National Intelligence Survey Program

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-05597A000200010004-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 2, 1998
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 17, 1973
• Content Type: MF

DRAFT
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17 April 1973
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT National Intelligence Survey Program
REFERENCE DDI Memorandum of 6 April 1973, same subject
1. This memorandum is submitted as a basis for discussion and
decision affecting the National Intelligence Survey program.
BACKGROUND
2. The National Intelligence Survey program is an interagency
effort conducted under the auspices of USIB and the general guidance of
the NIS Committee. Contributors are DIA and six components of CIA.
Editing, coordination, and processing functions are under the Director,
OBGI, who also serves as Chairman of the NIS Committee. (Tab A
provides details. )
3. The NIS program was set up by NSCID No. 3 in 1948 to con-
solidate a number of overlapping basic research activities and to fulfill
a national requirement for coordinated, up-to-date, readily available,
basic intelligence. Coverage was to be worldwide and detailed. The
original goals were never fully achieved.
4. For years, the NIS program has been under continuing critical
scrutiny. Despite the strong momentum of its original philosophical
and organizational rationale, the program has changed significantly in
scope, area coverage, content, emphasis, and magnitude. At its high-
water mark (1959), the program included 60 detailed topical sections
published separately on 100 different countries at a cost of approximately
annually. At present, all detailed sections but one are
eliminated and the program is concentrated on a newly conceived and
formatted General Survey published at the rate of 30 per year and the
Factbook, updated twice each year, at an estimated cost in FY 1973 of
(Tab B, USIB-D-51.1 /20, 19 May 1972, "Restructuring
of the National Intelligence Survey (NIS) Program" and graphic, Attrition
of NIS Detailed Sections. )
Classified by 019641
Exempt from general declassification
schedule of E.Q. ~!'~11652, e.>e:a.~tioa category:
?5B (1), (2), V" , or (4) (circle one or more)
Automatically declassified on
Date Impos:,ible to Determine
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5. At inception the primary aim of the NIS was to serve high-
level readers concerned with the development of foreign policy and
military planning and operations. Such high-level readers were not
directly reached. However, the General Survey has attracted a wide
and varied readership of middle and lower ranking military and civilian
officials. They use it in preparing briefings and studies for the top
echelons and for background, general reference, planning, area orienta-
tion, and training purposes. Private research organizations doing
contract work for the U. S. Government -- such as Battelle, NUS,
Westinghouse, and RAND -- also make regular use of the NIS.
6. Some general conclusions concerning the audience may be
drawn from a major User Survey conducted in 1969 and from general
experience. (Tab C - Summary of User Survey; Tab D - Copy of User
Survey Questionnaire; Tab E - Selected List of Users)
a. The NIS publications are used more extensively in
the field than in Washington because of the lack of other
comprehensive sources.
b. The DoD makes the most use of the NIS.
c. The users tend to have greatest interest in those parts
of the NIS not related directly to their mission; i. e. , military
use of political, economic, and sociological chapters and Embassy
use of General Surveys on countries other than the host country.
d. Users consider the greatest advantages of the NIS to be
its accuracy, comprehensiveness, and availability. Major criti-
cisms are too little detail, the lack of an index, and the tendency
of the political and economic chapters to become outdated.
e. With the detailed sections phased out and the General
Survey reoriented, the specialist in search of specific data is
served less well, but usefulness to the generalist is increased.
There has been an increase in higher level readers.
COSTS
25X1A1a7. Community resources charged a ainst the NIS program have
declined from in FY 1970 to in FY 1973.
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CIA resources charged against the program declined from 25X1A1a
in FY 1970 to in FY 1973. (Tab F provides a
further breakdown of costs. )
BASIC QUESTIONS TO RESOLVE
8. Certain basic questions arise in considering the future of
the NIS.
a. Should CIA continue to support as a service of common
concern a basic intelligence program that serves primarily an
extensive but middle echelon readership? The program is a
viable community effort and it is demonstrably useful to a wide
range of readers. However, first priority of the CIA production
Offices is to serve the national leadership in the White House and
the NSC Staff. As available Agency resources are reduced, some
intelligence production functions will have to be reduced or
eliminated. In these circumstances, what priority should be
assigned the NIS?
b. Is the usefulness of a coordinated interagency, or
"national", basic intelligence program worth the additional
management and production problems and costs to CIA? The
Agenc is not the main user of the NIS, yet in FY 1973 it will
25X1A1a bear or approximately 75%, of the estimated
production costs. The review, coordination, and processing
problems inherent in a "national" basic intelligence program are
a burden. However, improvements are being made in the produc-
tion process. CIA personnel do use the NIS, and the General
Survey does provide a publishing outlet for OCI and OER analysts.
If the NIS were not available, each USIB agency and a number of
components of CIA would feel it necessary to produce, individually
and independently, whatever basic intelligence it considers essential
to its mission. This would invite duplication and uneven quality
and coverage. The savings, overall, might not be significant.
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OPTIONS
9. A great many options could be devised and an infinite number
of variations are possible. The following are sufficiently different from
one another to justify consideration. Decision to end the NIS as a
"national" program, or to reduce significantly its area coverage or
scope would require USIB action.
A. Leave the program as it is.
B. Abolish it with no provision for producing and
disseminating basic intelligence. 25X1A1a
Clearly, the program cannot remain unchanged because
of the pinch on DDI resources and the traditionally low priority of the
program. The total cost to the DDI -- a4ld 121 people,,
estimated for FY 1973 -- is substantial.
On the other hand, total abolishment is unrealistic.
Basic intelligence in some form of availability is essential to all mem-
bers of the intelligence community. If the existing central community
structure for producing, publishing, and disseminating it were dismantled,
departmental products to fill the gap would proliferate. Any savings in
total resources (either community or CIA) would depend on the scope of
the various individual follow-on programs, the nature of their publica-
tions, and extent of dissemination.
C. Continue the NIS program on its present organizational
and operational basis, but streamline production
procedures and reduce the scope and extent of the
program.
Arrangements for further streamlining production
procedures are under way. The present bound-by-chapter format
provides new flexibility in coordination and processing.
The scope and extent of the program could be reduced to
various levels, with accompanying reductions in costs. For example:
(1) Limit General Survey coverage to about 75-80
countries (rather than the present 124) produced at a
rate of 20 per year. The Science and the Intelligence
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and Security chapters would be dropped. Establish
a 2-3 year maintenance cycle for a high priority group
25X1A1a of 20-22 countries and maintain the remainder on 3-4
year cycles. (Present average maintenance overall is
2 1/2 yea rs and annual production is 30 per year. )
Factbook would remain, updated semiannually. DDI
C ] resource requirements would be approximately
25X1A1a
TvF
-84 MY. Printing costs would be approximately
. (Tab G indicates methodology for
cost and MY estimates. )
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&r>- SL /"'t
same rate. In this case costs would be approximately
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(2) The program could be further reduced to General
Survey coverage of 40 high priority countries, produced
at a rate of 10 per year, and coverage by Country Profile
only of an additional 35 or 40 countries produced at the
i$-M. Printin costs would be correspond-
~ingly lowerti.~ 25X1A1a
These options provide significant savings in money and
manpower and would free some OCI and OER assets for higher priority
missions. The NIS mechanism would remain intact and the program
would continue to provide coordinated, basic intelligence on the higher
priority countries and some coverage on countries of lower priority.
The Factbook would continue to provide minimum essential information
on a worldwide basis.
On the other hand, the Agency would still be tied to
considerable extent to community considerations in production procedures
and scheduling. Coordination would still consume time and effort. The
general management function, exercised by OBGI, would still face the
problem of running a complex and diverse program without control of the
production resources.
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3.
D. Make greater use of external contractors for basic
intelligence production
At present, The Society and the Science chapters and
part of the Telecommunications section are produced by contractors.
The experience has been favorable. The Economy and the Government
& Politics chapters could also be done under contract, freeing OCI and
OER of NIS production. OCI and OER would review the drafts. The
usefulness of the resulting product would depend to considerable extent
on the contractors' access to classified information. An unclassified
NIS would be of very limited value because it could not be frank or
critical or go beyond generalized descriptions.
The Government & Politics chapters could be returned to
INR,, Department of State under contract or be turned over to an outside
contractor. The Economy could be produced by expansion of a small
contract group in the Department of Commerce which already does some
work on the NIS.
Assuming a program of the scope envisaged in option C(l)
the approximate costs would be as follows:
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DDI/OBGI (NIS)
DDI/Contractors
PSD
40 ,
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E. Centralize research, analysis, and processing of all
CIA-produced NIS chapters in a single Office
OBGI, for example, could be provided the resources and
authority to produce all non-DlA-produced chapters. The Society would
continue to be done under contract by the Department of Commerce. The
chapters would still be coordinated within CIA and the community.
This would free OCI and OER of the burden of NIS production
and would place all CIA production under a single management control.
Improvements in meeting schedules, coordination, and quality control
should result. On the other hand, OBGI would overlap some of OCI and
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OER's research and analysis functions. Under this option, savings in
money and manpower would be minor. Estimated cost to the Agency of
such a program at the level of production envisaged in Option C(l) would
be as follows: 25X1A1a
DDI/OBGI (NIS)
DDI/Contractor
PSD