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December 21, 1971
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tb 70t// Approved For ReI2w'e 2002/05/02: CIA-RDP78-06362A00' 004OOO3-7 7/_ Ii91 21 December 1971 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Senior Seminar Guest Speaker's Article Criticizing CIA 1. This Memorandum has been prepared as a result of the publication in-the New York Review of Books issue of 30 December 1971 of an article by Ric ar J. Barnet referring to the CIA Senior Seminar. (A copy of the article is contained in Attach- ment A.) Barnet, Co-director of the Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, D.C. was a guest speaker in the Seminar on 4 November. 2. The Seminar is discussed in the first two paragraphs of the article in which Barnet gives a misleading account (a) of the purpose of the Seminar, (b) of his ro:Le in it; and (c) of his discussions with Seminar participants. Contrary to Barnet's assertion, the purpose of the Seminar was definitely not to "con- sider its (the Agency's) image" except in a. limited sense of having the Seminar participants reflect on the suh ect briefly. Further, in a single paragraph Barnet tendentiously connects previous "con- versations with a number of CIA officials.," who he believes agree with his views but none of whom are identified, to the Senior CPYRGHT Seminar -hart; i 1_ L1_ _ r , pants w t CPYRGHT er another eagerly joined the discussion to assure me at t e days of the flamboyant covert operations were " 1 indicate agreement with Barnet's, contention that technical collection has come to overshadow, agent collection, but the recollections of the Seminar Staff and -record of the discus- sion preserved by the Senior Seminar rapporttteur for this session simply do not support Barnet's account. (Further details concern- ing the Seminar discussions with Barnet are contained in Paragraphs 6 and 7 below, following a resume of the circumstances surrounding the Seminar's invitation to Barnet.) 3. Barnet was invited to make a presentation on 4 November to the Senior Seminar as part of the four-day Block of the program devoted to domestic changes which are directly relevant to the Agency. This Block corresponded to the fo]Llowing announced objective of the Seminar: "To develop greater insight into problems and pressures facing CIA management, the processes of change within the Agency and i-m its external relationship, and developments in. American society which are relevant to CI:A as an o>anization." Approved For Release 2002/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-06362A000200040003-7 4. rai r ?'- ta? kl Approved For Rele a 2002/05/02 : C1 -RDP78-06362A00 00040003-7 The overall scope note for the "domestic environment" notes that the Block "examines contemporary domestic problems and issues and their impact on national priorities, foreign policy and the Central Intelligence Agency; and,explores the relationships of the communications media and public opinion with the executive branch of the U.S. Government in general and with CIA in particular. In this Block the Seminar Staff sought to present "critical" as well as "orthodox" views of problems so that participants would be challenged intellectually. Separate presentations were scheduled on "Social and Cultural. Change in American Society -- A Report," "Changing Economic Priorities and the Implications for CIA," "A Youth Viewpoint," "The Drug Culture," "Government and the Media," "CIA and the Media," "A Critic Looks at U.S. Foreign Policy," and "Social and Cultural Change in American Society -- A Perspec- tive." The penultimate was the topic proposed to Mr. Barnet (see Attachment B, copy of topic scope note). Thus in no sense, as .his article implies, was he invited to discuss the "Agency image." 4. Our selection of Barnet as a speaker was based on several considerations. He has achieved prominence as an articulate, if a hairshirt, critic of U.S. foreign policy via his books and articles (one of the latter, an excerpt from his latest book Washington Plans a _n_Aggressive War, appeared in Harper's just a ew days prior to his sc~io ule session with the Seminar.) He is not totally ignorant of the foreign policy process, as some acade- mic critics are. Finally, I knew him personally, from our service in the U.S. Disarmament Administration and its successor ACDA and believed he would live up to his billing as a "critic." 5. Prior to making any move to invite Barnet, I submitted his name,'along with that of many other possible guest speakers, to the Office of Security. Approval to use Barnet on an unclas- sified basis was granted by Security on 1 September. Contrary to the usual Seminar practice of writing a formal letter of invita- tion outlining the nature and objectives of the Seminar, our con- tact:.was limited to my telephone call inviting him to speak and a follow-up letter asking for his suggestions concerning perti- nent reading material and arranging details of his transportation to and from the Seminar site. (See Attachment C for a copy of the letter to Barnet.) His name was listed in the Senior Seminar guest speakers regularly forwarded to the DD/S by the OTR Speaker Coordinator. 6. The salient points of Barnet's formal presentation and ensuing discussion period were recorded by Chief, Personnel Security Division, Office of Security, who acted as Seminar rapporteur for the Block in which Barnet appeared. (See Attachment D for Rapporteur's summary of :Barnet's session with the Seminar.) His presentation consisted of two hours with the Seminar members which commenced with formal lecture-style'remarks Approved For Release 2002/05/02 CIA-RDP78-06362A000200040003-7 3`MA .1, Approved For Rel a 2002/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-06362A00W00040003-7 for one hour. His comments were critical., in a rather rambling fashion, of present day U.S. foreign policy. He particularly emphasized the impact of the Nixon Doctrine on foreign policy, contending that the Doctrine is a throwback to the Cold War and the policies of that era. Moreover, he claimed that CIA is an antiquated instrument of that cold war and its image is that of a "sinister force." 7. Following Barnet's formal remarks and a coffee break, the Seminar group reassembled in the Seminar lounge for discus- sions. Several questions were put to Mr. Barnet, but his detailed responses left far more questions unanswered than the group would have liked. Despite an occasional question posed by Barnet, no specific information was volunteered by the Seminar members. There was one lively exchange stemming from his claim that CIA is responsible for training Brazilian police in methods of inter- rogation with primary reliance upon the use of physical torture. When considerable skepticism was expressed by the group, the speaker asserted he had his information on "good authority" a personal friend. Pressed further to identify his source, Barnet claimed that the syndicated columnist Jack Anderson had given him this information. (Incidentally, he did not allude to this con- tention in the N.Y. Review article.) 8. Near the close of the discussion period, Barnet raised the charge that CIA has engaged in assassination. I joined several members of the Seminar in rejecting this claim in, a most positive manner. Notwithstanding, he concluded his article with a general reference to the Agency's having developed "brilliant techniques" for assassination, sabotage and deception. 9. Following the informal session, five of the participants and I took Barnet to-lunch since he had declined the Seminar's prof- fered honorarium on the basis that it was against the policy of his institution to accept government money. The conversation at lunch, according to the recollections of those of us in attendance, would certainly not have generated any of the allegations in the Review article. 10. The Seminar members were not particularly impressed with Barnet's theses or arguments. Some members expressed astonishment over the apparent lack of knowledge on the speaker's part as well as the sources of his information. Most Seminar members did state, however, in their critiques that they found him provocative and stimulating. (See Attachment E, copy f,?student ev uations of Barnet.) I jI ,s 25X1A Atts: A/S ie , S-enior Seminar Approved For Release 2002/0 : ,qJA-RDP78-06362A000200040003-7 ~r 5.8i 4d.. ~ Approved-For Release 2002/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-08'362A000200040003-7 Approved For Release 2002/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-06362A000200040003-7 S(1RCI : The Now York Review of Books - 30 December 1971 Approved FoT (ease 2002/05/02: CIA-RDP78-0636IM00200040003-7 BSc r (FN7, [N The Rope Dancer by \'ie or `.larehetti. Gross: t S: Dunlap, 361 pp., $6.95 In late November the Central Intel- ligence Agency conducted a series of "senior seminars" so that some of its important bureaucrats could consider its Public imate. I was invited to attend one session and to give my views on the proper role of the Agency. I suggested that its legitimate activities were limited to studying newspapers and pubtish:d statistics, listening to the radio, ILinking about the. world, interpretin_ data of recon- naissance sztcliites, end occasionally publishing the names of foreign spies. I had been led by conversations with a number of CIA officials to believe that they were thinking along the same lines. One CIA man after another eagerly ;ailed the discussion to assure me that the days of the flamboyant covert operations were over, The tipper-class amateurs of the OSS who stayed to mastermind operations in Guatemala, Iran, the Congo, and clse- where--:;Ilen I)uli s, Kermit Roosevelt, Ri~:li rd lii.scli, Tracy 13 aracs, Robert Amory, Desmond Fitz erald-had died or departed. In their place, I was assured, was a small army of professionals devoted to pren:aring intelli ence "estimates" for the President and collecting inforrtta- tion the clean, modern way, mostly with sensors, computers, and sophis- ticated reconnaissa ace devices. Even Gary Pcmcrs, the U-2 pilot, would now be as mu di a museum piece as Mata Bari. (There arc about 15.000 em- ployees in the CIA and 200.000 in the entire "intelligence conunuoity'' itself. The cost of maintaining them is sonle- where. between SS billion and S6 billion annually. The employment figures do not include foreign agents or Approved For Re mercenaries, such as tlicCIA's 100,000- ntan !tired army in Laos.) A week after lily visit to the "senior seminar" Newsweek ran a long story on "tile new espionage" with a picture of CIA Director Richard Helms on the cover. The reporters clearly had spoken to some of the same people I had. As Newsweek said, "The. gaudy era of the adventurer has passed in the American spy business; the bureaucratic age of Richard C. Helms and his gray spe- cialists has settled in." I began to have an uneasy feeling that Neivswcek's article was a cover story in more than i t has always been difficult to analy..e organizations that enrage in false advertising about themselves. Part of t:.e responsibility of the CIA is to spread confusion about its own work. The world of Richard helms and his "specialists" does indeed differ from that of Allen Dulles. intelligence orl;an- izations, in spite of their predilection for what English judges used to call ."frolics of their own," are servants of policy. When policy changes, they must eventually change too, although because of the atmosphere of secrecy and deception in which they operate, such changes are exceptionally hard to control. To understand the "new espionage" one must see it as part of the Nixon Doctrine which, in essence, is a global strategy for maintaining US power and influcno~e without overtly involving the nation in another ground war. on November 10, for a "Select: Com- mittee on the Coordination of United States Activities Abroad to oversee activities of the Central Intelligence Agency," Senator Stuart Symington noted that "tile subcommittee having oversight of the Central Intelligence Agency has not nlct once this year." Symington, a former Secretary of the Air Force and veteran member of the Armed Services Committee, has also said that "there is no federal agency in our government whose activ- ities receive less scrutiny and control than the CIA." Moreover, soon after Symington spoke, Senator Allen J. Ellender, chairman of the Intelligence Operations Subcommittee, admitted on the floor of the Senate, as the Wash- ington Post reported, "that he did not know in advance about the CI :"?.'s financing of any army in Laos." Sym- ington was able to get only thirty votes :.I favor' of a Select Committee. An attempt to impose a bn:!, glary ceiling on intelligence acts itie; al?a failed. Always intimidated by the mysteries of intelligence, senators were particu- kirly unwilling in this case to assert their constitutional responsibilities because the. President had just reorgan- ized intelligence operations. Richard helms had been given new authority over the bud,'ct of the Defense Intel- ligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the intelligence and Research Bureau of the State Department, and the. other intelligence agencies. This centralization of intelligence, adopted But we cannot comprehend recent over the protests developments in the "intelligence com- vices, gives the munity" without understanding want Agency and its Mr. Iiclins and his employees actually important powers. do. In a speech before the National ^'"' Press Club, the director discouraged tile most striking of the II7liliary ser- Central Lucili~ence director new and reori'.:Illizat101, is the erlll::Itc 3 journalists from lint:in" the attempt. role Of "1'ou'vc just not to trur;t us. We arc Henry Kissinger, who as chairman of new National Security Council lntel honorable nhen." The. same speech is made each year to 1110, small but lit;ence C'oramittee and supervisor of it growing number of senators who want new Net Assessment Group can now a closer check on the CIA. In asking, function as a chief of staff to the President on inicili'vnce matters. fiver ease 2002/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-06362A000200040003- Approved Foi*+R+eIease 2002/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-06361*600200040003-7 CPYRGHT -2- more than before, his view of the world is the basis for the President's decisions. The military services will now have fewer chances to sell the President their own version of events. For more than ten years the CIA has had one public failure after another- the Bay of Pigs, the failure of its counterinsurgency operations in Viet- nam during the early 1960s, its incom- petence during the Dominican opera- tion in 1965, the scandals over its penetration of the National Student Association and dozens of other organ- izations. But the Agency is once again becoming the most powerful bureau- cratic force in foreign. affairs. In part, its new prestige results from the Pen- tagon Papers. The record made available thus far shows that the CIA analyzed South Vietnamese politics in the late 1950s with remarkable accuracy. The Agency's Board of National Estimates, which prepares the National Intelli- gence. Estimates for the President, was perceptive about the weakness of the Diem regime and, unlike Rusk, Bundy, and McNamara, the Agency saw that the Viet Cond.*, was an authentic south- ern movement, not merely the creature of Hanoi. The CIA presented a strong case showing that bombing the north would not win the war in the south. Each time a major escalation of the war was- proposed, its predictions, though always hedged in the charac- teristic manner of investment analysts and other professional prophets, were duly pessimistic. The current prestige of the CIA is also explained by the failure of com- peting agencies. Robert Me amara's effort to create tire Defense Intelli- gence Agency, a little CIA to con- solidate the intelligence work of the military services, was not a bureau- cratic success. A former Air Force man described it for a A'ewsieeek corres- pondent as a "giant vacuum cleaner picking up millions of pieces of lint that we store in our computers." It did not help the reputation of Army intelligence inside the o iv crone iii when it was caught spying on such figures as Senator Adlai Stevenson. The State Department Intelligence and Research Branch, which also had a reasonably good record of accuracy in the Vietnam war, is small, depends upon other agencies for information, and shares the generally low esteem in which the State Department is held by those in charge of American foreign policy. But the most important reason for the new ascendence of the CIA and its highly publicized professionals is the Nixon Doctrine, which is in many ways a throwback to the policies of - the Eisenhower era, the CIA's Golden Age. John Foster Dulles and his brother used tile CIA as an instrument of political warfare to extend US control over the internal politics of countries throughout the world, with- out military intervention. During the Eisenhower years troops were used only in the brief adventure in Lebanon and for evacuating some tiny islands off China. -But CIA agents brought down governments in Iran and Guate- mala, attempted to do so in Indonesia, installed Mobutu in the Congo, and staged a secret war in Laos. These were the years in which the CIA established itself as the principal aint of US diplomacy in a number of countries and reduced many ambas- sadors to embarrassed ceremonial figures. Sometimes intelligence agents were openly appointed to strategic embassies. In 1953, for example, General "Wild Bit)" Donovan, the creator of OSS and the senior Amer- i~an specialist in espionage, v,as appointed ambassador to Thailand so that he could set up a variety of covert operations in Southeast Asia, of which many still survive. The Eisenhower era was a period of intense undercover activity, but under the cover of Dulles 's belligerent rhetoric Ike deliv- ered eight years of peace.. Nixon now promises a full genera- tion of peace. According to the n o- %ictterniehean vision of Ilenry lKiss- intper, expounded in State of the World rnessag es and in the President's major foreign policy speech last summer at Kansas City, US troop strength around the world will be reduced and large- scale military interventions will be avoided. Instead, Nixon will take dip- lomatic steps to reduce confrontations around the world. When the United States finds that it has no alternative to the use of force to protect what are still deemed our "vital interests" in other countries, the emphasis will not be on crude military power. The Nixon Doctrine calls for increased use of foreign military assistance, the develop- ment of an "electronic battlefield" and other lethal technology that can be operated at a safe distance, and re- liance on air power. When the United States finds it necessary to use military action abroad, every. effort will he made to ensure that the color of the bodies on the battlefield will render them in- visible to US newspaper readers. Presi- dent Nixon has made it "perfectly clear" that the United States is not abandoning its traditional view of its interests in Southeast Asia or Latin America. We will continue to resist or harass revolutionary 'movements even when, as in Chile, they cone to power by legal means. But a major effort is being made to find ways t at are cheaper, more effective, and more acceptable politically than sending in the Army or the Marines. Clearly such a strategy creates irresistible oppor- tunities for CIA action, the more "covert" the better. In recent months much evidence about how the CIA operates has come to light. As we have seen, the Pentagon Papers provide the first public glimpse of its "estimating" process, but the papers also show how little such estimates can matter. On the major foreign policy crisis of this generation,. the Victrunin war, they were continu- ously ignored. When 1 asked one of the government officials responsible for war planning how he could have recomniendcd escalation in the face of the CIA analyses of the nature of the CPYRGHT? _3- Approved Fo lease 2002/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-06362*00200040003-7 NLF and the impact of air bombard- ment on North Vietnamese resistance, he replied testily that nobody pays much attention to intelligence esti- mates. Remembering how bored and confused I was by the reams of red, yellow, brown, green, and blue docu- ments from intelligence sources during my own days in the State Department, I had to admit he was right. On really important questions, such as the political intentions of adversaries whom for some reason you are afraid to ask directly, the analyses seldom rise above the level of sophisticated gossip. There is always more than you want to know about personal idiosyn- cra.!ies, for example the sex habits of Congolese generals. On military mat- ters, such as the number of Soviet aircraft of a certain class, the estimates often are not attempts at establishing truth so mach as essential elements in the bureaucratic conflict over the US military budget. Whether the Soviets have fifty or a hundred more or fewer aircraft has no effect on the "military balance," but it will determine whether certain funds will go to the Air Force or the Navy. For this reason the military services have signed "treaties" with one another which are compro- mises on estimates of enemy forces. The CIA does not benefit directly from increased military appropriations and it is to some extelit insulated from intersereice rivalries; but while it has shown it can sometimes be objective on military questions, its estimates coo are colored by bureaucratic politics and self-interest. A real test of the CIA's objectivity would be the accu- racy of its reporting on its own paramilitary operations in Laos, where the Agency remains in charge of a full-scale war. No one in the intelligence business is naive enough to think that estimates, particularly on intangible political questions, can be separates] from policy reconhnlendations. Policy is in- fluenced by the picture of the world on which it is based. Because the CIA in preparing its estimates does not normally divulge its sources, the esti- mators have wide latitude to select and weii;h facts for their psycholo!teal impact on policy makers. (One former CIA official recalls the highly emo- tional estimate Allen Dulles sent Presi- dent lii:.enhower the day Castro marched into Havana. Dulles predicted a bloodbath and thereby set the tone for treating Castro as America's num- ber one obsession and number one target.) ' Some of the most revealing new information about the CIA is -to be found in the excellent investigations of the Symington subcommittee during its Laos hearing. There is also a small but growing group of CIA alumni who are sufficiently concerned with the threat that a largely uncontrolled and growing intelligence organization poses to a free society to speak candidly about the. Agency. Most of them are reluctant to be quoted, but one articulate excep- tion is Victor. lvtarerletti, who has not only written a novel, The Rope Dancer, dealing with the Agency, but has been willing to talk to writers on public affairs, including myself. For three years Marchetti worked as special assistant to the CIA's executive director and as executive assistant to the Agency's deputy director, Rufus L. Taylor. During these years in the "executive suite" he. attended daily meetings with the director and high Agency officials. While working in the office of the comptroller he was in a position to see how the money was spent and where. In view of the lack of effective congressional oversight, his information is unusually important be- cause it provides a rare view behind the CIA's cover. The characters in Ma rchetti's novel ate wooden and one-dimensional but his book is useful because it provides authentic details of life in the Agency. Marchetti gives a convincing account of what he calls the "clandestine n;en- ta]ity," the peculiar mindlessness of spying. The chief defect of this book as a work . of literature- may be the most revealing thing about it. His characters have no plausible motives. A happily married flan with a bright future becomes ? it spy for the Russians in order to get money which lie does not need and in which lie shows little interest. In the end lie is killed, but it is never clear why lie went to all the trouble. But in the espionage business plausible motives are not necessary. The clandestine mind may not care at all about the goals for which it plots or even about which side it is on. The excitement of spying, the thrill of being able to invert moral conventions, is its own reward. Marchetti shows that the impulse to lie is so strong in the clandestine world that intelligence officials ostensibly working on the same side cannot help deceiving each other. in his book, and in interviews, Marchetti has already disclosed enough concrete facts to contradict the image the Agency has been trying to promote about itself, and particularly its claim that clandestine operations are a rela- tively small and dwindling part of its work, while the really important CIA activity consists of research and anal- ysis. When Marchetti left the Agency in 1970 about one-third of its 18,00 employees worked on "research and analysis," including "current intel- ligence," "strategic research," "econ- omic research," photo interpretation and broadcast monitoring, and "tech.- nical research"-the latter including new or improved bugs, cameras, sear sors, data processors, methods of fouling Cuban oil tanks, etc. The Board of Estimates, the most visible of the CIA's Washington activities, em- ployed exactly eighty people, including secretaries, when Marchetti worked for it four years ago. According to blarclhetti, another third of the agency's employees are directly carrying out "clandestine activities." They are assigned to For- eign Intelligence, which is the covert collecting of information, e.g., by steal- ing codes or tapping wires, or to Covert Action, which includes such activities as the recent phony broadcast in Cambodia in which a gig line voice described as ''Prince Sihanouk" advised Cambodian women to sleep with the Viet Conti. They may also carry on counterespionage, Richard Bis c'I, the former CIA Deputy Director for Plans (covert operations) has defined "covert action" as "altenlpting to influence the internal affairs of other nations- somctinles called lintorvent ion'-by Approved For Release 2002/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-06362A000 '3OO40OOO-7 T-CPYRGHT -~- Approved For (ease 2002/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-0636NW00200040003-7 The renhaining third provide a In contrast the underdeveloped variety of "support" services such as world presents greater oppor- transportation, communication, and tunities for covert intelligence col- logistics. But most of these, as Mar- lection, simply because govern- chetti points out, help out the clan- mints are much less highly organ- destine services. Analysts who sit at rzed: there is less security con- sciousness; and there ?is apt to be desks at CIA headquarters in Langley, more actual or potential diffusion Virginia, and read Pruvda need and gat of power among parties, localities, little such "support." But the covert organizations, and individuals out- work of contriving "dead-drops," "safe side of the central governments. houses," "cut-outs," and of paying The primary purpose of espionage 1 b 1 t d i n 1 hers and in these areas is to provide Wash- t I ho c le Bissell recounted how "in the case of a large underdeveloped country" money was "put into a party's funds without the knowledge of that party." The United States, he said, "should make increasing use of non-nationals, who, with effort at indoctrination and training should be encouraged to de- velop a second loyalty, more or less ccntparable to that of the American staff. l y -ugc rl hes o r disloyal colonels requires the efforts of ~ington with timely knowledge of If the Agency is to be effective, it thousands of employees. It is also the internal power balance.... will have to make increasing use of ' t t is on an ex tot expensive. Marchetti estimates that at As one former CIA official explained least 65 percent of the Agency's it to me, Europe used to be an under- annual $700 million budget is spent on developed country from the spy's clandestine activities. And this figure, point of view. After the war the he emphasizes, is deceptively low, for continent was in ruins and everyone the Agency also draws on funds bud- was either on one side or the other in geted for the Department of Defense. the cold war. Now local authorities To run the war in Laos, for example, resent it when Soviet and American the CIA spends S50 million of its own agents chase each other in tl'teir coun- funds, most of which are concealed in tries. This complicates the game of the defense budget, and over $400 spying. Besides, diplomats now talk million of the Defense Department's more freely anyway. psi ate uls,l , parading scale, though those rela- tions that have been "blown" cannot be resurrected. We need to operate under deeper cover, with increased attention to the use of "cut-outs" [i.e., middlemen who protect the professional case worker or spy supervisor from direct contact with the agent who does the actual spy: hg] . . . . The CIA interface with various private groups, including business and funds. The disorganized, highly corruptible student groups, must be remedied. TX A~ societies of the Third World make ' ' 1 tf Lich of Marchetti s information is much more inviting targets. The same confirhnca., by the record of a discus- official pointed out that there is not Sion of covert operations which was much worth knowing about Chile, for led by Richard Bissell on January 9, example, that can be discovered by a 1968, as part of a Council on Foreign reconnaissance satellite or other "stand Relations study of the intelligence off" techniques of intelligence collec- community. A copy of the minutes of tion. To discover intentions, which is the meeting fell into the hands of the the essence of political intelligence, Africa Research Group, which has so-called "close in" methods must be published it. (The complete text is used. This means penetrating foreign available for $1 from the Africa Re- governments and societies. Bissell put search Group, PO Box 213, Cambridge, it this way: Massachusetts 02138.) Although Mr. Only by knowing the principal Bissell was dismissed from his job as players well do you have a chance manager of the nation's spies after the of careful prediction. There is real Bay of Pigs, Ile is still, according to scope for action in this area; the former associates, close to the Agency technique is essentially that of and regularly consults with its top "1%enetration".... Many of the officials. Thus, in the view of CIA " penetrations" don't ta k e the form of "hiring" but of estab- ahlnuni and other sources, his dis lisping a close or friendly relation- cussioln of covert activities reflects ship (which may not be furthered current thinking inside the A;^,cncy. by the provision of money from Bissell made it clear that the charac- time to tin.e).... In some ter of espionage is changing. There has countries the, CIA representative been, the says, a "shift in priorities for has served as a close counselor classical espionage toward targets in (and in at least one case a drinking the Underdeveloped world. Partly as a companion) of the chief of state. result of this change in priorities These are situations of course in and ... partly because of other level- sti'Iliclh the tasks of intelliPrnce opments the scale of the cl?lssicad collection and political action Many of the ideas that emerged from the Council on Foreign Relations study group, former CIA insiders say, were incorporated in a task force report prepared inside the CIA shortly after the Nixon Administration took office. The recent reorganizatian reflects both the criticism of the intelligence com- munity by high national security deci- sion makers and long-stan cling com- plaints by intelligence professionals themselves. The most obvious purpose of the -eorganization is to reduce "collection Overkill," i.e., the expensive, mindless iuplication of information that no- body reads or that snakes no dif- ference. The increased supervisory power of the CIA and the White House over intelligence operations is primarily designed to keep the expanding intel- ligence bureaucracies of the military services in check. The CIA's ci:an- destine services have complained about the military's moving in on secret operations which, Agency officials be- lieve, they often perform with extreme incompetence. The While Ilouse is also interested in Ill,'intai!nilt,; tighter coll- espionate effort in Europe has con overlap to the point of being trot aver ill teh igeuce activities in tile a ti i',Ill uishabe? utcd States is nov; siderably diminished. Approved For Releaseb`~~/O)b2 : '61A-RDP78-06362AOt1~00Od?Y~-fir 5 CPYRGHT ? Approved Fo lease 2002/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-0636 00200040003-7 more. vulnerable politically than ever when covert operations backfire. The Administration is also obviously crted in saving money. -his much of the story is reasonably clear from public statements. \;'hat is not clear is the extent and nature of the use of clandestine services. The official line promoted in private press briefings, dinners with the director, and confidential chats with key nicm- bcrs of Congress, is that the clan- destine services, except for the tech- nical people, have been trimmed and that the US now makes 'little use of covert means to manipulate the in- ternal politics of other countries. Newsweek correspondents in twenty- five capitals around the world ap- parently corroborated this claim when they reported a cutback of secret could mean either that clandestine, operations are in fact declining or that they are skillfully being performed by agcnis with the "deeper cover" that Bissell called for in 1968. As of 1970, as we have seen, Marchetti found ttie Agency was still heavily weighted in its personnel and budget in favor of clandestine work. In trying to understand what the Agency does, he contends, one must Keep in ri'iind that its managers, including the director, have made their careers in the clandestine services. lie recalls that top officials of the CIA were interested mainly in secret operations, not in intelligence analysis. llelm5, he renlenl- bers, often scented bored by meetings of the United States Intelligence Board but was alert and lively when working with the clandestine services. Former CIA officials contend that the Agency is now trying to "profes- siollaliie" the clandestine servicCs. M y CIA operations; as 13isscil at while separable in theory, "interact and overlap." Although an effort was made in the 1950s to separate the two by placing covert action in a "separate organ" under Frank G. Wisner, General "Becdic" Smith, according to Bissell, ordered the "complete integration of intelli;g,ence collection and covert ac- tion functions in each area division." In practice, this means that an agent who is trying to find out what is happening inside a foreign government or movement may at the salve time try to influence the very developments he is reporting on. i t can also be anticipated that intelligence agents will be increasingly recruited from the international under- world. At the height of the cold war it was possible to enlist businessmen, foundations, universities, znd churches in covert operations. Espionage was respectable among the intellectual and business elite. But spying is not in hint favor among the younger generation, and it is now much harder to find well-placed lawyers and professors to cooperate in performing what Allen Dulles used to call "dirty tricks." Thus while the ClA?s rlanagement in Washington will continue in the hands of libc:rill, polished, and well-spoken professionals, operations in the field will, be more and more entrusted to such adventurers as the CIA agent v:ho- according to Fred Branfman, yr o spent. a year and a half interviewing US employees in Laos--drops grenades on villages from airplanes and likes to send Lao heads to his friends; or the group of hired killers who run the Phoenix Program in Indochina which. according to CIA official Colby, claims to have ? assassinated more than 6,000 civilians in a sin? ale year. It is of course operations are so in Laos where CIA ambitious that they Papers contain a July, orandum by General Lancd.tle states that "Command control of operations is exercised by the Cl, i CIA, Vientiane with the advice o` Chief, MAAG." ' llz A _ncy has strategic difference. pointed out have had their covers eruiiud trained, and financed sever:.' pointed Bissell pointed out, covert cotlce?- secret armies made up of Meos, Yaos, "blown." As the CIA applies new flog OX) do n d- a c n c n 1st Chinese, and Nun- ,s. Approved For Release 1 666, 516 : 61A-Rb'PVA-06? ~ 6'2A0001 b4lbbb(.li' teCjliliques, especially in the under- developed world, these operations are being quietly phased out. The CIA used to pour money lavishly into organizations around the globe as, for example, the labor unions in British Goinna which were enlisted in the fight to overthrow the radical Clieddi Japan. Now such techniques appear too, risky. It is more "secure" to cultivate indi- viduals rather than organizations for covert operations. At the sane time ;Marchetti believes that the A cncy is; also anxious to "professionalize" spy- ing on American radicals, thus re- moving such politically sensitive opera- tions from what the CIA experts regard as the clumsy hands of the FBI and military intelligence. All the- alumni of both the FBI and the CIA. to whom I've talked ~grce that the two. organizations are e gaged in a bitter jurisdictional rivalry over such "coun- terespionage" work. he intelligence specialists I spoke to now anticipate two other developments. in US espionage activities. To obtain the- deeper cover that Bissell says is es?.sen- tial, more use will be made of "iilep,al' agents. These are spies, Americans or, foreigners, with no discernible connec-. tion with the Unitecl States who live. under an assumed identity in a foreign land. Most US operations have been carried out by "l gal" agents, i.e.,. identifiable US employees using a : cover. (In Laos, for exarnple, it has been admitted that CIA agents c.ngaged. in training Moo tribesmen posed as`, All) agriculture experts.) Legal agents; arc obviously easier to recruit since the, maxihnum risk they face is deporta from rather than the firing squad. But suspicions now rull high, and it in harder to do successful spying out of the US embassy. The new emphasis will be on re- cruiting strategically placed "foreigni nationals" in Third World governments;, for the intelligence "requirements" of the 1970s will increasingly center ocl the intentions of volatile regimes rather than on weapons developments, w?liicli, are. relatively easily discovered by tech- nical ni'aens and which make littlx1 .*The 01 A's foreign e ;ion sets tt - against tribe and nat?gi t i a cre.etly tented. Safes have been stuffed The Agency is now carrying on similar with purloined information. 1 ut to activities in Cambodia and parts of what end? the people or huatei ~.+.a Thailand. The close coordination of the CIA target spotters on the ground and the air force may well be the model for the "low-profile" para- military operations of the future. The increasing use of such "low profile" and paramilitary operations and the employment of "deeper cover" penetration by "illegal agents" means that more and more power over foreign affairs will be concentrated in the office of the President. It is hard enough for Congress to supervise the Pentagon; legislative review of large- scale clandestine operations is a vir- tually hopeless task. The only chance of ending the increasingly dangerous role of intelligence organizations in making- and carrying out foreign policy is to cut their budgets drastically and to set up accounting procedures to make certain that the cuts are in fact observed. Congress has the power to do this but it will not act so long as it accepts the mystique of intelligence. the short history of American intel- ligence is a record of tactical virtuosity and strategic stupidity. Much of the information obtained by covert means is either unused or used in connection with aggressive 2nd ille pl covert opera- tions which often fail. An honest and intelligent observer working in the open or in a library can learn more that is useful and true about t;:e world than a clandestine operator aided by the most Sophisticated spy parapher- nalia. Information obtained by clan- destine methods more often than not has a built-in bias that makes it suspect, as is to be expected when people are paid or pressured or black- mailed to deliver the goods. A careful reader of Le Monde would have a far more accurate grasp of the true sig- nificance of politics and military opera- tions in Indochina than someone con- demned to reading every intelli; epee document publish; d in the Pentagon Papers. Brilliant techniques have indeed been developed by the CIA for assassination, sabotage, and deception. Governments in Latin America have been neatly and Iran arc scarcely better off because of the CIA coups in their countries. American oil companies have benefited but the American people are neither more secure nor better liked because of these "intelligence" triumphs. The old imperial game of dividing and conquering weak countries serves the interests only of those who enjoy engaging in it and of those commercial interests that derive direct (and often short-term) benefits from it. It has yet to be demonstrated what security in- terest the United States has in manipu- lating the politics of other countries other than the perfect security of world domination, the dream that destroys great nations. ^ The Atcw York Review CPYRGHT Approved For Release 2002/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-06362A000200040003-7 -7- Approved ForQelease 2002/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-06362 0200040003-7 Approved For Release 2002/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-06362A000200040003-7 Approvedldr Release 2002/05/02: CIA-RDP78-06W2A000200040003-7 Approved For Release 2002/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-06362A000200040003-7 Approved For Release 2002/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-06362A0000200040003-7 A CRITIC LOOKS AT US FOPIEIGN POLICY The presentation will take a close look at U.S. foreign policy and will examine those elements and areas of foreign policy .,Mich have produced opposition and alienation among many segments of American society. The purpose of tills analysis is to identify the changes in the attitudes of the American public -- "the. lessons learned" -- which will influence future lines of foreign policy. U.S. involvement in Vietnam should be included in the discussion. The presentation should include the speaker's viers as to inplicat.ions of the Vietnam involve - m,tent for the foreign policy agencies of government, including CIA. The subject matters should not be restricted to Vietnam and of .er areas of foreign policy and US involvement should also be ex opined. Suggestions for change in U.S. foreign policy lines or in the policy-makking structure, might he of- fered., Approved For Release 2002/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-06362A00020004000377 Approved TWr Release 2002/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-0 2A000200040003-7 Approved For Release 2002/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-06362A000200040003-7 'Approved For Rele 2002/05/02: CIA-RDP78-06362A009W0040003-7 10 September 1971 Dr. R .char Cl J. Barnett. Co-director , Institute for I olic?y Studies 1520 NOW Harip shir. o .rtvenuo , N. V1. lash ington, D. C. 20036 Dear Dr. Barnett: leis told n.(., about h i s Conversation you concerninc your willingness to speak to the CIA Senior Seminar and has asked that I write you about the details of your appearance. You I17.Vr~ ' erm scheduled fi)r 9:30 a.~z. , Thursday, 4 ,ovember. The Senior is locat'c{.1yor. t;i'c l.Dta.l floor of the Axl:i_ri,,to?a C~1s'li)? cr of Commerce ,.'~uildin.g, 4600 Fairfax Drive, r incton, V'.rcrl.ilia; near the intersection of Glee`bo r;rJad and I L. i.x Drive I will be X..1 Contact with you later to offer any assistance in tr 11reli;.1g to t ale,, buil(dinrr which you may et~txl.x'C'... Regardinc the nature of your prese'F>itation, I. a))1 1c rl'.nc'r a "scope note" )riiich should su,7gcst the i cn rah. ?.me1:ork "for your presentation. After your talk of un to an hour or more, hone e one to have a discussion. In order to foster. this, your ;iucr- gesti.ons as to boo ::S and articles , other t h:111 your ~ll.ece 11?i ich will appear in Harpor's November issue, to which we may refer the Semin r i),1rv.1.Ci1;)antS in advance will be -101-)roci. ted. In ad- dition, a bio; ra)hic s1rotch of yourself to pass out to our So-ii iair participants would be helpful. Don has told me that the policy of your Institute precludes your acceptance, of an honorar. ium;1. I bona, Iio=.,?ovcr, your schedule will be flexible enough to allow; 11s to t lke you to lunch following your appearance. if you have any questions or coimiei is please feel free to call me on number 3S1-2200. Sia.1tooercly yours , AV Att: A/S 15 IAIINIL Surnor sr. nar i frC Off I cite o r Central I:altelli conce A'?;oncy Wa ahin!?;`t.c~n, D. C. 20 05 Approved For Release 2002/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-06362A000200040003-7 ApproveJor Release 2002/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-OW62A000200040003-7 Approved For Release 2002/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-06362A000200040003-7 f=011p CIA W l !(; 'Approved For Releft1b 2002/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-06362A00QZD0040003-7 BLOCK V-B- The Enviroment of CIA: Unofficial Relationships 18 November 1971 Critical Analysis of Foreign Policy Speaker: Richard J.. Barnet The speaker expressed the position that the post-World War II period found the U. S. as a supreme power and it w4s our "Empire" policy to remain number one. In the Truman doctrine, we took over from the British, and the policy worked for over 20 years, in spite of n-mistakes, because we were so strong. The speaker indicated that the fundamental failure of U. S. policy is that we are no longer operating in a 19th century concept; we have over- reacted; and dissipated our resources. There are vast areas of the world with their own politics. There are no power blocs now. In this regard, it was stated that the Nixon. approach to peace in Vietnam, through the USSR and China, is a mistake. The Soviets want peace but cannot deliver. According to the speaker, CIA exists because of a "bureaucratic history". The OSS developed an intelligence apparatus and it was unthinkable to let go. Our capabilities determine the requirements. In the Eisenhower era, it was part of the "more bangs for a buck" approach - particularly on CIA activities. We may be returning to this approach under Nixon. The general image of CIA is that of a "sinister force" - part of a foreign policy which involves control and domination. There has been some improvement in the Agency image as a result of disclosures in the Pentagon papers, but it would be a mistake to get involved in such countries as Brazil and Chile. Basically, the speaker expressed opposition to all clandestine operations. The attempt to get involved in Laos type operations holds great dangers and will defeat our purposes. The Agency will not be able to "carry it off. " Approved For Release 2002/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-06362A000200040003-7 . FOR NA l)i '1C I ;[ S ONLY Approved For Rel a 2002/05/02:- `CIA bP78-06362A00 0040003-7 In the question and answer period, the speaker indicated that the great security threat to the U. S. is internal; we should not be involved in counter-insurgency operations; and our industry has become too dependent on the U. S. Government. We should be using our financial resources to increase our efficiency and become more competitive in the world market. The U. S. should favor the development of a "rational world economy" while accepting limitations on our power. Although the speaker considers the Soviets to be more dangerous today than in the 1950's, we should deal with them as "equals" and cut down on cold war tensions. There was heavy discussion on the Nixon approach to Vietnam, with the speaker favoring support to neutralist forces and Coinnzunist participation in the South Vietnamese Government. There was also heavy discussion on the,theme that we should encourage Russian bureaucrats and decrease the power of the Soviet military. The speaker touched upon CIA involvement in "assassination plans" as mentioned by newspaperman Jack Anderson. Approved For Release 2002/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-06362A000200040003-7 ApprovedWor Release 2002/05/02: CIA-RDP78-c2A000200040003-7 Approved For Release 2002/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-06362A000200040003-7 Approved For Release 2002/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-06362A000200040003-7 11. A CRITIC LOOKS AT U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, Richard J. Barnet, Co-director, Institute for. Policy Studies . 1. Scale Rating: The average Seminar evaluation of Block V-B for "S" (Style or effectiveness of communication) was 4.06 and for "C" (Content) was 4.56. 2. Written Comments: Good! Stimulating presentation by an articulate spokesman. Keep a critic of CIA coming back. This man or another like him. This presentation was disappointing - very inferior to his article. His economic interpretations are generally all wet. Very unimpressive. Good as "controversial" speaker - really agitated the group more than any other speaker. Disappointing. On the basis of what I had read of his writing, I thought he would. come on. better. Disagree with many of Barnet's arguments but enjoyed the session and consider it valuable to hear these arguments presented well. Provocative, worthwhile because he was one of the few speakers who aroused the class; I rate the content high for only that reason. Perhaps Mr. Barnet was somewhat overwhelmed by the group, but he seemed to lose his ability to articulate at times. lIe was bettor during; coffee break so perhaps in future Seminars he should be invited to talk to us informally around the coffee table Approved For Release 2002/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-06362A000200040003-7 `Approved For RelbWe 2002/05/02: CIA-RDP78-06362A00Qa0040003-7 Richard J. Barnet (contd.) Good command of subject,, but pretty poor speaker. Subject is a or speaker and I had trouble deciding exactly what he was saying. I respect his views even though I do not agree with him. His view of the world is unreal in some respects. However, let's keep it. Highly provocative. Speaker struck me as quite naive. .Not enough sparks. Barnet's presentation was too slow and moderate. I enjoyed the opportunity, but was disappointed by how little ground was covered. Provocative but not particularly, impressive. I felt this was quite useful because the speaker was a "critic" and he generated a lot of fire in The Seminar. No one fell asleep. However, the important point related to the ignorance of the speaker on CIA in particular and aspects of US Gov't. in general. Approved For Release 2002/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-06362A000200040003-7 Approved For Release 2002/05/02 : CIA-RDP78-06362A000200040003-7 ?5X1 FORM 1"- 237 Use previous editions I-67 tV SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP TO NAME AND ADDRESS DATE INITIALS f.. e Ap - 6 1 ACTION DIRECT REPLY PREPARE REPLY APPROVAL DISPATCH RECOMMENDATION "OP4MENT FILE RETURN CONCURPENCE i INFORMATION SIGNATURE Remarks : c1,1r FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER FR - ESS AND PHONE NO. DATE f f ,p cckAppisg,%tv or asy / 02 : C (40) ;ENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM UUNCLASSIFIEDf CONFiDENTI,IL SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP TO NAME AN,t.'ADDRESS DATE -3 Executive Directbr-Comptroller t z k,e 25 1 7-E-12 Headquarters n idw ,~~.t " /1LALEGI 4 6 ACTION DIRECT REPLY PREPARE REPLY APPROVAL DISPATCH RECOMMENDATION COMMENT FILE RETURN CONCURRENCE INFORMATION SIGNATURE Remarks : Colonel White: The attached memorandum and cover sheet although lengthy and perhaps unnecessarily defensive responds to your comment on the Barnet appearance at the Senior Seminar. I can see the wisdom of exposing students to critics of the Agency and generally endorse tr. concept. Although a majority of this seminar would apparently endorse inviting Mr. Barnet again I intend to tell Hugh not to do so not because of the content of his presentation or views on the Agency but because he violated our confidence and attempted to trade on his seminar appearance. FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER FFbrA:'NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. DAT ~P-7 1D26 ext. 5454 Upp UNCLASSIFIED V3C.AS`EF!ED ^ tad VII IY EF JTUAaL El C SECRET ac ca _'.A ____ __ _. T _"_'"7{?'_T~3'_'9??-M hAA.I.A,~ __.. /11 A I.91"11"f -l ff A/~.f /~/~ A AAA/~A~A IAAA.f -1 M SUBJECT; (Optional) >E FaS a Ad I e ~', Laa CORD ?~'LLET Director of Training EXTENSION 1026 Chamber of Commerce 3245 TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building) DD/S 7D26 Ilgs 14. FORWARDED O1?FICEIt S ".NITIALS DATE 28 December 1971 COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.) The attached Memorandum for the Record sets out the whole story of Richard Barnet's appearance .at the Senior Seminar. Two factors connected with this episode cause me to wonder whether we really are "the loser in this particular case". a. Beginning his article with the boast that he had been invited to appear in our Senior Seminar seems to me to emphasize the point that CIA is not afraid to listen to its critics. The several paragraphs about the Seminar, however tendentious and mis- leading, do detract a good deal from the points he later goes on to make. b. One exchange with the students during the Seminar suggests that his article would have been even more critical if he had not been talked down on one of his favorite points. This waslis allegation that CIA is engaged in training Brazilian security forces in the use of torture. He nude a good deal of this point to the students; given his grasping at all other types of criticism of CIA he would surely have included this one in the article if he had not been 25suaded otherwise. -.Ond_QCRSe2002/ 5/02: A-RDP7 -06362A000200040003-7 FORM ~~ U,E PRINIOUS }J~ ` p g ._ ___., ...~_....~.. ~...~!'g"~ i p 3- 62 FI)I r103d5 C!?I `EC ET C FUi E c! r rix L Cl ;L ON AL C~ ~+,?c2 AsSU ED