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January 27, 1975
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Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA-RDP78B02992A000100010032-1 January 27, 1975 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE least 5 years within tlie 8-year period ending on the date of the sale. . .. , .. Taxpayers meeting ;these two requirements may elect to exclude the entire gain from gross income if the adjusted- ales price of their residence is $2q,000 or less. (This elec., s tion can only be m de once during a tax- payer's lifetime.) If he adjusted sales price exceeds $20,000, an .election may be made to exclude part of tile gain based on a ratio of $20,000 over the a?usteci sales price of the residence. Form 211 (Sale or Exchange of Personal Residence) is helpful in determin- ing what gain, if ay, may be excluded by an elderly taxpayer when he sells his horne. Additionally, a taxpayer may elect to defer reporting the gain ol the sale of his personal residence if within year before or 1 year after the sale he buys and occupies another residence, the cost of /which equals or exceeds the adjusted safe pripe of the old residence. Additional time is allowed if (1) you con- struct the new residence or (2) you were on active duty in the U.S. Armed Forces. Publication 523 (TaxlInformation on Selling Your Home) may. alsq be helpful. - Retirement Incomq Ore di!.?To qualify for the retirement inconie credit, you must (a) be a U.S. citizen or Iregident, (b) have re- ceived earned incoMe in excess of $600 in each of any 10 calendar years before 10'14, and (a) have certain types of qualifying "retirement income"J.Five types of income-- pensions, annuities, interest, and dividends included on line 15i Form 1040, and gross rents from Schedule E, Part II, column (b)- qualify for the retirement income credit. - The credit is 15% 'of the lesser of: . 1. A taxpayer's qualifying retirement in- come, or - I - ' - .-? '2. $1,524 ($2,286 for a joint return where both.' taxpayers are 5 or .older) minus the total of nontaxable ? ensions (such as Social Security benefits or: ailroad Retirement an- nuities) and earned ncome (depending upon the taxpayer's age - ncl-the? amount of any earnings he may ha If ?the taxpayer is nder 62, heinust reduce the, $1,524 figure 11- the amount of earned Income in excess. of 000. For persons at least 62 years old but less than 72, this amount is ? reduced by one-half ? the earned income in excess of $1,200 up- $1,700, plus the total amount over $1,700. ersons 72 and over are not subject to the e ned incorne Schedule R Is used or taxpayers who claim the retirement ludo credit.- - ? The Internal Re nue Service Will also compute the retire nt in-come credit for a taxpayer if he has r quested that com- pute his tax and h answers the questions for columns A and and completes lines 2 and 5 on Schedule relating to the amount of his Social Securi benefits, Railroad. Re- tirement annuities earned income and qualifying retireme t income - (pensions, an- nuities, interest, di idends, and rents). The taxpayer should als write "RIC" on line 17, Form 1040. was violated. H the Genocide Conven- tion been in ex tence two decades ago those who perpe uated atrocities between 1933 and 1939 co Id have been brought to justice. This situation displays the same kind of inaction tha was brought against those responsibl for the Armenian mas- sacres even thou h Turkey and her Ger- man allies were feated in World War I. There is eviden e on the record that Hitler duly note this fact when he pre- pared his prog urn of exterminations. Documents intr ? uced the Nurem- berg trials cont in the following state- ment made by tier in August 1939 just before the invas on of Poland: What the weak estern European civiliza- tion thinks about me does not matter. . . I have sent to ti e East only my Death's head units with e order to kill without pity or mercy all en, women, and children of the Polish race d language. Only in such a way will we win the vital space we need. Who still talks no adays of the extermina- tion of the Armeni ns? It is quite app rent from the previous statement that itler interpreted the world's inaction n the Armenian mas- sacres as tacit onsent to do as he pleased. Why sho Id the world stop him when they have a ways failed in the past to .show concern The Genocide ueaty is the document that displays the world's outrage and - concern over acts Genocide. Yet the refused to sign this t. In the interest of 1 peace and safety, minating all future nity, I urge my col- in support of the accords. United States has important docume further internation In the hopes of el crimes against hum leagues to join m Genocide Conventi NUREMBERG IALS ONLY REIN- FORCE NEED OR THE ADOPTION OF THE GEN CIDE TREATY Mr. PROXMI E. Mr. President, one of the worst offend rs of the crime of geno- cide before the ction.'was outlawed by the United Nat' ns was the Nazi's ex- termination of 6 illion Jews, 21/2 million Poles, hundreds f thousands of Czechs, Serbs, and Russi ns. When the Nu mberg trials convened it was decided t at the Nazis could not be punished for acts of genocide com- mitted prior to 1939. The Nuremberg tribunal which ried war criminals for crimes against h inanity refused to con- sider outrages o urring before the war on the grounds that no international law 1 CONCLUSIOFF MORNING BU ESS The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time for the conclusion bf morning business having arrived, morning business is closed. - -.--- SELECT COMMTTTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL INTELLIGENCE- GATHERING ACTIVITIES The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the hour of 1 p.m. having arrived, the Senate will now proceed to the consideration of Senate Resolution 21, which will be stated by title. The assistant legislative clerk read as follows: A resolution (S. Res. 21) to establish a Select Committee of the Senate to conduct an investigation and study with respect to in- telligence activities carried out by or on be.. half of the Federal Government, The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time for debate on this resolution is limited to 2 hours, to be equally divided between and controlled by the majority and minority leaders or their designees, with the vote to occur at 3 p.m. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, yield my time to the distinguished senior Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PAS- TORE). I suggest the absence of a quorum, with the time to be charged against both sides. S 967 Mr. GRivi? IN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? ? Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, I ask that the time on this side be yielded to the control of the Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER). The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk pro- ceeded to call the roll. Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Miss Pam Tur- ner, of my staff, have the privilege of the floor during the consideration of Sen- ate Resolution 21 and all amendments thereto. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GARY W. HART). Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. On whose time? . Mr. TOWER. To be charged equally to both sides. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will call the roll. The 'assistant legislative clerk pro- ceeded to call the roll. ? ? Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, a parli- amentary inquiry. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator will state it. ? Mr. PASTORE. What is the pending business? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending business is Senate Resolution No. 21. Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President and col- leagues, I am not going to belabor this measure this morning by an extended explanation. As a matter of fact, I did explain it last week and I think that what we are trying to achieve is quite well understood by the Members of the Senate. - I do not think we are going to have any difficulty with this resolution. As a mat- ter of fact, it is generally conceded, to be necessary, and I point up the fact that, by a vote of 45 to 7, it was approved by the Democratic Conference. As I understand it, the minority leader has stated today his selection of members of the select committee, so I construe from that that the other side is more or less amenable to this resolu- tion. Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. PASTORE. Unless it was a gesture of futility. Mr. TOWER. It was acceptance of the Inevitable, I think. Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I wish to make it abundantly clear at the out- set that the FBI, the CIA, and Military Intelligence are absolutely necessary to the security and the survival of this Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA-RDP78B02992A000100010032-1 Approved For Release 2006/10 19 : CIA-RDP78B02992A000100016632-1 S 968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE great Republic. Anyone who questions for a moment, anyone who should try or anyone who should even begin to imagine that the Senator from Rhode Island is trying to do anything to disrupt . or to injure -in any way these fine agencies, should immediately disabuse his mind of it. . I have been connected for a long time with the workings- of these agencies. I realize why they were instituted in the first place. We could not survive as a decent society without the FBI. We could never survive as a great nation in this troubled world, this sensitive world, with- out a CIA or military intelligence. So I wish to make it abundantly clear, Mr. President, that what We are trying to do is find out the abuses of the past and also of the present, to find out how it all started, how far it went, to remedy these abuses and make sure that in the future they will not happen; and in the final analysis, ultimately, that the confi- dence of the people wil be reaffirmed and strengthened in their appreciation and their consideration; as to the essen- tiality of these great- arms of Govern- ment. ? Mr. President, having said that; I Mast in all fairness say that there have been some very serious abuses. I am not going to debate them this morning: As a matter of fact, our newspaper headlines have been replete with-a dissertation of what they are. There have been- charges and countercharges. There haVe been those who- have exaggerated some of the wrongs; there are those who have mini- mized some the wrongs. Because the su- pervision on the part.. of Congress is spread throughout several committees, each of which has jurisdiction in-its own way?the Committee on Foreign Rela- tions is absolutely interested in inteli- gence abroad; the, Committee on the Armed Services is absolutely interested in military. intelligence; the Joint Com- mittee on- Atomic Energy is absolutely interested in where our nuclear weapons are and how well they are being pro- tected and, vis-a-vis With our adver- saries, what they have and what we must have?there is no question at all about the essentiality. . . . . The important thing here is to restore public confidence so that these agencies,? ,in the final analysis, will be responsive. That is what this -is all about. This is not to challenge the chairman of one committee or to challenge the chairman of another committee. We are not here to rebuke any Member of Congress for what supervision he gave or did not give. That is not the question this morning. What we are trying to do here is create a select committee consisting of 11 mem- bers-6 from the majority, 5 from the - minority. I know it is not going to be partisan. There is not a Member of the Senate who does not put his country before his party, or even, indeed, his own interest. If it were otherwise, that would be a blot on this great establishment: 'What do we do by this resolution? We create a committee of 11 members. The names have already been suggested by the minority leader of those on the part of the minority party. We know who they are. I am sure they will all render fine service. We do not know yet who the members are on the majority side. I know I am not one of them; I do not want to be one of them. I made that pledge at the time that- I introduced this resolution, that I was not doing it for any selfish reason; I was doing it because I thought it needed to be clone. Mr. President, having said that, I have nothing further. I amperfectly willing to answer any questions. It is a very sim- ple resolution. It is all spelled out. I understand there are going to be two amendments. I am amenable to both amendments, with the exception that on the Tower amendment, I hope we can clarify one statement at the end, where it says: The type of security clearance to be re- quired in. the case of arty such employee or person shall be commensurate with the sensi- tivity of the classified information to which such employee or person will be given access by the select committee. I think we ought to nail that down to be within the determination of the com- mittee itself. I should like to add some language in there, in the last sentence: "within- the determination made by the committee Itself." - - Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I wonder if I might visit with the distinguished _ Senator from Rhode Island. ' Mr. PASTORE. When the proper time comes. I do not think we are too much in disagreement. I repeat what I said last week when I was questioned by the distinguished Senator from Mississippi, the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services: The jurisdiction of each committee as it now stands will continue. There is nothing in this resolution that changes that one iota. I suppose that the authorization bills, when they come up, will be referred to the Committee on Armed Services, there is no question at all about that. I suppose before deciding the authorization the chairman will conduct some kind of hearings, not competitive to the select committee; it could be conr sonant with it. I am not opposed to that. ' As a matter of fact, let us face it: We are all here trying to do the right thing. Let us do it. That is about the size of it. Now, Mr. President, I have here a statement by Senator HUDDLESTON who asked me to have it inserted in the RECORD, and I ask unanimous consent that that be done. The PRESIDING 01,1010ER. Without objection, it is so ordered. STATEMENT BY SENATOR HUDDLESTON I am pleased to support Senate Resolution - 21, which would establish a select committee on intelligence activities. I believe the creation of such a committee is essential at this time. I believe the committee as proposed in the resolution before us will meet the needs of the Senate and our Nation in terms of struc- ture, representation and mandate. A committee such as we are about to cre- ate must touch upon the various ages, views, geographical areas and philosophies which are a part of the Senate and our nation-at-- large. To structure it otherwise would diminish January 27, 1975 not only the acceptance of any findings and recommendations but also the possibility of reconciling contrasting views and theories Which must be accommodated. - Ultimately, the report of this select corn- mittee must be widely accepted by many elements of the American people. Otherwise, efforts to correct past improprieties and re- store confidence in our government's ability to conduct in an appropriate manner the very sensitive and important intelligence function, will falter. ? To fail to create a broadly based committee would in the end be a disservice to ourselves, the Senate, our country and the American people.? ? Testimony already taken in the Congress strongly indicates that there have been, abuses and misuses of authority within. the Central Intelligence Agency. Allegations of other improprieties remain unanswered. A virtual floodgate of questions and charges has been opened, engulfing our intelligence community- in suspicion and uncertainty. While some of this may haVe been more sen- sation than substance, the facts remain that both damaging testimony and allegations of serious misconduct are before us and that they have not been rebutted to the satisfac- tion of most members of Congress or of. the., _ American people. - The floodgate cannot and should not be closed; the questions raised must be an- swered; the faith of the people in this most sensitive area of their government must, be restored. ,. -. If' an agency has overstepped its. author- , Ity, if it has violated the- rights of citizens whom it is supposed to serve, if it has been involved in illegal activities, if it has been utilized in derogation of its public trust, then these matters must be fully investi- gated. Corrective steps must be taken. There was an earlier time in this Nation when the agencies in question?born in a turbulent area of violent crime half a cen- tury ago, or in the aftermath of war 25 years ' later?enjoyed a very different image. They were looked upon as guardians of the Nation and protectors of law-abiding citizens. But, like so many of this country's institutions in recent years, they have fallen in esteem. The intelligence community has lost its glitter. The FBI hero of the 1930's has been replaced In . the public eye by a much more dubious ? character.- .- ? ' -- Thus, the need for a? full investigation of the tide of current charges goes beyond the obvious requirements of discipline within the government; it goes. to a restoration of confidence in a segment of government that, more than any other, must hold the pub- lic's confidence. . No nation can gamble with its security. Indeed, the 'guarantee of that security ? is perhaps the most fundamental of all govern- mental' responsibilities. Without it, all else can quickly fade. ? - National security arrangements, defense and foreign policy strategies, and decisions regarding a host of -other issues rely upon Intelligence. In fact, there are few who would argue that we could do without intelligence gathering activities?especially in what ap- pears to be an increasingly complex and uncertain world. . Furthermore, ?the- very nature of such ac- tivitieS requires that they be closely held and carried out with a certain degree of secretiveness and confidentiality. But, the agencies involved in such- activ- ities, like Caesar's wife, must, be above re- proach?not just because of their special status and charge but also because actions which involve them in suspicion and ques- tion tend to impair if not destroy their abil- ity to function. There are those in this body who have fol- lowed closely the activities of the CIA and other agencies with intelligence responsibil- Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA-RDP78B02992A000100010032-1 Approved For Release 2006/10/19 : CIA-RDP78B02992A000100010032-1 `January 27,:1975 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE S 969 ities--the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Federal Bu- reau of Investigation, and the Secret Service. For that reason, we should certainly make the best use of these persons; we shcfruld build upon their knowledge- and experience. At the same time, I believe we could bene- fit from new and fresh perspectives which could bring to such review an inquiring ap- proach which might not only develop mew ideas but also do much to insure a positive public response to the ultimate findings and recommendations. I do, consequently, support establish- ment of a special committee to review in- telligence operations in this country. I also think, however, that our intent and deter- mination to insure a broadly representative committee must be made. clear. To accommodate the representation of the various views, I proposed in the Democratic Conference that we consider an 11-member body, rather than a smaller one. While this Is an admittedly rather large committee, in this particular case, I believe that it is re- quired, Many Committees have some juris- dictional claim over intelligence activities. Interest and concern over this matter goes far beyond the jurisdictional boundstof com- mittees, encompassing, I would imagine, every member of the Senate, Views on the subject vary widely. ? Furthermore, I believe that the special committee must have broad authority, as the resolu.tion contains. It Must be em- powered not only to investigate possible il- legal activities and abuses in the intelli- gence community, but also to review the mandates of the agencies concerned; to study the role of intelligence in today's world and to make recommendations regarding the type of structure which can best meet the intel- ligence objectives which are deemed neces- sary and proper. ? - Some may perceive the proposal before us as fraught with implications of sensational- ism and headline hunting?an approach which we clearly cannot ? afford and which we would be Irresponsible to permit. Our de- termination on that point, too, should be made clear. But in this year?so soon after Watergate?we cannot leave in doubt the operations and activities of agencies involved in such sensitive and significant endeavors. We must instead place our important intel- ligence-gathering activities on a sound and viable basis. -In this case, skeletons in the closet are likely to haunt us not only at home but also abroad, not only on security issues but also in domestic politics. They must be laid to rest. The alternative is to let matters ride, to permit a series of well-intentioned but over- lapping investigations proceed, to divide ef- forts at a time when prompt and comprehen- sive action is needed. - . Thus, the preferable course, it seems to me is the creation of a special committee (1) broadly representative of the various Con- gressional concerna on intelligence (2) dedi- cated to a thorough Investigation of quesz tioned activities and current intelligence op- erations and a 'reexamination of the rola of intelligence operations in our society, and (I) charged with the responsibility of making recommendations to the Senate as expediti- ously as possible regarding both necessary corrective actions and the future structure, authority and relationships within the in- telligence community. I believe Senate Resolution 21 will ReC0111.- plish this and that adoption of It would be a right move in the right direction. Mr. PASTORE. I now yield to my dis- tinguished colleagues from California. Mr. CRANSTON. I thank the Senator very much for yielding. I want.first to thank the Senator from Rhode Island for his magnificent lead- ership in this matter. Without his help -we would not have accomplished as much as we have so swiftly in this very impor- tant matter. The efforts of the Senator from Rhode, Island have manifested a quality of greatness. I also want to thank the major leader (Mr. MANSFIELD), Senator MATH/AS on the minority side, Senator BAKER, Sen- ator WEICKER, and others who did so much of the vitally important spade work which has brought us to this point. I have been: involved in this matter since 1971, when I questioned Senator Ellender, the then chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, on the Senate floor about expenditures for in- telligence operations. I joined in earlier resolutions prior to the tinie that I helped in the support that has been brought to- gether behind the Pastore resolution. I agree, of course, with the Senator from Rhode Island that we need an ef- fective intelligence operation, we need it operating under clear and wise ground rules and under firm control by the Ex- ecutive and Congress. I have been crit- ical of the CIA and other intelligence agencies for many of the things they - have done that they should not have done. There have been serious abuses. But there also have been great accom- plishments. There have been deeds done _ by courageous and dedicated men and ? women, many of whom have risked their lives, and some of whom have lost their lives, in service of their country. I would just make these points for the legislative history and for consideration by the -committee. that. will be carrying on this activity: First. If anyone needs reminding, there have been a series of revelations over the past decade and a half that point not only to the internal shortcomings of Intelligence agencies in carrying out. their assigned tasks, not only the lack of co- ordination between their operations and national policy as declared by the Pres- ident and Congress, not only to the fail- ure of these agencies to communicate with one another and with the President and the standing committees of Con- gress?but, also, and more alarming?to their power to subvert the Constitution and threaten freedom here at home while damaging?in the majority- leader's words?"the good name of the United States" abroad. Further, it must be admitted, their power was of ten misused at the direction of higher authority in the executive branch?or with the acquiescence of higher authorities?and with a knowing wink or willful ignorance on the part of many members of Congress. Second. But the problem goes beyond the CIA, the FBI, and other intelligence agencies. It goes beyond foreign relations. It goes beyond civil liberties at home. Here the great issues of national sec- urity and individual liberty are inex- tricably linked. We have to get some perspective on ourselves, on our origins, on our immediate past, and on our fu- ture--as we proceed from the aftermath of the Cold War to what appears to be an era of interdependence in a multipo- lar world. The fundamental problem?as we ap- proach the bicentennial?is to restore constitutional government in the United States. There has to be accountability and responsibility. The intelligence agen- cies must be adapted to the needs of a constitutional democracy in our time? or they must be eliminated. We cannot eliminate them so we have to do what is necessary to keep them under control. That is a job for Con- gress. Third. Therefore, as the Senate pro- ceeds to establish the select committee, it is important to identify three impor- tant missions of this committee: First of all, it is charged with finding the facts in cases of alleged wrongdoing. Thus, the Pastore resolution empowers the select committee to "conduct an in- vestigation . . . of the extent, if any, to which illegal, improper, or unethical ac- tivities" have been engaged in by the intelligence agencies of the U.S. Govern- ? ment. This will involve identifying in- dividuals responsible for such activities, as well as their respective institutions and I cite paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 10 of sec- tion 2. Second, the select committee is charged with going one step further. It is to consider the institutional changes needed in the organization of the execu- tive branch and changes needed in con- gressional , oversight mechanisms as well?so that these abuses of power can- not occur again I cite section 2, para- graphs 4,5, 8, 7, 8, 9, and especially 11, 12, and 13, of Senate Resolution 21. Finally, the select committee is di- rected to make a complete investigation and study of the extent and necessity of overt and covert intelligence activities in the United States and abroad. I cite section 2 of paragraph 14. . Fourth, It- will be difficult for the select committee to carry out these mis- sions?no matter how sweeping the man- date entrusted to it, no matter how great its.delegated powers, and no matter how much access to secret documents and processes is guaranteed in the words of the Pastore resolution. ?,? - Just how does it investigate matters that, in their essence, depend on not being seen? How will the select commit- tee know when it is not getting wheat it needs to know to get at the full facts? These questions are _without easy Section 3(a), paragraph 11 of Senate Resolution 21 is of great importance. It grants the members and staff of the select committee 'direct access" to any data, evidence, information, report, analysis or documents or papers" rela- ting to the investiagtion in the possession of the intelligence agencies. Despite this clause, it can be predicted that this information--in some in- stances?will be given up with great reluctance and, indeed, some of it already may have been destroyed. Further, there will be a tendency for personnel of the intelligence agencies to use the classification system as a means of avoiding full testimony before the se- lect committee. That is, they may "tell the truth" or .provide the facts at the "top secret" or "secret" level, but not include information available on a given subject at a higher level of classification. Or they may cite law and executive or- ders and precedents and "executive priv- Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA-RDP78B02992A000100010032-1 Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA-RDP781302992A000100010032-1 S 970 CON liege"' as shields of justification for not telling all they know?even, though they are under oath. Fifth. This problem could be greatly alleviated if the Senate through its select committee was guaranteed- the full and active support of the Ford- administra- tion in this inquiry. As Walter Pincus pointed out in Sunday's Washington Post. such an investigation must inevita- bly end up queStioning the past policies and practices of Presidents and their staff. Perhaps a confrontation with the White House and the bureaucracy is in- evitable as the investigation proceeds. From the start, there are some powerful incentives for a cover up.' The Senate should understand this reality now. Already we see a former Director of the CIA, Mr. Helms pointing the finger of responsibility at one dead President and at another who is incapacitated? and who, so far, has managed to avoid coming, into court or before a congres- sional committee. This same man is known to have destroyed documents bearing, on his tenure as Director of the Further, the present Director of the CIA in his recent report apparently pointed to his predecessor and previous administrations as being responsible for acts of wrongdoing. The Senate should be reminded that this same man had spent his entire career on the operations side of, CIA before he became executive director and later director. Mr. Colby at one time directed the controversial and perhaps dubious Phoenix program in Vietnam, and at one time he was deputy director 'for operations, DDO, in the CIA?with, responsibility for counterin- telligence and domestic operations among others. ' - - This , investigation z cannot ? succeed without determining the individuals re- sponsible for illegal and improper acts-- be they in the Oval Office, the National Security Council?and the 40 Committee within it?the President's Foreign Intel- ligence Advisory Board, the U.S. Intelli- gence Board, or in the individual agen- , cies. A number of the persons involved in past actions still serve in high positions in the Government. So while the select committees' inves- - tigation must not degenerate into a witch hunt, it cannot be a picnic, either. For here are bound to be a lot of skeletons In a lot of closets. Individuals and agen- cies involved in wrongdoing or ques- tionable practices must be identified. Or else the American people will be ill served by another coverup. Some have stated that this investiga- tion must not be a "TV spectacular." But It must not be conducted behind closed doors, either. "Protecting the national security" arguments must not stand in the way of the American people's full Understanding of this problem, and they must not stand in the way of publicly assigning responsibility for past actions. Again, the fundamental issue is account- ability and responsibility under a consti- tutional system of government. There is no good reason why questions of policy in the intelligence community cannot be discussed in open hearings, and all facts bared?except for the most sen- Aoproved For GRESSIONAL REC013,D ?SENATE ? January 27, 1975 sitive?that bear upon the matters and questions posed in Senate Resolution 21. In this regard, any classification?de- classification system employed should be devised by the select committee?in co- operation with the executive branch, if possible. After all, one of the issues at stake is secrecy itself. The emphasis throughout should be on sharing the maximum amount of information with the public. . Seventh. In conclusion, several ele- ments are required for a successful in- vestigation and study: A continuation of aggressive investigative reporting on the part of the press, and I know that will occur; a select committee with members and staff interested in getting all the facts and sharing them with the Ameri- can people to the extent possible; the full cooperation of the executive agen- cies involved; sources and witnesses who are assured of proper protection along the way. , Again I thank the Senator from Rhode Island, the majority leader, and the many others for the magnificent work that has brought us to this point on this day. ? . Mr.. TOWER. Mr. President; I yield myself such time as I may require. Mr. President, I will be very candid with the Senate. It was my original feel- ing that this matter should have been contained within the Committee on Armed Services which does have over- sight jurisdiction over the CIA. But in the spirit that this resolution has been offered by the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island, I am certainly pre- pared to accept it, because I think that the Senator from Rhode Island has set the right tone for the conduct of this in- vestigation and the subsequent conclu- sions to be drawn from it. ? I think that some examination of the domestic activities of our intelligence- gathering organizations should be in- vestigated and I think perhaps such an Investigation is overdue. . I think it is essential that agencies in- volved in this kind of work be proscribed from activities that either violate their charter, their congressional authoriza- tions, or militate against the individual freedom of the American people. I think, to that end, this is the most important thing that our committee can do- or that the select committee when it is chosen can do. It is my view that we can develop con- structive legislation that affords such proscriptions and such protections. I would express the hope that has already been expressed by the distinguished Sen- ator from Rhode Island that we can con- duct our work in a responsible way, so as to preserve the confidentiality of mat- ters that impact on the national security of the United States of America. We must recognize that our adver- saries and our potential adversaries have had a sophisticated intelligence-gather- ing organization, that they have an ad- vantage over us in that they operate in this country in a free society, and in most respects in our operations abroad we op- erate in closed societies, making the gathering of significant intelligence a much more difficult proposition. I think we do have to afford adequate safeguards for our legitimate operations abroad. I am hopeful that we can observe the need to conduct many of our delibera- tions in private. I think that although the objective set forth by the distin- guished Senator from California is de- _ sirable, that as much as possible they be.. open to the public, there are going to be times, I think, when we can elicit more information and more significant and more penetrating and in-depth infor- mation, if we go into executive session. So I think that what we roust do is have a balanced approach here, recognize that we have to correct abuses, recognize that we must compel our intelligence- gathering operations to conduct them- selves within the purview of the law that - authorizes them, and at the same time recognize the vital interest of the United States from the geographic, strategic, po- litical, tactical, economic situation that , we find ourselves in and make sure we - do not hobble ourselves and render our- selves at such a disadvantage that we cannot maintain the kind of internation- al posture we need. -. I might mention one other thing, Mr. President, and that is not only the neces- sity to protect some of our agents or some of our covert operations abroad, but also the confidence placed in us by foreign governments. We must, think, be care- ful not to embarrass foreign govern- ments, not just friendly governments, but perhaps some mutual governments and some that may not appear to be so friendly that may have supplied us some cooperation; and I would hope we would take care not to embarrass governments of these countries. this - With the proper care, I think it is per- fectly correct that we embark on is course today. I am delighted to yield to the Senator from California. Mr. CRANSTON. I thank the Senator for yielding. - On one point he mentioned, I recog- nize that there will have to be closed door sessions, first, in order to get such information, that would not otherwise be made available, and that the committee will need. I recognize the reason for his . amendment.. I think it is quite appro- priate. I would like to ask one question and make one point about it. First, I think, as I said in my earlier remarks just now, that the committee must control the classification and de- classification process, hopefully in coor- dination and cooperation with the ad- ministration, but It cannot get itself into a situation where it is unable to do 'cer- tain work that it feels it must do. In regard to the speeific amendment that the Senator has offered, under his amendment how do we prevent the exec- utive from abusing this authority? a For example, suppose they did not cooperate? Mr. TOWER. If the Senator from Cali- fornia will withhold on his question, I was going to engage in colloquy with the Senator from Rhode Island on this mat- ter. Mr. CRANSTON. Fine. Mr. TOWER. And we will bring all this out. Release 2006/10/19: CIA-RDP78B02992A000100010032-1 January 27, 1975 Mr. CRANSTON. Fine. Mr. TOWER. So that we will make it clear what everyone means and intends; but :I think the distinguished Senator from Mississippi has been seeking the floor and has been very patient, so I would like to yield to him, and then we will take this matter up subsequently. Mr. CR.ANSTON. Certainly. I thank the Senator. ? Mr. TOWER. I yield to the Senator from Mississippi such time as the Sena- tor requires. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Texas. At this point, at least, I certainly will not require over 20 minutes, so we can just limit it to that. - Mr. President, after a conference with the Senator from Rhode Island and the Senator from Texas; I send to the desk an amendment to the proposed resolu- tion and ask that it be considered now, The PRESIDING OFFICER. . The amendment will be stated. . The assistant legislative clerk read as follows: The Senator from Mississippi proposes an amendment, at the end of the resolution, to add a new section as follows? Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with, Mr. MANSFIELD. Why not let him read it? - Mr. STENNIS. All .-right, I withdraw that. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will read it in full. The sasistant legislative, clerk read as follows: At the end of the resolution add a new section as follows: ? - - Sc. 7.. The select committee- shall insti- tute and carry out such rules and procedures as it may deem necessary to prevent (1) the disclosure, outside the select committee, of any information relating to the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other department or agency of the Federal, Government engaged in intelligence activi- ties, obtained- by the seleot committee dur- ing the course of its study and investiga- tion, not specifically authorized by the se- loot committee to be disclosed, and (2) the disclosure, outside the select committee, oi' any information which would adversely af- fect -the intelligence activities of the Central Intelligence-Agency in foreign countries m' the intelligence activities in foreign countries of any other department or agency of the Federal Government. Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? ? Mr. STENNIS, Yes, I am glad to yield to the Senator from Rhode Island. I want to state very briefly what the purpose is, but I yield now. Mr. PASTORE. For the purposes of the Racoae, would the Senator in explain- ing his amendment, which I am going to accept, explain what he means by "not specifically authorized"? Mr. STENNIS. Yes, That is on the second part, is it not? Mr. PASTORE. Yes. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. .President, this amendment relates to what we ordinarily call "leaks." It does not put any :thrifty.- tion on the committee whatsoever. The first part relates to matters that are not expressly authorized or given Appl'oved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA-RDP78B02992A000100010032-1 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE out by the committee itself or its mem? bers. It just requires that such reason- able rules and regulations as the com- mittee may see fit be established by the committee regarding disclosures of in- formation that might, in the second part, affect intelligence abroad. But going back to the fast one for just a moment, this relates to disclosures by those other than the committee, staff members or anyone else that might come in contact with this information. In other words, the committee itself is called on by the Senate to make these rules and regulations. Now, with reference to foreign intel- ligence or intelligence activities abroad? and that is what my plea is for here to- day, the protection of this foreign in- telligence?there we are trusting the committee to write rules and procedures to set out for themselves and staff mem- bers regarding this foreign intelligence. Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield briefly for a question? Mr. STENNIS. I am responding to a question of the Senator from Rhode Is- land. Will the Senator restate his question with respect to paragraph 2? Mr. PASTORE. I was wondering if the word "specifically" was not rather redun- dant. If it just said "not authorized by select committee," that would not lead to any chntroversial confusion. Naturally, the authorization would have to be explicit. The word "specifical- ly" for the time being, without knowing within what context it was inserted in the amendment, disturbs me for the mo- ment, unless it is more explicitly ex- plained. I thought if we just said "not authorized by the Select Committee" it would be enough. In other words, I do not want the com- mittee to sit down and begin to write a bill of particulars every time they are going to authorize some disclosure. Mr. STENNIS. What line is the Senator referring to? I see it. That is before the second paragraph. That relates to staff members. Mr. PASTORE. I know that. This whole amendment relates to staff members. I quite agree with the Senator from Mis- sissippi. I hope that the staff does not begin to hold news conferences. That al- ways happens. They just take this whole thing over. I think if there are going to be any news conferences, they should be by the Chairman or the members of the committee themselves. But in the past we have had the sorrowful situation that staff members fall over one another to see who can tell it to the press first. I think everything should be told to the press that needs to be told to the public, I think the public understands that. Mr. STENNIS. This is not to prohibit that kind of information. Mr. PASTORE. I know that. But I was wondering if the word "specifically" is not a little too tight for the committee. If we said "not authorized by the com- mittee," I think we accomplish the objective. Mr. STENNIS. What we were trying to get at was to cover the situation where a staff member or some other person had this information and, since it was riot S 971 covered in any way very plainly, that there was no prohibition on it. I do not think this puts too much of a burden. The Senator is opening up all of these files. Mr. PASTORE. No. Mr. STENNIS. The resolution does. I do not mean the amendment does but the resolution opens up the files. We just have to have a safeguard. Mr. PASTORE. I do not think we are meeting on our intent here. I am not op- posed to the Senator's suggestion that the matter of leaks should be prevented, and that the, staff should not disclose anything without authorization by the committee. The only thing that bothers me is that he is tightening up the obli- gation and responsibility of the commit- tee a little bit too much by using the -- word "specifically." If he left the word "specifically" out, I think he would ac- complish his purpose and not open it up to debate every time there is the question of disclosure. Mr. STENNIS. The main point here is to have something explicit in writing by - the committee as to rules and proce- dures. When we nail that down explic- itly, how it should be done, then we cover the waterfront. We can strike out the word "specif- ically." - Mr. PASTORE. Will the Senator strike it out? - , , , Mr. STENNIS. Yes. - Mr. PASTORE. If he strikes it out, I s would accept the amendment. Mr. STENNIS. With the understand- ing that this still carries with It? - Mr. PASTORE. With the understand- ing that the committee and only the committee has the authority to disclose. I will admit that. Mr. STENNIS. It is better to be care- ? ful here than to be sorry later.. This is . not directed at the committee. Mr. PASTORE.! know that. Mr. STENNIS. This is putting the Senate in a proper position. I think it will help the committee to have the Sen- ate go on record here in making this one _ of the ground rules, so to speak. ? Mr. PASTORE. Is the Senator willing to delete the word "specifically." Mr. STENNIS. Yes. ''-- Mr. PASTORE. With the modification. I will accept the amendment. - Mr. YOUNG. Will the Senator yield for 3 minutes? I support the amendment. Mr. STENNIS. I do not have control of the time. The Senator from Texas has control of the time. Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I ask the Senator from Mississippi if he will yield for a question on his amendment. Mr. STENNIS. All right, and then I will yield 3 minutes to the Senator from North Dakota out of my time. I yield for a question. Mr. BAKER. This is a question of clarification. This amendment, of course, Is an antileak amendment. I think that is fine. I hope we succeed. We failed miserably in the Watergate Committee. Our former colleague and I tried in every way we could. It did not work. There are some matters of sensitivity that have not been leaked, but are still In the Atomic Energy Committee, many of them, in safe storage. Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA-RDP78B02992A000100010032-1 Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA-RDP78B02992A000100010032-1 S 972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE January 27, 1975 Paragraph 2 concerns me. It says: And, number 2, disclosure outside the committee of any information which ad- versely affects the intelligence activities of the United States. It would appear on its surface to say that if we stumbled into a matter such as the Chilean situation, the Bay of Pigs, or the Lebanon incursion, notwithstand- ing that it might appear to the Commit- tee to be something that ought to be dealt with in the Congress, we should not disclose it. Will the Senator from Mississippi re- assure me that that is not the purpose of paragraph 2? Mr. STENNIS. No. that is not the pur- pose of paragraph No. 2. We tried to wrap it up in such a way as require rules of procedure in the committee which I understand to be the feeling of the Senator from Tennessee. Mr. BAKER. If there appears to be conduct by any agency of the U.S. Gov- ernment that appears to be improper or exceeds its jurisdiction, that would not be limited by paragraph 2 of this amendment? Mr. STENNIS. This does not put a limitation on the committee. It requires the committee to proceed under rules, regulations, and procedures. But these things are still left in the hands of the committee. Mr. BAKER. I thank the Senator. Mr. STENNIS. It is a rule of the Sen- ate by a guideline. Mr. PASTORE. With the modifica- tion, I am willing to accept the amend- ment . Mr. STENNIS. If no one else wants the floor, can we have a vote on the amend- ment? Will the Chair put the question? The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Mississippi modify his amendment? Mr. STENNIS. Yes; by striking out the word "specifically" in the sixth line from the bottom. ? , The PRESIDING 0101010ER. The ques- tion is on agreeing to the amendment as modified. Mr. CURTIS. Reserving the right to object and 1, of course, will not object. I would like to ask a question. Is there any penalty or enforcement means to compel staff members of this committee to not disclose information that their committee directs should not be disclosed? Mr. STENNIS. It is a sad state of the law, Mr. President, but I am quite doubt- ful that we have a law that really is drawn to cover situations of this kind. We have the old Espionage Act of 1918, which specifically requires there must be an intent to do harm to the United States. It is a kind of wide-open proposi- tion which is, in itself, a very strong argument here for the adoption of this amendment. It puts in some kind of an obstacle. A staff member, if he violated the rule, would violate a Senate rule. It would not have any criminal penalty at- tached to it, but it would be a rule to that extent. I hope the committee will get a prom- ise in advance that no one is going to write a book?that no staff member is going to write a book, or a journal arti- ole, or anything else?about things that were disclosed to them in these proceed- ings. I think that is a matter we have to trust to the discretion of the commit- tee. Under present law we have to. I be- lieve the Senator raised a good point. Mr. CURTIS. I certainly am for the amendment of the distinguished Senator, but I believe we have to rethink our posi- tion on some of these things. Here in this country if someone discloses a tax return, he has violated a criminal law and can be punished. If he discloses secrets vital to the security of the United States, he is apt to defend it as the right of the people to know. We have, certainly, a right to not only make it a law violation to dis- close, but there ought to be a penalty to it. I thank the Senator. . Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator. ... If there is no further discussion, could we have a vote on the amendment? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques- tion is on agreeing to the amendment, as modified, of the Senator from Mississippi. The amendment, as modified, was agreed to. . Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to yield 3 minutes to the Senator from North Dakota without losing my right to the floor. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without ,objection, it is so ordered. Mr. YOUNG. Mr. President, I see no objection to a thorough examination of the operations of the CIA, the to.13I, or any other intelligence-gathering agency, but I believe it can only be done effectively, and without great injury to the agencies, by a relatively small committee and a small staff. A big investigating committee with a sizable staff?no matter how well intentioned?cannot avoid much of the information that develops at the hearings being leaked to the public, thereby be- coming easily available to the intelligence agencies of Russia and every country in the world. . ? If the pending resolution involved a much smaller committee with only a very minimal staff, I believe the security of this Nation could be safeguarded and the Investigation could be very helpful. I would hope that the meetings of the com- mittee would be open to the public. If this were the procedure, then the public would get firsthand information rather than from leaks highly distorting the facts dis- closed in the hearings. Mr. President, I cannot help but be deeply concerned about the future effec- tiveness of the Central Intelligence Agen- cy. No intelligence operation?particu- larly involving clandestine operations in foreign countries or involving some of our most advanced technology, especially in defense areas?can be publicly dis- closed without endangering our sources of information, the lives of those involved In this type of intelligence operations, and the very effectiveness of an intelli- gence-gathering organization. Russian intelligence agents, for example, would only have to read our publications to obtain information highly valuable to them. About 12 years ago when we had the missile crisis in Cuba a Russian intel- ligence agent, a high-ranking member of the GRU, disclosed to Great Britain and the United States a great deal of inside information regarding how far Russia would go in this missile crisis. He also prqvided us with much other information regarding the entire operations of the GRU and KGB?their two major intel- ligence-gathering agencies. A book was published regarding the Penkovsky pa- pers and information which has been in circulation for several years. The point I am trying to make, Mr. President, is that Penkovsky expected to be caught and was caught. There was a 2- day trial and he was killed. Here in the United States there is not much of a pen- alty for even the highest ranking intel- ligence officer, a Member of Congress, or anyone else for disclosing our most highly classified intelligence. Mr. President, the Washington Star- News of Sunday, January 26, 1975, pub- lished a very good editorial on the sub- ject of intelligence and the forthcoming investigations entitled "The Great Intel- ligence Exam." I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD. There being Tic objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: THE GREAT INTELLIGENCE EXAM ? This is the era of bosom-baring and the country's numerous intelligence-gathering organizations are not immune. As things stand now, various committees of the House and Senate are gearing up for investigations of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Fed- eral Bureau of Investigation, the Defense In- telligence Agency and the National Security Agency. We hope that these investigations will be boiled down to; at most, one select committee in the House and Senate. We also . hope that the investigations will be skepti- cal, thorough and responsible. A witch-hunt born of the peculiar sensitivities left over fromWatergate would not be helpful. A careftil analysis of this country's intelligence problems and legislation to remedy the mis- takes and deficiencies of the past are very surely in order. A bipartisan congressional investigation is especially desirable in view of the conservative complexion of the blue- ribbon executive panel headed by Vice Presi- dent Rockefeller which is also looking into CIA activities. The difficulty, of course, is that, when it comes to intelligence-gathering operations, bosom-baring Is a tricky procedure. The risk is that too much public exposure of a highly sensitive area of government will put the whole operation out Of business, and imperil the reputations?and even the lives?of peo- ple involved, to say nothing of the nation's security. In the past, the congressional com- mittees with intelligence oversight responsi- bilities have been squeamish about inquiring too deeply Into these clandestine affairs. The present danger is that post-Watergate zeal- otry, inspired by news stories of a "massive, illegal dotnestic intelligence operation" mounted by the CIA a few years back, will lead 'to excesses of revelation. For our part, we remain unconvinced that the charges have much real foundation. From what has been revealed so far?mostly by CIA Director William R Colby to a House Appropriations subcommittee?it appears that the agency was involved in a program of Internal surveillance of certain domestic dis- sident groups suspected of having connec- tions with foreign agents. CIA agents were "Inserted" in ? some of these organizations, some mail between American citizens and Communist correspondents was read, and flies?largely furnished by the FBI?were established on some 10,000 people. In addi- tion, Colby said, the program involved physi- Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA-RDP78B02992A000100010032-1 Approved For Release 2006/10/19 C1A-RDP781E302992A000100010032-1 ifranuary 27; 1975 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE cal surveillance, wiretaps and break-ins di- rected at CIA personnel suspected of security leaks and, in a few cases, those who were thought to be receiving the information. In Colby's opinion and that of his immedi- ate, predecessor, Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger, the CIA, in this period, may have overstepped the strict limits of its charter. The various acts have been labelled as '"reE,,T,ettable" or "inappropriate" or?In the case of Colby?the result of "a miscon- ception of the extent of -the CIA's authority." Richard Helms, who was CIA director during most of the period of anti-war fervor, stoutly denies any impropriety on his part. The dif- ference in judgment reflects more than any- thing else the change in climate in the last two years. But surely a large part of .the problem lies In the ambiguity of the charter of the CIA, written by Congress in 1947. In setting up the agency, Congress ruled that it should have no "police, subpoena, law enforcement powers or internal security functions" with- in the United States?this area being strictly reserved to the long-established FBI. How realistic and workable this prohibi- tion was is sharply illustrated by the events under investigation. Despite the prohibition against domestic spying, the director of the CIA was also made "responsible for protect- ing intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." He was also in- structed by Congress to "perform such other functions and duties relating to intelligence affecting the national security as the Na- tional Security Council may from time to time direct." Between them, it can be argued that these directives provide ample justifica- tion for the activities being denounced as "illegal." And the evidence Is reasonably clear that a number of former directors be- lieved this was indeed the case. - Clearly, the first objective of the current investigations must be to spell out more ? clearly the rules under which the CIA?and other intelligence agencies as well?are sup- posed to function. It aU domestic counter- , espionage is to be more severely restricted-- as seems to be the mood of the liberal major- ity?Congress will also have to figure out how the CIA is to protect its "sources and meth- ods from unauthorised disclosure." One ob- vious way, of course, would be pass a law making it a'crime for former CIA agents -to write books. But this would not solve the larger problem of trying to separate domestic and foreign intelligence into neatly separate operations. - Mr. STENNIS, Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining out of my 20 minutes? The PRESIDING OFFICER. (Mr. Doeteence) . The Senator has 2 minutes remaining. Mr. TOWER, Mr. PreSident, I yield 10 additional minutes to the Senator from Mississippi. Mr. STENNIS. As I understand, that will leave me 12 minutes, Mr. President, may we have order? The PRESIDING OFFICeat. The Sen- ate will be in order. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, my main plea today is for the protection of for- eign intelligence said intelligenee sources. I think all other matters do not add up, in the? range of importance with the CIA's operations, to compare with this collection of foreign intelligence, appreciate very much the sentiments expressed on the floor of the Senate as to the necessity for CIA and other intel- ligence agencies, but that view is not shared by all the people and is not under- stood, either, by all the people. There is a great deal of sentiment, even under- standing sentiment, that would question the necessity for the CIA, or the pro- priety of having it. Another thing, Mr. President, is that this is not a political issue, and CIA is not a political agency of any kind. It serves one President after another, as they come. It makes no difference which party that President belongs to and has nothing to do, with political matters. Primarily, CIA is a Government agency collecting foreign intelligence of the most highly sensitive nature. To be effective, it must be secret. If intelligence facts are disclosed, they often lose all of their value. If an adversary merely infers that we have certain in- telligence, often it is no longer of value. An illustration would be work on a code. The purpose of gathering intelligence is to learn intentions and capabilities. The first extensive foreign intelligence act ever passed by the Congress was in 1947. Called the CIA, it has come a long, long way in the past 26 years. For il- lustration, we no longer argue about a missile gap, or a bomber gap. In the broad and essential fields, the CIA has done an extensive and effective job in dealing with enemy capabilities and intentfons. As we go through investigations, let us keep in mind the dangers from expo- sures. Exposures can be a matter of life and death to Americans abroad as well as friendly foreigners. This ?Pinion is strongly shared by many highly respected persons, including Director Colby, who have been a part of the operations and know the facts first-hand. Friendly gov- ernments and friendly foreigners will greatly reduce, if not terminate their co- operation and assistance. They already have. The information flow has been greatly reduced. Our relations with other nations have 'been strained. Exposure of sensitive facts through hearings, through pressures, through staff members, or through other sources, regardless of the good intentions of the actors, comes at a price we cannot bear. ? In a time of nuclear weapons, with the power to deliver warheads on target from continent to continent, we must have re- sponsible information from many foreign sources. Further, our ships at sea, our military manpower scattered throughout the world in support of many commit- ments voluntarily made, are all in need of the fruit of intelligence 'gathered around the world. The President, all Presidents, have to have this worldwide intelligence in for- mulating foreign policies, including trade and other economic policies formulated with nations around the world. , Intelligence comes from several sources, but much of it comes from our CIA agents abroad. In ray travels, I have found them to be excellent men, capable and loyal, with a steady stream of highly valuable and responsible information. They seldom get credit for anything. They often get blamed?but by and large, they continue to carry on. One purpose of my remarks today is to say a word of encouragement to those S 973 men; to tell them they are appreciated, and to ask them to carry on under highly adverse conditions. From some of this intelligence, we make decisions in the Congress as to military weaponry. We often save great sums of money, because this intelligence lets us know what weapons to avoid building as well as what weapons are most probably needed. Without the in- telligence gained under the CIA direc- tion, we would not have known of the missiles in Cuba until they were actually fully installed and we were directly un- der the gun. Indeed, U.S. intelligence, on which the CIA sits at the top, has come a long way over the past two decades. We have reached the point where the SALT agree- ment is possible, because we can now verify what they have in being. A num- ber of other treaties have also been pos- sible, because of our vertification process. Under Director Colby, I feel that the CIA is now operating in a fine way, en- tirely within the law. I shall do my part in keeping it that way. - The organic act creating the CIA needs some amendments which tighten up the present law. Our committee has given some major amendments which I intro- duced in late 1973, special attention in 1974. I assisted Senator PROXMIRE with a similar major amendment offered by him to the military authorization bill. It passed the Senate with my active sup- port and we made a strong effort at the conference in behalf of the amend- ment. It finally lost at conference be- cause it was not germane, but the con- ferees for the House supported the idea of hearings which the House has started. We shall continue our efforts on that amendment and others.'. We We may have certain intelligence of great value to us. But hit is known to our adversaries that we have At, or if they suspect that we have it, then it turns to ashes in our hands and is' of no value whatsoever. - - Illustration: Hundreds of millions of dollars invested in electronic devices can become valueless overnight if it be- comes known we have such devices. - Our committee shall continue to exer- cise committee jurisdiction on legisla- tion regarding the CIA,- and also exer- cise surveillance over its operations, and such other activities connected therewith as may be necessary. We shall continue to have the Senator from Montana (Mr. MANSFIELD), and the Senator froth Pennsylvania (Mr. SCOTT), the Democratic and Republican floor leaders and hence representing all of the Senators, invited to all of our meet- ings regarding the surveillance of the CIA. I have discussed this with the Sena- tor from Montana on last Thursday and lie expects to- attend. The Senator from Pennsylvania attended our session last Thursday. The CIA, of course must operate within the law, but I want to emphasize to all of my colleagues and to the American people that foreign intelligence supplied by the CIA is absolutely necessary for our President and his close advisers, includ- ing the top officials of all of our military A nnmved For Release 2006/10/19 CIA-RDP78B02992A000100010032-1 Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA-RDP78B02992A000100010032-1 S 974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE services, both those in civilian and mill-. s tory positions. In modern times this in- formation is not merely needed, it is es- sential.- . Therefore, someone has to stand up for the CIA through foul as well as fair weather; and make hard decisions and take firm stands, whether popular at the time or not. I have done that and I Propose to do just that in the future. I shall not shirk this duty. This does not at all mean that I pro- pose to operate a duplicate or rival in- vestigation with any select comm1ttee, will make no attempt to do that, but I will carry out the purpose,. as I have briefly outlined it here. . I thank the Senator from Texas for yielding this time to me. The PRESIDING OEVICER. Who yields time? Mr. TOWER, Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Mis- sissippi for his cogent remarks. I think it would be appropriate for me to thank him at this time for the splendid leadership he has shown in the Committee on Armed Services. In fact, on numerous occasions, we have looked In depth at some activities of ,the CIA and it has not been generally known that we have. I think the Senator from Mississippi has always measured up to his .responsibility in the highest tradi- tion of the Senate. ? Mr, President, may I inquire how much time I have left? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 15 minutes remaining. Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment and ask that it he stated. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will state the amendment. Mr. TOWER. May I call to the at- tention of my friend from Rhode Island that I have now offered the amendment. The legislative clerk read as follows: At the end of the resolution add a new section as follows:- ? "No employee of the select committee or any person engaged by contract or other- wise to perform services for, the select com- mittee shall be given access to any clas- sified information by the select committee unless such employee or person. has received an appropriate security clearance. The type of security clearance to be required in the case of any such employee or person shall be commensurate with the sensitivity of the classified information to which such em- ployee or person will be given access by the select committee." Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, the amendment is somewhat self-explana- tory. However, I think we -should make some legislative history on it. What is contemplated here is the type of Q clear- ance which is administered by the Atomic Energy Commission and which the Senator from Rhode Island is so well familiar with. I should like the Senator from Rhode Island to comment on it at this time if he would. Mr. PASTORE. I have no objection to the amendment provided I get a fur- ther explanation of the last sentence: The type of security clearance to be re- quired in tho case of any such employee or person shall be commensurate with the sen- sitivity of the classified Information to which such employee or person will be given access by the select committee. As determined by the committee. After all, who is going to make this determination? We are not going to have a debate by the members of the commit- tee every time we get to a point where this would apply. I am all for preserving. the classification; the Senator from Texas knows that I am all for his amend- ment, the spirit of it, the intention, the objective of it. But I think we should make clear that the determination ought to be on the part of the committee. When it says "sensitivity of the classi- fied information," who is going to deter- mine whether it is sensitive or not? We have to say here "the type of security clearance to be required in the case of any such employee or person shall, with- in the determination of' the committee, be commensurate with the sensitivity," and so on. Mr. TOWER. I should be glad to ac- cept that as a modification by the Sena- tor from Rhode Island. Mr. PASTORE. That is what I want. I want the determination to be made by the committee, if we can work out that language. ? Mr. TOWER. That suits me splendidly. As a matter of fact, if the Senator will read that language again, I think that would be a suitable modification. Mr. PASTORE. The type of security clearance to be required in the case of ?any such employee or person shall, with- in the discretion of the committee itself, be commensurate with the sensitivity of the classified information to which such employee or person will be given access to the select committee. . Mr. TOWER. I will accept that lan- guage as a modification by the Senator from Rhode Island. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be so modified. Will the Senator send the modification to the desk? The amendment, as modified, is as follows: No employee of the select committee or person engaged by contract or otherwise to perform services for the select committee shall be given access to any classified infor- mation by the select committee unless such employee or person has received an appro- priate security clearance as determined by the Select Committee. The type of security clearance to be required in the case of any such employee or person shall within, the determination of the Select Committee be commensurate with the sensitivity of the classified .Information to which such em- ployee or person will be given access by the select committee. Mr. TOWER. What is contemplated here is a simple type of Q clearance which is ordinarily required of Senate employees. Mr. PASTORE. I realize that. Every member of the staff of the Joint Com- mittee on Atomic Energy has Q clear- ance and has to have it. I think in this particular case, where we are dealing with classified information, covert ac- tivities abroad and domestically, I think we have to have reliable people. We just cannot afford to take a chance. Now, I am all for this study and this investigation. I repeat, I do not want to January 27, 1975 be misunderstood. There have been a lot of mistakes and they have to be cor- rected. But we are not out to destroy intelligence-gathering. ? I remember one time when I was sent by President Kennedy to Moscow to wit- ness the signing of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. I was sitting on the porch of the Embassy, together with Dean Rusk, at the time, and we were talking about a lot of measures. Finally, the Ambassador came out and said, "I suggest you two gentlemen take a walk and do your talk- ing because this place is bugged." "This place is bugged." Now, that is what the Russians are doing to us. As a matter of fact, they did it right down there at the United Nations. They had a bug, I think, under the American seal. We all remember that. Let us face it: We are in a critical world where we are being spied upon and, in order to know what they are doing, we have to spy on them. There is no question about that. But that has nothing to do with many of these charges that have been made. Nobody is out to destroy the CIA. Let uS get an understanding on this. No one Is out to destroy military intelligence. No one is out to destroy the FBI. Let us make it all clear. On the other hand, this is an open society. All we are saying is that there are some things that have been wrong, and under the pretext of either national security or secrecy, private rights are be- ing violated unnecessarily. That is all we are trying to eliminate. That is all we are trying to do. It is as simple as all that. am perfectly willing- to accept this amendment with that modification. ? Mr. TOWER. The modification has been accepted. The amendment has been so modified. I might say one other thing. I think this is partially for the committee's pro- tection. If we did not require clearance of some sort, it is not impossible that an alien intelligence organization could penetrate the committee by inserting one of its people on the committee staff. So I think we would want that kind of protec- ? tion, because I do not think the commit- tee would ever want to be embarrassed by finding, having failed to require any kind of clearance, that their staff had been penetrated. Mr. BAKER. Will the Senator yield? Mr. TOWER. I yield to the Senator from Tennessee. Mr. BAKER. Will the Senator from Texas reassure me that by setting up these requirements for classification, we are not setting up within the committee layers of access and levels of access to in- formation that will be available to the committee? What I have in mind is the possibility that the committee may de- cide that there is a requirement for secu- rity beyond even the requirements for Q clearance, a kind of "eyes only" classi- fication, and have someone say to Ho- ward Baker, that he can read those 8,- 000 pages, but his staff man does not have that clearance. Now, can the Senator assure me that nothing that is contained in this amend- ment will in any way deprive any Mem- ber of access, and his staff, if otherwise properly cleared? Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA-RDP78B02992A000100010032-1 Approved For Release 2006/10/19 CIA-RDP78B02992A000100010032-1 January 2'7;'1975 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE. Mr. TOWER. I do not perceive that it would. In other words, for the protection of the staff? Mr. BAKER. What does the Senator mean, he does not perceive that it would? Is it his opinion that it would or would' not? Mr. TOWER. It is my opinion that it would not. Mr. BAKER. Does the Senator wish that to be included as part of the legis-- lative history? Mr. TOWER. As a matter of fact, the committee itself will determine. Mr. BAKER. Does he wish it to be a part of the legislative history of this amendment that it is not his under- standing or intention as the author of this amendment to create that situation? Mr. TOWER. It is not my intention to create that situation. Mr. BAKER. And h , is not his belief that that will occur? Mr. TOWER. It is not my belief that it will occur. But it is my intention that we should .not have people on the staff who would be security risks. Mr. BAKER. We all share that con- cern. Let us very much hope we succeed in keeping leaks from occurring alto- gether. I assure the Senator that this will be the ,case as far as this Senator is concerned. But as far as I am concerned, I cannot in good conscience see the adoption of an amendment that will make part of this committee privy to highly sensitive material while other parts of the committee, though legally, as a practical matter might be deprived of that information. Mr. PASTORE. Will the Senator ex- plain that again?. , ? Mr. BAKER. Yes. Assume for a mo- ment that the committee, in its dis- cretion, according to the amendment that the Senator from Rhode Island pro- posed and Senator TOWER accepted, adopts some classification beyond, say, a Q clearance. We all know there are some classifications beyond a Q clear- ance. Suppose the Senator's personal staff or select committee staff comes to him and says, "I cannot gain access to that last communication Director Colby sent to us because' the committee says we have to have an XQI clearance as well as a Q clearance." I want to be sure that!, as a member of the committee, or anyone else as a member of the cora- rnittee, will not be thus deprived of ae- cess to any information that comes be- fore that committee. Mr. PASTORE. His amendment only has to do with staff members. The Sena- tor is saying he does not want to be deprived. If a member of his staff or anyone on that staff that he maybe re- sponsible for the committee engaging does not get the clearance from the com- mittee that he must have, he cannot get the information. There is nothing wrong with that, be- cause he is the one who determined that he could not get it. Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, as long as I am assured, which is the only thing I sought, that the concern that I ex- pressed was not the intention of the author of the amendment, I will be sat- isfied I do not want to be deprived, legally or effectively, of any information that comes before this committee. If there are 10,000 pages of classified material, I cannot read it, and the Senator cannot either, or It is unlikely that he is going to be able to. I think I have that assurance. If the Senator from Texas will-express his un- derstanding that, this will not be used as a device to deprive any of us of informa- tion, then I am perfectly pleased with it. Mr. TOWER. It was the intention of the Senator from Texas to establish what he thinks is the minimum requirement that we can establish; that is, some sort of clearance for people. I noted a moment ago that it is conceivable that if we re- quired nothing, the committee staff could be penetrated by an alien intelli- gence-gathering organization. I think this would be particularly true of clerical help. I think that the professional staff that Is likely to be engaged will probably be people who will have no difficulty getting any kind of clearance they need. It is not my intention to proscribe or to hobble the action of any Senator on the com- mittee. Mr. BAKER. Whose authority will be required to gain the clearance, that of the full committee or the chairman and vice chairman? Mr. PASTORE. By vote of the com- mittee. Mr. TOWER. I should say the commit- tee has to meet and make its ground rules pursuant to the guidelines laid down here. Mr. BAKER. Is that the Senator's intention? Mr. TOWER. That is my intention. Mr. PASTORE. May we have the amendment read again? Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, one fur- ther question, if I may: It has been neces- sary, in my experience, to enlist one's personal staff, legislative assistant, or anyone else, to help in a compilation or ordering of the information at hand. I fully agree that then they should be re- quired to have whatever clearance is required, and be fully investigated. But I hope there is nothing in this amend- ment that would prevent an application for clearance of personal staff, and that on obtaining that clearance, they would, In fact, be subject to the same rules as committee staff, Mr. PASTORE. That is correct. We do that on the joint committee now. The Senator from Missouri has had members of his staff who have Q clearance look at some of our classified information. They are entitled to do it, with the per- mission of the committee itself. Every person who looks at classified information has to be cleared. We should be clear about that. Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. TOWER. I yield to the Senator from Missouri. Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank my able friend from Texas. As I understand it, whoever is cleared, whether lie be on the staff or off the staff, is cleared for the information. He is cleared for the Information on the basis of the nature of the clearance that S 975 he receives. It would be up to the Senator In question to decide whether he was violating the rules of the Senate if he was on the committee and at, the same time discussed any matter with somebody who did not have the proper clearance. 'Am I correct in that? Mr. BAKER. Absolutely. Mr. PASTORE. That is right. No one disputes that. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the , Senator yield for a question? Mr. PASTORE. Yes. Mr: STENNIS. I believe the Senator from Missouri was talking about some- one who was not on the committee staff. I would not think that anyone who was not responsible to the committee would have access to this information. Mr. PASTORE. Oh, no? Mr. SYMINGTON. May I say In an- swer to my able friend, the Senator from Mississippi, I was discussing this matter with the distinguished senior Senator from Tennessee on the basis of his staff; and the Senator is entirely correct, and if he is on the committee?and I read he was on the committee?then it would be his problem to see that the people on his staff were cleared to receive the informa- tion on the basis of their clearance, and did not receive it if they did not have adequate clearance. - Mr. PASTORE. Provided they got the permission of the committee. Mr. STENNIS. It would be a commit- tee responsibility. Mr. PASTORE. That is why I am writ- ing there "by the determination of the committee." - Mr. BAKER. I entirely agree with that. Does the Senator from Texas? Mr. TOWER. The determination is to be made by the committee, that is the difference. Mr. BAKErt. And it can be made foi-?- security classification for personal staff as well as staff? Mr. TOWER. Not for personal staff. I think for any information that the Sen- ator gives to his personal staff, he has the personal responsibility to determine whether that staff member has an ade- quate clearance. My oWn personal policy - is that nobody handles classified docu- ments on my staff unless they have clearance. Mr. BAKER. That is the essence of my question. The answer to the question to the Senator from Texas is? Mr. PASTORE. We are confusing a very simple thing. Let us get it plain. No one can look at classified information unless they have clearance. Mr. TOWER. Right. Mr. PASTORE. If a personal staff member of any member of the commit- tee has that clearance, he or she can be entitled to that classified information only if the committee gives permission. Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, that is my understanding. Mr. PASTORE. That is the rule of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy now. I cannot say in-nore clearly than that. Mr. BAKER. Is that correct? Mr. TOWER. That is correct, and the policy will be set by the committee. I see no reason why a majority of the com- mittee cannot work it out satisfactorily. Annrnved For Release 2006/10/19 CIA-RDP78602992A000100010032-1 Approved For Release 2006/10/19 : CIAIRDP781302992A000100010032-1 S 976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Texas has expired. The Senator. from Rhode Island has 32 minutes. Mr. PASTORE. I think we ought to get this amendment clarified further. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr: PASTORE. I yield. Mr. MANSFIELD. I understand, Mr. President, after listening to this debate, that it is the Senate select committee, if there is one approved by the Senate, which has the final determination as to who shall have access to what informa- tion; is that correct? Mr. PASTORE. That is correct. Mr. MANSFIELD; No executive agency shall determine directly or indirectly who shall. have access to information. Mr. PASTORE. That is correct. And I cannot- be more explicit than that. I would like to have the amendment read. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will read the amendment.. The legislative clerk read as follows: At the end of the resolution add a new sec- tion as follows: "No employee of the select committee or any person engaged by contract or otherwise to perform services for the select committee shall be given access to any classified in- formation by the select-. committee unless such employee or person has received an appropriate security clearance as determiLned by the select committee The type? of secu- rity clearance to be required in the case of any such employee or person shall within the de termination of the select committee be commensurate with the sensitivity of the classified information to which such em- ployee or person will be given access by the select committee." ? ? The PRESIDING OrsaCER. The Sen- ator from Rhode Island has 30 minutes remaining. ? Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. PASTORE. I yield. . Mr. CRANSTON. The Senator from Rhode Island, I think, has performed a very useful service in making plain that the second part of this amendment is finally in hand for decisionmaking pur- poses of the committee. Mr. PASTORE.. That is- correct. , Mr. CRANSTON:, But the first part creates a similar problem. ' Mr. PASTORE. No, he added the words for the first part, too; right at the end of the first sentence he added the words "within the determination of the select committee." . Mr. CRANSTON. I have a somewhat similar question to ask; it is similar in its implication, and I perhaps need the help of the Senator in figuring out what to do about it. With respect to the words "unless such employee or person has received an ap- propriate security clearance," who gives security clearance? - Mr. PASTORE. Usually by the FBI and all other sensitive agencies of Gov- ernment. That is the way they do it now. Mr. CRANSTON. The question I ask Is, how do you prevent, and just make certain, that there is no abuse of this by the executive branch? They would not, I assume, try to hold down the staff to zero, but they might improperly with- hold or delay security clearances. ' Mr. PASTORE. The Senator from Montana just asked the question arid I answered it. It is not up to any agency executive; it is up to the committee. Mr. CRANSTON. Who is going to give clearances, the committee or the execu- tive? Mr. PASTORE. The committee is going to determine whether the clearance is adequate and sufficient. Mr. CRANSTON. If a staff person that the committee wishes to use is denied clearance by the executive branch can the cOmmittee override and decide they are going to hire that person? Mr. PASTORE. Well, in an extreme case, I would have to answer the Senator in the affirmative, but I mean, after all, I do not anticipate that. I do not antici- pate that trouble. Mr. CRANSTON. I did not anticipate it generally. I think we might anticipate it in regard to certain individuals who might render invaluable service to the committee but who might be preferred not to be on that committee staff by one or another of the agencies we are talking about. Mr. PASTORE. Is the Senator saying to me if for some capricious motive some executive department refused to grant a clearance, the question would arise, would that put that individual out of commission? ? Mr. CRANSTON. Yes. Mr. PASTORE. The answer is no. The answer is it is up to the committee to make the determination. Mr. CRANSTON. That is fine. I thank the Senator. Mr. PASTORE. OK. Does any other Senator wish to, speak before we-vote? , Mr. BAKER. Mr. President; I am happy to have this-opportunity to express my support for Senate Resolution .21, legislation establishing a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Oversight. As an original cosponsor of the resolu- tion offered by Senators MANSFIELD and Mamma, and as? a strong supporter of this legislation offered by Senator PAS- TORE, I believe this resolution to set in motion a responsible study of the intelli- gence activities, carried out by or for the United States is of tremendous impor- tance. - In supporting the creation of a select committee, as in sponsoring legislation to establish a permanent Joint Commit- tee on Intelligence Oversight, let me em- phasize that it is not my intention to criticize the distinguished chairmen of the Armed Services Committee or the Ap- propriations Committee, or the ranking minority members of those committees. They have done. an admirable job in carrying out the diverse duties and re- sponsibilities of leadership on those com- mittees., In my view, however, the. far- reaching operations of the some 60 Gov- ernment agencies which conduct an in- telligence or law enforcement function demand the careful scrutiny of a select committee created for that purpose and charged with that responsibility. Some have argued that Congress can- not be trusted to participate in the crit- January 27, 1975 ical and terribly secret operations, of the Intelligence community. They cite the fact that Washington has become known as a city of leaks.. I suggest, though, that critics are losing sight of the explicit-con- fidence-in which Congress has dealt with national security agencies of the highest order in the-past. In our past national conflicts, during World- War I, World War -II, the Korean war, and the war in Vietnam, the rule has been confidentiality where required. I am proud to serve on the Joint Com- mittee on Atomic Energy, a committee which is so ably chaired by the sponsor of Senate Resolution 21, Senator PAS- TORE. I believe I.., am correct in saying that, in more than a quarter century, there has never been a security leak from the Joint Committee, which daily deals With what are perhaps the most sensi- tive materials in the entire annals of the defense establishment. It is evident, then, that ample precedent exists for congressional participation in such a sensitive area. I am not impressed by those who contend that Congress is not to be trusted. with the truth. A balance must always be made be- tween the requirements of a democracy for public knowledge, and the require- ments of its security and defense. When a doubt, arises, the people's branch of Government must be- privy to those re- quirements and, the pertinent informa- tion required to make a balancing judg- ment. The outcome of the select committee inquiry, obviously, cannot be foreseen. I pledge my personal efforts, just as I know the other members of -the select committee will dedicate their efforts, to seeing that our job is done thoroughly and that we follow the facts wherever they lead without fear or favor. This res- olutipn charters neither a whitewash nor a witch hunt;. it does establish a select committee to carry out a sensitive mis- sion as fairly, and as. even handedly as possible. It is not may intention to carry out a vendetta against the Central Intelligence agency, or against any established intel- ligence agency of our Government. I be- lieve that the CIA, the FBI, and other agencies are necessary to the security of our national institutions when they per- form their proper functions. Serious allegations have been made, however, and it is the responsibility of the Congress to .weigh the charges, find the facts, and determine what remedial ac- tion, if any, is necessary to make sure that an effective intelligence program is maintained without endangering the rights of our citizens. Mr. President, I shall not detain the Senate long. Everything has been said which should be said, I believe. I am pleased and I am gratified and enthusi- astic about the action that I believe the Senate is about to take. I think that it signifies diligence and sensitivity and the recognition of a necessary national pur- pose. It speaks well of the viability of this group as a great deliberative body in support of the executive branch of Government. I have no quarrel with the CIA. I per- Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA-RDP78B02992A000100010032-1 Approved For Release 2006/10/19 : CIA-RDP78B02992A000100010032-1 !January 27, 1975 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --SENATE S 977 tainly have no quarrel with the Senate Armed Services Committee or its distin- guished chairman. This resolution, how- ever, is drafted so that It extends far be- yond the CIA, to the entire intelligence apparatus of this country. Some of rny colleagues may be interested to know there are 60 agencies of the U.S. Gov- ernment ;that conduct some sort of intel- ligence or law enforcement responsibility. There are 16 agencies of the Government conducting intelligence operations other than the CIA and the DIA, Defense In- telligence Agency, and the FBI, which have a combined budget of over a billion dollars a year. The intelligence of the Federal Government is an enormous business. I became concerned about this. matter in the course of Watergate. The stories which have appeared in the press and been related by others to me since that time have done nothing to allay that concern. It is important, I _believe, that we have a thoroughgoing investigation to determine whether or not the agencies involved in the intelligence activities of the Government are complying with the requirements of the law. But maybe?just maybe, Mr. Presi- dent?there is one ether thing that we need to do to reassure not only Congress but the people of this country, and that is to make sure that the intelligence coin- mimity and, of course, to some extent the law enforcement community, is un- der somebody's control. They are not au- tonomous entities within a representa- tive democracy, as I am sometimes tempted to suspect. We are not talking about a Republican national administration or a Democratic. I rather suspect that some of the prac- tices that we see discussed in the public forum began a long time ago, and maybe included activities going all the way back, possibly, to the Eisenhower administra-. tion, the Kennedy administration, and the Johnson administration. I think, Mr. President, one of the major undertakings of this committee ought to be to talk to the last surviving ex-President we have and to examine the records that are available to us to determine whether or not the President of the United States knows what is going on in the CIA, ,the DIA, and the FBI.. I want to be reassured in that respect, and I confess I am not now. I suppose we would run into the questions of our friendly adversaries on executive privi- lege and executive powers with respect to those Presidential powers. I know for-. mer President Harry Truman declined to grant certain information after he left office, but I think we ought to try. We ought to find out not whether the CIA, for instance, was engaged in domestic surveillance, but whether somebody was running the show. I know Congress was not running the show; and I want to be relieved of that shuddering fear I have that the White House was not, either. So I pledge, if I am a member of this committee, that I will conduct it as dis- creetly and privately as I can commen- surate with my responsibility. I pledge that we will be careful to preserve our legitimate intelligence in- tens Is. , I pledge, as well, that the public's right to know is second only to national sur- vival, and that when we are finished with the private portion of . these hearings there will be a public disclosure, a public declaration including the good and bad,. recent and in the past. It is a terrible time we are in. We have not had a President who has completed his term, in a sense, since President Ei- senhower. These are turbulent times when we have set about the business of investigating ourselves to the point where sometimes I think we are devouring our public officials, our leaders. When I permit myself the luxury of thinking that, sometimes it also dawns on me that the investigation has been pretty productive, and we have got to do .this one, too, not because we are bent on political cannibalism, but because it has to be done. I believe, Mr. President, that it will be clone, and done effectively. I Pledge my efforts in that respect and I serve notice, as well, that I will de- vote every ounce of my energy to seeing that we find all the facts and pursife them, wherever they lead us. It is far too late in my political career to worry about whom I might hurt or who might be injured. ? Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. PASTORE. Have we voted on the amendment? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques- tion is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Texas, as modified by the Senator from Rhode Island. The amendment was agreed to. Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the Senator from Rhode Island yield to me? Mr. PASTORE. How much time will the Senator require? Mr. TOWER. A couple of minutes. Mr. PASTORE. All right. Mr. TOWER. Since I have run out of time. Mr. PASTORE. OK; Mr. TOWER. I have an amendment here which I will either offerer not offer. It is copied directly out of the resolution that authorized the select committee for the Watergate investigation. ? It simply says: The minority members of the selept com- mittee shall have one-third of - the profes- sional stair of the select committee (includ- ing a Minority counsel) and such part of the clerical staff as may be adequate. Mr. PASTORE:- Why not leave that to the committee? I think? Mr. TOWER. The Senate resolution re- quires 30 percent, I believe. Mr. PASTORE. Yes. Mr. TOWER. If the Senator from Rhode Island will simply assure me the minority will get adequate staffing? Mr. PASTORE. It will be up to the' committee itself. I will not have any au- thority over the committee. Mr. TOWER. I think an undertaking by this side of the aisle would be honored by the majority on the committee. Mr. PASTORE. All right, so I under- take it. Mt-. TOWER. I thank my friend from Rhode Island. Mr. HATe iELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. PASTORE. I yield to the Senator. Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated. The legislative clerk read as follows: At the end of the resolution add a new sec- tion as follows: Sec. 7. As a condition for employment as described in Section 3 of this Resolution, each person shall agree not to accept any honorariutn, royalty or other payment for a speaking engagement, magaalne article, book, or other endeavor connected with the investi- gation and study undertaken by this Com- mittee. Mr. PASTORE. I will accept this amendment, Mr. President. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques- tion is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Oregon. The amendment was agreed to. Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I send up another amendment for the purpose of colloquy. - The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated. The assistant legislative clerk read as follows: . - - On Page 4, line 4, insert after the word "agency" the following: "or any Committee or Subcommittee of the Congress." On Page 5, line 13, insert after the word "agencies" the following: "or any Commit- tees or Subcommittees of the Congress" Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I would like to ask the Senator from Rhode Island a question because I may with- draw the amendment after I have the record made on the problem that con- ? cerns me so greatly. As a member of the Rules Commit- tee, I am aware that we have brought before us the requests from various com- mittees and subcommittees in the Senate for the budget to operate that committees _ The Internal Security Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, dur- ing the presentation of their budget re-- quest on February 27, 1974, indicated that they kept records on various people in this country which they gathered through intelligence activity. They had files, names of people that could be con- sidered as suspicious, and other such characteristics as they indicated to our committee. My Only point is that I realize that this Is not a matter of one Senate committee investigating other subcommittees or committees where we have the word "investigation" on page 2 of our resolu- tion today, however, we have some vari- ous generalities as to what this commit- tee's authority may include. A prime responsibility is that it can look into, of course, any agency which is carrying out intelligence or surveillance activities on behalf of any agency of the Federal Government. I would like to ask the Senator from Rhode Island if he considers that the language is broad enough, on page 2, lines 8 and 9, to include the reviewing of the activities of the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S. Senate, as it might A nrwni/Pri Fnr Release 2006/10/19: CIA-RDP78B02992A000100010032-1 Approved For Release 2006/10/19 : CIA-RDP78B02992A000100010032-1 S 978 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE relate to surveillance activities or gather- ing of intelligence. Mr. PASTORE. Well, I mean, if they so determine. I do not see how that is apt to happen. The House already dis- banded that committee. I hope we do it here in the Senate, as well. But this is a far-reaching authority. If they so choose to do it, I would say that they could, but I would not want to amend the present resolution as it now ' stands. Mr. HATFIELD. Would the Senator have any objections to the latitude and scope of this committee being interpreted to include, some review or investigation of activities of the-Internal Security Sub- committee, to see how it is collecting data? Mr. PASTORE. Well, if they have done things as bad as the CIA or FBI, If it is so determined, I do not see why any Senate committee should be immune. I mean, we have got to treat ourselves as we expect to treat everybody else., Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I am 'very happy to hear the Senator say this, because it would seem to me- if we are basically concerned about the abridge- ment of civil rights of our citizens through the action of gathering intel- ligence, and so forth, of executive agen- cies, we should be doubly concerned about the procedures used by one of our own subcommittees of the U.S. Senate. I, for one, am not satisfied with the answers I receiVed from the chief clerk of that subcommittee as he appeared before our Rules Committee. I would like to think it i& understood that the resolution certainly carries with it enough authority for that committee under this resolution to look into these activities of the Internal Security Sub- committee, if someone brings that issue up before the committee. Mr. PASTORE. Or any other com- mittee. - ? - Mr. HATFIELD. Or any other com- mittee, but this one committee is already involved. Mr. PASTORE. But that is not the -thrust, I want' to make it clear, not the thrust of: this resolution, but it woUld be encompassed in it because it is broad in, scope. Mr. HATriELD. I understand, but I would not want to exclude one of our own subcommittees, if we are so anxious to investigate the executive agency. That is why I am raising the question. Con- gress should look at its own intelligence gathering and file keeping also. Mr. PASTORE. That is right.? Mr. HATFIELD, Mr. President, I with-, draw my amendment. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is withdrawn. Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. President, will the Senator from Rhode- Island yield to me 2 minutes? Mn PASTORE. I yield 2 minutes to the Senator. Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. President, I call up my amendment. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated. The legislative clerk read as follows: To Section 2 add a new subsection a,s ? "(16) Whether new legislation or an amendment to, any existing legislation should be enacted to strengthen the national secu- rity, intelligence or surveillance activities of the United States." Mr. BARTLETT, Mr. President, the amendment adds to section 2, beginning on page 3, one more paragraph, to insure that the Senate further expressly auth- orizes and directs the select committee to make a complete investigation with re- spect to the following matters, or ques- tions. It adds the question of whether there needs to be any bill introduced or any amendment to strengthen the na- tional security, intelligence or surveil- lance activities of the United States. I am aware, as the Senator from Rhode Island knows, that section 4 on page 10 of the bill authorizes the select commit- tee to recommend the enactment of any new legislation or the amendment of any existing statute which it considers neces- sary for these purposes. But I want to be assured that the ques- tion will be answered by the committee, and to know that in case there was no forthcoming legislation that there would be a definite and definitive answer as to whether this question, had been reviewed and answered by the committee in its re'commendation. Mr. PASTORE. I would 8uppose so, otherwise this whole investigation would be a nullity. In other words, if nothing was found and nothing was wrong, and naturally, of course, they had given a bill of en- dorsement, we would have to change nothing by legislation. On the other hand, if certain authority was exceeded or the agencies went be,- yond the parameters of the present char- ter and got tia mixed up in Laos, got us mixed up in Chile, got us mixed up in Cambodia and other parts of the world, where they had no authority without the consent of Congress, in that particu- lar case, the committee would come back and make a recommendation, if they would find it necessary to do so. I would hope, without encumbering this with duplicate language, that we would understand that these are legisla- tive words of art when It says the select committee shall have authority to recom- mend the enactment at any new legis- lation. They have the authority. I would hope that they would exercise it. Mn BARTLETT. Will the Senator yield? Mr. PASTORE. What the Senator wants to do is to say that they have to make a recommendation one way or the other. Mr. BARTLETT. I am saying, if I may say to the Senator from Rhode Island, that they shall make a determination of whether or not there is legislation needed to strengthen the national security, in- telligence or surveillance activities, that they shall make that determination. Is the Senator assuring me that they will make that determination in deciding whether or not they will avail themselves of the authority of section 4? Mr. PASTORE. I would hope so. I would hope so. Mr. BARTLETT. With that assurance from the Senator from Rhode Island, I withdraw my amendment. January'27, .1975 The PRESIDING 0 toriCER. The amendment is withdrawn. "Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? I would like to ask one question. of the Senator from Texas- regarding his amendment. I assume that it was not his intention that the amendment would be used to deny a member of the select committee staff of the knowledge of the existence - of a classification designation or a classi- fied program. I ask that in light of the fact that many documents and pro- grams bear a classification that is actu- ally higher than the secret which, itself, Is classified. Mr. TOWER. May I say to the Senator from California I believe we have already answered that question. It would be up to the committee to determine what kind of clearance is required. That will be an internal housekeeping matter for the committee. But the guidelines should be laid down. I believe the committee would want to be protected. I mentioned as a worst case theory awhile ago that per- haps a foreign intelligence-gathering organization, in the absence of any in- telligence clearing on our part, could- - insert one of its people into our commit- tee staff and actually penetrate the com- mittee. That would be of considerable' embarrassment to the committee mem- ber under whose sponsorship that per- son was. I think we should have that protection. In addition to that fact, the country should have that protection. I believe we have a public responsibility to make sure that the people that we put in these staff - positions are going to be people whose sense of discretion and loyalty are be- yond question. Mr. CRANSTON. I admire the Sen- ator's efforts to cut off such dangers. Since there is no law that gives the Exec- utive the power of clearance or denial of clearance, since that is done by Execu- tive order, whatever rules the committee, writes will govern what happens in this- area. Mr. TOWER. This- is correct. It is the committee's baby. Mr. CRANSTON. I thank the Senator.... Mr. PASTORE. Well, let us see if we cannot put the baby to, sleep.. I suggest the absence of a quorum. Mr. TOWER. Will the Senator-with- hold that for a minute and yields to me?- Mr. PASTORE. I yield. Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, in the Fri- day, January 24, issue of the Arizona Re- public, William P. Maloney, Jr., a farmer ambassador to Ghana and a good Dem- ocrat who insists that CIA regulation is long overdue, he states that: In the approaching investigations, it is-im- portant to keep two things in mind: That a competent intelligence branch is essential to our survival and that the CIA, with all its faults, is one of the best, if not the very best, organizations of its kind around. So let us not throw the baby out with the bath. I ask unanimous consent that his letter In the Arizona Republic be printed at this Point in the RECORD. There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: Annroved For Release 2006/10/19: 0IA-RDP78B02992A000100010032-1 Approved For Release 2006/10/19 CIA-RDP781302992A00010001.0032-1 January 27, 1975 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE CIA REGULATION LONG. OVERDUE As a former diplomat, / have followed re- cent news on alleged involvement of the CIA in domestic affairs with special concern. Clearly, congressional oversight and appro- priate regulation of the agency are long over due. A recent best seller on the subject, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence" by Mar- chetti & Marks, the accuracy, of which is generally recognized, makes a compelling case in this regard. There is enough blame to taint all in- volved, not only the agency itself but recent administrations and especially a pliant and. gullible Congress. Additionally, the agency operates under a vague grant of powers which fails to define what is "domestic" and what is "foreign," let alone providing guid- ance for what falls in either category when It involves legitimate intelligence operations. But in the approaching investigations, it is important to keep two things in mind: that a competent intelligence branch is es- sential to our survival, and that the CIA, with all of its faults, is one of the best, if not the very best, organizations of its kind around. So, let's not throw.the baby out with the bath. Hopefully, in the coming months both our domestic freedom as well as the struc- ture and role of this excellent organization will be strengthened. Mr. SCHWEICKER. Mr. President., I would like to commend the distinguished majority and minority leaders for their decisive action in moving to establish a select Senate committee to investigate the recent charges involving various or- ganizations within the U.S. intelligence community. I had introduced my own legislation in this area, Senate Resold- tion 6, cosponsored by my colleague from Wisconsin (Mr. PROxIVIIRE), and I am pleased that the Senate has decided to move forward with a similar proposal. I think it is appropriate to empha-" size four points in connection with this. First, this Nation vitally needs an effec- tive intelligence service. No one disputes that, and I am confident no one in this body would support any action which would undermine the effectiveness of Government organizations performing legitimate, necessary, intelligence func- tions. In the 14 years I have served in the House and Senate, I spent 10 years as a member of the Armed Services Com- mittee, both in the House and here in the Senate, and that experience convinced me of the necessity for an effective in- telligence organization. But second, and equally important, it Is the responsibility of -the Congress to define legitimate intelligence activities, and to establish guidelines which the ex- ecutive branch must -follow in conduct- ing intelligence activities?and then to see that these guidelines are enforced. The intelligence community, like every other sector of our free society, must be subject to the rule of law?and in fact, because of the unique nature of intelligence activities, it is fundamental to the integrity of our free institutions that the intelligence community respect the rule of law. Unfortunately, the Congress has not been as vigilant in this area as it should have been. Despite nearly 200 legisla- tive proposals, no major legislation re- gaveling, our intelligence community has been passed since 1949, when the original CIA charter was amended. In the inter- vening years, the statutory authority of the CIA has apparently been modified and expanded by a series of secret ad- ministrative actions, Executive orders, and National Security Council actions. As a result, the CIA now has a "secret charter" which may be vastly different from the original statute passed by Con- gress?and even those Members of Con- gress with oversight responsibilities for CIA cannot say with confidence what is in the secret charter. I hope the select committee will focus a major inquiry in this area, and will untangle the various provisions of the secret charter and in- sure that our basic intelligence author- ity is embodied in a new statute, passed by Congress, rather than in a series of secret documents. In a free society, the entire concept of a "secret charter" is an intolerable contradiction in terms and must not be permitted. Third, there are numerous indications that the intelligence community?and particularly the CIA?has expanded its functions. into nonintelligence areas, creating a shadow government, dupli- cating and even superseding the activi- ties of other Govermnent agencies. I re- cently disclosed an unclassified, CIA con- tract proposal, asking American firms to conduct industrial espionage against our NATO allies and others, to determine their future plans in the area of ground transportation. Certainly we have a legi- timate Government interest in this area, but it should be pursued openly, by the Department of Transportation or Com- merce, rather than covertly by the CIA. And in response to my disclosure, our NATO allies said they would be happy to share information of this nature with our Government and in fact, are now doing so, thus eliminationg any need for CIA activity. I hope the select commit- tee will explore intelligence community activities in this area, to determine to what extent a shadow government has in fact been created, pursuing nor- mal Government functions in secret, simply to avoid congressional oversight and accountability. Finally, I think it should be empha- sized that the CIA represents only about 15 percent of the entire U.S. intelligence effort. Recently, this has been the most visible 15 percent, in view of press dis- closures, but certainly no responsible congressional evaluation in this area can take Place without inquiry into all facets of the U.S. intelligence community. My- bill specifically authorized inquiry into all U.S. intelligence agencies, and I would hope the select committee bill adopted today will have similar broad authority. Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, the reso- lution before the Senate is the product of long and thoughtful concern over the role of intelligence agencies in a demo- cratic society. Nearly 20 years ago, the distinguished majority leader urged the Senate to adopt a related measure to exercise its responsibility for the activi- ties of our Nation's intelligence com- munity. Since the adoption of the National Se- curity Act, there have been more than 200 attempts to establish separate and broadly based intelligence oversight committees for the Congress. S 97O Today, with the leadership of the dis- tinguished senior Senator from Rhode Island and the esteemed majority leader, and the many other Members of this body who have labored for this change, we can take a vitally significant step by the creation of a Senate Select Commit- tee to Study. Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. This select committee is similar in many respects to a proposal offered by Senators MANSFIELD and IVIerunis which was referred to the Committee on Gov- ernment Operations. The Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations, which I chair, held hearings on December 9 and 10 on that and other proposals to strengthen congressional oversight of-in- telligence activities. While we will continue to explore the long-range congressional needs for a more permanent oversight mechanism, it is essential that we have a select corn- inittee study what has gone before us and to measure past activities of our intelli- gence agencies against the laws which authorized them. For many years now we have been given constant assurances by the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelli- gence agencies that they have been forthcoming to the Congress through the appropriate Channels such as the present oversight committees. Unfortunately, events of the past few years, and more particularly of the past few weeks, ap- pear to suggest that there is an instinct on' the part of these agencies to withhold information from the Congress to protect themselves. In the past, proposals from the Con- gress, from scholars and from Presiden- tial task forces have been met with little more than indifference. Certainly public opinion and opinion in the Congress have changed. In recent years we have seen alarming evidence that the FBI has spied on Con- gressmen and on domestic political groups. The President has acknowledged that the CIA mistakenly became involved in domestic surveillance. We have had evidence of military agents spying on civilians on behalf of an agency treated by Department of Defense directive. The list gees on. ' The creation of a select committee to explore these allegations and activities as well as the overall activities and re- sponsibilities of the entire intelligence community represents an objective re- sponse by the Senate to difficult and complex circumstances. It is not a call for a witch hunt. It is an assumption of responsibility. This is an undertaking of the greatest importance. It is one which has the strong support of most of the Members of this body. It is essential that this select commit- tee begin now to obtain answers to the many questions which have been raised Iii the short run about the recent dis- closures and allegations and in the long run about the authority and functions of all of our intelligence gathering agencies. The committze should address the question of how we can balance vital national security needs with the public's nr-trnwPfl Fr Release 2006/10/19g: CIA-RDP78602992A000100010032-1 Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA-RDP78B02992A000100010032-1 ' S 980 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE right to know what its 'Government is doing and why. If the events of the past 2 years are to provide the momentum to help fashion any changes in the way we conduct our Government, they should at, the very least underscore the necessity for public accountability?in this case, account- ability to the Congress for the proper .and judicious administration of intelli- gence gathering agencies and the assur- ance that those activities are subject to the restraint of law as they impinge upon the free exercise of our constitutional rights. If the select committee is to carry out this mandate, it must not be impeded in any way in its investigations. The committee should explore still un- answered questions about the use of in- telligence agencies in the Watergate incident and any ?thee instances where agencies exceeded their a.utherity. The committee should examine the existing laws and procedures for review of their implementation and recommend necessary changes. Finally, the work of the committee should serve as a basis for restoring pub- lic confidence in the integrity and quality of our intelligence agencies.- In the December hearings before the Intergovernmental Relations Subcom- mittee, Senator BAKER testified that as a member of the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities he was told at one point in his-investigation that the CIA would supply no further in- formation to the Watergate committee but instead would supply all of the in- formation to their regular oversight committees. Senator 13axelt went on to say: That effectively ended the Watergate Com- mittee's inquiry into CIA involvement. Based on the explanation by Senator MANSFIELD and Senator PASTORE On the day Senate Resolution 21 was introduced, there should be no question about the right and the -authority of this commit- tee and its staff to obtain any informa- tion which in any way affects or relates to the intelligence activities of the Gov- ernment. _ As the able majority leader stated so well: . . . it should be made. clear that this committee-will only be able to perform its function effectively if the provisions of this resolution are liberally construed by com- mittees and by the agencies which are the subjects of its investigation. Nothing should be able to be used as a bar to a thorough investigation? neither the system for classifying na- tional secrets xior the provisions of the National Security Act itself. I am confident that the members of this committee will use this authority judiciously with the utmost concern for preserving and improving the institutions they are charged to examine. It has taken us a long time to reach this important point but the effort prom- ises to bring forth fruitful and construc- tive change. Mr. PACKWOOD, Mr. President, early last week the Senate determined to take an active role in the investigation of al- leged misconduct by the CIA and the FBI. Legislation was offered to establish a Watergate-like select committee to thoroughly examine these allegations and determine their validity. We are go- ing -to vote on that legislation this after- noon and I intend to support it. In addition to the CIA and the FBI, the select committee will also review the activities of the other Federal intelli- gence gathering agencies, including the National Security Council and the De- fense Intelligence Agency. However, the main focus will be on the heretofore largely unknown activitiee of the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. For the last 2 months, the newspapers have been replete with stories of CIA Involvement in Watergate-related in- trigue in violation of the CIA's legisla- tive mandate to restriet all intelligence gathering activities to foreign countries. Further, we have been informed that the 1,1:SI was actively and illegally wiretap- ping civil rights leaders and other poli- ticians at the 1964 Democratic Conven- tion. Who, ,Mr. President, sanctioned these wiretaps? Who suggested to the CIA that they assist E. Howard Hunt with his masquerade for the purpose of clandestinely breaking into the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist--a pat- ently illegal act? Who put together the Huston- plan to infiltrate dissident groups for the purpose of gathering in- formation on them? These are questions that need to be answered and I trust that in the course of the select committee's investigation they will be. Mr. President, the collection and cata- loging of information on individuals? without their knowledge or consent?has always been abhorrent to the American people. It is, at a minimum, a violation of the constitutional right to privacy as guaranteed by the fourth -amendment and, at maximum, a threat to one's lib- erty and freedom of expression. In the ? context of these recent revelations, we hear the phrase "police state" bandied About and I am disturbed -by it. A de- mocracy is founded on the principle that the Government is for the people, not against them. Consequently, as the elected Representatives, of the American people and their interests, it is incum- bent upon the Congress to act quickly to insure that this unwarranted intru- sion into the private lives of U.S. citizens has stopped and will not recur. The re- sponsibility is ours and the response must be ours as well. Mr. President, included within the pur- view of the select committee's inquiry is "The extent and necessity of overt and covert intelligence activities in the United States and abroad." I have al- ready expressed my deep concern for unmonitored intelligence gathering op- erations within the United States, par- ticularly those conducted by the CIA, but I would also like to remark briefly on the need for some congressional knowledge of and input into the foreign intelligence activities. Up to this time, the Congress has gen- erally had very little knowledge of CIA operations in a foreign country unless something goes wrong and a great deal January 27, 1975 of adverse publicity results. Witness the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the toppling of the. Allende government in Chile. While I dO not dispute the need for secrecy in their overseas intelligence operations, I would be interested to know if the CIA operates solely under the direction of the National Security Council and/or the President. Correspondingly, have the members of the current congressional subcommittees on intelligence oversight more often than not simply been pre- sented with a fait accompli rather than consulted during the initial decision- making process? I do not think this is at all clear and it should be. I have indicated my support for a permanent Joint Congressional Commit- tee on Intelligence Oversight which should, in theory, enjoy a more compre- hensive oversight capability than has been the case with the current subcom- mittees in the House and Senate. Given that reality, however, exactly what will that oversight capability include? And, more importantly, given the congres- sional track record on sensitive informa- tion leaks, can the security of intelligence information imparted to the oversight_ committee be guaranteed? These are very serious questions in my mind and I hope that the select committee will include them in its inquiry. Mr. President, I believe that the need for the creation of a select committee to Investigate the Federal intelligence com- munity has been amply documented. I strongly endorse its enactment. Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I rise in support of Senate Resolution 21 creating a Select Committee to Investi- gate Intelligence Activities. At the outset, I want to state that the intelligence community has served the Nation loyally and ably. Moreover, I want to take this opportunity to salute the dedicated, hard working men and women of the intelligence community whose work goes largely unheralded be- cause of the climate in which they must work. . Production of useful intelligence to guide the Nation's policy makers in mak- ing decisions relies upon the efforts of thousands of persons who do their work in a painstaking and careful way. While agent operations are important to the Nation, they constitute a very small proportion of the total intelligence effort. Agent operations have been glamorized in novels and movies. Most of us enjoy this kind of entertainment, but the image that emerges is very far from reality. The truth of the matter is that the production of intelligence requires the painstaking work of many specialists who carefully analyze information from many sources. Most of the work is far from glamorous and very far from James Bond. Under the political climate now pre- vailing, I guppose a select committee was inevitable. I would have preferred that the Senate inquire into intelligence ac- tivities through the existing committees and subcommittees that have responsi- bilities for intelligence. In supporting Senate Resolution 21, I want to make it clear that in no way Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA-RDP78B02992A000100010032-1 January 21, 1.975 Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA-RDP78B02992A000100010032-1 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 981 do I agree to the criticism that has been made concerning Our existing commit- tees. I know that our colleagues on these committees have done their utmost to carry out the -trust of the Senate. Because the.attacks on the intelligence community persist, and because part of that attack is directed to the existing committees, I am supporting Senate Res- olution 21 as a way to clear the air and set the record. When the .distinguished senior Sena- tor from Arkansas was chairman of the Permanent Investigations Subcommittee, I believe he established the procedure of having closed hearings before open hear- ings were held. If I remember correctly, the distinguished Senator from Arkansas established this procedure to protect both his subcommittee and witnesses from unnecessary embarrassment. ? It is my hope that the Senate select committee will proceed in a careful and deliberate manner. I believe the com- mittee's work, at least initially, should be in camera. ? Most of the Senators and staff, who are going to serve on the committee, are not thoroughly familiar with the orga- nization and functions of the intelli- gence community. Before any decision on open hearings is made, I would hope the members and staff would have ample opportunity to do some homework. The Senators and staff who serve on the select committee are going to have knowledge of a lot of matters which, If improperly handled, can cause our Na- tion harm, It is important that the select com- mittee establish sensible rules in dealing with the intelligence community. In other words, let us get the information we need to do the job but no more. There is a reason over and above se- curity considerations for the select corn-. rnittee to hold its meetings in camera: The basic American idea of protecting professional and. personal reputations unless unlawful or unethical acts are in- volved. Although Senate Resolution 21 does not specifically make this point, I believe the work of the select committee should have as its focus the National Security Act of 1947. rt is that act and the direc- tives issued under its provisions which have created the intelligence community as we know it today. Using the act of 1947 as a frame of reference, I-believe the select committee should have two prime objectives: First, to determine whether or not the act of 1947 needs revision. Second, to determine whether or not there have been illegal activities within the intelligence community. If there have been illegal activities, then I believe the committee must de- termine whether these illegal activities constitute a pattern or are merely aber- rations. - Sometimes what may appear to be an illegal activity may turn out to be some- thing quite different. Ultimately, the select committee will make its findings and recommendations known to the Senate. It would he a trag- edy for the Nation should this document reflect anything but the best of the Sen- ate. If surgery is required, let it be per- formed only after the most careful diag- nosis. And, if there is surgery, let us use a very sharp scalpel?not a meat ax. - Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, the Central Intelligence Agency is charged with conducting the kinds of intelligence activities that are absolutely essential to preserve our free and open democratic society in the real world in which we live. I say this because example after exam- ple has shown that our Nation must re- main ever-vigilant against the publicly stated desires of other governments to destroy our free existence. The charter establishing the CIA lim- ited it to foreign intelligence gathering. Allegations have been made that the charter has been exceeded on occasion. If correct, then much of the blame for these excesses lies with the Congress for failure to discharge its duty of congres- sional oversight. Recognizing that our Nation must have an intelligence gath- ering capacity that Congress has failed in its oversight responsibility, the ques- tion becomes: Is the creation of a select committee to investigate our, intelligence operations, with all its extensive press coverage and certain leaks, the wisest method to explore and correct past wrongs and prevent future abuses? I have grave doubts. There are many possible alternatives to such a suggested select committee. One alternative that comes immediately to mind is the creation of a permanent joint committee to oversee intelligence gathering by our Nation's agencies. Such an alternative has been offered in the form of S. 327, which I have cosponsored and intend to support. However, the realities of our current situation dictate my reluctant support of Senate Resoultion 21, with the strong reservations mentioned previously and an admonition to my colleagues that we must not breach our national security by revealing matters of truly critical impor- tance. These hearings must not be char- acterized by a veritable flood of leaks and publicity stunts that will perma- nently jeopardize the effectiveness of our intelligence operations which serve a very legitimate purpose. We must be on our guard that such legislation with a commendable purpose is not allowed, through error or excess, to undermine our country's security. Mr. PACKWOOD. Mr. President, yes- terday's Washington Post included an editorial by Walter Pincus entitled "'Spies' and Presidents." In speaking of the investigation before a select commit- tee to study the Federal intelligence community, Mr. Pincus declares that: No select Senate committee?not even a joint congressional committee?will get to the bottom of the U.S. intelligence commu- nity's problems without the full and active support of President Ford and his staff." This Is because, he goes on to say, "The inquiry into intelligence activities must inevitably find out what past Presidenta authorized the agencies to do. ? Because of its particular relevance to the bill we will vote on today, I am bring- ing this article to the attention of my colleagues. Mr. President, I ask unani- mous consent that the text of Mr. Pin-. cus' editorial be printed at this point in the Rreorto. There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the REcoao, as follows: "SPIES" AND PRESIDENTS (By Walter Pincus) No select Senate committee?not even a joint congressional committee?will get to the bottom of the U.S. Intelligence com- munity's problems without the full and ac- tive support of President Ford and his staff, The reason is simple: such an inquiry must inevitably end up trying to and out what past Presidents and their staffs authorized these agencies to do; what formal groups, such as the 40 Committee, approved; and what steps, if any, the White House ever took to stop abuses of authority or projects that were il- legal on their face. Current newspaper allegations about the Central Intelligence Agency's domestic ac- tivities and the CIA partial confirmation plus admission that the Federal Bureau of Inves- tigation has collected files on members of Congress illustrate the point. Former C/A Director Richard Helms tied the start of that agency's domestic activities in the late 1960.s to "the express concern of the President" (Lyndon Johnson), although he did not detail how this "concern" was transmitted to him. The present CIA Direc- tor, William Colby, told a Senate subcom- mittee that, under Helms, the agency on Aug. 15, 1967 established a unit within its coun- terintelligence department -"to look into the possibility of foreign links to American dis- sident elements." Two weeks later, Colby went on, the executive director of the Presi- dent's National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorder asked how the CIA might assist that inquiry. . In setting up thi commission, President Johnson's executive order had called upon all government agencies to cooperate. Colby never stated, in his prepared text, why or under what authority Helms had established the unit prior to receipt of the commission's request for assistance. Colby did add, how- ever, that later the same year "the CIA ac- tivity became part of an interagency program, In support of the national commission (on disorder), among others." What that program was and who the "oth- ers" were who received its output were not spelled out. The only known group estab- lished at that time was one Intended to work out a plan for handling disorders in Wash- ington. Former participants on that inter- agency panel from the Pentagon and Justice Department don't remember CIA having been a party. Colby's later disclosure?that at this time the agency's Office of Security "inserted 10 agents into dissident organizations operat- ing in the Washington, D.C. area . . to gather information relating to plans for demonstrations . . . that might endanger CIA personnel, facilities and information"? parallels what this interagency group did. Whatever the facts were, only information from the White House tracing establishment of such a group could shed light on how the CIA became a participant. In 1969, the CIA was asked by the White House to undertake surveillance of the Presi- dent's brother, Donald Nixon, who, accord- ing to documents from the House impeach- ment inquiry, was moving to Las Vegas where It was feared he "would come into contact with criminal elements." The agency refused, but the Secret Service Act, which requires government agencies to cooperate in the pro- tection of the President and his family, may have been the source of other such requestS. Only the WlIile House can disclose what role .AoProved For Release 2006/10 19 : CIA-RDP78B02992A000100010032-1 S 982 the CIA has been asked to play ,under that law. In 1970 and 1971, White House aides asked CIA to participate in what was known as the Huston domestic intelligence plan and to provide assistance to a former agency official, E, Howard Hunt, who at the time worked for the President. Again, the question must be raised as to what White House. authorization the agency was given to undertake the re- quested activities. Hunt's aid was cut off only when, in the words of the man who was then chief assistant to the deputy director, It appeared the agency was becoming involved in a "domestic clandestine operation." In 1971 and 1972, according to Colby, the CIA undertook Physical surveillances of five Americans including, apparently, newsman Jack Anderson, "to identify the sources of (news) leaks." This appears to complement the so-called "national security" wiretaps conducted by the FBI at the direction of the Nixon White House from 1969 to 1971. Again, the agency and the White House must make clear the authority under which the CIA conducted such operations. In March 1974, Colby "terminated the do- mestic intelligence collection program (be- gun 7 years earlier) and issued specific guide- lines that any collection of counterintelli- gence information on-Americans would only take place abroad and would be initiated only in response to requests from the FBI. . ." Was this at White House direction? And if not, could, a future President reverse such a policy? , The FBI situation is -slightly different There is no information as to how or why former FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover began collecting politically-tantalizing material about congressmen and other public figures. One point is clear, however?he frequently used the information to titillate Presidents, and apparently no Chief Executive or White House aide ever told him to stop. When the so-called "national security" FBI wiretaps were operating, Hoover regularly sent social and political gossip picked up from over- heard conversations to Nixon chief of staff, II. R. Haldeman. No objection or order to stop ever came back from the Oval Office. One other presidential role in these areas needs exploration. Were agency directors ordered by the White House to cover up certain activities when called before con- gressional ccimmittees? Former CIA Director Helms, for example, when questioned by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February 1973, was asked directly about CIA participation in a White House plan in 1969 or 1970 to coordinate domestic intelligence activities: Helms said he could not recall? though he knew full well of his activities in 1970 Huston plan discussions. Last week he- told senators he misunderstood the question. At a May 1973 hearing, Helms told senators he had no idea that Hunt, prior td public mention of the Eilsberg break in, "was going to be involved in any domestic activity." Of course, he did?that was why aid to Runt stopped. Former President Nixon and his aides kept a close watch over any congres- sional testimony that could implicate them or their assistants in Watergate. Was Helms told to mislead? If current congressional efforts to harness the intelligence community break up as a result of lack of White House cooperation, additional allegations of past wrongdoings are bound to be made because the climate both inside and outside the secret security services has changed. Strong internal agency leadership has gone. And on Capitol Hill, the old staunch defenders of intelligence ac- tivities are either gone or powerless. For those interes bed in protecting the legit- imate functions of the intelligence commu- nity, the future looks grim?indeed black if the Ford White House fails to see that, far snore is needed than a narrow blue-ribbon commission studying a very narrow set of allegations. Approved For Release 2006/10 19 : CIA-RDP78B02992A000100010032-1 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I sug- gest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER, The clerk will call the roll. The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, rask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING 0.PPICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for 2 minutes? Mr. PASTORE. I yield. JOINT REFERRALI OF CERTAIN COMMUNIC TIONS ? Mr. MANSFIELD. % President, I ask unanimous consent t t a communica- tion from, the Federal Energy Adminis- tration transmitting a study under Pub- lic Law 93-391, be ref 'red jointly to the Committees on Interi r and Insular Af- fairs, Public Works, ommerce and Fi- nance, and that a sec( nd communication received this day from the Council on En- vironmental Quality n Land Use, pre- pared as a part of it annual report, be referred jointly to t e Committees on Interior and Insulcr Affairs, Public Works, Commerce, A riculture and For- estry. The PRESIDING FeiCER. Without objection, it is so ord ed. AUTHORIZATION F R COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE T b FILE REPORTS UNTIL MEDNIGH I TONIGHT Mr. MANSFIhLD. r. President, I ask unanimous consent t at the Committee on Commerce be au orized to file re- ports until midnight ? night. The PRESIDING 10FICER. Without objection, it is so orde ed. QUORUIV CALL Mr. 1VTANSFi1fLD. J Mr. President, suggest the absence 4f a quorum. The PRESIDING 0 CER. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legi lative clerk pro- . ceeded to call the roll. Mr. PASTORE. M4. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order fat the quorum call be re cinded. The PRESIDING PFICER. Without objection, it is so orde ed. SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES The Senate continued with the con- sideration of the resolution (S. Res. 21) to establish a Select Committee of the Senate to conduct an investigation and study of governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities. Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on passage. The yeas and nays were ordered. Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I sug- gest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk pro- ceeded to call the roll. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask January 27, 1975 unanimous consent that the order for the quorum be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. - Pursuant to the previous order, the Senate will now proceed to vote on the resolution, as amended. On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered, and clerk will call the roll. ? The assistant legislative clerk called the roll. Mr. YOUNG (after having voted in the negative), On this vote I have a pair with the junior Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON). If he were present, he would vote "Yea." If I were permitted to vote, I would vote "Nay." I therefore withdraw my vote. Mr. GRIFFIN (after having voted in the affirmative). On this vote I have a pair with the Senator from Ohio (Mr. TAFT) . If he were present, he would vote "nay." If I were permitted to vote, I would vote "yea." I therefore withdraw ray vote. Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from Washington (Mr. JACKSON); the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PEW , the Senator from California ' (Mr. TUNNEY) , and the Senator from Indiana (Mr. IlAarKE) are necessarily absent. I further announce that the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. HUDDLESTON) , and the Senator from Hawaii (Mn INouYE) are absent on official business. I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PELL) , and the Senator from Cali- fornia (Mr. TaNNEY) would each vote yea." Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from New York (Mr. JAvrxs) is necessarily absent. - I also announce that the Senator from Maryland (Mr. MArmAs) , the Senator from Idaho (Mr. McCLuac) , and the Sen- ator from Vermont (Mr. STAFFORD) are absent on official business. I further announce that the Senator from Ohio (Mr. TAFT) is absent to attend a funeral. ? I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from New York (Mr. JAviTs) , and the Senator from Maryland (Mr. MATHIAS) would each vote "yea." The result was announced?yeas 82, nays 4, as follows: [Rolicall Vote No. 1 Leg.] YEAS-82 Eastland Metcalf Fannin Mondale Fong Montoya Ford Morgan Garn Moss Glenn Muskie Goldwater Nelson Gravel Nunn Hansen Pack wood Abourezk Allen Baker Bartlett Bayh Beall 13 ellmon Bentsen. Bideri Brock Brooke Buckley ' Bumpers Burdick Byrd, Harry F., Jr. Byrd, Robert C. Cannon Case Chiles Church Clark Cranston Culver Curtis Dole Dom enicl Eagle ton Hart, Gary W. Pastore Hart, Philip A. Pearson HaskellPercy Hatfield Proxmire Hathaway Hollings Hruska Humphrey Johnston Kennedy Laxalt Leahy Long Mae-nuson Tvlansfield McClellan McGee l'Govern McIntyre Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA-RDP78B02992A000100010032-1 Randolph Ribicoff Roth Schweiker Scott, Hugh Sparkman Stennis Stevens Stevenson Stone Symington Tower Welcker Williams Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA-RDP78B02992A000100010032-1 trwitcary 27, 1975 NAYS-4 helms Talmadge Scott, Thurmond William L. PRESENT AND GIVING LIVE PAIRS, As PREVIOUSLY RECORDED-2 Young, against - Griffin, for CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE. S 983 Hartke Huddleston Inouye Jackson NOT VOTING-11 Javits Stafford Mathias Taft McClure Tunney Pell So the resolution (S. Res. 21) was agreed to, as follows: S. RES. 21 Resolved, To establish a select committee of the Senate to conduct an investigation and study of governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities and of the extent, if any, to which illegal, improper, or unethical activities were engaged in by any agency of the Federal Government or by any persons, acting individually or in combina- tion with others, with respect to any intel- ligence activity carried out by or on behalf of the Federal Government; be it further Resolved, That (a) there is hereby estab- lished a select committee of the Senate which may be called, for convenience of expression, the Select Committee To Study Governmen- tal Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities to conduct an investigation and study of the extent, if any, to which illegal, improper, or unethical activities were en- gaged in by any agency or by any persons, acting either Individually or in combination with others, in.. carryingout any intelligence or surveillance activities by or on behalf of any agency of the Federal Government. ? (b) The select committee created by this resolution shall consist of eleven members of the Senate, six to be appointed by the Presi- dent of the Senate from the majority mem- bers of the Senate upon the recommendations of the majority leader of the Senate, and five minority members of . the ? Senate to be ap- p inted by the President of the Senate upon the recommendation of the minority leader of the Senate. For the purposes of para.- graph 6 of rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate, service of a Senator as a mem- ber, chairman, or vice chairman of the select committee shall not be taken into account. (c) The majority members of the com- mittee shall select a chairman and the minor- ity members shall select a vice chairman and the committee shall adopt rules and proce- dures to govern its proceedings. The vice chairman shall preside over meetings of the select committee during the absence of the chairman, and discharge such other respon- sibilities as may be assigned to him by the select committee or the chairman. Vacancies in the membership of the select committee shall not affect the authority of the remain- ing members to execute the functions of the select committee and shall be filled in the same manner as original appointments to it are made. ? (d) A majority of the members of the se- lect committee shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business, but the select committee may affix a lesser number as a quorum for the purpose of taking testimony or depositions. Sec. 2. The select committee is authorized and directed to do everything necessary or appropriate to make the investigations and study specified in subsection (a) of the first section. Without abridging in any way the authority conferred upon the select com- mittee by the preceding sentence, the Sen- ate further expressly authorizes and directs the select committee to make a complete investigation and study of the activities of any agency or of any and all persons or groups of persons or organizations of any kind which have an tendency to reveal the full facts with respect to the following mat- ters or questions: (1) Whether the Central Intelligence Agency has conducted an illegal domestic Intelligence operation in the United States._ (2) The conduct of domestic intelligence , or counterintelligence operations against United States citizens by the Federal Bureau of Investigation or any other Federal agency. (3) The origin and disposition of the so- called Huston Plan to apply United States in- telligence agency capabilities against indi- viduals or organizations within the United States. ? (4) The extent to which the Federal Bu- reau of Investigation, the Central Intelli- gence Agency, and other Federal law enforce- ment or intelligence agencies coordinate their respective activities, any agreements which govern that coordination, and the extent to which a lack of coordination has contrib- uted to activities or actions which are ille- gal, improper, inefficient, unethical, or con- trary 'to the intent of Congress. (5) The extent to which the operation of domestic intelligence or counterintelligence activities and the operation of any other ac- tivities within the United States by the Cen- tral Intelligency Agency conforms to the leg- islative charter of that Agency arid the intent of the Congress. (6) The past and present interpretation by the Director of Central Intelligence of the responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods as it relates to the provision in section 102(d) (3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(d) (3) ) that ". that the agency shall have no police, subpena, law enforcement powers, or internal security functions. . . ." (7) Nature and extent of executive branch oversight of all United States intelligence activities. (8) The need for specific legislative au- thority to govern the operations of any intel- ligence agencies 'of the Federal Govern- ment noW existing without that explicit stat- utory authority, including but not limited to agencies such as the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency. The nature and extent to which Federal agencies cooperate and exchange intelligence information and the adequacy of any regula- tions or statutes which govern such coopera- tion and exchange of intelligence informa- tion. (9) The extent to which United States in- telligence agencies are governed by Executive orders, rules, or regulations either published or secret and the extent -to which those Exec- utive orders, rules, or regulations interpret, expand, or are in conflict with specific legis- lative authority. (-10) The violation or suspected violation of any State or Federal statute by any in- telligence agency or by any person by or on behalf of any intelligence agency of the Fed- eral Government including but not limited to surreptitious entries, surveillance, wire- taps, or eavesdropping, illegal opening of the United States mall, or the monitoring of the United States mail. (11) The need for irnproved, strengthened, or consolidated oversight of United States in- telligence activities by the Congress. (12) Whether any of the existing laws of the United States are inadequate, either in their provisions or manner of enforcement, to safeguard the rights of American citizens, to improve executive and legislative control or intelligence and related activities, and to resolve uncertainties as to the authority of United States intelligence and related agen- cies. (13) Whether there is unnecessary dupli- cation of expenditure and effort in the col- lection and processing of intelligence infor- mation by United States agencies, (14) The extent and necessity of overt and covert intelligence activities in the. United States and abroad. (15) Such other related matters as the committee deems necessary in order to carry out its responsibilities under section (a). . SEC. 3. (a) To enable the select commit- tee to make the investigation and study au- thorized and directed by this resolution, the Senate hereby empowers the select com- mittee as an agency of the Senate (1) to employ and fix the compensation of such clerical, investigatory, legal, technical, and other assistants as it deems necessary or appropriate, but it may not exceed the nor- mal Senate salary schedules; (2) to sit and act at any time or place during sessions, re- cesses, and adjournment periods of the Sen- ate; (3) to hold hearings for taking testimony on oath or to receive documentary or physical evidence relating to the matters and questions It is authorized to investigate or study; (4) to require by subpena or otherwise the attendance as witnesses of any persons who the select committee be- lieves have knowledge or information con- cerning any of the matters or questions it is authorized to inveetigate and study; (5) to require by subpena or order any depart- ment, agency, officer, or employee of the executive branch of the United States Gov- ernment, or any private person, firm, or cor- poration, to produce for its consideration or for use as evidence in its investigation and study any books, checks, canceled checks, correspondence, communications, docuinent, papers, physical evidence, records, record- ings, tapes, or materials relating to any of the matters or questions it is authorized to investigate and study which they or any of them may have in their custody or under their control; (6) to make to the Senate any recommendations it deems appropriate in respect to the willful failure or refusal of any person to answer questions or give testimony in his character as a witness dur- ing his appearance before it or in respect to the willful failure or refusal of any officer, or employee of the executive branch of the United States Government or any person, firm, or corporation to produce before the committee any books, checks, canceled checks, correspondence, communications, document, financial records, papers, physical evidence, records, recordings, tapes, or materials in obedience to any subpena or order; (7) to take depositions and other testimony on oath anywhere within the United States or in any other country; (8) to procure the temporary or intermittent services of individual consultants, or orga- nizations thereof, in the same manner and under the same conditions as a standing committee of the Senate may procure such services under section 202(I) of the Legis- lative Reorganization Act of 1946; (9) to use on a reimbursable basis, with the prior con- sent of the Committee on Rules and Ad- ministration, the services of personnel of any such department or agency; (10) to use on a reimbursable basis or otherwise with the prior consent of the chairman of any subcommittee of any committee of the Sen- ate the facilities or services of any members of the staffs of such other Senate commit- tees or any subcommittees of such other Senate committees whenever the select committee or its chairman deems that such action is necessary or appropriate to enable the select committee to make the investi- gation and study authorized and directed by this resolution; (11) to have direct access through the agency of any members of the select committee or any of its investigatory or legal assistants designated by it or its chairman or the ranking minority member to any data, evidence, information, report, analysis, or document or papers, relating to any of the matters or questions which It is authorized and directed to investigate and study in the custody or under the control of any department, agency, officer, or era- Approved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA-RDP78B02992A00010Q010032-1 Approved For Release 2-006/10/19 : CIA-RDP78E302992A000100010032-.1 S 984 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE ployee of the executive branch of the United States Government, including any depart- ment, agency, officer, or employee of the United States Government having the power under the laws of the United States to inves- tigate any' alleged criminal activities or to prosecute persons charged with crimes against the United States and any depart- in.ent, agency, officer, or employee of the United States Government having the au- thority to conduct intelligence or surveil- lance within or outside the United. States, - without regard to the jurisdiction or au- thority of any -other Senate committee, which will aid: the select committee to pre- pare for or conduct the investigation- and study authorized and directed by this reso- lution; and (12) to expend to the extent it determines necessary or appropriate - any moneys made available to it by the Senate to perform the duties and exercise the powers conferred upon it by this resolution and to make the investigation and study it Is authorized by this resolution to make. (b) Subpenas may be issued by the select committee acting through the chairman or any other member designated by him, and may be served by any person designated by such chairman or other member anywhere within the borders of the United States. The chairman of the select committee, or any other member thereof, is hereby authorized to administer oaths to any witnesses appear- ing- before the committee. . (c) In preparing for or conducting the investigation and study authorized and die- rected ery this resolution, the select com? mittee shall be empowered to exercise the, powers conferred upon' committees .of the Senate by section 8003 of title 18,.? United States Code, or. any other Act of Congress regulating the granting of immunity to witnesses. - ? - ? SEC. 4. The select committee shall have au- thority to recommend the enactment of any new legislation or the amendment of a:ay existing statute which it considers neces- sary or desirable to strengthen or clarify the national security, intelligence,' or surveil- lance activities of the United States and to protect the rights of United States citizens - with regard to. those activities: SEC. 5. The select committee shall make a final report of the results of the investiga- tion. and study conducted by it pursuant to this resolution, together with its findings, and- its recommendations as to new congres- . sional legislation it deems necessary or de-. slrable? to the-Senate at the earliest practica- ble date, but no later than September _1, 1975. The select committee may also submit to the Senate such interim reports as it con- siders appropriate.- After submission of its final report, the select. committee shall have 'three calendar months to close its affairs, and. on the expiration of such three calendar months shall cease to exist. , Sec. 8. The expenses of the select commit- tee through September 1, 1975, under this resolution shall not exceed $750,000 of which amount not to. exceed $100,000 shall be avail- able for the procurement of the services ct individual consultants or Organizations thereof. Such expenses shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon-vouchers approved by the chairman of the select com- mittee. Sec. 7. The select committee shall institute and carry out such rules and procedures as it may deem necessary to prevent (1) the dis- closure, outside the select committee, or any Information relation 'to the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other department or agency of the Federal Govern- ment engaged in intelligence activities, ob- tained by the select committee during the course of its study and investigation, not authorized by the select committee to be disclosed; and (2) the disclosure, outside the select committee, of any information which would adversely affect the intelligence activi- tier of the Central Intelligence Agency in foreign countries or the intelligence activi- ties in foreign countries of any other de- partment or agency of the Federal Govern- ment. Sec. 8. As a condition for employment as described In section 3 of this resolution, each person shall agree not to accept any honor- arium, royalty or other payment for a speak- ing engagement, magazine article, book, or- other endeavor connected with the investiga- tion and study undertaken by this commit- tee. SEC. O. No employee of the select committee or any person engaged by contract or other- wise to perform services for the select com- mittee shall be given access to any classified Information by the select committee unless such employee or person has received an ap- propriate security clearance as determined by the select committee. The type of security' clearance to be required in the case of any such employee or person shall, within the determination of the select committee, be commensurate with the sensitivity of the classified information to which such em- ployee or person will be given access by the select committee. Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I move to. reconsider the vote by which the reso- lution was agreed to. Mr. MANSFIELD. I move to lay that motion on the table. ,The mo.tion to lay on the table was agreed to. SENATOR FRO CRE The PRESIDD NEW HAMPSHIRE? OPVICEle. Under the previous order, t e Senate will now pro- ceed to the consi eration of the motion by the Senator from Montana (Mr. MANSFIELD) to r er all credentials and papers dealing w h the New Hampshire election dispute to the Committee on Rules and As nistration, which the clerk will state. e time on this debate Is limited to 1 our, to be_ equally di- vided and contro led by the Senator from Montana. (Mr. ANSFIELD) and the Sen- -ator from Michi an (Mr. GRIFFIN). The Senate wi be in order. The clerk will state the motion. The legislativ clerk read as follows: The Senator Ir m Montana (Mr. MANS- FIELD) moves tha the credentials of Louis C. Wyman. and Jo n A. Durkin and all papers now on file with he Senate relating to the same be referred o the Committee on Rules and Administrat n for recommendations thereon. Mr. MANSF unanimous con business be lai that I may corn olution providin tee, on which pressed its appr The PRESID objection, it is s Mr. MANSE we have order? The PRESID ator from Mon have order in th D. Mr. President, I ask ent that the pending aside temporarily, so ete the work on the res- ' for the select commit- Senate has just ex- val. G Orlol.CER. Without ordered. LD, Mr. President, may G OrVICER,. The Sen- a has the floor. May we Senate? SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENT INTELLIGENCE AC- TIVITIES The Senate continued with the con- sideration of the resolution (S. Res. 21) January 27, 1975 to establish a select committee of the Senate to conduct an investigation and study of governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I wish to state, before proceeding with the (Us- - cussions and consideration of this resolu- tion, that insofar as the majority leader Is concerned, the chairman of the Com- mittee on Armed Services, our colleague from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS) is owed 'a. vote of thanks because throughout the years he has scrupulously endeavored, to the best of his ability and in line with his other responsibilities, to scrutinize all activities of intelligence agencies related to the defense community. He need not yield to any Member of this body his stance as the preeminent "watchdog" of the Congress in performing this critical oversight function. I commend JOHN STENNIS. The Senate commends JOHN ?STENNIS for his assiduous and conscien- tious work in this endeavor. " Mr_ President, now that the select committee has been approved by the Sen- ate, the minority leader and'I have di- rected a letter to the heads of agencies and departments of Government most ? preeminently concerned with- intelli- gence endeavors. The letter reads as follows: As you may be-aware, the Senate is to Con- duct an investigation and study of govern- ment operations with respect to intelligence activities. The scope of the investigation is set out in S. Res. 21, a copy of which has been enclosed for your information. We are writing to request that you not destroy, remove from your possession or con- - trol, or otherwise dispose or permit the dis- posal of any records or documents which might have a bearing on the subjects under investigation, including but not limited to all records or documents pertaining in any way to the matters set out in section. 2 of S. Res. 21. Sincerely yours, This letter is being directed,to heads of 19 separate governmental units as listed here: _ - JANUARY 21, 1975. Honorable William E. Colby, Director, Cen- tral Intelligence Agency, and as Coordinator of Intelligence Activities, Washington, D.C. 20505, ? Lt. Gen. Daniel 0. Graham, Director,. De- fense Intelligence Agency, The Pentagon,, Washington, D.C. 20301. Honorable William B. Saxbe, Attorney. General, Dept. of Justice, 9th and Constitu- tion N.W.. Washington, D.C. 20530. Mr. John C. Keeney, Acting Asst. Attorney General, Criminal Div., 9th and Constitution N.W., Washington, D.C. 20530. Mr. John R. Bartels Jr., Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration, 1405 Eye St. N.W.,-Washington, D.C. 20537. Honorable James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense, Room 3B 880, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301. Honorable Howard H. Callaway, Secretary of the Army. Room. 3E 718, The Pentagon, Washington. D.C. 20310. Hon. J. W. Middendorf, Secretary of the Navy, Roone-4E. 710, The Pentagon, Waehing- ton, D.C. 20350. Hon. John L. McLucas, Secretary of the Air Force, Room 4E 871, The Pentagon, Wash- ington, D.C. 20330. Lt. Gen. Lew Allen Jr., Director, National Security Agency, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755. I add that the administration about the preservation of records, documents, AnnrovAd For Release 2006/10/19 : CIA-RDP781302992A000100010032-1 Approved For Release 2006/10/19: GIA-RDP78B02992A000100010032-1 January 27, 1975 .. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD?SENATE , S 9G5 et cetera, applies as well to all agencies and subagen.cies concerned but not spe- cifically singled out. The task faced by the select commit- tee which the Senate has just established is to examine into the intelligence ac- tivities of the U.S. Government. No more important responsibility to the people of the Nation can be assumed by Senators than membership on this committee. What is asked of them, in the name of the Senate, is to probe fully and to as- sess completely, to understand thorough.- ly and to evaluate judiciously. To the ex- tent that the intelligence agencies have acted correctly and within the law, that must be made known. If there have been abuses, they, too, must be set forth, There can be no whitewash in this inquiry; nor is there room for a vendetta. In the end, the Senate must know what has tran- spired so that it may seek to close legal loopholes if there are any. In the end, we must know so that together with the House and the President, we may move to foreclose any demeaning of the basic premises of a free society. What is at stake in the work of this committee is a resolution of doubts. What is at stake is a restoration of confidence in a large and costly and little known segment of the Federal Government. The Senate must be satisfied that the intelli- gence community is doing the people's business, to the end that the Nation may be with assurance so advised. The Sen- ate must be persuaded that what is be- ing done in the name of security under a cloak of obscurity is the people's busi- ness, as defined, not by employees of a Government agency, but the people's business as defined by the Constitution and the laws duly enacted thereunder. The committee is called on, further- more, to elucidate for the Senate the relevance of the intelligence commu- nity as it now operates to the Nation's contemporary needs. We need to know what may be required, today, not what might have seemed necessary yesterday. The fact that a commission is looking into the CIA is all to the good; the re- sponsibility of that group is to the Presi- dent who created it. Its existence in no way relieves us of our responsibilities. It is appropriate and proper at any time that the Senate so determines, to inquire into any agency and, as necessary, to seek to clarify and redefine its functions and the scope of its activities. One aspect of the impending inquiry concerns covert activities. Thsee activ- ities have been acquiesced in, to say the least, by the Congress for a long time. No one should be surprised or appalled, therefore, to discover their existence a quarter of a century later. In recent years, however, the extent and necessity for them have come under question. Who sets the policy and why? What obtuse intrusions may there have been by these activities into the President's conduct of iforeig-n affairs? What indifference, if any, to the laws passed by the Congress? What damage, if any, to the demeanor of the Nation? What interference in the personal lives of Americans and by whose authority and under what guidelines? What public funds have been committed and to what end? What proliferation of activities and how much overlap , and duplication? It used to be fashionable, Mr. Presi- dent, for members of Congress to say that insofar as the intelligence agencies were concerned, the less they knew about such questions, the better. Well, in my judgment, it is about time that that at- titude went out of fashion. It is time for the Senate to take the trouble and, yes, the risks of knowing more rather than less. We have a duty, individually, and collectively, to know what legislation en- acted by Congress and paid for by ap- propriations of the people's money has spawned in practice in the name of the United States. The Congress needs to recognize, to accept and to discharge with care its coequal responsibility with the Presidency in these matters. The Senate has begun to address itself to these questions by approving the cre- ation of this select committee. There is a need to understand not only the pres- ent intelligence requirements of the United States but also what systems or procedures for oversight and account- ability may be required to keep them within bounds set by the Constitution. the President and the elected Repre- sentatives of the people in Congress. Wisely, I believe, a special committee for handling the investigation has been established by this action today: The scope of inquiry is far larger than can come within the purview of any single committee. Hopefully, within the select committee, the pieces?all of the pieces? can be fitted together. May I say that in- sofar as the Senate is concerned, I think this action expresses the expectation that the matter will be concentrated in this one committee. In my judgment, it would be most inappropriate for a bevy of studies of ? intelligence to proceed simultaneously in several others. May I say, Mr. President, that this in no -way conflicts with the legislative jurisdiction of the legislative committees so charged. The select committee is equipped with a bipartisan membership. The Senators who will be selected for service on this committee are no different than the rest of us. They are not tied with a blue rib- bon or a white or pink ribbon. There is no higher or lower order of patriotism in the Senate. There are no first- and sec- ond-class Senators. Those who will serve are men of competence, understanding, and decency. They will do the job which -the circumstances and the Senate re- quire of them. The committee has been equipped with full authority to study, to hold hearings and to investigate all ,activi- ties?f ?reign and domestic?of the intel- ligence agencies of the Federal Govern- ment. In the pursuit of that mandate, I have every confidence that the commit- tee will act with discretion, with re- straint and with a high sense of na- tional responsibility. There is no cause and inclination to pursue this matter as a Roman circus or a TV spectacular. There is only the need to see to the sober discharge of very sober responsibilities. How the committee proceeds is largely up to the members of the committee. They have the authority to make their rules and to define their procedures, and that would include the question of when to close or open the door to the use of television. As I have indicated, I would not anticipate any great requirements for the latter at this time. Most emphat- ically, I would express the hope, too, that committee staff would be selected with as much concern for discretion as for other qualifications. What comes to the - public from this committee and when, ought to be solely?I stress the word "solely"---determined by the members of the committee. The Senate is entrusting this commit- tee with its deepest confidence. I know that that trust is secure and that the re- sults of the inquiry will reflect the high- est credit on this institution. I submit to the Chair the names Of those assigned to the Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities and ask that they be read and I do so on behalf of the distinguished Republican leader and myself. The PRESIDING OvriCER. The clerk will read the nominations; The assistant legislative clerk read as follows: Senators Church, Hart of Michigan, Mon- dale, Huddles ton, Morgan, and Hart of Colorado. Mr. MANSFIELD. The Republicans also. The assistant legislative clerk read as follows: Senators Tower, Baker, Goldwater, Mathias, and Schweiber. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSEal-tE--- CREDENTIALS ? The Senate 'continued with the con- S. sideration of ti credentials of the claim- ants to be U. Senator from the State of New Hamps ' re. The PRESI ING Oreactlis Who yields time? Mr. MANSFIIrLD. Mr. President, are we back'on the regular order of business? The PRESID G OlevICER. We are back on the Ma.4sfield motion. The Senator frr Illinois is recognized. RESOLUTION LLA.TIVE? TO THE DEATH OF REPRESENTATIVE JOHN C. LIJ1CZYNSKI, OF ILLI- NOIS ' Mr. PERCY. M. President, I ask the Chair to laY befor ;the Senate a message from the House on H.R. 97. The PRESIDINGt OlenCER. The clerk will read the message from the House. The assistant legislative clerk read as follows: i Resolved, That the 6ouse has heard with, profound sorrow of the death of the Honor- able John C. Kluczy ski, a Representative ? from the State?. of Elit.ois. Resolved, That a committee of 65 Members of the House, with such Members of the Sen- ate as may be joined, be appointed to attend the funeral. Resolved, That the Srgeant at Arms of the House be authorized .nd -directed to take such steps as may be ecessary for carrying out the provisions of ese resolutions and that the necessary expenses in connection \ Approved For Release 2006/10/19: GIA-RDP78B02992A000100010032-1 Aitproved For Release 2006/10/19: CIA-RDP78B02992A000100010032-1 El UNCLASSIFIED luNSTEERM 0 CONFIDENTIAL El SECRET ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET ____, ........_.... .. SUBJECT: (Optional) FROM: EXTENSION NO. George L. Cary Legislative Counsel DATE STAT 28 January 1975 TO: (Officer designation, roam number, and building) DATE OFFICER'S COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom RECEIVED FORWARDED INITIALS to whom. Drow a line across column after each comment.) 1 . Mr. Carver Attached for your information 2. 7 E 62 Headquarters is the floor debate on the Senate Select Committee to study governmental intelligence 3.STAT activities and the full text of the resolution establishing it. , 4. 5. 4GEQ1cGE L. CARV Legislative Counsel 6. 7. ri, .5t t Po . 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. - Attachment FORM610 USE PREVIOUS I?I crrDeT El INTERNAL EDigarrove-ePFofrldbAse 2CU/16PV:IPOKI*78B19.2.99PINO i 1.0001006-1 1 UNCLASSIFIED