COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS ON THE PROPOSAL OF THE MANAGEMENT ADVISORY GROUP TO LENGTHEN THE EMPLOYEE PROBATIONARY PERIOD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-06217A000200050013-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 13, 2002
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: April 7, 1971
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2002/05/SECAlf78-06217A00024050013-6 DTR- 6170
7 April 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for Support
SUBJECT
Comrne.ts and Observed* 0:4 the
postal of the Management Advisory
up to Lengthen the Employee Pro
batiouary Period
REFER CE Not, to DTR from DS dtd 29 Mar '71
same subject
' Lengthening the probationary period for new employee-4 to five
nd subjecting them to a "rigorous, competitive weeding-out. . .
ad of the third and fifth years" wouldO?t be of any significant
? the Office of Traink,g in pruning its rolls of uf.suitabie or At ,sat-
ctory persortnel. Except for Career Trainees, most professional
requirements are filled through conversion of *Mears from other career
services and through the rotational tours of experieaced personnel.
During the !sat five years approximately 15 professional people wire
obtained through external recruitment. Accordingly, the majority of
OTR staff officers have been with the Agency well beyond five years.
The present one-year probationary period is entirely adequate for eval-
uating the suitability of new clerical employees who are assigned to OTR
from the Office of Personnel at an average rate of seve,4 per year.
The MAG proposal would probably have a depressing effect on
recruiting people into the Agency, especially if they are told (and they
should be) that an offer of permanent employment is subject to the
satisfactory completion of a five-year probationary period. As it
applies to the Career Trainee, I think it is too long. The average age
Excluded from autumatIc
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of the CT at present is 27. The prospect of being automatically el rni
zkated at age 32 en the basis of competitive rankings and fixed percent-
ages would not likely be considered an attractive proposition. I believe
that selection procedures currently in force sufficiently guarantee that
our CTs have all the necessary qualities and background for success in
dm Agency. Where failure ai;cars, it is often explained Iu terms of the
individual not having received the right Amount of direction, gnidance,
supervision, and training during his developmental years. Occasion-
ally. outside tactors. such as family problems, show up early or late
in his career and affect his performance and flexibility in regard to
sae zunents.
3. Speaking of Career Trainees want to correct and comment
on a statement made in paragraph 6 which says that CTs often receive
"protective performance evaluations" and "extra help" from their
eenselors. There is no policy or other directive existing in OTR
which advocates the assignment of "protective" ratings (false, padded.
Inaccurate?) on CTs. To my knowledge, there never has been a prac-
tice of this kind. Further. Program Officers of the Career Training
Staff encourage the utmost candor in reports prepared on the CT by compo-
nent supervisors during interim assignments of the young officer. Whether
or not this is done conecientionsly, of course, lies beyond the control of
OTR. I am not certain what is precisely meant by the term "extra help
except te note that Program Officers, or cattareicass are obligated to
help the new CT with his problems, official and personal, whenever they
are asked to do so, and if appropriate. This function is quite identical
to that of the duty of the supervisor during the early stagel of any other
employee's career. There is simply no one else to do the job, and, in
a real sense, the Program Officer is the CT's supervisor. It would be
unthinkable not to offer this basic service to a new employee.
4. Perhaps a fuller explanation would clarify the implications
the last sentence in paragraph 11 which reads: ''The CS Evaluation
swards are having little difficulty identifying a marginal 5% at each
grade among more senior officers and we think the rationale of a pro
bationary period argues for more rigorous pruning then. than at mid-
career," From the statement, / do not quite see how it can be con-
eluded that a "rigorous praning" during the five-year probational
phase will substantially reduce (?) or eliminate (7) the wired for such
action, in the middle time of an officer's career. This conclusion
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presumes that nearly everything detrimental to success will manifest
itself during the early years. This would be an ideal situation, but I
am not sure we can rely on it totally even though the limited exiperience
of the CS Evaluation Panels seems to have produced some justification
for this method (pp. 2-3). In any event, why leave the job to a panel
when supervisors and career service heads should be examining the
records of all newcomers on a continuing basis? Though such a review
would uncover some potential misfits, it still does not come to grips
with the problem mentioned in paragraph 4 of the MAG memo -- that of
the officer who has "peaked-out" at his mid-career point.
5. I am disturbed by the line of reasoning set forth in paragraph
12 as justification for establishing a separation program founded on
intensive competitive rankings and fixed-percentage cuts at the end of
three and five-year periods. Granting that this approach might be the
one to use, it should be applied for the right reasons -- that it is the
fairest, most efficient, and most accurate, not that it relieves the
supervisor of the distasteful chores of "documenting the record, writ-
ing the fateful recommendation, facing-down an irate employee," or
"palming him off on another office." It is conceivable that a system
such as the one advocated in paragraph 12 would not promote good
management practices. Primarily, it is oriented toward helping the
supervisor to avoid his on-going responsibility to evaluate the employee
candidly and take whatever action is necessary at the time, including
the preparation of unfavorable Fitness Reports and the accompanying
warning letter. The tendency could well foster an attitude of "let the
panel do it." I also think that deferral of action to three and five-year
periods would have the unpleasant effect of focusing attention, internal
and possibly public, on the release of relatively large numbers of
employees at the same time.
6. I doubt if a five-year period of probation is needed to evaluate
every professional employee. Something like that amount of time
might be necessary in the Clandestine Service, considering the time
required for training, Headquarters exposure, and an overseas tour.
It certainly should be less for some research and analytical jobs in the
Intelligence and in the Science and Technology Directorates. I wouldn't
need five years to assess the abilities of an instructor in OTR. Accord-
ingly, the adoption of a five-year trial period throughout the Agency
would not be realistic. The Organization would probably end up with
more than one set of probational standards.
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. The solution to many of the problems outlined in the MAG
paper are already available. In two words it adds up to "vigilant
management." The following points are relevant:
a. Retain the one-year probationary period. It is entirely
adequate for evaluating clerical employees and possibly other
special categories of personnel. As stated in paragraph 3 of the
MAG paper it succeeded in eliminatin of the profession-
als. Possibly, Management should encourage that even greater
emphasis should be placed on evaluating employees during this
period. OTR training programs could be of further help in achiev-
ing this objective.
b. Continue to stress the fact that Fitness Reports must
record absolutely accurate evaluations of employee performance
and that this is a supervisory obligation, not an option. The uni-
form application of this elementary principle of good management
would eliminate the need for procedures like the ones outlined in
the MAG paper: it deals with the problem as it arises and on its
own merits. OTR can help here also.
c. Employ more diligently and extensively the review pro-
cedures prescribed j As you
know, these regulations require that at the end of the three-year
provisional period the Head of the Career Service must ". . .
carefully evaluate the individual's suitability for selection as a
Career Employee. . ." The regulation also establishes procedures
for handling a recommendation that the employee's Career-Provi-
sional appointment be terminated. Obviously, the various career
services have not used this means of separating employees unfit
for, uninterested in, or unable to assume the responsibilities and
obligations of Agency employment. Perhaps a directive or instruc-
tion from top management is necessary to activate this little used
regulation.
HUCI-I 1. C U MIN
Df.rector of Training
Attachment
MAG Recommendation
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
MANAGEMENT ADVISORY GROUP
2 5 MAR 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Executive Director
SUBJECT: Recommendation on Lengthening the Employee Probationary
Period
1. CIA officers enjoy, in fact if not in theory, virtually
unparalleled job security. They do not face the service
officers' maximum time-in-grade hurdles nor the periodic
competitive weeding out FSO's undergo.
2. There is one time only in his career when the inept CIA
employee faces any real prospect of discharge: during his
first or probationary year. Having survived 365 days, he is
safe against all but the grossest offenses against security,
decorum, or the law.
3. The Agency, traditionally very chary of exercising the
DCI's statutory authority to make summary dismissals, has
only proved willing to discharge the inept or miscast em-
ployee during his probationary year. In the last five years
an average of
new employees) were so separated eacn year. in contrast,
virtually none were discharged during this five years after
their probationary periods had been completed.
4. The Agency seems content, and perhaps is morally
obligated, to carry to retirement eligibility the formerly
able officer who peaked after 15 years and is coasting. It
correctly feels no similar obligations to the new officer
who usually has minimal family obligations and a minuscule
investment of tenure in his intelligence career.
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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5. Despite the best of screening aids, hiring mistakes are
inevitable. Many new employees themselves recognize mistaken
career choices, and the greatest percentage of resignations in
Agency professional ranks occur during the first five years of
'employment.
6. The Agency gives itself only a year to recognize and
correct such hiring mistakes. MAG believes this time is
clearly too short. CT's are still in training status when
the .year has expired (and are often receiving protective
performance evaluations and "extra help" from their counselors.
PTP officers are still busily indexing documents in RID and
dreaming of a future CS career. CS careerists can be evalu-
ated fully only on their field performance, and few are lucky
enough to escape desk servitude within a year.
7. MAG finds cumbersome, unnecessary, and possibly dis-
advantageous the suggestion of hiring new employees under
contract. The paperwork is unnecessary, and the Agency's
primary recruiting theme - "a career in intelligence" -
becomes a bit hollow when followed by a contract offer with
the standard 30-day notice clause. Adoption of such a
practice would undoubtedly put us at a hiring disadvantage.
8. The contract suggestion rests in fact on recognition
that Agency management has grown accustomed to letting con-
tracts lapse but has shied away from firing staffers. It is
thus in essence a dodge to circumvent traditional attitudes
and practices.
9. Why not, instead, change practice? There is no statutory
bar to CIA's setting any probationary period it wishes for new
employees. MAG advocates adopting a five-year probationary
period, with rigorous, competitive weeding-out hazards to be
faced at the end of the third and fifth years.
? 10. This proposal parallels roughly the Macomber task force
recommendations for fairly ruthless competitive selection out
of less promising junior FSO.'s. It assures that marginality
. can be detected fairly early in a career. (There is good
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evidence for this, in, among other places, the results of the
CS evaluation panels.) It assumes that surgery is better and
more humane early in a career than later. It holds the promise
of fewer career misfits and of fewer future cuts in the established
officer corps. It permits us to risk a greater infusion of new
blood.
11. MAG advocates competitive ranking of new employees in each
directorate and the automatic discharge at the end of three
years of the lowest 10% and at the end of five years of another
5%. (There is nothing sacrosanct about the percentage cuts
recommended but we think their logic can be supported. The
CS Evaluation Boards are having little difficulty identifying
a marginal 5% at each grade among more senior officers and
we think the rationale of a probationary period argues for
more rigorous pruning then than at mid-career.)
12. We suggest this procedure because the firing decision is
always a painful one. No "sensible" supervisor wants to docu-
ment the record, write the fateful recommendation, nor face
down an irate employee. It is easier to try to palm off a
marginal employee on another shop. The fixed percentage re-
quirement avoids all this and ensures that the non-competitive
officer is impartially identified and acted against. The
two-stage procedure should permit some career experimentation
and the rehabilitation of employees possibly miscast in one
directorate but entirely competitive in another.
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