STAFF STUDY IMP OUTLOOK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-05927A000300070002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 27, 1999
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 21, 1973
• Content Type: STUDY

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OBGI/GD/S
21 March 1973
2-8
Since its inception in 1960, the joint CIA-DoD Intelligence 25X1A9a
Mapping Program has absorbed 199,400 man hours, considerably more
time than any other Geography Division project. The 1971
Report and the 1971-72 User Survey concluded that these hours were
well spent in creating this multipurpose intelligence reference.
The purpose of this staff study is to survey the present status of
and outlook for the IMP. It will outline and evaluate current and
projected plans, estimate costs and manpower requirements in the
future, and recommend possible modifications.
SUMMARY
The IMP has reached a crucial crossroad. With a great majority
of the sheets already finished, about 200 sheets of intelligence
significance remain to be done. A concentrated effort is under way
to complete these important sheets and to begin an overdue revision
program by the end of FY 1975.
A few working problems still exist, but their resolution will
lead to greater efficiency during this critical phase. Most needed
will be the clarification of IMP priorities in relation to other
geographic projects, the overhauling of guidelines, and the improved
control of research time expenditures. During this period work must
be focused on the most strategic and active areas of the USSR and
China, which will both contribute to analyst expertise and increase
the opportunities for spinoffs of other useful intelligence publi-
cations. Finally, continued close cooperation with DMA will be
needed to ensure that sheets are printed as soon as possible after
completion of CIA research. Closer liaison with prime users should
also be explored as a means of assuring the validity of sheet pri-
orities and the maximal utilization of the IMP.
The revision of sheets in important areas that contain outdated
intelligence should be the main goal beyond FY 1975. The completion
of new important sheets not now covered is important, but an ongoing
program of sheet revision is of equal importance for the usefulness
Classified by 019641
Exempt from ge.ieral declassification
schedule of E.O. 11652, exemption category
1), ?, ?, or (4) (circle one or more;
villas
Automatically declassified on
Date Impossible to Determine
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and credibility of the entire program. Some sheets will require
periodic revision and may be put together in a standardized re-
vision cycle.
Further out, any speculation becomes quite fuzzy, but indi-
cators point to the possible need of IMP-type work for other areas
of the world. We may also see increased machine applications of
IMP data pertinent to specific intelligence problems.
HISTORICAL NOTES
The IMP was started in 1960 to answer a critical need in the
intelligence community for definitive maps of the USSR. It con-
tinues today for the same basic purpose, but has been modified
slightly and has been extended to cover China, Poland, and Eastern
Mongolia. DMATC has maintained responsibility for base details,
geodetic controls, compilation, printing, and dissemination.
Geography Division has continued to be responsible for providing
all-source intelligence data contained on the maps. Besides OBGI
files, basic information is obtained from CRS, NPIC, DoD, open
literature, and special source material. IAS continues to provide
photo interpretation support; OSR, OSI, and OER have occasionally
assisted on specific problems.
The map has undergone several changes. First it was done as
a codeword series. Later the need for wider distribution and
utilization in the intelligence community led to the production
of SECRET Special Intelligence Graphic (SIG), Series 1505, which
originally used planimetric bases with terrain shaded representa-
tions of relief. At present, the intelligence for the SIC is
overprinted on modified Joint Operations Graphics (JOG), which
contain contours. In spite of these changes to the base, the
scope and detail of intelligence inputs has remained relatively
unchanged, and the IMP has steadily advanced toward its goal of
providing the community with comprehensive maps of key communist
areas.
PRESENT STATUS
As of 1 February 1973 Geography Division had completed the
intelligence research on 1,843 maps in SIG Series 1505. (An
additional 734 intelligence maps were produced in the codeword
DESPA - 1 and 51 in the DESPA - 2 series, which preceded the 1505.)
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This represented 86 percent of the 2,154 sheets originally planned
for the program, including 24 sheets at 1:1,000,000 covering remote
areas of Siberia and Tibet. Completed sheets considered important
because of military installations, economic activity, main communi-
cation lines, or strategic position numbered 700, or 77 percent of
the 908 sheets having these features. Much planning in the IMP is
based on these 908 important sheets.
During the past three years (CY 1970-1972 the IMP has accounted
for a sizeable chunk of the project research time in Geography Divi-
sion -- an average of 36 percent (see table below). Time expenditures
have averaged well over 13,000 man-hours per year. The cost to OBGI
alone represents about 4.5 percent of the total OBGI budget. Including 25X1A1a
collateral information support from CRS and photo interpretation su
port from IAS, the cost for the intelligence on each SIG averages
CY
Time spent
(man-Hours)
Intelligence
overlays
produced
Percentage of Direct Cost
GD research to
Project time OBGI CIA
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1970
15,309
168
39.6
1971
12,596
173
31.8
1972
12,465
147
36.6
DMA costs over a comparable time span have been considerably more.
For example, during FY 1972 DMA used 13.2 man-years in the intelligence
overlay compilation phase and their total cost including printing
amounted to $397,000. This represented an average cost per sheet of
$1,640 for compilation and approximately $2,000 more for rintin .
Combining DMA costs with CIA's gives a grand total of for 25X1A1a
each SIG sheet.
RELATIONS WITH DMA
Through the years DMA has steadfastly supported the IMP and full-
filled its responsibilities in the program. DMA's work schedule is
basically controlled by the number and complexity of overlays that are
sent to them, but within this framework they create their own priorities.
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Our working relations with Topographic Center and with DMA Head-
quarters have always been amicable and priority requests have
been honored by both sides, whenever possible.
Because DMA managers have the responsibility for coordinating
all mapping requirements of foreign areas, their attitudes toward
the IMP and their insights into future programs are extremely
significant. They have recently concluded that almost all medium
scale requirements are satisfied by 1:250,000 unclassified Joint
Operations Graphics (JOG) and secret SIG series 1505. The 1:200,000
Air Target Chart, a medium-scale intelligence map series produced by
Aerospace Center, is currently required only by SAC, and will be
supplanted even there by 1:250,000's in the future. It has clearly
been an advantage to have the SIG tied to a main workhorse like the
JOG.
It is worth noting here that at the present IAS and NPIC use
Air Target Charts more than the SIGs. Their main reasons are that
the ATC is "cleaner," with less information permitting photo
interpreters to draw in search area requirements and installations,
and that the ATC provides greater coverage in the important areas
of Sino-Soviet Bloc. NPIC planners are currently studying the sup-
port needs of photo interpreters situated at detached locations
where collateral storage space is minimal. Since the SIG with its
complete intelligence picture better answers many of these needs,
NPIC may increase their requirements for and use of the SIG in the
future.
CURRENT GOALS
Beginning with the Program Call of January 1973 and extending
through FY 1975 the IMP working priority is shifting from complete
once-over coverage of the USSR and China to a concentrated effort
to complete only those 200 sheets remaining that are judged to be
key sheets for intelligence purposes. (Note the projected effect
of this emphasis shift on Graph ?1.) Focusing manpower solely on
these sheets will hasten their availability to the intelligence
community. These 200 sheets are considered important because they
cover areas that contain priority targets, economic potential, main
transportation facilities and other intelligence. In addition,
numerous other important sheets already printed need revision
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either because new and important installations have been added or
because the base information and existing installations require
change or updating. It is anticipated that revision will be com-
pleted on 50 of these sheets by the end of FY 1975.
The revision program means that complete coverage of remote
areas with little or zero intelligence significance will be de-
layed or possibly disregarded entirely. These remote areas should
be periodically scanned, of course, to assure that nothing important
is going on. Decisions on whether to research these sheets will
have to be considered during the next phase of the Program.
Assuming that the 200 new, important sheets are completed by
FY1975, it would be reasonable to expect that they would be printed
by FY 1976 if the lag time between research completion and printing
continues at its present rate. It is likely that, given the same
number of analysts, 100 important area sheets plus 50 revision
sheets could be produced annually during the following few years.
(See Graph #2.) A reduction of work force or deemphasis of the IMP
would reduce the production correspondingly. Likewise an increase
in staffing, even considering training time would increase the
production rate and accelerate the completion schedule. The
overall costs for the program are going to increase slightly because
of rising wages and material costs; also, cost per sheet should
increase noticeably due to the concentration on difficult sheets.
PROBLEMS AND EFFICIENCY
Since there is now a change from the concept of complete cov-
erage to a concentration on important areas not mapped, an excellent
opportunity exists (1) to establish new priorities, (2) to improve
methodology, (3) to develop a system of research time limitations
and (4) to initiate tangible spinoffs.
In the past only a priority in a general sense has existed for
the IMP with a distant goal of complete once-over coverage. IMP
priorities in relation to other projects and activities have become
somewhat vague. The IMP has sometimes been relegated to secondary,
but more often to tertiary, importance. But, now that essentially
only 200 significant sheets remain, a tangible goal exists, and a
definite, albeit secondary, priority could be firmly established.
A statement from the Office or Division level clearly reiterating
IMP values and goals would accomplish several things. First, for
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the benefit on newer analysts it would clarify the relationship
of the IMP to approved research projects and to all of the other
time spent in Geography Division. Secondly, it would reaffirm
the significance of IMP research for established analysts. And
most importantly, an authoritative voice above the immediate
branch level could provide this seemingly perpetual project with
a new impetus. Instead of merely assuming the priorities, analysts
could have a clear cut knowledge and understanding of higher man-
agement desires.
Of equal importance is the need for a more precise set of
guidelines or a consistent outlined approach to IMP research.
Beginning with the highest priority targets and including all
aspects of research, this guide would be of value to new re-
searchers as well as experienced ones. What exists now are a
set of general rules and topical or potential target explanations
i.e. specifics on how to handle and write-up various references.
Lacking is a systematic outline ranking particular levels of in-
telligence and clearly suggesting which require only cursory
treatment because of marginal intelligence worth. Some of this
outline would be superfluous to most analysts, who already com-
mand a well-organized set of criteria for the numerous evalua-
tions which must be made. Yet even the most knowledgeable and
productive analyst could profit by having his judgments reaffirmed.
Much information exists to show where time expended produces only
marginal returns. Also as OBGI begins the revision program,
another set of guidelines could direct efforts to the most im-
portant additions or changes of intelligence value. Both guides
would contribute to analytical efficiency during this critical
period.
Never before has a system of deadlines or definite time
limitations been applied to individual IMP sheets. Considering
that data are available on how much time is required to complete
sheets of similar density covering analogous areas, and recog-
nizing the need for maximum efficiency in researching the re-
maining difficult sheets, the establishment of specific time
limitations for each sheet should now be undertaken. Such guides
would assist the analyst in allocating his time and would also
improve planning schedules and forecasts. In addition, an ac-
curate time limitation system can be an aid in seeing that sheets
are neither under-researched nor over-researched.
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There have been relatively few geographic research projects
initiated as a direct result of the IMP. However, there have
been a host of intelligence reports which have benefitted from
IMP information and from the wealth of area and topical expertise
obtained from IMP work. The best examples of inspired projects
are the USSR forced labor camp studies, a study of Soviet storage
facilities currently underway, and a possible study of "new
cities" in China. Those projects based primarily on IMP data
are the USSR railroad map, revision of Comirex search areas, a
series of maps locating USSR and Chinese border installations,
target area studies in China and Laos, and a report on military
storage facilities in South China. Examples of other reports
that benefited directly from the IMP or that could not have been
done without the expertise gained from working on the IMP include
the study of opium movement in the Thailand - Burma border area,
briefs on selected Soviet and Chinese cities in preparation for
the President's visits, and detailed terrain studies for ORD.
It is in the area of intangible expertise and routine out-
put that more effort should be focused to derive real spinoffs.
Much thought and discussion have occurred in the past concerning
a publication of SIC notes or gems gleaned from IMP research.
Formatted SIG outlines are now produced regularly after completion
of research, but nothing has been done to extract, abstract, or
combine the significant observations contained in them. Either
the existing or a newly devised outline that highlights the
uniqueness of an area could form the backbone of an IMP Newsletter
or SIG Notes Report. This seems more feasible now that we are
concentrating on areas of maximum activity and intelligence in-
terest. Brief geographic appraisals of these areas will assist
other offices to be aware of this IMP expertise that goes beyond
itemized intelligence. The value of the expertise cannot be ac-
curately judged until we can assess what applications there may
be for it.
An informal monthly, bi-monthly, or periodic publication
designed to inform working level analysts could be one way to
exploit this IMP expertise. If it were supervised by one per-
son with a flair for news and writing, the result would be a
real product with a minimum amount of time expended. Since
little additional expenditure of analyst's time is anticipated
between the present outline and a modified paragraph write-up,
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the only new expenditure would be the time of one person to jell,
mold, and headline the inputs into one paper and carry out the
editorial process.
MANAGEMENT
While the Headless Horseman might operate quite effectively
throughtout eternity and the mythical Hydra actually profited by
having a head lopped off, the IMP suffers in the long run without
a central responsible figure. Split between two diverse branches,
the IMP has endured more by the force of its original momentum
than by any accelerating inputs. Immediate branch supervision
has created as near frictionless environment as possible and higher
management has paved the way by supplying personnel. But there are
occasions now, and increasingly so in the future, when a single ad-
ministrator is needed. Questions on the overall IMP posed by office
or inter-office management can be fielded, in part, by no less than
one division chief, two branch chiefs, three branch supervisors, and
a host of senior analysts; but not, in total, by any one person. It
seems safe to conclude that some saving in time would be effected by
having only one person ultimately responsible for, and able to answer
for, all areas and aspects of the IMP and, in addition, to serve as
the central point of contact for DMA and Topographic Center. Besides
functioning for management this coordinator could easily serve as a
filter to relay IMP information and priorities to analysts, amalga-
mate and crystalize analyst's ideas and modifications to the IMP, and
unify and clarify IMP procedures.
Much thought has been given concerning a separate IMP branch or
a rotating, semi-permanent IMP assemblage. The main advantage is that
time could be concentrated on the IMP with a few diversions from other
duties. These very diversions, however, contribute heavily to the an-
alyst's well-rounded expertise in IMP evaluations and would, therefore,
be totally or partially lost in a permanent or semi-permanent assign-
ment. However, an IMP administrator armed with overall priorities and
working in close cooperation with branch chiefs and supervisors could
establish temporary priorities for concentrated IMP work, thereby
minimizing diversions and yet utilizing analytical expertise.
REVISION PHASE
Following FY 1975 when all new important sheets will have been
completed, IMP work will focus on a major revision program. This is
an essential part of the IMP and must be thought of as an ongoing
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program. Outdated maps of important areas must be replaced periodically
to keep the program current and reliable. Without some kind of revision
or maintenance cycle the IMP would quickly lose its value. The main
problem is to determine which sheets are to be revised and in what time
span. At the present there are 237 important sheets, which require
major changes and updating. In addition, as sheets become older and as
significant developments occur more of the 908 important sheets will
require revision each year. It is estimated that at least one-half of
the important sheets, approximately 454, will need to be revised by
FY 1976 when this program begins in earnest.
The first important aspect of the revision phase is to examine
goals of the future IMP and to develop a working methodology. The
manpower available, estimated cost, and the degree of change and ac-
curacy desired will all have to be weighed carefully. The 1972 User
Survey will provide some background on requirements and the needs of
various offices and will be the basis for finalizing working proce-
dures for the revision program. The time span covered by this phase
will vary greatly depending on priorities, type of approach, time
available, and actual number of sheets requiring revision. Until
some realistic time estimates can be obtained through experimentation,
schedules during this phase must be highly theoretical. However,
certain aspects of the program can be examined briefly and some pro-
jections can be estimated.
The first and most familiar way to do revisions is to give all
of the intelligence a new look and a complete reevaluation. Reworking
sheets completely using present methods has the advantage of being the
most thorough process where older intelligence can be weighed against
new and current evaluations can be made. The main disadvantage of
this method lies in the time required for an entirely new look. Given
that the most important and densest sheets are on the revision schedule,
a complete reevaluation will undoubtedly take the most time and be the
costliest. It is estimated that 180-200 man-hours would be required
for this type of approach. This would mean that with the present man-
power and projected time allocation, (14,000 man-hours, see Graph #2)
about 74 revisions could be completed each year; to revise the 454 im-
portant sheets that will need revising at the offset of the program
would then take 6 years. This forecast, of course, excludes other
sheets that will also require updating during that time span. Counting
all of the 908 important sheets, a revision cycle at this rate would
require 12 years.
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A second approach to the revision program is to limit work out-
lays to new annotations and selected updatings. This method has the
distinct advantage of being the quickest. New intelligence, corrections
of easily apparent mistakes, and updating of significant old intelligence
will still be undertaken, but most of the intelligence will stand from
original evaluations. The disadvantage or this method is that a partial
revision leaves a greater possibility for errors and incompleteness
and reduces the reliability of the Its". Under this method it
is estimated that revisions could be accomplished in about 80 hours.
With the present manpower, about 175 sheets could be revised each year
and the 454 important sheets originally requiring revision could be
finished in 2.7 years. The 908 important sheets could be revised at
this rate on a 5.2 year cycle.
Another approach to the revision program is to strike a compromise
between time spent and thoroughness of analysis. By using slightly
more time and by concentrating on a complete analysis of only the im-
portant intelligence, an acceptable product could be produced within a
reasonable time span. This method would retain the present high quality
standard of the IMP while also significantly improving its currency. At
the rate of 100-120 hours per sheet about 125 revisions per year could
then be produced under present manpower and time allocations. The orig-
inal 454 sheets requiring revision could be finished in 3.7 years and if
all 908 important sheets were considered, each sheet would be revised
every 7.5 years.
REVISION PLANNING AND COST
DMA is willing and able to begin a revision program, and they
recognize its importance. They request in certain instances a lead
time of 1 1/2-2 years to rework the JOG base. Since the first group
of sheets that need revision has already been determined, DMA can be
alerted and begin their preparation now. In many cases where a plan-
imetric SIG is to be revised, a recent JOG exists and no reworking by
DMA is necessary. This is the case for many of our first priority
revisions. Inasmuch as JOG bases are under constant revision by DMA,
a revision schedule from us will be a welcome input to their planning.
As usual, DMA will require as much advance notice as possible for all
revisions and re-revisions. Accurate OBGI planning and determination
of user needs will be especially critical during this period. Close
relations with prime users (OSR, OSI, NPIC, DoD) will have to be
maintained so that priorities can be ascertained and DMA can be kept
as well informed as possible.
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Costs and manpower for a revision program are expected to increase
slightly each year. If Geography Division produces about 125 revisions
per year, the work load for DMA will be about the same as the present.
To meet this production the current level of manpower will be required
in Geography Division, but because of salary increases and other fac-
tors the annual cost, which now is approaching can be expected 25X1 Al a
to trend upward in the future. DMA costs, which include manpower as
well as significant material costs for printing, are also expected to
rise slightly to nearly during the mid and late 1970's.
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FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The future of the IMP is open to many possible directions and ap-
plications. Much depends on the Programs' ability to meet the needs
of the intelligence community. If schedules outlined above are met,
revisions accomplished in a reasonable time span, and coverage is
mostly complete, the SIG will increase its usefulness and esteem.
Since the User Survey showed that NSA, NPIC, IAS, FBIS and ORD have
a continuing need for complete once-over coverage of the USSR and
China; the need for sheets never done plus the supplementary
1:1,000,000 sheets will have to be reassessed sometime after the
revision program has been operating effectively. The diversion of
manpower from the revision program will have to be carefully weighed
against the requirements for once-over coverage. Map coverage may
also have to be extended to Eastern and Western Europe, to North
Korea, and to Western Mongolia; isolated coverage may be required in
the Middle East, in areas of border disputes, and in regions outside
the Eurasian land mass. Large-scale maps may be a requirement for
spot areas everywhere.
It is reasonable to assume that a source of basic evaluated all-
source information will always be required. It is just as reasonable
to assume that the packaging may vary. Instead of hard copy intel-
ligence maps, an evaluated computer data base may be preferred. Ex-
perimentation is already being undertaken in OBGI to computerize the
intelligence information on the SIG. The chief applications appear
to be in the machine's ability to plot this information at various
scales and for various areas and to select out intelligence data per-
tinent to user needs. More on this subject will be found in the re-
port currently under development by Delmar Anderson.
RECONNEMTIONS
Most aspects of the IMP require no change; others require slight
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modifications to focus our efforts, to improve speed and efficiency,
and to rationalize working procedures. As in any long-term project,
conditions change and problems gradually evolve, so there may even-
tually be a need for clarification of goals and review of procedures.
RECOMMENDATION 1: GD should proceed to complete 200 important and
50 revisions by end of FY 1975.
Advantage : Sheets most valuable to intelligence community
will be speeded up.
Disadvantage : Complete coverage of USSR and China will be de-
layed.
Estimated cost : No additional costs.
RECOMMENDATION 2: Chief GD should give the IMP an official priority.
Advantage : Analyst's understanding and effectiveness in work
will be renewed.
Disadvantage : Less time will be spent on GD's general research
maintenance and research support.
Estimated cost : None.
RECOMMENDATION 3: GD should prepare new overall guide outline; es-
tablish standard time limitations for each sheet
in research.
Advantage : Analysis will be facilitated and production ef-
ficiency will be increased.
Disadvantage : Slight degradation in analyst creativity will
25X1A1a00070002-8 occur and research time will be limited.
Estimated cost : (1/4 man-year), initially will be offset
by improved analyst efficiency.
RECOMMENDATION 4: CD should begin a SIG periodical or newsletter.
Advantage : Analyst expertise will be better utilized and
OBGI research will be advertised; also new writing
outlet will be provided for analysts.
Disadvantage : Additional duty for analyst-editor.
Estimated cost : - (1/4 man-year), printing cost not included.
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RECOMMENDATION 5: Chief GD should appoint IMP administrator.
Advantage : Coordination and responsibility will be centralized.
Disadvantage : One analyst will be removed from production force.
Estimated cost : None.
RECOMMENDATION 6: GD should increase its IMP relations with prime
users (OSR, OSI, NPIC, IAS, DIA)
Advantage : IMP will be better known and utilized; more accurate
sheet priorities will be obtained.
Disadvantage : None.
Estimated cost : None.
RECOMMENDATION 7: GD should concentrate on revision but also should
reassess the need for and manpower available to
complete once-over coverage of USSR and China during
FY 1976 and beyond.
Advantage : IMP will be kept current and coverage required by
many offices will be extended.
Disadvantage : Some time will be spent to produce negligible intelligence.
Estimated cost : per year for CIA, - for DMA. 25X1A1a
RECOMMENDATION 8: GD should devise new methodology for revision program
which streamlines evaluations.
Advantage : Revision of important areas will be speeded up; im-
portant changes and new intelligence data will be
highlighted.
Disadvantage : Minor intelligence data will not be fully researched;
new approach will take time for analysts to master.
Estimated cost : (1/4 man-year) 25X1A1a
RECOMMENDATION 9: GD should encourage ideas and investigate alternative
applications of future IMP, especially computer sys-
tems interconnecting to IMP and from IMP; assign one
analyst 1/2-time duty.
Advantage : IMP will be assured of keeping pace with other offices'
developments and needs.
Disadvantage : None.
Estimated cost : - (1/2 man-year)
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