Interim Review of the National Intelligence survey (NIS) Program

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-05597A000100010001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 29, 1963
• Content Type: NIS

0 Approved For Release, OOO/09/11: CIA-RDP78-05597#00100010001-4
Attachment A
USIB-D-51.13
29 January 1963
Interim Review
of the
National Intelligence Survey (NIS)
Program
Approved For Release 2000/09/11: CIA-RDP78-05597A000100010001-4
 Approved For.Rele a 2000/09/11: CIA-RDP78-055 ,0000100010001-4
L
Interim Review
of the NIS.Program
1. Introduction
a. As a result of experience in World War II and with
predecessor programs of this general tyke, the National Intelli-
gence Survey (NIS) was established on 13 January 1948, pursuant
to National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 3
(NSCID No. 3), latest revision 18 January 1961. The NIS Program
is intended to be the means of providing all the basic intelligence
required by the United States Government. Basic Intelligence &s
defined in NSCID No. 3 "is that factual intelligence which results
from the collation of encyclopedic information of a fundamental
and moreor less permanent nature and which, as a result of
evaluation and interpretation, is determined to be the best
available.
b. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) has the responsi-
bility "for coordinating, production and maintenance, and for
accomplishing the review, publication, and dissemination of these
National Intelligence Surveys." Implementation of the DCI1s
responsibilities have devolved upon the Deputy Director (Intelligence),
Central Intelligence Agency.
c. On December 28, 1948, the National, Security Council (NSC)
approved the Standard Instructions for the National Intelligence
Survey which were prepared by an ad hoc committee; approved by the
Intelligence Advisory Committee (forerunner of the United States
Intelligence Board); and transmitted to the NSC by the DCI. NSC
approval of the Standard Instructions included the establishment of
the NIS Committee with the authority to approve changes in outline
requirements and other modifications of the Program. This Committee
was also charged with approving policies and plans; determining scope
and treatment; allocating production and maintenance; establishing
production and maintenance schedules based on JCS priorities; and
recommending to CIA measures for coordination of the Program. Each
member of the Committee was authorized to speak for his principal
in these matters.
d. The NIS.covers more than 100 foreign land and ocean areas
and sub-areas. Approximately 6,200 separate NIS units have been
produced, and to date a total of more than 2,500,000 copies of
these units have been published and disseminated almost world wide.
Approved For Release 200,0/09/11: CIA-RDP78-05597A000100010001-4
 Approved For.ReIe,e 2000/09/11: CIA-RDP78-055A000100010001-4
r, rr i+T m T n T
A standard NIS is divided into chapters, each of which treats
a major functional aspect of the country or area under
consideration. These chapters are divided into sections,
each of which treats a major subdivision of the functional
field covered by the chapter. Modification of topical coverage
is authorized as appropriate for the area involved.
(1) The Standard NIS Chapters are:
Chapter I
'Chapter II
Chapter III
Chapter IV
Chapter V
Chapter VI
Chapter VII
Chapter VIII
Chapter IX
- Brief of Country as a Whole
- Military Geography
- Transportation and Tele-
communications
- Sociological
- Political
- Economic
- Scientific
- Armed Forces
- Map and Chart Appraisal
(2) The section is the basic NIS unit for production
as well as for subsequent maintenance. Responsibility for
production and maintenance of each of the 94 sections is
allocated to a given agency with provision, as required,
for assistance from other agencies, including those outside
the intelligence community.
(3) Where appropriate, chapter discussion is amplified
by more detailed treatment in supplements as follows:
Supplement I - Ports and Naval Facilities
Supplement II - Coasts and Landing Beaches
Supplement III - Telecommunications
Supplement IV - Urban Areas
Supplement V Petroleum
Supplement VI - Communism
Of the six supplements provided for only I and II continue
in production. No supplement IV and only very few supple-
ments III, IT, or VI were ever produced.
2. General
a. Over the years there have evolved as the main objectives
of the NIS Program:
N Development of world coverage, and
Provision for continuing maintenance of published
material.
Approved For Release 2 597A000100010001-4
 Approved For Releae 2000/09/11: CIA-RDP78-0554000100010001-4
"^ r TT. rp_T_
These two objectives are closely related, and as initial coverage
increased,, so also did the problem of maintenance. The net result
is that the objective of world coverage has been essentially
achieved, but maintenance of published material has become a
truly monumental production task which is falling short of
desired accomplishment. In the early postwar years, production
capabilities of the various agencies allocated to the NIS Program
were generally high, and the NIS Program advanced rapidly with
progress being made toward both objectives.
b. As the NIS Program progressed under the direction of the
Central Intelligence Agencyts Office of Basic Intelligence, and
the NIS Committee, a number of factors played important roles
in the destiny of the Program. The later postwar years brought
about a general and gradual reduction of intelligence production
capabilities allocated to meet the needs of the NIS Program within
the various producing agencies, and the rate of progress in the
Program, therefore, steadily decreased. The accepted concept of
the Program was so broad that it permitted expansion of the Program
outline to include considerable and sometimes perishable detail
and numerous items designed primarily to meet certain departmental
needs. Thus, the Program became more complex,, the number of
contributors increased, and the production and coordination efforts
increased. substantially. The NIS Program eventually evolved into
a highly formalized, deeply entrenched intelligence. effort which
produced a high quality stylized. product in considerable volume,
but which required carefully controlled and time-consuming
administrative procedures as well as an ever increasing production
capability to maintain its timeliness. The increasing production
capability required, for timely revision and updating as well as
for continued initial. production has not been available and most
likely never will be sufficient to cope with the Program in its
present size and form. The Program, therefore, has reached
unmanageable proportions and the problem is worsening. Significant
factors in this development over the past few years have been a
continuing lack of clear direction and authority for the
administration of the Program, and of well defined managerial
policies.
3. Concept
a. As already pointed out, the basic concept of the NIS
Program is very broad. As defined in the NIS Standard Instructions,
this concept now reads:
"The NIS is a comprehensive digest of the basic intelligence
required for the United States Government. The NIS is
Approved For Release -05597AO00100010001-4
 Approved For, Release 2000/09/11: CIA-RDP78-0559 A000100010001-4
G-G-N-P-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
designed to serve fully the basic intelligence requirements
of the Department of Defense in strategic and high-level
operational planning, and the Department of State in
formulating and executing U. S. foreign policy. The NIS
also serves lower planning and operational levels in the
Armed Forces and the Department of State, and in addition,
all other Government agencies which require basic intelli-
gence in the accomplishment of their missions."
The breadth of this concept, as expressed, has inevitably resulted
in steady expansion in Program scope in an attempt to meet too
many differing needs. The outline prescribed for the Program
under this concept has become very detailed and has been subjected
to even more detailed interpretations within the various producing
agencies? The broad, concept and its expanded interpretation and
application throughout the Program have, therefore, contributed
greatly to the management problems with which the Program is
now burdened.
b. To become manageable the NIS Program should be directed
primarily toward meeting governmental needs for the basic-type
intelligence required as a foundation for strategic and high-
level operational. planning and for the development of foreign
policy. Consistent therewith, the NIS Program obviously must be
reduced in scope, and its outline modified or adapted to reflect
the truly essential and relatively static basic intelligence on
a given area. The NIS should not attempt to serve lower planning
and, operational, levels of the Armed. Forces and the Department of
State, nor of other Government agencies, although it is recognized
that it will have a high degree of utility in this field. The
individually produced departmental intelligence as well as that
produced on an interdepartmental basis should provide, on behalf
of the community, basic intelligence of a more detailed, perishable
or transient character as an elaboration of, and. supplementary to,
the more general treatment of the subject in the NIS. Increased
emphasis and reliance must be placed upon the production of more
detailed and specialized, intelligence outside the NIS Program in
response to specific user requirements. Through this departmental
production, the high-level planners and policy makers would have
the additional and the more detailed intelligence available that
might be needed to meet more fully particular requirements. At
the same time the specific and continuing needs of the lower
planning and operational levels in the Armed Forces, the Department
of State, and other governmental departments and agencies for more
expanded and detailed information could be accommodated. The above,
concept of the relationship between the NIS Program and depart-
mentally produced intelligence should bring into better balance the
allocation and expenditure of the intelligence production effort.
Approved For Release 20D LW i Zt xRDPiV~05597A000100010001-4
 Approved For. Release 2000/09/11: CIA-RDP78-0554000100010001-4
4. utility
a. The NIS Program is universally recognized as a valid and
highly essential. Program which finds extensive use both at national
and lower governmental levels. One of the principal reasons for
this recognition is that it is an authoritative, coordinated, inter-
departmental publication. Appropriate elements of the NIS have
been used as basic background material for briefings, estimates,
and various locally prepared publications in support of operational
plans. In many instances, NIS material has been used without
identification and, therefore, has failed to receive appropriate
credit. Despite such use, however, many consumers unable to
determine the relatively unchanging nature and consistent validity
of much of the included information have been reluctant to employ
material therein bearing a non-current publication date.
b. As now constituted, the NIS is considered by many to be
too voluminous and unwieldy for efficient use. Classification of
the NIS also limits its utility, partly because classification
poses a storage problem for many of the users. As a result of
these factors a number of potential users lack the opportunity,
or fail to make the opportunity, to acquaint themselves with the
vast amount of valid data which could be made.available to them in
the NIS if the classification problem could be ameliorated.
Amelioriatiori of these problems should be reflected in expanded
interest and use of the NIS.
c. It appears that some productive changes could be made in
the method of presentation, especially by increased effort and
supervision to minimize tendencies toward academic stylization.
d. In the past the problem of establishment of priorities
is considered in itself to have had an adverse impact on Program
utility. rriorities should be assigned critically with a view
toward balancing increased overall coverage against priority
coverage in existing or potential trouble areas.
5. Timeliness
A great amount of detailed and transitory material has been
introduced into the NIS by agencies and individual analysts in
an effort to use the NIS.as the vehicle for many forms of intelli-
gence. This has resulted in delays in production of the NIS
which have seriously limited its usefulness. These same factors
have also contributed to the failure to produce timely coverage
of new areas of growing importance. At the same time, the number
Approved For Release 2 00 ?/ 1 - I - ?6P7 -05597A000100010001-4
 Approved For.Releoe 2000/09/11: CIA-RDP78-055,000100010001-4
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A.L
of countries with which the NIS must be concerned has expanded
greatly and the problem of continuing maintenance has grown
proportionately. In order to meet the expanded requirements
of the Program, to ensure that consumers will have in hand a
product which is reasonably stable, accurate and timely, and
to accommodate the contant problem of updating and improvement,
it appears that a measured cutback in the scope and modification
in the outline of the Program is essential.
6. Production
a. The production problems relating to the NIS are many and
varied.. On the one hand, the requirement to produce the NIS has
unquestionably stimulated and supported the collection and analysis
of essential basic intelligence information on most world areas,
and this continues to be a major benefit of the Program.
b. However, this extensive interdepartmental production effort
has developed deficiencies over an extended period of time. As
has been noted, the NIS has been produced within diminishing
allocation of community capabilities in later years. Under these
conditions, intelligence analysts could not be employed steadily
on the NIS, and consequently, editorial and.substance review of
the material was not necessarily performed consistently or in a
timely fashion 'within producing agencies. The turnover and shift
of analytical personnel created an uneven flow of work and resulted
in products of varying quality, and the development of crisis
situations often adversely affected the priority status of NIS
production. In addition there have been evident uncertainties
as to the identity and needs of the users of the product with
resultant inconsistencies in the review policies of the producing
agencies. These same factors contribute greatly to the task of
the CIA in performing final coordination, review and publication
of the NIS
c. The aforementioned reduction in the scope and modification
in the detailed outline of the NIS should minimize many of the
problems involved in its current production. Nevertheless, other
specific corrective actions will be necessary. The specific
changes within the present topical coverage which would be required
to achieve this objective cannot be determined without considerable
additional detailed study.
Approved For Release 0bT06 9 41 ` G kADO~8-05597A000100010001-4
 Approved For Relea a 2000/09/11: CIA-RDP78-055 4000100010001-4
Attachment B
U8 .B-]-j1'~~1 3
29 January 1963
Personnel Interviewed by the Coordination Staff
in its Review of the NIS Program
1. Mr. Bay S. Cline, Deputy Director (Intelligence), CIA.
2. Capt. K. A. Knowles, USN (Ret), former Assistant Director, Basic
Intelligence, CIA, and Former NIS Committee Chairman.
3. Capt. R. E. Styles, USN (Ret), former Chief, Production Center, DIA.
25X1A9a
4. Assistant Director, Basic Intelligence, CIA,
and NIS Committee 'Chairhi'an::_ _.
25X1A9a 5. , Deputy Assistant Director, Basic Intelligence,
CIA, and NIS Committee Vice Chairman.
6. Mr. James A. Minogue, NIS Coordinator, Department of the Army.
7. Col. W. R. Burgoyne, USMC, NIS Coordinator, Department of the Navy.
8. Mr. Henry Noland, Assistant NIS Coordinator, Department of the Navy.
+W
Lt. Col. Jack Young, USAF, NIS Representative, Department of the
Air Force.
10. Mr. Stewart Lester, NIS Coordinator, Department of State.
25X1A9a 11.
Chief Editorial Division, Office of Basic Intelli-
gence (OBI), CIA, and former NIS Coordinator for the Department of
the Navy.
25X1A9a
12. Deputy Chief Editorial Division, OBI, and former
Assistant NIS Coordinator, Department of the Army.
25X1A913
25X1 A9a1).
25X1A9-
Chief Military Geography Branch, Editorial
Division, OBI, CIA.
Intelligence Officer General, Chief Military
Branch of Editorial Division, OBI, CIA.
Chief Transportation Branch, Editorial Division,
OBI, CIA.
25X1A9a16. , Economic and Sociological Editor, OBI, CIA.
Approved For Release 2000/09/11: CIA-RDP78-05597A000100010001-4
 Approved For. Relea a 2000/09/11: CIA-RDP78-055. 7 40001 00010001 -4
25X1 A9c17 .
25X1A918.
25X1A9a
19.
25X1A9a 20.
25X1 A9a 2l .
25X1 A9@2.
25X1 A983 .
25X1 A9a?..
25X1A9a 25.
26.
27.
25X1A9a 28.
, Chief Economic Branch, Editorial Division, OBI,
Scientific Editor, OBI, CIA.
Chief Publications Division, OBI, CIA.
Chief Economic Research, Office of Research and
Reports (ORR), CIA.
, Chief Geographic Research, ORR, CIA.
Chief Latin American Branch, Regional Division,
OBI, CIA, and former Secretary of the Scientific Intelligence
Committee.
Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Scientific
n e igence OSI), CIA.
Staff, ORR, CIA.
Chief Plans and Evaluation Branch, OSI, CIA.
Chief Special Projects Branch, Information
Mr. Alvin A. Munn, Chief NIS and Standardization Branch, Area
Analysis Division, Office of Chief of Engineers, Department of the
Army.
Mr. Earl W. Coxe, Chief Transportation Department, Area Analysis
Intelligence Agency, Army Map Service, OCE, Department of the Army.
Reference (OCR), CIA.
, Chief Biographic Register, Office of Central
Approved For Release 200 / 9 1 1 A D -05597A000100010001-4
 Approved For, Relee 2000/09/11: CIA-RDP78-05594000100010001-4
Attachment C
USIB-D-51.1 3
29 January 963
State Department Posts Queried
as to Value of the NIS Program
1.
Paris
18.
Bangkok
2.
Copenhagen
19.
Taipei
3.
Stockholm
20.
Tokyo
4+.
Helsinki
21.
Djakarta
5.
Bonn
22.
Rab at
6.
Rome
23.
Tunis
7.
Warsaw
24.
Cairo
8.
Budapest
25.
Accra
9.
Moscow
26.
Lagos
10.
Prague
27.
Addis Ababa
11.
Belgrade
28.
Guatemala
12.
Athens
29.
Bogota
13.
Amman
30.
Caracas
14.
Tel Aviv
31.
Santiago
15.
Tehran
32.
Rio de Janeiro
16.
New Delhi
33.
Rangoon
17.
Karachi
Approved For Release -05597A000100010001-4
 Approved For, Relae 2000/09/11: CIA-RDP78-055A000100010001-4
Attachment D
USIB-D-51.13
29 January 1963
Non-USIB Government Agencies
Queried as to Value of the NIS Program
11 The National Security Council
2. Office of Emergency Planning
3. Agency for International Development
4+. The United States Information Service
5. National Headquarters, Selective Service System
6. Federal Reserve System
7. Department of Agriculture
8. Department of Labor
9. Department of the Treasury
10. Department of Commerce:
a. U. S. Weather Bureau
b. Bureau of the Census
c. Maritime Administration
d. Bureau of International Commerce (Commercial Intelligence)
e. Bureau of International Commerce (Regional Economics)
f. Bureau of Business and Defense Services
11. Department of the Interior:
a. The Librarian
b. Bureau of Geological Survey
c. Bureau of Mines
d. Fish and Wildlife Service
e. Office of Geography
12. Department of Health, Education and Welfare:
a. Office of International Surveys
b. Office of Social Security
c. Office of International Education
d. National Institutes of Health
Approved For Release 2000/09/11: CIA-RDP78-05597A000100010001-4
 Approved For. Release 2000/09/11: CIA-RDP78-055 A000100010001-4
Tab B
USIB-D-51.1/3
29 January 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USIB
SUBJECT USIB Vote Sheet Action
REFERENCE. USIB-D- 51.1 / 3, 31 January 1963
1. With respect to the recommendations in paragraph 5 of
Tab A to the reference.
b. I concur, subject to the comments
or amendments set forth in
paragraph 2 below.'
c. I do not concur. See comments
below.'`
2. Comments or amendments. *
(Signature)
(Title)
(Date) (Agency)
* May necessitate classification and control of this. memorandum.
Approved For Release 2000/09/11: CIA-RDP78-05597A000100010001-4