(Sanitized) Interim Report

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-05597A000300060023-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 3, 1998
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: January 30, 1963
• Content Type: MEMO

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Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP78-05597A000300060023-3
PGB 30 January 1963
SC
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Interim Report 25X1A9a
1. As you said. much of the report s em aimore concerned with
re- statement of the preconceived ideas of the Committee than with
subjective evaluation of their incomplete findings. The review (Attachment A) ,
presumably drafted by ~. has a contradiction in pare 6. b. where it says 25X1A9a
in talking about uneven production that NIS :.material has not been consistent
and it is of varying quality. after having said in pars 4. c. of the same paper
that productive changes could be made in the presentation so as to minimise
academic stylization. The statements on page 4. pars 3. b. attempt to direct
the NIS away from lower planning and operational levels of the armed forces.
This is reflected in his summary and his recommendations. pars 4. i and
recommendation S. a. (1). The embassies, however, seemed almost unanimous
in claiming that Chapter I - toward which the Program. is to be mainly aimed -
is used in the field primarily as a low-level briefing paper providing basic
intelligence for operational missions.
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2. Turning now to - summary, recommendations S. b. (1)
through (3) are seen to closely parallel actions now being promoted by 08i.
therefore I assume we should concur in these.
3. Authoritative "central point" recommended in pares 5. b. (4) has been.
since the authorization of the Program, the AD/BI as representative of the DI)!I
and in turn the ICI and as chairman of the NIS Committee and director of the
NIS Program. The only way to make this central point more authoritative
for the stated purpose would be to give the DCI command over DIA and State.
4. Recommendation S. b. (5) perhaps could be agreed to in principle
considering the fugitive nature of priorities impinged upon by counterinsurgency
requirements and Presidential areas of interest.
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5. Recommendation 5. b. (6). undoubtedly speaking, would be
an excellent measure if feasible. It runs counter to one of the definitions I
have of intelligence.
6. Para 5. b. (7) - the flexibility of NIS format and production called for
here has been demonstrated during the years by nurnerous changes in the NIS
Standard Instructions and by priority production (such as the recent expedited
production of Sec 45 on Cuba and Sec 24 on East Germany).
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Approved For Release 2000/08/29 : CIA-RDP78-05597A000300060023-3