ADDRESS BY MR. DULLES - PROJECT USEFUL FRIDAY, 23 OCTOBER 1959

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-05795A000500110001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 20, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 23, 1959
• Content Type: SPEECH

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Address by Mr. Dulles - Project USEFUL
Friday, 23 October 1959
It is a great pleasure to be with you today. Like most of us, I am
somewhat superstitious and was very glad to see that this exercise had the
name of USEFUL. In one of Winston Churchill's books, at one point, he
became irritated at the code names given to operations because they would
give such names as AGONY, DISASTER, etc. He sent out an order that he
himself was going to pass on these names. He refused to accept any names
that had a discouraging context; he gave such names as OVERLORD, etc.
I have always tried to follow that example--the most difficult and dangerous
operation always had a pseudnym that Indicated hope and success. The most
difficult operation ever engaged in was "SUCCESS". So, I welcome you to
the conclusion of Project USEFUL and hope that this has been a useful
operation for you. I have gone over the agenda and would doubt there is
anything I could tell you about the Agency and our work that has not been
covered, or could have been omitted in this comprehensive list of subjects
and speakers who appeared before you. I would be very glad, however, at
the conclusion of my brief remarks to answer any questions that you may
want to ask.
I have considered that one of my major tasks here is to see that the
relations between CIA and the Armed Services at all levels should be a
cooperative one. ;ire are got_ q competition--we are in coordination and
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cooperation with you, we all serve one Government, and we all have the
interests of our country at heart. I have given the watchword to our people
that we are not to engage in any petty bickerings in functions and roles, but
to make this Agency a cooperative agency in the common cause of the defense
of these United States.
When we get into the field of war planning, I sometimes feel that
we started out some years ago planning for the last war rather than
next war when it comes. I think maybe we have to review some of our roles
and the mission of CIA from that viewpoint.
We have, of course, the field of limited war where many of the lessons
we learned f rom the last war would still be applicable. Then we have the
problemsof nuclear war which would involve different principles. I have
been reviewing some of our ataybehind operations, etc. , to see if they are
realistic. I know that has been considered during the discussions you have
been having during this past week. I have also made it a practice myself to
visit the overseas commands and to become personally acquainted with the
commanders and our relationships in the Pacific and European Theaters, and
25X6
in the various other theaters of operations.
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As we look toward the future, we face a series of very difficult problems
mutually. Naturally, our work and much of your work to beamed toward the
problem created by the International Communist Bloc. If you have been trying
to analyze recently the effect of the Khrushchev visit- -what did he learn, what
did we learn, what was the policy that came out of that visit- -I am rather
inclined to think that Khrushchev did gain some new information on one or two
points. In fact, he gained more than what I expected. While he was aware of
our potential military, industrial and economic strength, I think he gained a
new impression of it on his trip here. In fact, he did say privately that maybe
it would take a little bit longer than he had boasted in his statements about his
seven-year plan--that around 1970 he would be catching up with us. It will take
a good deal longer. While he continues to think that there are a certain number
of war mongers in Washington and Government and big business, I think he is
convinced that the majority of us want peace and are working for peace. These
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two impressions are a very substantial plus! I think, however, that he has
gone back with the idea that he should continue on for a time at least with
preaching the necessity of coexistence, and will carry out certain measures
to make that more appealing to us. I don't believe that, as we plan our work
for the future, we can assume that there has been any change in the over-all
outlook of international Communism. I think he realizes that, despite his
strength in certain fields of armament, he doesn't want to take on the Free
World in an atomic struggle at this time. From reports we have had, word has
gotten out through the Communist apparatus to avoid incidents to make us
believe that the cold war has been heated up. For the time being, he to going
to try other methods while carrying on subversively the same efforts to
penetrate. This is especially true in the major effort exerted in Africa. I
think the.economic program will be stepped up in the future as part of his
over-all scheme of international Communism. So, I do not think any of us can
relax and lay down our arms. I think he also feels that he can probably get
his people, due to the regimentation that exists in the Soviet Union, to work
harder than we do. He stated he wasn't impressed with the number of U. S.
automobiles--he didn't want that as they just clutter up the roads. He was
going to have taxis. I think he may have the impression we are going a little
soft with all the instruments of pleasure that we have. We have so much to do
of interest other than our work that we are inclined to have an element of
softness. He is going to keep that element away from his people in order to
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control them. That is just a brief picture of that phase of the present situation
as I see it and as we analyze it today.
I will close on the remark that we must go ahead and carry on our tasks
with even more devotion and vigor than we have in the past.
Thank you very much for this opportunity to be with you.
Question: Do you feel that there are indications that Russia and Khrushchev,
in particular, will subscribe to the open inspection program?
Answer: I don't believe so. The one thing that has been impressed upon us
and that has come out in the sessions in Geneva, is that there is no
indication of any relaxation of their hold on every security precaution
they have. You will note that Khrushchev brushed off the suggestion
that he see any military installations in the U. S. This included any
missile sites, launchings, etc. He also imposed the same
restrictions on Kozlov when he was here. The reasons for this are that
he knows pretty well what he would see from other sources, and that
if he accepts our invitation to visit Such installations, he will be under
heavy pressure during the President's visit to show an equal amount of
their military establishments and installations. He has no intention of
doing that. He considers this an secrecy and security and has no
intention of showing them except at a very high price. That is an asset
that he can hold, and that asset proves that we are pretty much an open
book due to our press. it also indicates that we have given up, to a great
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extent, the secrecy and security of our military and other developments.
He has been capable of keeping his, and I would be surprised to see any
change such as granting open skies.
Question: I think it would be Interesting to bear your personal assessment of
the man after meeting him socially.
Answer: My meeting socially was very limited. I was at the White House
dinner for Khrushchev at the beginning of his trip. As I came along
the receiving line, the President introduced me to Khrushchev.
Mr. Khrushchev, when he saw me, turned and said something to the
interpreter. He said, "Oh yes, I know you--I read your reports. "
That was no time to get Into an argument with him, so I smiled and
went on. After dinner, the Vice President introduced me again to
Mr. Khrushchev. This time, Mr. Khrushchev said: "I know Dulles-
I read your reports. " I answered something to the effect that, "I hope
you get them legally. " Mr. K. answered, "Oh, you know how we get
them--we all have the same arrangements. " Then I said, "Maybe we
should look into this. "
As to the impression of the man, we naturally made a careful study
of him by analyzing all reports. While not an intellectual giant, he is
extremely astute and very quick on the response, very domineering,
and somewhat moody. He became tired from time to time; yet, he kept
control of himself extremely well. On the whole, I think in Los Angeles,
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Mr. Khrushchev thought it was time to have an outburst and, I believe
it was a controlled outburst of anger- -particularly on the question of his
visiting Disneyland. He thought that here was a good chance because
he thought they (meaning the U. S.) wouldn't let him go some place. He
felt he got a little bit of an asset to have been denied the privilege of
going there. He is in absolute control--more so than his predecessors
in the sense that there is no No. 2 man. Kozlov would probably be
selected if a predecessor were to be selected. Mr. K. is going at a hard
pace. He is not young and is a little bit too stout for the life he is leading.
However, we do not think anything is wrong with his health. After all,
he follows a schedule that would knock any man down. He is resourceful
and quick and doesn't forget the main objective at any time. He is a
formidable m
Question: I have heard that the Russians plan to out-produce us in jet
transports and that by 1975, they will be carrying more passengers
in jet aircraft than the U. S.
Answer: They are producing the TU-104 which is the commercial type of
modern bomber. This is an uneconomical plane as far as fuel is
concerned. Yet, they have tried to peddle it around the world. They
are endeavoring to develop civil aviation; however, they don't want
their people to travel by aircraft. Presently, they are using the
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planes because they haven't developed the roads and because they can
control their people who travel in airplanes. I think we are ahead of
them in the design and construction of our commerical aircraft-
particularly in the point of view of economy of operations. I
thank you very much, gentlemen, for the pleasure of talking with
you today.
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