The(Classified) Memo

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-05597A000200010016-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 2, 1998
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: April 4, 1973
• Content Type: MF

Approve a 1999/09/20 : CIA-RDP78-05597A000200010016-7
MEMO FOR: JM 25X1A9a
4 April 1973
1. John has performed the classic feat of mounting a white
charger and racing off in all directions. The result is a
confused, illogical, and self-destructive proposal, and
whatever its purpose or genesis, the memo does not make
good sense.
2. Ash starter, his main target is "interagency
coordination," which has apparently become a dirty phrase in
OCI. Yet, nothing else would make these various agency
products into national intelligence, and nothing else would
provide the system of checks and balances that we now have.
It is worth noting--and noting well--that the coordination
system, while indeed timeconsuming if not at times ponderous,
does not seek to emulate the estimative process, whereby
an initial draft is successively watered down until agreement
is reached, with impasses being solved through the use of
often inexplicable or parochial "dissents." The NIS Program
may ask producers to make adjustments to another agency's
expertise, but the final statement of fact or opinion always
devolves to the producer, who is granted the right to have
the last word.
3. Second, John makes the typical error of categorizing
consumers, assuming that a military planner needs only data
on transportation or geography, that a policymaker can
limit his topical interests, or that a naval officer will
be interested only in another country's navy. In truth,
each of these hypothetical users could have an urgent need
for basic intelligence in any of our present categories,
and hence each must be treated as if he were "the general
consumer" that John refers to on p. 2. It is next to
impossible to predict user needs, and over the years we
have gone through successive painful realizations of that,
as each "user survey" has verified the impossibility of
identifying a "general consumer" as such.
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4. Probably the weakest part of John's proposal is the
"new basic intelligence product," which goes through the
same old motions of eliminating everything that CIA doesn't
produce, except in certain cases, such as armed forces,
where he thinks CIA can do it better. We have a new product
now, in the bound-by-chapter GS; we are in the process of
establishing continuity and then moving into the separate
chapter maintenance cycle. This in itself will tone down
much of the "interagency coordination" that John gripes
about, since chapters will be in different time frames
and exact coordination of data will no longer loom so
important.
5. Finally, John has a head-knocking contradiction in
stating the new product should concentrate on areas about
which the least is known, aid in the next breath calling
for the availability of data on every country where there is a
U.S. interest. While it is true that the Nixon Doctrine
lowers the priority for some areas (e.g., Latin America
and Africa), there is a potential for U.S. interest everywhere
in the world where U.S. firms do business, where U.S. ships
and planes call, and where U.S. citizens live or visit.
Ll_
CHC
Approved For Release 1999/09/20 : CIA-RDP78-05597A000200010016-7