HEREWITH OPTION X

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78B02992A000100070002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 7, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 11, 1975
• Content Type: MF

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11 December 1975
MEMORANDUM F'OR: DDCI
Mr. Duckett
Mr. Proctor
Mr. Nelson
Mr. Blake
Gen. Wilson
Mr. Carver
Dr. Chamberlain
Mr. Warner
Mr. Cary
Mr. Brec inridge
Mr. .Knoche
Herewith Option X as approved by the DCI this
afternoon.. He made very minor changes to the lunch-
time draft, but wants this included in the Ogilvie
paper. i suggested instead that we discuss tactics at
to ensure
the 9 o'clock tomorrow, and have asked
that Ogilvie's paper is held open for this op ion if
i
me.
the DCI so decides at that t
RICHARD LEHMAN
STAT
STAT
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Rationale
Option X--.CIA Emphasis
This Option starts from the premise that CIA is a
vital national asset that must be preserved and, if
possible, strengthened. It recognizes that the DCI's
power rests primarily on CIA, and that his authority
over the Community, except for CIA, is limited. It
assumes it will remain so. Under these circumstances his
efforts to provide vigorous Community leadership conflict
with his interests as Director of CIA. This option seeks
to.amelioraate this conflict by making a clear distinction
between these two roles, and by providing a spokesman for
CIA interests. At the same time it recognizes that effec-
tive Community management can only be achieved by a collec-
tive effort of the agencies involved, and presents a new
concept of how this.might be done.
Description.
The DCI would remain Director of CIA, but would be
provided with an additional Deputy, appointed by the
President and confirmed by Congress. The present Deputy
would be a civilian specifically responsible for manag-
? ing the Agency under the DCI; the other Deputy would be
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responsible under the DCI for coordination of the
Community. The DCI would have an Agency office at
Langley and a Community office downtown, where his
Community Deputy would be located.
The DCI would be the President's chief intelligence
advisor, and would be a member of the NSC.
The DCI would chair an NSC Executive Committee for
Intelligence, with Deputy Secretaries of State and-Defense
as members. The Committee would have under control of
its members all important' intelligence assets, and could
act as a board of directors for national-intelligence. It
would not be advisory to the DCI but would work by consen-
sus, with right of appeal to the President. EXCOM(I)
would absorb the functions of NSCIC, EXCOM (NRO plus
equivalent responsibilities for NSA), IRAC, and USIS
(except national intelligence production*). It would in
addition coordinate policy matters affecting State and the
Community.
The DCI's "Community" Deputy would be his alternate
in EXCOM(I) but would not serve as Chairman in his absence.
The IC Staff would be the secretariat of. EXCOM(I). The
DCI would carry out. his existing responsibilities for the
NFIP (less its tactical and departmental components)
with the assistance of the Committee. EXCOM(I) would
* It would be inappropriate for policy officers to parti-
cipate in substantive intelligence judgments.
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have approval authority for the NFIP (CIA, NRO, NSA)
and its decisions would be binding. The DCI would
have administrative authority only over CIA. Present
administrative arrangements for the NRP and NSA would
be preserved.
USIB would be reconstituted as a National Intelli-
gence Board, responsible only for production, and advisory
to the DCI. The NIO's would act as the DCI's staff for the
NIB. The :Board would be chaired by the DCI, with his
"Agency" Deputy as CIA member. The latter would serve as
chairman in his absence. Under the policy direction of
USNIB, the Deputy would become Executive Agent for produc-
tion of the full range of national intelligence, drawing
on departmental agencies as required and submitting products
for coordination as USNIB directs. (The Board might even
be thought of as sort of a Board of National Estimates).
The DCI would be a member of the 40 Committee, but
not its Chairman, with his Agency Deputy as alternate.
Clandestine collection and covert action would remain
assigned to CIA, without. change in present arrangements.
Without administrative authority over the Community,
it would be inappropriate for the DCI to have an IG
responsibility except over CIA. This Option assumes an
oversight mechanism at the NSC or White House level.
The DCI would continue to be the Conununity spokesman
to Congress.
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EXCOM(I) would handle matters relating to the
relationship between tactical and national intelligence.
The DCI would have no responsibility-for the tactical
intelligence budgets of the military services, or for
the service cryptologic agencies.
Other Considerations
By stipulating that the DCI will coordinate policy
and manage production, this option recognizes reality
and at the same time strengthen's the DCI in his strong
suit. Management issues usually involve _the alloca-
tion of resources. It is here that the interests and
weight of Defense are most important. Also these issues
require decisions; once the money is spent the existence
of a dissent carries no weight. Thus it is. here that
the DCI must be most ecumenical if he is to avoid charges
of "partiality" to CIA.
Production issues are quite different. Here the
DCI is supposed to be objective and free of departmental
bias, and CIA's production elements are precisely the in-
struments whereby he is supposed to achieve this objec
tivity. Moreover, they are fully capable of holding
their own against Defense. If the DCI is to be objective,
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he must rely on and be "partial" to CIA. Here too, more-
over, the right of dissent is effective; the DCI's judg-
ment is. permanently accompanied by any alternate views.
The DCI is therefore able to take a much stronger position.
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THE ROLE OF THE DCI
0 8 D7 C t75
(Talking paper for use in closed session with the Senate Select
Committee on Thursday, 11 December 1975..)
INTRODUCTION
1. Role of the DCI is difficult to describe in the
abstract since it depends on a variety of factors, of which
the authority actually assigned him by law or directives is
only one.
Other important factors include:
a. The world situation, and the type of problems
which are most critical to the United States.
b. The expectations of the President, and how'the
President approaches his decision making.
c. The personality and character of the DCI himself.
3. A brief look at the primary focus of individual DCI's
suggests what each of them considered most important--and indicates
a wide diversity in their approaches to the job:
a. The first DCIs, through the period of General
Smith, focused almost entirely on organizational matters,
establishing the CIA and defining its role.
b. Allan Dulles devoted most of his attention to
covert action, and in his period this loomed large in CIA
resource use.
C. Mr. McCone was primarily interested in improving
the quality of estimates, and in initiating several of the
major technical collection systems on which the Community
now puts so much dependence.
d. Admiral Raborn was in the job hardly long enough
to become a major influence in any particular area.
e. Mr. Helms divided his attention primarily between
service to the President and supervision of overseas
operations of the Agency.
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f. Dr. Schlesinger was DCI for only a very brief
period, and he put his major attention during those months
to matters of restructuring and reorienting CIA.
g. My tour has been devoted largely to serving as
spokesman for the Intelligence Community and strengthening
Community aspects of the U.S. intelligence effort. I have
paid less attention to details of Agency operation than
most of my predecessors.
4. It was only shortly before Dr:- Schlesinger and I came
into the office that the President issued his landmark directive
of 5 November 1971. on "Organization and Management of the U.S.
Foreign Intelligence Community."
a. I should stress that this document, and NSCID No.. 1
which put the President's Memorandum in directive form, added
to the responsibilities of the DCI, but did nothing to increase
his authority. That authority, then and today, extends only
to the CIA.
b. It was this directive which, for the first time,
charged the DCI to prepare for the President an annual. budget
recommendation for the entire Intelligence Community, including
tactical intelligence.
c. The directive also charged the DCI to:
(1) Plan and review all intelligence activities
and the allocation of all intelligence resources.
(2) Produce the national intelligence required
by the President and other national consumers.
(3) Chair and staff all Intelligence Community
advisory boards or committees.
(4) Reconcile intelligence requirements and
priorities within budgetary constraints.
d. The President put special emphasis on. the need for:
(1.) Assuring authoritative and responsible leadership
for the Community as a whole.
(2) Continuing review of the U.S. intelligence
effort with respect to national requirements.
(3) More efficient use of resources by the
Community in the,collection of intelligence information.
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(4) Review and revision of the assignment of
intelligence functions within the Community to
? eliminate inefficient, unnecessary or outmoded
activities.
(5) Improvement in the quality, scope and
timeliness of the Community's product.
(6) Use of intelligence to enhance the formulation
of the foreign, military and economic policies of the
U.S. Government, and the planning for and conduct of
military operations.by U.S. forces.
5. On the basis of my experience in seeking to execute
this directive, I see the DCI role as involving three basic
ingredients.
6. First, he must assure that high quality intelligence.
is provided to the President and to policy and decision-making
levels of the Government.
a. This involves a variety of tasks.
(1) The DCI must seek to assure that the
Intelligence Community has adequate resources to
collect, process, and produce the intelligence needed;''
(2) He must assure there are mechanisms for
liaison with consumers to determine what is needed,
and that sound analysis is applied to the development
of estimates.
(a) To this end, I have put great reliance
on my National Intelligence Officers and the
United States Intelligence Board.
(b) I also have used my Intelligence
Community Staff to review and evaluate the
performance of the Community, particularly in
crisis situations.
(3) The DCI must provide guidance to the Intelli-
gence Community',' both as to current needs and as the
basis for planning.
(a) To accomplish this I have used a
number of guidance documents.
1. Key Intelligence Questions are
published annually to identify matters of
particular importance, and we have developed
procedures to evaluate the manner in which
the agencies of the Community respond to
the KIQs.
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2. "Substantive objectives" are included
in my annual Objectives for the Intelligence
Community.
3. Guidance for the coming five years is
provided in my annually issued Perspectives for
Intelligence.
4. Supplementing the Perspectives we
annually prepare a directive (DCID 1/2) which
provides specific listing of the priority which
applies to each of more-than 100 topics of
intelligence interest. This measure of expected
importance to U.S. interests is assigned by topic
to each country of the world to which some intelli-
gence importance attaches. The guidance is applicable
for planning purposes over the next five years.
(b) My National Intelligence Officers and my
Intelligence Community Staff are directly involved in
the development of these guidance documents.
7. The second major DCI function is what-is often referred
to as "management" of the Intelligence Community, but can'more
aptly be called leadership of the Community.
a. The leadership role of the DCI depends in large
measure on the guidance-which he issues and his use of
coordination mechanisms such as the United States Intelligence
Board and the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee.
(1) This is because he has no authority actually
to manage any elements of the Community except the CIA
and the two small offices which directly support him:
The National Intelligence. Officers and the Intelligence
Community Staff.
b. The DCI has two primary vehicles for his involve-
ment in Community management decisions.
(1) The first of these applies to the Community
as a whole. It is his National Foreign Intelligence
Program Recommendation which he submits to the President
each December through the OMB.
(a) In preparation for this document, the
DCI's Intelligence Community Staff participates
in detailed budget'reviews with the major organizations
of the Community.
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(b) Major issues are raised for discussion
before the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee,
which the DCI chairs.
(c) By the time the program recommendation is
ready to go to the President, the DCI is quite
aware of the management issues which are engaging
the components of the Intelligence Community. His
guidance during reviews, and his recommendations
set forth in the program recommendation document
are a major element of the DCI's Community
management role.
(2) The second management vehicle available to
the DCI is a specialized one stemming from the fact
that he is chairman of the two-man Executive Committee
(or EXCOM) for the National Reconnaissance Program.
(a) The second member is the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
(b) This EXCOM arrangement is based on a
ten-year old agreement between the Secretary of
Defense and the DCI, and stems from the fact that
both the CIA and the Defense Department are deeply
involved in the space satellite business.
(c) The EXCOM is responsible for decisions
on the program-and budget of the National
Reconnaissance Program.
(d) No comparable EXCOM arrangement exists
for the other major collection programs (signals
intelligence and human source activities).
c. Despite existence of the NRO EXCOM and the National
Foreign Intelligence Program Recommendation, I feel it
necessary to stress that the DCI is not the manager of the
national intelligence effort.
d. In an overall sense, he is its leader, its spokesman,
its primary coordinator, but not its manager.
8. The third major DCI responsibility stems from his position
as'operating head of the Central Intelligence Agency.
a. Because of competing demands on my time, particularly
Community matters and the requirement that I serve as spokesman
for the Community and advisor of the NSC, I have left the
detailed management of the Agency largely to my Deputy
Directors.
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b. My role has been primarily one of issuing
dir?lctives and utilizing a system of management by
objective to measure accomplishments and to assess
responsiveness of the Agency to its responsibilities.
(1) I have been very fortunate in having
top quality deputies in whom I could put great
reliance.
DESCRIPTION OF OPTIONS
9. Looking to the future, I recognize: that there are a
considerable number of options applicable to definition of the
role of the senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer--whether
or not he is termed the DCI.
10. In my view, determining which option is best requires
decisions in three areas.
ll.' First, what does the President expect of his senior
intelligence officer and how does he intend to use him?
.a. Since this is a matter which each President must
decide, I will not explore it in any length.
b. Suffice it to say the senior intelligence officer'
can be:
(1) Someone who is a Presidential confidant, or,
at the other extreme, might see him very seldom.
(2) An operating manager of the entire Community,
or a coordinator, or even a first-among-equals.
12. Second, what authority is the senior intelligence officer
to have with respect to resource matters?
a. Is he to be responsible for actually approving'
the budgets cf component organizations of the Intelligence
.Community in detail?
b. Or is he to be charged only with recommending
an overall budget figure without specific approval authority?
Or is he to have no Community budgetary role at
13. And, third, is the senior intelligence officer to
continue as the operating head of the CIA or be separated from
the Agency?
S M,
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14. Determination as to detail,-; of the role of the senior
intelligence officer can be worked out once decisions have been
reached as to the second and third of the factors I have mentioned--
budgetary authority and the relation to management of CIA.
15. With these factors in mind, I visualize four major
.options for determining the role of the DCI (or whatever title
is given to the senior intelligence officer) and for working
out the kind of Intelligence Community structure which will
enable that role to be fulfilled.
16. I would like to sketch these-four options briefly, and
indicate the PROs and CONs that apply to each.
THE FIRST OPTION
17. The senior foreign intelligence officer would be a
member both of the White House Staff and of the National Security
Council. He would have supervisory and direct management authority
over the major national intelligence organizations--CIA, NSA and
.NRO. The CIA would have a separate director. The NSA and NRO
would each become a. statutory executive agency. The senior
intelligence officer would have responsibility for production of
national estimates. and for the warning function, and would have
a staff for these purposes. Departmental and agency intelligence
would be a responsibility of the departments and agency (CIA).'.--
Community coordination mechanisms would be as desired by the
senior intelligence officer..
a. PROs
(1) The President and the Congress would have
one man upon whom to charge responsibility for
effectiveness of the U.S. national intelligence effort--
and that man would have the tools to carry out the job.
(2) The national intelligence effort would be
highly centralized through direct management controls
from the top, embracing CIA, NSA and NRO.
(3) Responsibility for substantive national
intelligence of direct interest to the President and
the NSC would be located in the White House Staff.
(4) The Intelligence Community would have a
senior spokesman with greater access to the President
than the DCI now has.
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(5) Separation of the senior intelligence officer
from CIA would eliminate any charge of favoritism from
other agencies.
(6) Clear delineation of organizational functions
and responsibilities would be enhanced.
b. CONS
(l) Such extreme concentration of intelligence
authority in a single person would pose serious problems
if that person is politically-motivated and more
interested in responding to policymaker desires than
in concentrating on unbiased intelligence.
(2) The Department of Defense could be expected
to object strenuously to separate executive agency
status for NSA and NRO, which are now within Defense.
(3) Major legislative actions would be required.
(4;) The necessary bureaucratic changes would have
a major, if only temporary, unsettling impact within
the Intelligence Community.
(5) Unless adequate coordination machinery is
provided, conflict could arise among the departmental
secretaries and the senior intelligence officer over
estimates prepared in the White House Staff and over
what is national and what is departmental intelligence.
(6) The senior intelligence officer would require
a sizeable separate staff.
(7) The national intelligence and warning production
staff would be handicapped by lack of direct access to-
the analytic base.
THE SECOND OPTION
18. The senior intelligence officer would be attached to
the Office of the President and serve as advisor to the NSA. The
CIA would have a separate director. The senior intelligence
officer would have responsibility for production of national
estimates and for the warning function. Budgets of the CIA, NSA
and NRO would require approval of the senior intelligence officer,
but he would have no direct management authority over these
organizations. NSA and NRO would remain, as now, within the
Department of Defense structure. The senior intelligence officer
would serve as Inspector General of the Community for the
President.
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. a. PROs
(1) Some of the PROs for this option are the
same as those for Option One:
(a) Increased access to the President
by an intelligence spokesman.
(b) Separation of .the senior intelligence
officer from CIA to reduce any charges of
favoritism.
(c) Responsibility for production of
national estimates would still be in the
White House Staff.
(2) Other PROs directly applicable to the
second option are these:
(a) The senior intelligence officer would
not be burdened with administrative management
chores since he would not have management
responsibility for CIA, NSA and NRO, but he still
would hold a strong hand through his budget approval
authority.
(b) Little legislative action would be
required.
(c) Defense Department objectives might be
less strong than in the case of Option One.
b. CONs
(1) The CONs for this option also include some
of those applicable to Option One.
(a) Location of the senior intelligence
officer within the White House Staff would increase
the risk of politicization of the intelligence
effort.
(b) 'There would be a major, even if only
temporary, unsettling effect within the Intelligence
Community.
(c) The senior intelligence officer's staff
for production of substantive intelligence would
be handicapped by lack of direct access to the
analytic, base.
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(d) Unless coordination mechanisms were
particularly effective there would be risk
of conflicts with departmental secretaries over
the content of estimates produced by the senior
intelligence officer and over determination as
to what are national and what departmental intelli-
gence activities.
(2) Other CONs directly applicable to Option Two
are these:
(a) The line of authority of the senior
intelligence officer would be limited to budgetary
control.
(b) Budget controls might not be sufficient
to eliminate "end runs" by agency heads.
(c) Detailed control by the senior intelli-
gence officer of sensitive clandestine (CIA)
activities would be weakened by bureaucratic
barriers.
THE THIRD OPTION
19. The senior foreign intelligence officer would be
as now, the operating head of the CIA. The CIA would retain
its present function, and existing Community coordination organs
would continue. The CIA would chair Executive Committees--or
EXCOMs--for the NSA and well as the NRO. These EXCOMs would
have approval authority for programs and budgets of NSA and NRO,
but the organizations would remain within the Department of Defense.
Departmental intelligence activities, including tactical intelli-
gence, would be solely departmental responsibilities. The DCI
would have two deputies, with appropriate staffs, one for Community
management and one for direct management of CIA.
(1) The present Community structure would be
maintained and somewhat strengthened.
(2) The DCI would have more responsibility
than now for the three major national programs--CIA,
NSA and NRO--encompassing the major collection activities
(SIGINT, imagery and human source).
(3) The concept. of a national intelligence
Community independent of departmental or White House
pressures would be continued.
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(4) Conflicts between the DCI and departmental
? heads concerning departmental intelligence activities
would be minimized.
(5) The DCI would continue to serve as spokesman
before Congress for all national intelligence activities.
(6) Bureaucratic changes would be few, so
turbulence would be minimal.
(7) No legislative action would be needed for
organizational changes.
b. CONS
(1) The senior foreign intelligence officer
would continue to be separated from the White House
and would still be clearly subordinate to the Secretaries
of State and Defense in the NSC structure.
(2) The DCI would have only partial authority
for non-CIA budgets and programs.
(3) Problems of DCI and CIA access to sensitive
departmental activities and communications would
continue.
(4) Some ambiguities would continue concerning
.differentiation between national and departmental or
tactical intelligence activities.
(5) Adoption of?this "partial" option would
mean missing an opportunity for a major reshuffling
within the Intelligence Community which could markedly
enhance the authority of the senior foreign intelligence
officer and erase the bad image which the CIA has
recently acquired.
THE FOURTH OPTION
20. The Intelligence Community concept would be abandoned.
The DCI would have no operating responsibilities other than as
head of the CIA. No consolidated Intelligence Community budget
recommendations would be prepared. State, Defense and CIA would
separately support intelligence needs of policy levels of the
Government. Some agency and departmental functions could be
redistributed. (An example would be transfer of CIA responsibilities
for collection and analysis of technical intelligence to the
Defense Department.)
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a. PROs
(1) Visibility of CIA would be reduced, which
could assist continuation of clandestine activities.
(2) Renaming of CIA and reduction in the scope
of its responsibilities could enhance a "fresh start."
(3) The CIA service and support structure could
be reduced somewhat.
(L) Specialized activities, such as technical
intelligence, could be concentrated in a single
department.
(5;1 Reduction in the analytical role of CIA
could facilitate creation of an intelligence analytic
staff in the NSC structure to produce national intelligence.
b. CONS
(1) Resource constraints and increasing dependence
on technology in intelligence activities emphasizes
the need for greater centralization of intelligence
management, not abandonment of a Community concept.
(2) The DCI would not be able to provide service
to the Congress commensurate with what he now does.
(3) Coordination of national intelligence estimates
and other national intelligence activities would be
much more difficult.
(4) Independence of intelligence advice and
assessments to the. President and the NSC would be much
reduced. Parochial views could well replace a broad
interdisciplinary approach.
(5) The CIA would lose much of its present
flexibility in support to the Government as a whole.
(6) Bureaucratic upheaval costs would be high.
(7) CIA would experience a major loss of cohesion
and lowering of morale.
21. The foregoing discussion of basic options and their
pros and cons represents only my personal views.
IQ FM? FT
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22. Obviously, there are many variations within each of
these options. And others may think of additional pros and
cons.
23. The Administration has not yet developed a formal
..position, and I do not wish to express any personal preference
-in advance of the Administration decision.
24. I trust, however, that I have provided you with food
for thought which will be useful in the'followon discussions
which you hold among yourselves.
SEC RL F.
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