NOTIFICATION(Sanitized) OF NON-ACCEPTABILITY OF TWO OF OUR OVERRUN PROPOSALS

Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP78B04770A002800020003-8
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
C
Document Page Count: 
10
Document Creation Date: 
December 28, 2016
Document Release Date: 
May 19, 2005
Sequence Number: 
3
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
November 3, 1967
Content Type: 
MF
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP78B04770A002800020003-8.pdf632.33 KB
Body: 
1. I have attached basic iafozption providing the .background :for the overrun condition, oft contreotst the, Vu-graph.Meker; end _ the , P. Y. Print .Enlarger .?3 Nor 67 DATE OF DOG I DATE RECD DATE I 3 l TO. Chief, Support Staff FROM USPENSE DATE sdEfi. Notification of Of I Accepter i1ity of of our overrun Proposals 13i, r'ibution: m/#:/ 3S Orig .&'I,': j /A{TD CROSS REFERENCE ORS POINT OF FILING DATE SENT. Approved For Release 2005/06/06: CIA-RDP78B0677 A00 00020O 3- ec9ass eviewby hGA. 25X; I Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP78BO477OA002800020003-8 BEST COPY AVAILABLE Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP78BO477OA002800020003-8 Approved For Release 2005/06/06 CIA-RDP78BO477OA002800020003-8 OVERRUN CONDITION OF THE VUGRAPH MAKER AND P.I. PRINT ENLARGER X1 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1 X1 1. The Projects for the Viewgraph Maker and thePl Print Enlarger are presently under separate contracts with the predicts that both of these contracts will require about a 50% overrun to complete. The Government is seriously concerned about the magnitude of these overruns and the fact that they were not anticipated sooner. It is hoped that will carefully examine its performance on these contracts to determine if they are representative of the standards by which is to be judged. 2. Significant historical data for each project is provided below. Comments are included to emphasize certain aspects of cited documents or events. 3. At this time, the Government can find no gross technical deficiencies in the basic concept of-,the equipment being furnished under the subject contracts; although a thorough evaluation of technical performance must of course, rest on the acceptability of the delivered items. However, the target costs of the contracts have already been reached and =estimates considerable des* n and engineering effort yet to be carried out. This, and comments from July monthly report for the PI Print Enlarger (Statement A.3. - "Redesign was effected in a number of major areas."), suggest that technical performance was open to some criticism. 25 25 4+. The most disturbing aspect of II performance rests in its 25 inability to predict costs either before or after contract negotiations. The Government puts great trust in a contractor's ability to accurately account for past costs and to predict future costs with a reasonable degree of accuracy. proposals stressed its ability to accomplish such controls and the contract was awarded relying on I intent to do so. 25 When the contractor grossly underestimates his future efforts, he creates administrative delays that prolong the completion of the project. He may also disturb the Government's R&D budget to such an extent that other projects are jeopardized. In the two projects under discussion, 25 consistently predicted via its monthly reports that the projects were in no financial difficulty. last monthly reports were delayed, but verbal contacts with project managers predicted no overruns. When I Isuddenly predicted a 50% overrun on the PI Print Enlarger, the Govern- ment was immediately concerned about the financial status of the Viewgraph Maker. However, two =personnel reported that the latter project would not have an overrun. Within two weeks, this statement was contradicted by the same personnel and a 5010 overrun was estimated. 5. submitted independent proposals for the PI Print Enlarger and for the Viewgra h Maker. The contracts were negotiated and signed at different times. should have estimated its target costs on the basis Approved For Release 2005/06106 7 CFA- QP78B04770A002800020003-8 Approved For Release 2005/66/06 .: CIA-RDP78B0477OA002800020003-8 that only one contract would be signed. Since both contracts were let, and since both projects had considerable common technology, design, and even component parts, II should have been in a position to exploit these commonalities to the financial benefit of itself and the Government. 6. The Directorate concerned has informed the Government's Contracting Officer that it will not accept its estimated total costs to complete the projects as a ceiling price. Therefore, the Government is confronted with an uncertain total cost for either project and cannot assess the cost effectiveness of the equipment. Due to the magnitude of the estimated overruns and because of I luncertainty of these overruns, the Government could decide to terminate these contracts. This would mean that the Government would have spent a considerable amount of money and received virtually nothing for it. The Government should request that =review both projects and suggest any alternative courses of action that would be of more advantage to the Government (~rnrfr nr`'rF,I Approved For Release 20050'/I~ ; ~ Cl%- ID P Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RD' O78B04770A002800020003-8 HISTORICAL DATA FOR PROTECT #10197, VIEWGRAPH MAKER CONTRACT PROTECT 9619 4 November 1966. I Isubmitted Technical Proposal, (dated 2 November 1966). Total price quoted for two units was Of particular interest is section 5.2.3 of the pro- posal describing computerized PERT controls to predict costs and time periods for the completion of programs. 17 March 1967. I Ireported an increase in overhead and G&A rates and quoted a fixed'price of I for two units. 13 April 1967. Contract I Iwas executed with a tar et cost and target fee totalling The only amendment to tar 25X proposal was the inclusion of ground glass port for viewing the image plane. This contract was a cost-plus-incentive-fee type. The period of performance was to be from 13 April 1967 to 14 August 1967. The fee was subject to an 80-20 share on all costs over or under target costs. 21 Aril 196 . The Contracting Officer's technical representatives, I land discussed the project with The designers expressed some concern about the adequacy of the 10-15 Platemaster in accomplishing the task. They decided to use an 11-17 Platemaster as a basic framework for the Viewgraph Maker. 8 May 1967. Layout Study J92208-115703 was completed. At this point areas requiring extensive design effort should have been identified. 12 May 1967. to discuss 25X the project. I Irevealed no serious technical problems to be overcome. 31 May 1967. I Isent its first monthly report. Some parts had already been ordered. Total costs were predicted to be exactly the target costs of the contract.. 23 June 1967. II sent its second monthly report. This report covered the period of 1 to 31 May. Some parts were -received. Intended progress during the next month (June) predicted the completion of "...all design efforts." (emphasis added) and*"Release all items for procurement." (emphasis added). No increase in costs were predicted. 24 July 1967. 0 sent its third monthly report. This report covered the period of 1 to 30 June. Intended progress during the next month again predicted completion of all design, drafting and procurement. No increase in costs were predicted. Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP78BO477OA002800020003-8 Approved For Release 2005/66166 CIA-RDP78B04770A002800020003-8 11 August 1967. Ito discuss an overrun on another contract (PI Print Enlarger was on vacation, but specifically questioned as to the status of funds for the Viewgraph Maker project. He assur did not anticipate an overrun on Contract 15 August 1967. 0 was called by Q and information was requested concerning the status of the funds. I Istated that he did not see any financial difficulties and in ac , thought that he could possible complete the project for less than the target costs. 2X 225X 25X 25X 24+ August 1967. I land informed him of an anticipated overrun of about I Iwas reminded to 25X check the details of the contract to determine his company's obligation in spending more than target costs. This was the first indication of an overrun status. 14 September 1967. delivered the fourth monthly report covering the period of 1 to 31 July (it did not predict any increased costs) On this same date, 25X discussed the contract with the Governments Contracting Officer and his technical representative and a Government auditor. A cost analysis was presented by 0 which estimated that an additional lI was 25X needed for the completion of the project. 27 September 1967. Government personnel visited "to discuss the project. 25X presented an analysis of the Viewgraph Maker. He discussed technical areas where design problems had occurred. However, these problems had not been relayed to the Government previously nor did the monthly reports indicate any difficulties. Statements were made in all monthly reports that there were no unresolved technical matters. 0 25X was requested to absorb their overrun costs and propose costs again. 12 October 1967. delivered a revised analysis of costs proposal for the Viewgraph Maker. Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP78B04770A002800020003-8 Approved For Release (2005/06/06 CIA-RDP78BO477OA002800020003-8 ----]Project 9 1 HISTORICAL DATA FOR PROJECT #10147 PI Print Enlarger Contract Total price quoted wasiI based on a fixed price contract. 8 September 1966. I Isubmitted Technical Proposal January 1967. II reported an increase in overhead and G&A rates and quoted a fixed price of 27 February 1967. Contract was executed with a target cost and target fee totalling Included were seven items as an addendum to the Contractor's proposal. This contract was a cost-plus- incentive-fee type. The period of performance was to be from 27 February to 27 September 1967. The fee was subject to a 90-10 share on all costs over or under target costs. 13 April 1967. I Isubmitted its first monthly report for the period of 28 February to 31 March. More than 10% of the work was reported as complete with a proportionate. amount of funds being spent. 18 April 1 267. By this date, layout drawings 92208-124100, J-124577, and 25X 25X J-124578 were completed by I At this point, areas requiring 25X extensive design efforts should have been identified. 21 April 1967. The Contracting Officer's technical representative I 25X Ito discuss the project with Many technical details were discussed but 0 expresse no concern over the difficulty of their solution. 12 May 1967. again visited reported on his progress on the PI Print Enlarger. Technical areas were again discussed. 12 May 1967. I Isecond monthly report was sent covering the month of April. Design of the condenser lenses was reported about 90% complete. Drive design was complete, frame 100%, vacuum platen 90%, paper transport 50%. 50o requested revision of exposure time from "less than one second" to "five to two second range." 20 June 1967. The Third monthly report was sent covering the month of May. Condenser lens design was reported as complete. Electrical parts were being ordered. Circuit drawings were'being prepared. July 1967. I uinformed that the June monthly 25X report was nearly complete, but that there was a delay by the accounting department in completing the status of funds. gave no 25X indication at this time that there would be any overrun. Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP78BO477OA002800020003-8 Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA=RDP78B04770A002800020003-8 Week of 24+ July 1967. called to report an anticipated overrun of approximately This was the first indication of an overrun status. 11 August 1967. I Ivisited) intent was to review everawing, if necessary to determine where costs might be reduced. However, nearly all of the design was reported as complete and most the parts were ordered. 14+ September 1967. delivered a cost analysis to the Governmen overrun o was predicted. One of the items reported as contributing to the overrun was the cost of the condenser assembly. It was estimated as while the actual price was I Why this could not have been predicted three or four months sooner was not explained. The July and August monthly reports were also delivered at this time. 27 September 1 267. Government personnel visited u to discuss the project. presented several reasons for the PI Print Enlarger overrun. However, the reasons indicated were under control for several months. If the overruns could not have been prevented, they should have been obvious before the contract was negotiated. was requested to absorb their overrun costs and present a new cos proposal. 12 October 1967 delivered a revised analysis of costs for the project. Included in this analysis was a copy of the third month) report. Page 5 of that report indicates that there was a overrun estimated on 26 May. This information has been changed and does not agree with the third monthly report previously delivered to the Government. The latter report had predicted no overrun. The analysis also indicated 600 hours of engineering, design, and drafting to be completed. This information does not conform with information gathered at the 11 August meeting. Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP78B04770A002800020003-8 Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP78B04770A002800020003-8 0 Format to Contain Comments On: 1. Past business with II 2. Future business witY~ 3. Existing contracts 4+. Trouble contracts (Vu-graph Maker & P.I. Pring Enlarger) a. Nature of trouble (1) Changes in technical aspects w/o government approval (2) Administrative errors a. Untimely reporting b. Altered reporting c. Unanticipated costs b. Nature of claims (1) Before contract changes (2) Unapproved alterations 5. Cite our detailed records of these deficiencies. 6. The requirement for continuously improving management 7. The recommendation they assume liability for their poor performance 8. Implication of these problems in relation to the Automatic Stereo Scanner contract; we would expect that this, project would proceed according to contract. Approved For Release 2005/06/06 : CIA-RDP78B04770A002800020003-8 ^ UNCLASS IFA roved G1 fagRL 005/06/06: CIA-RDPfid3Oi bbt OOO3-8 )1 SECRET ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET SUBJECT: (opt not) Request for Overrun Expenditure of for a Vie raph Maker FROM: Asst. fo Technical Development NO. NPIC/TDS- 9567 DATE 26 Ktober 1967 TO: (Officer designation, room tuber, and building) DATE OFFICER'S COMMEN (Number each comment to show from whom INITIALS tow o Draw a line across column after each comment.) RECEIVE -FORWARDED 0 Ch/Support Staff 1 2. Asst for Planning and Management 3. Technical Advisor f to the Director 4. Director, NPIC 5. SS/LB (After Approval) 6. > 7. y 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. SECRETv~vv^v CONFIDENTIAL ^~ I SEA ON'Y vvv__E UNCLASSIFIED 5