U.S. DEPLOYMENTS IN THAILAND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-05399A000200030002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 28, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 9, 1974
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2001/11/19 : CIA-RDP78=05399A000201 W OOO2
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 266
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
*NSC & OSD Reviews Completed*
m
and intelligence i p
is in and the turnover of U. S.
l
a
May we please nave your g
lications of the Defense Department proposals
encies' comments on the political
t
from Secretary Schlesinger and
oy-1e11
concerning U. S. dep
equipment to Thailand, as contained in the January 22 memorandum
h ?,xnrch 1 memorandum from
Deputy Secretary. Clements {attached).
from Deputy oecrGLa- y "_"----
memorandum from Secretary Kissinger to Secretary Schlesinger
Attached also for your background information are 7a memorandum
d a
We would like to receive your comments by close of business
Wednesday, March 13.
Jine'W. Davis
Staff Secretary
Attachments
SEC Gt or Release 2001/11/19 : CIA-RDP78-05399A000200030002-0
March 9, 1974
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director of Central Intelligence
OL 4 1418
of November 21, 1973, on this subject.
 1? -. ?M_t`,. . -tfG }+t.lv-1 rLV.~1.1.%N. v. ....._..__
? I' .' ? t' WASHINC.1ON D. C. 70101
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13 OCT 1U<
t?,EtIORI't"DU:'t rCR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PR ESIDEI:T FOR UATIOt1AL -
SECURITY AFFAIRS
DEPUTY SECt:ETARv OF STATE
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIrENCE
DIRECTOR, orr i CE or I i1,,:A1rEi'E; T Ai T1 BUDGET
DIRECTOR, ARJ?IS CONTROL AND DISAF:i MEIlT ACEUCY
in Thailand
SUBJECT: NSSt:-171 Follow-on --. Analysis of U.S. Deployments
The attached paper responds. to the 28 August 1973 rcc,uest
from Dr.. Kissinger for. an analysis of.U.S. dcployr,cnts in.Thailan
withdrawal of forces from Thailand between now and end FY 74.
'However, a decision on longer-term deployrents card, be deferred
dep1uylrwiL . A ohx is ton un the short- Lc.rm dep ioyr.vents is
needed in the near. future as this decision will affect the
The analysis includes options for both short-and longer-term
MI/6{ I 4t1L .NI i l ~.V-~ JI bb-44IV-I J1.4N1.1 {GLJ .- \~\~
Enclosure
COPY TO:
Chaivr;.n", Joint ^-iiie; of staff
pr~.t.l~.;' P - t 'r f ist')
Approved For Release 2001/11/19 CIA-RDP78-05399A000200030002-0 .
 THE SECRETARY OF CiEF'EN-WE ! ..
Approved For Release 2OOlt9M/19-CFA`PE)P-7`9-05399A0002000300Q2 O
I2M RA:1DU:t FCR ASSISTANT TO TEE PRESIDENT FOR 1:,'1TI0:I^,L SLCu^ITY AFFAIRS
SUGJCCT: U.S. Dep to eats in Thailand (L')
delayed until t'av 1075 in order to protect an FY 75 drv season
capability. However, I am prepared to withdraw some unessential,'.
non-strike aircraft at any time if pressures on the RTG make some
r
7
dry season, with further reductions to reach the end FY 75 level
(S) To comply with the President's decision to maintain the current
U.S. force level in Thailand through the Fv 74 drv season (ilovember-
April), I have prepared a plan with reductions eornuiencinn in Flay
ii ti i 1 t'i'thclra%.!,Il s will be eornl etgd prior to the FY 75
4 Th i
l
B-52s in Thailand, 25 B-52s would be returned to Thai an nom
Guam if a decision were made to employ the B-52s during the FY 75
dry season. The FY 75 dry season force level in Thailand will
b h held thro t .~e I plan fuMrV}her i vllt1f"f'ucY?fT!1y
e h tfth April - 75, at Which ti-me N
l
air and gunship squadrons, anu F/ 0-DLs. 11 auui "':
yvdf~
W1 re
ae nnn ii tartirn1 Air and aunshin squadrons, and 50
(S) The withdrawal scheduled to begin after the FY 74 dry season
ill duce our forces in Thailand from the current. level of
redeployments necessary.
to reach an end FY 75 level of 24,700 personnel, 5 tactica
?(5) Throughout this entire period we plan to maintain as a minimum
one carrier either on-station or on 96 hour readiness for South
Vietnam, one within one week's sailing time, and a third carrier
.,air and gunship squadrons, and 15 B-52s.
Vietnam, one would be available within four days, an a
carrier would be available within one week.
to the Indian Ocean, then one carrier wou F u ue uii-:, uu 6 i uir .. r ,
d third
noon
surge levels for up to six nonths without additional funding,
munitions production should he increased if bombing is resumed so
that our stocLpiles would not be dannerously lowered. Supplemental
funding of $32 - 42 million per month to support additional
munitions procurement would be needed at the time a surge was started.
1,800 B-52s sorties per month. lrhdle our current muni ion
i toriee nil Programmed production will permit us to fly these
T
(5) iroug i p
permit us to fly, indefinitely, as many as 11,500 tacticalsair and
j f IFV 7r I ian to maintain an SEA surge capability that will
Classified bv 1 Pft ,C
Sl.fl J[CT TO r4-!fll.l:AL. UL(:L/1;S I ? I (7A 1 IOU SCI II i)UU OF
EXECUTIVE tl7"Di:R 11(11*2. AtiTr?." ATICALLY f.0:"?rI'.Ar)CD
AT TVO YLAR. IIITEi'VALS. DLC1;,SSIFIED Oil 1Z/:;1/,111
Approved For Release 2001/4'4;11'1 C!A fRDP78-05399A00020QQ30Q02-0. '--
 Approved For Release 2001/11/19 : CIA-RDP78-05399A000200030002-0
(S) The personnel levels, sortie capabilities and surge levels
available fro::, now through FY 75 are sur.;ciarized in the following
table. Cetween the dry season periods (November-April) shown in
the table the capability declines to the-next lower level.
U.S. Forces and Carahilities in SEA
Timinn Thailand Carriers
Mi i tary sorties/i::onth
.Personnel B-52 lac Air a/
0)_.__.- sorties/r onth
FY 74 Dry Season
36.0
1,200
8,500
FY 75 Dry Season
32.2
1,000
5,100
End FY 75
24.7
300
1,900
Surge Capability
Through FY 75
1,800
7,000
a/--Includes 400 nuns ip sorties per month.
2,100
2,100
2,100
4,500 j
E/ In addition to a minimum of one carrier on 96 hour alert, two
carriers are available within two weeks which could raise the
sustained Navy capability to 3,300 sorties per month. A fourth
carrier wculd take one month, to reach SEA and enable the Navy to
sustain the 4,500 sortie per month surge capability.
(S) To insure efficient manpower management a decision to modify
this withdrawal plan should be made at least three months in advance.
While the plan can be chanced on very short notice, the three-months'
planning for personnel reassignments is the decision factor with
the longest lead time.
(S) In addition to 25 EB-66s tirhich have redeployed, if required, Y am
prepared to withdraw on short notice 8 EC-121s, 7 C-130s, and 38
0-2s, although the 0-2s are under consideration for possible turn-
over to the RTG. Approximately 1,290 personnel would also be
withdrawn when these non-strike aircraft were redeployed. It should
be noted that these aircraft and personnel do not include dedicated
national intelligence collection assets.
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(S) A reply to your requests for (1) our review of equipment which
could be turned over to the Thai, and (2) our recoranended manning
levels for headquarters in Thailand will be forwarded to you in
the near future.
SE(3"Pi
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 THE SECRE' F r
Approved For Release y7,Qga/,~,,~ RfpA000200030002-0
1 F:-12 1974
MEVORANDL:1 FOR THE AS ISTANT TO THE PRESIULi*:T FO1; NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIrS
SUBJECT: Turnover of U.S. Equipment to Thailand (U)
(S) Your r.:r.r:nranrium of r:ovc:^her 21, amonn other thinns, relayed the
President's directive that we review the enuirrent of U.S. forces to
be withdrawn from Thailand through FY 75 to determine to what extent
amounts ;of U.S. equipmcnt in addition to that which we are fi-nancinq
-.(S) On a number of occasions the Thai have requested significant
we can respond to Thai equipment requests..
major items of equipment-is over 5400 million, tonetber with the
requested by the Thai, for which the first year's cost of the
in the Military Assistance Program (MAP). A list of equipment
-equipment and support for which DoD believes there is a valid
many items requested by the Thai are in the apnroved POt?t. for thre_mo.st
The size of the Thai request precludes serious consideration, althounh
the DoD program is now S310 million, of which over 40Z is FMS Credit.
military need are shown in the Enclosure. The five-year cost of,.
part, this _eq.uipn:ent--would-upn-rade.and- modernize the Thai armed
orces to a much greater exi int_thaII_ L bel.tcvve necessar_ . _; ar_ 4h it
security requ
to the Thai, placing the oth.er_..-in-.caretaker.-status.-.However, listings
or-the exact items which can be made available will not be known
FY 75. Durin2that_ver_iod_ste plan to withdraw about _10,000.-mil-i-tar-y._..
personnefrom Thailand, return Takh.l i --and either Ubon or Kor-at--airbase.s..__
which we would be witlina to provide the Thai between now and end
(S) There is.a significant amount of equipment and valuable facilities
LST. There are also as many as 34 O-2s and 5 EC-47 aircraft which
be identified now for turnover. In fact, since receipt of your November
21 memorandum we haverniven 6 F-5As and an AU-23 to tli^. RTG. A destroyer
escort (DE),and an LST are currently on loan to the Royal Thai Navy.
We are exploring the possiblity of transferring the DE to Thailand on
a no-cost basis and are in the process of extending the loan on the
(S) Nevertheless, there are some major items of equfnment which can
until the time of the withdrawals and base closings.
Classifier by DDPA"E
SUflJECT TO CI ~:i T:A T,ttL-I ,Ti`irr,Tli1,^;C}rr irT'~F
EXFCIITIvi n!!Nrl"f 1)15?.. Atli c:il!TICALLY I")!lr;CPAfiD
AT 11.10 YCAI; I::TCRVALS. DECLAS;;IFILD %Nl?'/31/::?
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 Approved For Release 2001/11/19 : CIA-RDP78-05399A0(L0200030002-0
eruld r.ivrn to the Thai, plus sore t:;edical enuip;;:cnt (less
than S10,000). In addition, I believe discussions should be
initiated with the Thai to determine their interest in and
capability for assunino control of a Sincilc Intenratcd Military
Tel ecoryuunications System (SUITS) to serve U.S. and RTARF renuiremcnts.
Although this would not provide turnover of the communications
enuipr.:ent to the RTr, by the end of FY 75, discussions initiated at
this time could lead to equipment turnover beninninn in fY 76.
Ilowever. S I!!T S is not in the FY 75-7') fAP for Thailand and its
Bests have not yet been determined.
(S) In*order to insure the capability for rapid re-introduction
of our forces into Thailand, it'is desirable that, if necessary,
we be able to reacquire the facilities which we turn over to the
Thai. However, we do not have RTG assurance that these facilities
would be made available nor that they would be in operating condition.
(S) Rapid re-entry also requires that mobility equipment and supplies
needed for direct support of an aircraft or its weapons systems be
redeployed with the units. Therefore, except when not cost effective,
this equipment should be redeployed with the unit.
(S) A factor'in the"turnover'of equipment to the Thai is the impact
of the annual $150 million world-wide legislative ceiling on foreign
excess Defense articles and facilities which need not be chargeable to
PIAP appropriations. Although this legislative ceilincr does not appear
to be a constraint, equipment turnovers must be considered in light
of turnover actions elsewhere to insure that the ceiling is not
exceeded. Also, there are no prior agreements recardino disposition
of equipment and property at Thai bases, and disputes may arise
over whether property is part of the real estate which belongs to
Thailand or whether it is U.S. property.
Deputy
Enclosure
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 MUitarv Assistanct for the. P, TG;
AT? roved For F e,~ me ~2~~1/ 1/~Sry~?-RPR78r t4atgo- peQ$Qo02 th
The footirtn(l c()sn?
ti-se U.S. ~t'Cnr?i ty prorlrart fir Thailand in the FY 75-79
Security A sistance pO.I. The identified fir,t year costs for tie
RTG request is $400 million; the U.S. program has a five-year cost
I. Esuipient
Aircraft
011 -!Z
U11-111
0-1
T-41
U-17
OV-10
F-5E
C-123K
NH-53
EC-130
A-37 B
Shins and Goats
Thai Request
27
40 + 10/year a/
10/year
10/year.
2/year
32
27
8
25
8
PGFi tlbt, )
PGU1 (100' )
mist 2
rCF
LCU 2
PBR 55
DE
Up to 75 non b/ 1,500
Over 75 nun 174
M167 Vulcan
Radios
Camand & Control c/ 7
Ali Tt:C-9Q
Torn Tape Relay Equip 6
Proposed U.S.
FY 75-7n Pronrarr
25 (F!?1SCR)
55 (HAP)
11 (MAP)
6 (MAP)
(no cost)
13,09 2/204 (MAP/Fit':CP)
150/3G0 (MAP/F11 SCl:)
144 (FtfSCR)
481 (MAP.)
a-1 The i:TG has in icatet t1 one time request for 40 U11-is (for RIM
F?- +t,., DTR
and Rl/It), as well US 1ki 1,;j .ru,
The RTG specified 1,500 11-16 rifles for Thai Marines. In addition,
the Thai have also made less definitive requests for smaller
caliber t?;capons? (1) modernize AAA battalions, (2) iiaprovr combat
readiness of three special forces groups, (3) provide equiplent
for 7,000 security force troops and security of four bases,
(4) military equipment support for volunteer ornanizitions, and
(!) equi paent support to lrri nq all RTA units to full TOC.
In addition to the items sp-cifically requPsterl, the RTC, also inrlic?.tt+?'t
a need for: (1) repIt'ni shinq and mod-rnizinq RTA eommmications
equiinarnt and (2) the II.S. co:'U'ninicatiens neWori': in Thailand for
joint U.S./RTAF use.
of $310 -ai l l i on .
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~\ .t. ..I .
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II. Support
The RTG also requested the following types of sunport:
- NO years repair parts for aircraft requested for RTA.
- Amnuni ti on support for war reserves.
Increased armunition production support.
Increased maintenance capability for aircraft communications
equipment, air defense radars, and combat support equipment.
- .A general support field hospital.
During the period FY 75-79 the U.S. proqram, while not
addressing the specific RTG requests, does contain the following
support funding (in addition to the equipment noted above).
Support for RTG: FY 75-79
mil ions
Type of Support
Aircraft
Ship
Supporting Equipment
Training
0M
Total
14AP
2.6 12.2
3.5 -
21.1 13.8
7.4 -
66.6
101.2
2-6.-0
The approved FY 75-79 Security Assistance POM is the best
estimate of RTG requirements, but is subject to Congressional
authorizations and appropriations. Additionally, the- FY 75-79.
P0fl does not reflect the impact of FY 74 funding reductions nor
program changes resulting from the President's FY 75 budget decision
to give the RIG $15 million additional grant aid in i-ieu of an
equal amount of Ft1S credit. At the present time field agencies are
preparing an updated PC:1 for FY 7G-80.
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Future S. 1crlov:.ents in Thailand
Introduction
..
The purhosE o ~
political ir.:plieations of cicployr?cnts in Thailand during FY 74-79-
as they rcl atc to U.S. military strateny in Asia and as they impact
upon the dvvclooinn rely ionships ar..onr' the Asiatt nations. Included
in tile. discussion are options for Loch short-and lonr!er-term deploy-
pent levels.'
II, Sortie C,t.rol.ilitics of the Current Faree~tis Pr viaus Sortie
11`ctt~t_v_
Since the cease-fires in trietnart and Laos and especially since
the t;ombinn halt.t'rrouchnut Southeast Asia, reouircr:ents for U.S.
forces based in Thailand have decreased. The forces which previously
had an active eo^:aat role, now are a sti-:tho1 of U.S. presence and
resolve in Southeast -Asia,. and act as a deterrent to increased iiort:h
Vietnamese military activity.
f this ,per is to assess Foth tie military and
'
draual tirl~icit was co*'rlet{:d in r.tcl-Scntcr~.hcr (al L.UU t u
we had even more aircraft and 45, noo military personnel in Titailanu
c
to
air'and runship sc'uadre'ns,. and .:C G-52s priorI + one Foint
forces in Thailand. To accor.moaate this expansion ue .?r
relaxed the U.S. l annct-cr ceiling. Our force area .front 32,200
personnel (the cei l i era autheri zccl by the RTC, at the time) , 12 tactical
(2
air and aGnSrtlp scuadrons and 42 G-5`S, to ~i2 ,000 t:en, 22 tactical
initial frith-
ti
?
Concurrent T?rt t t our -
of North Vietnam's offensive in the Sprinn of 1572, we exna nded our
+t rTC tot-^orarily
1 ? ~i thdrat??al from South-Vietnam and as a .resul t
.ceiling authorized by the RTG.
rccaed to fly tlt(ese scrtics, as null as Lrtese for o rc _
reeu i rce:ents in Thailand were to be kept within the military manpotrcr
a
1
Asia (.SC/?.), as urn f:wa
U.S. to fly co:-bat sorties frer, air Lases in Thailand. The personnel
tI 'r rrilitarv
Since 1~'C4 the level of L.S. presence in Thailand has been
dctcrr,:ined laat?c'%.?ly tw our rccuirtr.:c?nts for air support in Southeast
vt'rni rent (PTC) has ncrraitted the
Tt C
I. ' Current L.S. rPeirce.
At a result c?f tl:c r c c c nt.l v cr': ?pl etcd ;tai thdrat:al (I ncrc:: en t
1 of a here's inc:rer.cnt itS pl;.n), U.`. forces in Th3ilzind have been
0.0
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reduced to lG t: etieal air and runnhir scuadrons and ?1.3 KC-135s.*
Thcrc eras no rcc!uctiout in the nti.- :cr of f-'_'2s t.hieh rer:ains at
50 aircraft. iwlso rcr-aininn in Ti?wilr:rc: are al,rut 3~.5OO U.S.
ctil i taarti 't rscanne?1 , -:i tit alzcut 31,600-of these personnel directly
related to U.S. air activities.
The tactical air force: not! in Thailand are eapaL?lc of
c.encratiam! .,"'0 nortics ver? r.Y111ti1. A dds ti na l lv, Marco
Grits in can sustain 3,3CC t'ctic; t1 ail' ;ertics I`C1? r.onth,
for a total SUa\ ca;;ability of ll,C! tactical air sarLics l'er
i onth. The C-52s in Thailand can c cnc.raatc 1 ,20.1 sorties monthly
and those on Cuac:w can fly 1,320 more sorties i1;onthly.
B. Past Sortie Activity
The table below?- cor-rares current sortie capabilities
t
.
is at selected times III the pas
SEA U.S. Attach and C-52 Sorties a/
?sorti s/t:.ontn
r.....i i i i t.
I or-3
i 71
i 72
Tac Air/Gunship
11,100
31,100
10,200
13,500
G-52
2,520
1,715
1,050
2,370
l 72 flc.c 72
17,700 11,700
2,2E0 2,770
Includes sorties flown from. RVtt, Thailand, carriers and
Guam.
A1thourh our current tactical air car-ability of 11,800
sorties per month would be aLle to sustain only one-third the levels
flown in 1"M (when Sol-tic's rc flo :n fror t:iscs%in fVt; and Thailand
and frori carriers in support of U.S. oncratinlls)-it represents a
capability cca :raaral,l a to the averaactcw sGr?ti rs f l Cain in t)cecr ;er 1972
(the rontia enco-...raassinr L1!:cb cl:el? II) and in 1971-1.'72. Current
6-S2 capability has not um-cased sic'nificantly below the monthly
averages of the periods shown at;ovr..
*t;ot eoncic!ercd in the discussion are other support and marl titre
patrol aircraI t.
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M. re'aIrr,l nc(+ C,1 t.ilit.y
In addition to and indercrt'cnt of the caiabilities of the forces
renainino in Thailand or offshore. t:e have bc.c:n r:aintainina a
capability to return addi tioiwl air assets to SEA .:nd resume our
scrtic can bil i tv to as rr:uch as 20,''.!'(' tactical air and 3,000 C-52
sorties r:an.ti;1y in t!:c event enc:r'v activity prorpts such a r.ced.
Ito ever, in -lcoir .:ction with our reduced SE/: air renuirc.m.ents the
Seerctl;i'1; of L'c.'fc'n:c try s prorcict. to li!..er Lite. sur('c' eal?a! i l i t'
to 11,5,^?n tactical air and C-S2 scrtic:s p(:r n:::lrttt for the
ror:airidcr of FY 7, and for FY 7f.. P.r unitinn sufficient to sustain
the sure until the resunply pirel inc could 1.0 cstrat.l ish:cJ rust
'be pre-rosi.t.ioncd in Thailand, on Cuc-r; and at,card ships dcploycd in
tiESTPAC.*
.Our current dcployr~ents and base availability permit all of the
1.? ~.~. .(? t .. ?. .tP.,.,,.......; ;., r.~"CTOAr
lIr 1Rt}}u 011411144 .~ R/1/ IN ~t/.!u/3 \l.l, bll~ 1/4i1.1.4'i V1 car r is rs .c ~cvcr. ?.? ..v...w.
be available within 30 days rcc:a rdl es s of the force levels i n
nevertheless, it is cstimated that the full surge carability t:culd
on the nu^vcr of bases that are oncn or in a. caret: t:cr status.** V
the surge can be ir,rl er.:entcd at any tir::c in the future will depend
B-52s and the r-.ajority of the tactical air capability- necded for
the surge to be available within one week,, with the rc'maindcr
available in no core than two weeks. However. the speed with which
There are costs associated with rniintainino the resurcence
with active forces costs approximately X20 million per year, al thounh
holding a base in a caretaker status reduces the cost to about $2
a ptontt; is also costly. For crag:hole, ti:aintaininn -a base in Thailand
a caretaker status to insure that the suroc is achieved in less than
capability. t'unitions are a significant part of these costs as it
is estimated that nrotectinn the lo-tcr surge canabi l i ty throunh FY 75
will cost about $70 million in added munitions procurement (actually
irtpler.'entirta the surge would increase this cost. the size of increase
dependent on the duration of the sume). Keeping bases open or in
million annually.
*Currcntly there are sufficient air munitions stored in or enroute
to the Pacific greater to support the hir.;rcr surac level for 45 da e. or
the lo:-(?r level for t) days. At {!resent sufficit'tit r.:urti tions are buitlq
pruducclt to sustaini th' hir'hl:r .ur!?c: hcn:c:vcr, after fI.Lca:Lcr 1973
planucct r.'r'nductic:n t:ill s:ri'i'ur't uatly t.t.-.' lt.:c'r surc:c lc:v(,1;
,k+tin f}.l'_.L' R:,l irlta irlt.,i in?~l ,:i'.l'r :;tilt:i call 11C.. fully orcration.-.1
t' /: thin twi', 3a'?l't.a, t:7tcr'e.I!: 'r r::ty f.c' nl?t dcd for a f'a e t'irtch hV-
been CIc};t?VI, to f:(.(:(.r:r' 101t? o; cI aLilla.s1 . ia,;,, vc r, ttu' tir.c: to roe.L'