(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-05343A000100110010-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 16, 2001
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: June 6, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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NOTE FOR: Director of Com ni.cations
Director of Joint Computer Support
Director of Personnel a~
Director of Security
Director of Training
Chief, Information Systems Analysis Staff
An expeditious review of the attached suggests that the ICI's
comments and proposals would have an impact on various DID/M4S Offices.
In view of the extremely short deadline, please provide comments by
noon on 10 June 1974 so that your views can be incorporated or attached
to a DD/M&S position paper.
LTD
5 1974
cc: (OMS,)OF, C/HS
Distribution:
1-Da Adse w/att
1-DZh44S Subj
1-DDM4S Chrono
Suspense: Noon - 10 June 1974
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PERSPECTIVES FOR INTELLIGENCE - 1975-1980
Introduction
1. These Perspectives for Intelligence 1975-1980
are issued by the Director of Central Intelligence to
provide general guidance for planning for all elements
of the Intelligence Community for the next five years.
They are. particularly designed to stimulate early action
on problems requiring long-term research, development, or
planning such as complex technical systems, language
training, skills augmentation, etc. They are designed to
influence decisions during the forthcoming Fiscal Year
1975 but whose effects will be felt only after several years.
For Fiscal Year 1975, near-term guidance is provided in the
Director's Objectives submitted to the President, which
include both Substantive Objectives (further detailed in
hey Intelligence Questions) and Resource Management Objectives
(furtai2r spc^~:.ified in SI.IU^VUJeL.U.Ve3).
2. These Perspectives open with a general overview
of the political, economic and security environment anti-
cipated during the coming five years (Part I). This is
followed by an overall statement of the anticipated role of
intelligence in these situations during that period (Part II).
Finally, more specific guidance is given with respect to
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activities which should be planned or initiated in order
to meet the needs of the period ahead (Part III).
3. The Perspectives are focused on major intelligence
problems and guidance. They recognize but do not deal with
three additional categories of problems which will require
attention and resources during the coming years:
(a) Continuing lower priority national responsi-
bilities which must be satisfied but which at the same
time must be sharply limited in their call upon resources.
(b) Departmental or tactical intelligence support
of subordinate civil and military elements of the United
States Government. These will also require continuing
investment of attention and resources, but they should
be in an appropriate proportion to those devoted to
national priority matters.
(c) Unexpected problems or crises not anticipated
in the discussions herein but which can pose major poli-
tical, economic or security problems to the United
States. Some attention and resources will certainly be
diverted for such purposes, and some appropriate level
of reserve capability must be included in planning to
meet them.
Part I - Major World Problems
1. The USSR. The Communist Party bureaucratic
structure will probably continue to rule the USSR, whether or
not a change occurs in the individual leaders thereof, Soviet
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policy will continue to reflect a drive to maintain at
least strategic equality with the United States, and
superiority if it can be obtained at a reasonable risk, but
a conscious decision to initiate hostilitiesagainst the U.S.
is not likely. At the same time, Soviet policy will seek
a degree of international respectability, positive political
relationships with other nations and the economic benefits
of trade and technological exchange. There will be some
ebb and flow between these two approaches to tha United States,
but the USSR will continue to be the greatest single military
power outside the United States,, it will be a competitor with
respect to world influence, and it will be the principal
counterpart in a large number of bilateral and multilateral
negotiations on political, economic and security matters.
There may be some amelioration of the authoritarian
economic structure-of the Soviet Union and greater opportunity
for access, trade and intercourse with the Soviet economy. At
the same time, there is not likely to be any substantial
amelioration of Soviet authoritarian political discipline,
internal security controls, and high degree of secrecy with
respect to Soviet political and military programs and policies.
Moscow's military power will be of particular importance
to the United States. Unless constrained by arms limitation
agreements, the USSR will continue to improve its strategic
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forces, maintain and modernize its general purpose forces,
and gradually augment its capabilities at sea (surface
presence, submarine attack and SLBM and ASW). The Soviets
will continue to develop their satellite capabilities for
intelligence,_antisatellite attack, communications and
possibly space platforms for offensive activity. The Soviets
will continue their heavy emphasis on defense, particularly
air defense, and on the possible development of new techniques
of laser or similar air or ABM defense systems, unless limited
by arms limitation agreements.
Moscow will continue to be the counterpart to the United
States in arms limitation negotiations. Prospects for progress
in these fields will be in part dependent on Moscow's perception
of threats from other sources such as China, its concern at
maintaining a predominance over its neighbors and satellites,
its respect for American capabilities and its deep-seated sus
p.icions of the non- Communist world stemming from Communist
doctrine,
2. China. Almost certainly, China will undergo a change
in leadership. The succession could see an initial collegial
unity followed by an authoritarian, aggressive and hostile
xenophobic leader. The initial period could also be followed
by a fragmentation into a variety of contesting military,
party, and provincial elements. For planning purposes, how-
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ever, it would seem most appropriate to assume that the
follow-on leadership in China will retain the unity and author-
itarian discipline imposed by the. Communist Party, that it will
be primarily concerned with internal unity and meeting the
social and economic problems within China,and that it will main-`
tain an arms-length, somewhat hostile attitude 'toward any
element on its periphery or elsewhere which might be deemed
to offer a threat to China,
China will continue gradually to develop its strategic
forces and will present a retaliatory threat to the Soviet
Union. By 1980,it will have the capability of threatening
the United States with a demonstration (or desperation) strike
by a small number of ICBMs.. China will maintain large general
purpose forces capable of operations on its periphery but will
be unlikely to commit them in the absence of major provocation
or concern,
Internally, China will. continue its authoritarian economic
programs, but these are unlikely to accomplish more than keep
China up to the growth of its population. Internationally,
China.will endeavor to become the ideological leader of the
Third World, will participate in aid programs and similar
political gestures with. other Third World powers but will not
establish substantial authority over Third World countries,
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3. Europe. Western Europe will continue the process of
gradual political, economic, and military integration but will
be handicapped by a continuation of the same centrifugal
forces working today. French nationalism, suspicion of undue
German power, ultimate reliance on U,S, support against the
USSR, absence of dynamic leadership, the relaxing effect of
continued detente and the effects of.internal political
fragmentation-will all cause Europe to continue its complex
internal negotiations and show hesitancy toward more vigorous
common policies or positions.. Substantial economic problems
will face European countries individually and collectively
as the Third World. becomes more aggressive on this subject.
4. East Europe. East Europe will continue to be under
Soviet control, with some loosening of its ties insisted upon
by the East Europeans, The five-year period could see an
explosion from within one or more Eastern European countries
against Soviet dominance, but this would likely be of short
duration and overall Soviet hegemony will soon be reestablished.
Internal discipline may be alleviated in these countries at
the cost of continued adherence to the Soviet alliance--a form
of "Finlandization." Economic relations with the West and
with the Third World will grow in quantity and in independence
from Soviet control. The passing of Tito could open an arena
of difficulty and contest over the succession internally and
over the future orientation of Yugoslavia externally.
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5. Japan. Japan will continue. to play a major economic
role in the. Pacific and as a participant in international
economic affairs generally, It will continue a restrained
.political role but will endeavor to establish some form of
coexistence with both China and the Soviet Union, It will
continue a security relationship with the United States in a
low key but probably be less and less amenable to strong
American influence in political and security-affairs. The
internal Japanese scene is not apt to change so substantially
as to affect Japan's role abroad,
6. New Powers. During the coming years, a number of
nations will increase in absolute and relative strength and
become at least regional great powers, plus playing more
substantial roles in world international forums. An example
is Brazil,' whose economic and political power is growing in
Latin America. Another is Iran, whose Shah is determined to
build Iranxs relative strength in the region so as to play a
full great power role there. Nigeria in Africa could also
develop this sort of role. Aside from these, several nations
having considerable influence within regions will display
greater independence from th.e close U,S. relationship which
may have characterized them in the past, This will be parti-
cularly prevalent in the economic field, but it will also display
itself in various international relationships, Examples of such
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powers are Canada, Australia, Mexico, and Thailand, plus
several South American nations such as Venezuela, Panama,
and Peru.
7. The Third World will present a variety of problems,
A number of local disputes will preoccupy not only the
leaders of individual countries but the international community.
Examples are relationships between India and Pakistan, black
and white Sub-Sahara Africa, and Southern Arabia. Several
existing disputes will continue to be a matter of concern to
the international community and be the seeds of potential
larger scale involvement (Arabs and Israel, North and South
Vietnam, North and South Korea, Taiwan). A number of Third
World countries will become increasingly antagonistic toward
the great powers and their local presence in the economic,
political and cultural spheres, e.g., in Africa, Latin America
and South Asia. In this respect some identity of interest may
grow between nations divided by the Cold War, developing into
collaboration against both superpower complexes, e.g,, Cuba
and the Caribbean, the Arab nations, the rising Black nations
of Africa, and the nations of the Malay Archipelago, Inter-
nally , many Third World nations will suffer serious damage
from tribal and regional differences, economic extremism, and
ideological zealots (India, Cambodia, Ethiopia, et al). Some
of the Third World will find an outlet for its frustrations in
self-defeating assaults on groat power economic relationships
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and in hamstringing the effectiveness of a variety of
international forums,
8. Social change will cause turbulence and possibly
create power vacuums in a number of areas. These will stem
from increased expectations and a perception of the growing
economic gap between less developed countries (and classes
within countries) and the developed world, Areas particularly
susceptible to this process will be the Persian Gulf, certain
other Arab states such as Morocco, India, possibly the Malay
Archipelago (including the Philippines) and the Caribbean.
Internally this turbulence may be temporarily stilled by
authoritarian governments, but they will have difficulties
in maintaining themselves over the longer term and transferring
power to successors, The resulting turbulence can present
temptations to neighboring states to exploit long-standing
differences or to great powers desirous of extending their
influence, Such turbulence will also exist within advanced
nations, as economic, racial, ideological, or regional minori-
ties turn to violence and terrorism to press their claims
against more and more delicately tuned and interdependent
societies.
9. The acceleration of events. will be a characteristic
of the years ahead. This will come from improved communication
and transporation, sharply reducing the time available to
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reflect on, negotiate, and resolve international problems.
It will also raise many local events to international pro-
minence and inflate national or political pride, posing
further handicaps to successful negotiations, There will be
a resulting tendency towards shorter attention spans for
individual situations and a need for simultaneous perception
and management of a multiplicity of international.. relation-
ships. Acceleration will also mark the process of change.
To a major degree this will occur in the .fields of science
and technology, but the pace there will have substantial effects
on the pace of sociological, industrial, and institutional
change., with resultant political and economic impacts. Iden-
tification and accurate assessments of such changes and their
effects will be needed on an increasingly rapid or even immediate
basis,
Part II - The Role of Intelligence
1. The primary charge on. intelligence during the years
a
~. to
ut. to Provide
accurate data and assessments with,
respect to the variety of complicated problems facing the United
States. These must be in formats which will facilitate their
communication to those responsible for decisions about U.S.
policy. In particular, the need will be for early warning,
because of the acceleration of events, to permit the resolution
through negotiation of matters which might otherwise involve
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political, economic or military contest or unrest., The
acceleration of events and the explosion of information will
also require a major effort by intelligence to process raw
information into manageable form and to devise adequate
techniques for presentation to assist consumers in the
identification.of the essential elements of foreign situations,
the reliability of our assessments and the likely impact of
alternative policy decisions, Intelligence will be increasingly
expected to provide assessments of the intentions'and likely
courses of action of foreign powers, in addition to exact facts
and the basic capabilities available to them.
2. The USSR. The USSR will remain as the major intel-
ligence target. Its military power, its economic role in the
world., its political policies will continue to pose major
problems for American leadership. Intelligence will be expected
to provide precise data on Soviet military capabilities and
economic activity. It will be expected also to supply reliable
information on Soviet political dynamics and intentions.. These
must be supplemented by clear and accurate assessments of
likely Soviet courses of action in the political, economic and
military fields. While a small percentage of this material
will become available through open exchange and access, vast
fields of highly important information will be kept by the.
Soviets within a closed society, requiring extraordinary efforts
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to obtain them. A particular requirement will be accurate
and demonstrable monitoring of arms limitations agreements
made with the Soviet Union, In the military field special
attention will be focused on Soviet research and develop-
ment, in particular with respect to weapons Systems which
could substantially affect the balance of power (anti-
submarine warfare, satellite systems, strategic deception,
etc.). The readiness of Soviet forces will be a constant
subject of attention, Intelligence will be required to main-
tain a base-line capability for tactical intelligence coverage,
for rapid augmentation in case of local or general confronta-
tion or conflict. Trends and factions in Soviet leadership
and political doctrine will be a major subject of interest,
to assist in negotiations and to warn of undesirable develop-
ments ahead. The Soviet role abroad, either directly through.
diplomatic means or indirectly through party or subversive
means, will be a matter of particular attention with respect
to the turbulence of the Third World. Soviet policy, power
and determination will be of importance in Eastern Europe as-
well as in some of the areas of great power competition or
exploitation of local power vacuums (Persian Gulf, India, etc.).
3. China. China will continue to be a second but still
important intelligence target. The closed nature of Chinese
society will continue and make it of great importance to know
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with precision the possibility of difficulty within China
or by threats it might pose abroad., This will become
particularly important as Chinese strategic power grows in
range and threatens a larger group of. allies and the United
States itself. It will also apply to Chinese political
activities and intentions in view of their influence in the
Far East and through China's ties with and aspirations to lead
the Third World.
4. Europe. Europe's gradual process of cohesion will
be a constant and major intelligence target in view of
United States participation in NATO, United States involvement
in bilateral and multilateral negotiations, and the importance
of Europe to the overall relationship between the United States
and the Soviet Union. Intelligence in Europe will be in great
part a matter of following open political and economic activi-
ties, supplemented by the need for accurate assessment of
their significance and likely future developments. Europe's
economy will be a significant intelligence target not only in
Europe itself :but also with respect to Europe's impact on the
Third World and world-wide economic affairs. Eastern Europe
will be a constant intelligence target to assess political
developments vis-a-vis the USSR and the military and political
strength the East European nations individually and collectively
bring to the Warsaw Pact.
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5. Economics, Economic intelligence will increase in
importance world-wide. This will include economic situations
in nations having a major impact on the world economy and on
relationships with the United States, such as the Arab oil
states, major economic powers such as Japan, major suppliers
of food and raw materials, and nations where internal economic
chaos can create major world problems out of sympathy or
resonance (e.g. India). Intelligence on economic affairs
will increasingly become international in scope and include
appreciation of the activities of multinational corporations,
international development programs and regional and commodity.
6. Intelligence will increasingly be looked to to warn
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differences between societies, cultures and national personali-
categorizations of behavior and motivation to reflect the
mechanisms. This may require intelligence to develop net
American interests. An example will be to identify the causes
of social change, turbulence, and political terrorism in Third
World countries, so the component elements of these problems
can be isolated, negotiated about or countered with appropriate
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7. A few of the major problems which will be either
the subject of dispute or negotiation, or sometimes both,
and consequently will be priority intelligence requirements,
can be listed:
(a) Economic interrelationships in monetary,
trade, and resource control, especiallytiith respect
long-term inflation; energy demand and supply, and
population growth. Patterns of commercial and business
activity (the multinational corporations, foreign invest-
ment, etc.). The division of return between raw material,
processing and finishing operations, and environment con-
trol.
(b) Communications and transportation, including
movement of goods, information and persons,
(c) Arms limitations, nuclear proliferation and
crisis avoidance..
(d) Jurisdiction, exploitation, and relationships
in the oceans and on sea beds.
(e) Space exploitation and the use of space with
respect to national territories.
Part III - Implications for Intelligence Planning
A. Collection vs. Exploitation
1. Over the past decade, management focus and the
allocation of resources have been directed especially to the
application of advanced technology to the collection and, to a
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lesser degree, the processing of intelligence data. This
has been highly successful, resulting in major substantive
advances in our knowledge, particularly with regard to the
military capabilities of the Soviet Union. This investment
has made a major contribution to the negotiations required
for detente.
2. This forward technological progress will soon
reach a plateau with new capabilities in the photo and SIGINT
fields. This plateau will present large problems of
success.
3. Within the time frame of this document, an
important and pervasive problem facing the Intelligence Commu
nity will be to ensure efficient exploitation of the enormous
amounts of data it will be collecting. Exploitation means not
only sifting, selecting and processing the most relevant data,
but also the application of advanced techniques of transfer of
data to the point of ultimate use, to analysis and production
and to the presentation of the end products to the ultimate
users of intelligence.
4. Action: Study and planning must be initiated by
Intelligence Community agencies in;
(a) Processing in rapid time all raw informa-
tion received, to include selection and discard of
non-essential material at the earliest possible time,
identification and acceleration of critical material
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and reducing manpower and investment on lower
priority material.
(b) Development of improved methods of
analysis and production.
(c) Development of improved methods of
presentation.
B. Demands vs. Resources
5. Another problem of great magnitude facing the
Community over the next five to ten years will be the changing
(and in all probability increasing) demands for intelligence
while available resources for intelligence decrease. in real
terms.
6. In the past, the major portion of our intelligence
effort has necessarily been deployed against the military capa-
bilities of the Soviet Union and our other adversaries, actual
and potential. Even assuming a period of genuine detente, much
of this military focus must be maintained because of the
importance of this subject to national security and the need
for information on the quality of enemy weapons systems. It
must not only serve to keep us alert militarily, but also
support negotiations and verify arms limitations agreements.
At the same time, the demands for other types of intelligence
are growing. The result is a probable net increase in demand
with a new proportionate mix among political, economic, military
and technical target objectives,
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7. This simultaneous shift and increase in
requirements is occurring in a period of serious resource.
constraint and continuing inflation, Until very recently
we-have had the freedom to invest resources in a number of
functional areas-.simultaneously without undue difficulty.
This is no longer true, We will have to accomplish our
objectives without the benefit of significantly greater
resources. We must find trade-offs in the systems we use,
the areas we cover, and the depth of the data we seek,
8. One area which holds promise for greater
efficiency is the national/tactical interface. Current studies
seek to identify ways by which national programs can more
directly support tactical requirements, and vice versa. As
more capable and flexible systems come into the national.
inventory, they must be made to serve the needs of operational
forces as well as national-level consumers. Modernized systems
and procedures which, by their design, permit greater mutuality
of effort between national. and force support activities should
enable trade-offs achieving net resource savings.
9. Another area can be the optimum interrelationship
among overt and clandestine, and technical and human sources.
Costly and risky clandestine techniques must only be employed
if overt sources cannot be successful in obtaining needed
information. The technical can in some cases substitute for
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human effort, but human sources can also at times collect
final conclusions rather than masses of technical data.
10. Action: Study and planning must be initiated
by Intelligence Community agencies to:
(a) Increase flexibility of responses to changes
in priorities for intelligence coverage,
(b) Identify areas in which intelligence coverage
can be reduced or carried on a base-line maintenance
level, permitting rapid augmentation in case of increased
need.
(c) Examine techniques by which national programs
can contribute better to departmental needs and vice
versa.
(d) Examine areas subject to overt-and human source
collection reducing the need for clandestine or
technical operations.
(e) Develop programs to improve the productivity of
intelligence resources in qualitative terms.
C. Technical Systems
ll.The great accomplishments of present and projected
technical collection systems must not conceal the fact that
a major crisis is arising in the future. This stems in part
from the necessity of solving the problems of processing and
presenting the material collected, noted above, Of even
greater concern, however, is the pace of technological change,
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which is upgrading target technology in complexity and in
volume at a rapid rate, posing the danger that present
systems become obsolescent in reduced time periods, This
pace of change affects technology of collection and proces-
sing also, however, so that new potentials appear at shorter
intervals. A governing restraint on these comes from budget
and inflationary pressures. Because of long development and
production cycles, the conflicts among these factors must be
resolved at early stages, requiring the Intelligence Community
to study and plan to.-
Ca) Identify technological trends in target
complexes which will close off access and initiate
planning for upgrading current collection and proces-
sing systems to assure future coverage.
(b) Research and develop new techniques of collection
and processing to capitalize on technological change to
give access and coverage to new targets of importance.
(c) Ensure that substantive intelligence needs rather
than technological improvement momentum drives investment
in upgrading or replacing currently operating and produc-
tive systems.
D .
Requirements and Evaluation
12. Taking advantage of potential trade-offs will
require systematic evaluation of the total effort, and the
forg
ing of a much tighter link between the allocation of
C, 0
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resources and the substantive intelligence result. A start
in this direction has been made with the KIQ/KEP, but success
will require an increasing commitment from the entire Community.
In particular the Community must demonstrate flexibility in
reducing at least.to a maintenance level intelligence activities
providing only marginal results in the circumstances of the
time.
13. A critical dimension to better evaluation and
more efficient use of resources will be a far better definition
of intelligence requirements, both short and long term (the
latter in particular with regard to R&D). Today the Community
has a confusing variety of means, methods, and vehicles and
even language to determine and state requirements. Ways of
restructuring the machinery for generating and communicating
requirements must be undertaken on both Community and depart-
mental levels. Thus study and planning is required to:
(a) Interrelate the procedures at tactical,
departmelL.al and national levels for gcnc a ing
requirements, ensuring optimum satisfaction of each.
(b) Improve communication among intelligence
users, producers and collectors to reduce bureau-
cratic rigidities and improve the responsiveness
and flexibility of the intelligence machinery at
all levels.
(c) Produce periodic evaluations of the pro-
ducts and performance of the Intelligence Community
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against current primary or maintenance level
requirements.
E. Manpower Implications
14. The future responsibilities_ Of :.the. Intellig.ence
Community establish new needs for manpower levels, academic
and scientific disciplines and language capabilities. This
will be particularly true with respect to humaz:.,.,source_, ca,Z,lec.-_:..
tion,_where depth of cultural knowledge plus greater capabili-
ties in scientific and economic disciplines will be needed.
The analyst of the future will have to be comfortable with
electronic tools. In our preoccupation recently with manpower
reductions, investment in new talent, training and career
development, and exposure abroad may have suffered. j:j
not: be permitted to continue. In particular, steps are needed
to deepen our knowledge of foreign cultures and thought processes
through language fluency and foreign residence, especially with
respect to nations important in political., economic or military
terms (e.g., USSR and East Europe, China, Latin America, Arab
States, South and Southeast Asia). Collectors and producers
must extend their ability to cover both scientific and liberal
arts subjects intelligence must be equally comfortable in
.either or both of the "two cultures," And the Intelligence
Community must undertake affirmative action to ensure equal
employment opportunity to keep fully in step with national and
government-wide trends.
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15. Advanced information processing and presenta-
tion techniques will pose particular manpower training
requirements. Indeed, the Intelligence Community should be
in the forefront in placing new technologies in the service
of users. New methods of analysis, forecasting, coordination
and presentation of information must be energetically explored
and applied where appropirate. Care must be taken in the
application of such new methods and systems to ensure they are
designed for the people who will use them and that adequate
training in their use is active and integral to the process.
16, The Intelligence Community must study and plan
(a) Assure that training and familiarization
are undertaken in new methods of collection, analysis
and production, particularly in the use of new techni-
cal capabilities to increase productivity and precision
and save manpower.
(b) Develop selection and training programs
in those foreign languages and cultures which will
be important intelligence targets of the particular
agency in the 1975-1980 time frame,
Ensure the availability of technical and
academic talents and expertise in the subjects. which
will be of importance in the years 1975-1980,
economics.
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(d) Flexibly reduce manpower commitments
to lower priority activities and reduce (or
reorient to new requirements) the persons freed
by such changes in priority.
(e) Develop and apply affirmative action
plans for equal employment opportunity.
F. Security
17. The Intelligence Community must develop a
satisfactory resolution of its needs for the protection of
sources and methods and the American public's right to informa-
tion about its Government's activities. This may require new
legislation, the development of new ways of informing the
Congress and the public of the substantive conclusions of the
intelligence process and clear standards for compliance with
the.Freedom of Information Act and Executive Order 11652 (and
their exceptions) in the Intelligence Community.
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