularly charges that
foreign , Le., British and America, officers are teaching Y13, oslav soldiers. Two
new charges (Which have not yet been eal..oi?ioed to a extent are that Yugo alav
soldiers will be trained in the United States,* and that 'the Yugoslav Army will be
directly under Eisenhower.
ezelil,~ txvr xadi,ces The absence of an increase in the . aall, .x`at of armed forces
charges is accompanied by a similar absence of qualitative shifts. Charges con-
sidered to be of a more belligerent nature-such as the citing of a specific target
of attack, details as to place-ne ices, rAambers, or units ., * etc.---have not signifi-
cantly increased. Since the end of July, the number of times a specific satellite
has been. named as the target of a Yugoslav attack is only slightly more than one-
half the comparable number during the previous 10-week period. Similarly, the
charges citing Western military collaboration with' Tito have been reduced from last
b-n e%r 4 s heavy emphasis on Am,erican arms shipments. Detailed naming of lodations
remains fairly constant; more than two-thirds of the relevant charges, however.' are
made only to Yugoslav audiences,
III. , ;t3iaiss of _l~~i.la t ~~'s?e: oaatora
Continuing their previous practice u the Satellite radios, during the subject period,
have shown no tendency ' deny Thg cslav charges related to the Satellite armed
forces; during the past 10 weeks, only one such denia.1.**x- was made, and it was not
beamed, to Satellite audiences., On the, other hand, Satellite denials of border
violation charges made by 'the Belgrade radio have increased somewhat in the past few
weeks. This was. true particularly of the Albanian protest note of 19 September
which seemed to reflect sensitivity over the, fact that the last Yugoslav note
concerning Albanian border violations was dispatched to the United Nations in early
September. The Albanian note contained five denials and it was broadcast six 'times,
three times in the Albanian home service--an unusual departure.
._ _11 to A
IV. ae1texaen&g itih eax tiz qe . b Voided
Satellite transmitters still refrain from making te statement that Yugoslavia is
to threaten them. Statements that Yugoslavia conatitate s a continuing threat,
on the other hand, are still, made 'tlcugh, rarely--during the past ten weeks only 7
such charges occurred.
This charge was first heard an the. Rumanian home service on 29 September.
Actually, Satellite radios ~rery z rarely allude to specific arm units. The only
recent case was contained in a Budapest broadcast on 3 September which Stated: ?
"Several units of the E to qg are already carrying out t~raiuing with U.S.
Sherman tanks wind Cobra and >l tang Fighters. or an example of the detail
Satellite radios might use in the future, see page 7, which quotes an item
25X1 A6c distributed only by the Rumanian. press service in Morse code last January. The item
gives many order-ofs-battle details concerning -the disc +sition of Yugoslav Army and
Air units along the Albamian frontier, namirg towns in which specific units are
located.)
Concerning Satellite troop strength exceeding peaces treaty limitations.
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V. 5,at-111tte 'elf
Claims of self strength ccc.ntir p, ;e to be avoided In broadcasts to Yugoslavia. During
the past 10 weeks only 10 such claims were made; and, seven of them occurred at the
end of August during the week which included such events as the Rumanian liberation
anniversary, the Polish Ai e force Day, and the anniversary of the establishment of
the Bulgarian border guards, Even in the home services there is no increase in
strength claims except when related to stailar anniversaries. Consistent with the
policy of de-emphasizing self strength., expressions warning of the consequences to
Yugoslavia if she 'sere to attack are extremely rare. Only five such warnings have
been broadcast (a1l: in the home services) since mid-May. None have occurred in the
past month, however.
VT.
As noted above, there has been no over ail, qualitative change in the nature of the
military charges, Recently, however, -there have appeared isolated statements and
unusual statements of a threatening nature. If the Satellites wished to intensify
the war of. nerves they presumably could be expected to increase these kinds of state-
ments in both quantity and variety. As pointed out, military self?stren, th
assertions are not prominent. The only recent qualitative departures have been the
following statements. They are unusual because they t li,citl identify Tito as
the enemy in the context of self strength.
"If the imperialists... and their servant Tito will attempt to
desecrate the beloved soil of our fatherland..., we, the soldiers
of the People ? s A7- W will. not stint any sacrifice to smash their
attempts, 81 (Rumanian Home Service, 23 August)
"These (?i,-to) wax incendiaries can be stopped by strength alone
and we must therefore make our fret country even stronger."
(Hungarian Home Sfr?:i..re, 25 Angst)
"It would be wrong for the Govren ent of the Belgrade spies to
misinterpret our self=possession and calmness " (Hungarian Home
Service, 27 August)
Army resistance charges are for the most part of Taite a routine nature. An
exception is the following
"Soldiers are establishing ties with underground artisan units
so that they may be able to fight for freedom. " (Tirana, in Serr?bo~-
croat, 25 August)
Other statements departing from the usual include,.
"Particularly in the villages located An the border area
officers of the People's Army are giving lectures on 'Tito e s
bandits-lackeys of the Anglo-American imperialists in the
Balkans. (Bulgarian Home Service) 16 August)
"Tito has promised in the event of war to send troops to Austria
and Greece.""" (Polish Home Service, 29 August)
Current broadcasts do not indicate any increase in the number of such 'Mnusual or
more threatening sharge,s. On the contrary there appear to be fewer departures from
routine and stereotyped accusations during the past week,
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