Interim Review of the National Intelligence survey (NIS) Program

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December 9, 2016
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August 4, 1998
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January 29, 1963
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0 Approved For Release, OOO/09/11: CIA-RDP78-05597#00100010001-4 Attachment A USIB-D-51.13 29 January 1963 Interim Review of the National Intelligence Survey (NIS) Program Approved For Release 2000/09/11: CIA-RDP78-05597A000100010001-4 Approved For.Rele a 2000/09/11: CIA-RDP78-055 ,0000100010001-4 L Interim Review of the NIS.Program 1. Introduction a. As a result of experience in World War II and with predecessor programs of this general tyke, the National Intelli- gence Survey (NIS) was established on 13 January 1948, pursuant to National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 3 (NSCID No. 3), latest revision 18 January 1961. The NIS Program is intended to be the means of providing all the basic intelligence required by the United States Government. Basic Intelligence &s defined in NSCID No. 3 "is that factual intelligence which results from the collation of encyclopedic information of a fundamental and moreor less permanent nature and which, as a result of evaluation and interpretation, is determined to be the best available. b. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) has the responsi- bility "for coordinating, production and maintenance, and for accomplishing the review, publication, and dissemination of these National Intelligence Surveys." Implementation of the DCI1s responsibilities have devolved upon the Deputy Director (Intelligence), Central Intelligence Agency. c. On December 28, 1948, the National, Security Council (NSC) approved the Standard Instructions for the National Intelligence Survey which were prepared by an ad hoc committee; approved by the Intelligence Advisory Committee (forerunner of the United States Intelligence Board); and transmitted to the NSC by the DCI. NSC approval of the Standard Instructions included the establishment of the NIS Committee with the authority to approve changes in outline requirements and other modifications of the Program. This Committee was also charged with approving policies and plans; determining scope and treatment; allocating production and maintenance; establishing production and maintenance schedules based on JCS priorities; and recommending to CIA measures for coordination of the Program. Each member of the Committee was authorized to speak for his principal in these matters. d. The NIS.covers more than 100 foreign land and ocean areas and sub-areas. Approximately 6,200 separate NIS units have been produced, and to date a total of more than 2,500,000 copies of these units have been published and disseminated almost world wide. Approved For Release 200,0/09/11: CIA-RDP78-05597A000100010001-4 Approved For.ReIe,e 2000/09/11: CIA-RDP78-055A000100010001-4 r, rr i+T m T n T A standard NIS is divided into chapters, each of which treats a major functional aspect of the country or area under consideration. These chapters are divided into sections, each of which treats a major subdivision of the functional field covered by the chapter. Modification of topical coverage is authorized as appropriate for the area involved. (1) The Standard NIS Chapters are: Chapter I 'Chapter II Chapter III Chapter IV Chapter V Chapter VI Chapter VII Chapter VIII Chapter IX - Brief of Country as a Whole - Military Geography - Transportation and Tele- communications - Sociological - Political - Economic - Scientific - Armed Forces - Map and Chart Appraisal (2) The section is the basic NIS unit for production as well as for subsequent maintenance. Responsibility for production and maintenance of each of the 94 sections is allocated to a given agency with provision, as required, for assistance from other agencies, including those outside the intelligence community. (3) Where appropriate, chapter discussion is amplified by more detailed treatment in supplements as follows: Supplement I - Ports and Naval Facilities Supplement II - Coasts and Landing Beaches Supplement III - Telecommunications Supplement IV - Urban Areas Supplement V Petroleum Supplement VI - Communism Of the six supplements provided for only I and II continue in production. No supplement IV and only very few supple- ments III, IT, or VI were ever produced. 2. General a. Over the years there have evolved as the main objectives of the NIS Program: N Development of world coverage, and Provision for continuing maintenance of published material. Approved For Release 2 597A000100010001-4 Approved For Releae 2000/09/11: CIA-RDP78-0554000100010001-4 "^ r TT. rp_T_ These two objectives are closely related, and as initial coverage increased,, so also did the problem of maintenance. The net result is that the objective of world coverage has been essentially achieved, but maintenance of published material has become a truly monumental production task which is falling short of desired accomplishment. In the early postwar years, production capabilities of the various agencies allocated to the NIS Program were generally high, and the NIS Program advanced rapidly with progress being made toward both objectives. b. As the NIS Program progressed under the direction of the Central Intelligence Agencyts Office of Basic Intelligence, and the NIS Committee, a number of factors played important roles in the destiny of the Program. The later postwar years brought about a general and gradual reduction of intelligence production capabilities allocated to meet the needs of the NIS Program within the various producing agencies, and the rate of progress in the Program, therefore, steadily decreased. The accepted concept of the Program was so broad that it permitted expansion of the Program outline to include considerable and sometimes perishable detail and numerous items designed primarily to meet certain departmental needs. Thus, the Program became more complex,, the number of contributors increased, and the production and coordination efforts increased. substantially. The NIS Program eventually evolved into a highly formalized, deeply entrenched intelligence. effort which produced a high quality stylized. product in considerable volume, but which required carefully controlled and time-consuming administrative procedures as well as an ever increasing production capability to maintain its timeliness. The increasing production capability required, for timely revision and updating as well as for continued initial. production has not been available and most likely never will be sufficient to cope with the Program in its present size and form. The Program, therefore, has reached unmanageable proportions and the problem is worsening. Significant factors in this development over the past few years have been a continuing lack of clear direction and authority for the administration of the Program, and of well defined managerial policies. 3. Concept a. As already pointed out, the basic concept of the NIS Program is very broad. As defined in the NIS Standard Instructions, this concept now reads: "The NIS is a comprehensive digest of the basic intelligence required for the United States Government. The NIS is Approved For Release -05597AO00100010001-4 Approved For, Release 2000/09/11: CIA-RDP78-0559 A000100010001-4 G-G-N-P-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L designed to serve fully the basic intelligence requirements of the Department of Defense in strategic and high-level operational planning, and the Department of State in formulating and executing U. S. foreign policy. The NIS also serves lower planning and operational levels in the Armed Forces and the Department of State, and in addition, all other Government agencies which require basic intelli- gence in the accomplishment of their missions." The breadth of this concept, as expressed, has inevitably resulted in steady expansion in Program scope in an attempt to meet too many differing needs. The outline prescribed for the Program under this concept has become very detailed and has been subjected to even more detailed interpretations within the various producing agencies? The broad, concept and its expanded interpretation and application throughout the Program have, therefore, contributed greatly to the management problems with which the Program is now burdened. b. To become manageable the NIS Program should be directed primarily toward meeting governmental needs for the basic-type intelligence required as a foundation for strategic and high- level operational. planning and for the development of foreign policy. Consistent therewith, the NIS Program obviously must be reduced in scope, and its outline modified or adapted to reflect the truly essential and relatively static basic intelligence on a given area. The NIS should not attempt to serve lower planning and, operational, levels of the Armed. Forces and the Department of State, nor of other Government agencies, although it is recognized that it will have a high degree of utility in this field. The individually produced departmental intelligence as well as that produced on an interdepartmental basis should provide, on behalf of the community, basic intelligence of a more detailed, perishable or transient character as an elaboration of, and. supplementary to, the more general treatment of the subject in the NIS. Increased emphasis and reliance must be placed upon the production of more detailed and specialized, intelligence outside the NIS Program in response to specific user requirements. Through this departmental production, the high-level planners and policy makers would have the additional and the more detailed intelligence available that might be needed to meet more fully particular requirements. At the same time the specific and continuing needs of the lower planning and operational levels in the Armed Forces, the Department of State, and other governmental departments and agencies for more expanded and detailed information could be accommodated. The above, concept of the relationship between the NIS Program and depart- mentally produced intelligence should bring into better balance the allocation and expenditure of the intelligence production effort. Approved For Release 20D LW i Zt xRDPiV~05597A000100010001-4 Approved For. Release 2000/09/11: CIA-RDP78-0554000100010001-4 4. utility a. The NIS Program is universally recognized as a valid and highly essential. Program which finds extensive use both at national and lower governmental levels. One of the principal reasons for this recognition is that it is an authoritative, coordinated, inter- departmental publication. Appropriate elements of the NIS have been used as basic background material for briefings, estimates, and various locally prepared publications in support of operational plans. In many instances, NIS material has been used without identification and, therefore, has failed to receive appropriate credit. Despite such use, however, many consumers unable to determine the relatively unchanging nature and consistent validity of much of the included information have been reluctant to employ material therein bearing a non-current publication date. b. As now constituted, the NIS is considered by many to be too voluminous and unwieldy for efficient use. Classification of the NIS also limits its utility, partly because classification poses a storage problem for many of the users. As a result of these factors a number of potential users lack the opportunity, or fail to make the opportunity, to acquaint themselves with the vast amount of valid data which could be made.available to them in the NIS if the classification problem could be ameliorated. Amelioriatiori of these problems should be reflected in expanded interest and use of the NIS. c. It appears that some productive changes could be made in the method of presentation, especially by increased effort and supervision to minimize tendencies toward academic stylization. d. In the past the problem of establishment of priorities is considered in itself to have had an adverse impact on Program utility. rriorities should be assigned critically with a view toward balancing increased overall coverage against priority coverage in existing or potential trouble areas. 5. Timeliness A great amount of detailed and transitory material has been introduced into the NIS by agencies and individual analysts in an effort to use the the vehicle for many forms of intelli- gence. This has resulted in delays in production of the NIS which have seriously limited its usefulness. These same factors have also contributed to the failure to produce timely coverage of new areas of growing importance. At the same time, the number Approved For Release 2 00 ?/ 1 - I - ?6P7 -05597A000100010001-4 Approved For.Releoe 2000/09/11: CIA-RDP78-055,000100010001-4 C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A.L of countries with which the NIS must be concerned has expanded greatly and the problem of continuing maintenance has grown proportionately. In order to meet the expanded requirements of the Program, to ensure that consumers will have in hand a product which is reasonably stable, accurate and timely, and to accommodate the contant problem of updating and improvement, it appears that a measured cutback in the scope and modification in the outline of the Program is essential. 6. Production a. The production problems relating to the NIS are many and varied.. On the one hand, the requirement to produce the NIS has unquestionably stimulated and supported the collection and analysis of essential basic intelligence information on most world areas, and this continues to be a major benefit of the Program. b. However, this extensive interdepartmental production effort has developed deficiencies over an extended period of time. As has been noted, the NIS has been produced within diminishing allocation of community capabilities in later years. Under these conditions, intelligence analysts could not be employed steadily on the NIS, and consequently, editorial and.substance review of the material was not necessarily performed consistently or in a timely fashion 'within producing agencies. The turnover and shift of analytical personnel created an uneven flow of work and resulted in products of varying quality, and the development of crisis situations often adversely affected the priority status of NIS production. In addition there have been evident uncertainties as to the identity and needs of the users of the product with resultant inconsistencies in the review policies of the producing agencies. These same factors contribute greatly to the task of the CIA in performing final coordination, review and publication of the NIS c. The aforementioned reduction in the scope and modification in the detailed outline of the NIS should minimize many of the problems involved in its current production. Nevertheless, other specific corrective actions will be necessary. The specific changes within the present topical coverage which would be required to achieve this objective cannot be determined without considerable additional detailed study. Approved For Release 0bT06 9 41 ` G kADO~8-05597A000100010001-4 Approved For Relea a 2000/09/11: CIA-RDP78-055 4000100010001-4 Attachment B U8 .B-]-j1'~~1 3 29 January 1963 Personnel Interviewed by the Coordination Staff in its Review of the NIS Program 1. Mr. Bay S. Cline, Deputy Director (Intelligence), CIA. 2. Capt. K. A. Knowles, USN (Ret), former Assistant Director, Basic Intelligence, CIA, and Former NIS Committee Chairman. 3. Capt. R. E. Styles, USN (Ret), former Chief, Production Center, DIA. 25X1A9a 4. Assistant Director, Basic Intelligence, CIA, and NIS Committee 'Chairhi'an::_ _. 25X1A9a 5. , Deputy Assistant Director, Basic Intelligence, CIA, and NIS Committee Vice Chairman. 6. Mr. James A. Minogue, NIS Coordinator, Department of the Army. 7. Col. W. R. Burgoyne, USMC, NIS Coordinator, Department of the Navy. 8. Mr. Henry Noland, Assistant NIS Coordinator, Department of the Navy. +W Lt. Col. Jack Young, USAF, NIS Representative, Department of the Air Force. 10. Mr. Stewart Lester, NIS Coordinator, Department of State. 25X1A9a 11. Chief Editorial Division, Office of Basic Intelli- gence (OBI), CIA, and former NIS Coordinator for the Department of the Navy. 25X1A9a 12. Deputy Chief Editorial Division, OBI, and former Assistant NIS Coordinator, Department of the Army. 25X1A913 25X1 A9a1). 25X1A9- Chief Military Geography Branch, Editorial Division, OBI, CIA. Intelligence Officer General, Chief Military Branch of Editorial Division, OBI, CIA. Chief Transportation Branch, Editorial Division, OBI, CIA. 25X1A9a16. , Economic and Sociological Editor, OBI, CIA. Approved For Release 2000/09/11: CIA-RDP78-05597A000100010001-4 Approved For. Relea a 2000/09/11: CIA-RDP78-055. 7 40001 00010001 -4 25X1 A9c17 . 25X1A918. 25X1A9a 19. 25X1A9a 20. 25X1 A9a 2l . 25X1 A9@2. 25X1 A983 . 25X1 A9a?.. 25X1A9a 25. 26. 27. 25X1A9a 28. , Chief Economic Branch, Editorial Division, OBI, Scientific Editor, OBI, CIA. Chief Publications Division, OBI, CIA. Chief Economic Research, Office of Research and Reports (ORR), CIA. , Chief Geographic Research, ORR, CIA. Chief Latin American Branch, Regional Division, OBI, CIA, and former Secretary of the Scientific Intelligence Committee. Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Scientific n e igence OSI), CIA. Staff, ORR, CIA. Chief Plans and Evaluation Branch, OSI, CIA. Chief Special Projects Branch, Information Mr. Alvin A. Munn, Chief NIS and Standardization Branch, Area Analysis Division, Office of Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army. Mr. Earl W. Coxe, Chief Transportation Department, Area Analysis Intelligence Agency, Army Map Service, OCE, Department of the Army. Reference (OCR), CIA. , Chief Biographic Register, Office of Central Approved For Release 200 / 9 1 1 A D -05597A000100010001-4 Approved For, Relee 2000/09/11: CIA-RDP78-05594000100010001-4 Attachment C USIB-D-51.1 3 29 January 963 State Department Posts Queried as to Value of the NIS Program 1. Paris 18. Bangkok 2. Copenhagen 19. Taipei 3. Stockholm 20. Tokyo 4+. Helsinki 21. Djakarta 5. Bonn 22. Rab at 6. Rome 23. Tunis 7. Warsaw 24. Cairo 8. Budapest 25. Accra 9. Moscow 26. Lagos 10. Prague 27. Addis Ababa 11. Belgrade 28. Guatemala 12. Athens 29. Bogota 13. Amman 30. Caracas 14. Tel Aviv 31. Santiago 15. Tehran 32. Rio de Janeiro 16. New Delhi 33. Rangoon 17. Karachi Approved For Release -05597A000100010001-4 Approved For, Relae 2000/09/11: CIA-RDP78-055A000100010001-4 Attachment D USIB-D-51.13 29 January 1963 Non-USIB Government Agencies Queried as to Value of the NIS Program 11 The National Security Council 2. Office of Emergency Planning 3. Agency for International Development 4+. The United States Information Service 5. National Headquarters, Selective Service System 6. Federal Reserve System 7. Department of Agriculture 8. Department of Labor 9. Department of the Treasury 10. Department of Commerce: a. U. S. Weather Bureau b. Bureau of the Census c. Maritime Administration d. Bureau of International Commerce (Commercial Intelligence) e. Bureau of International Commerce (Regional Economics) f. Bureau of Business and Defense Services 11. Department of the Interior: a. The Librarian b. Bureau of Geological Survey c. Bureau of Mines d. Fish and Wildlife Service e. Office of Geography 12. Department of Health, Education and Welfare: a. Office of International Surveys b. Office of Social Security c. Office of International Education d. National Institutes of Health Approved For Release 2000/09/11: CIA-RDP78-05597A000100010001-4 Approved For. Release 2000/09/11: CIA-RDP78-055 A000100010001-4 Tab B USIB-D-51.1/3 29 January 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USIB SUBJECT USIB Vote Sheet Action REFERENCE. USIB-D- 51.1 / 3, 31 January 1963 1. With respect to the recommendations in paragraph 5 of Tab A to the reference. b. I concur, subject to the comments or amendments set forth in paragraph 2 below.' c. I do not concur. See comments below.'` 2. Comments or amendments. * (Signature) (Title) (Date) (Agency) * May necessitate classification and control of this. memorandum. Approved For Release 2000/09/11: CIA-RDP78-05597A000100010001-4