INFORMATION ON THE NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION CENTER FOR THE DCI BRIEFING OF THE MAHON COMMITTEE
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Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP78B05167A001800100001-4
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
11
Document Creation Date:
December 23, 2016
Document Release Date:
February 3, 2014
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
February 7, 1966
Content Type:
REPORT
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INTRODUCTION
CKGROUND
MISSION At NPIC, primary emphasis is placed on the immediate
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readout, analysis and reporting of satellitsA1)81.aft
photography. This first-phase reporting is accomplished
'NM
7 February 1966
Information on the National Photographic Interpretation
Center for the DCI Briefing of the Mahon Committee
One of the principal problems I want to discuss
with you this morning is that of the exploitation of
photography .and specifically the future needs of the
National Photographic Interpretation Center. NPIC
serves as the single national level Center for the
exploitation of photography acquired from the various
aircraft and satellite reconnaissance collection pro-
grams in support of the national intelligence effort.
The Center functions under my executive direction and
: is primarily manned by CIA with some DOD personnel
assisting. It is currently housed in Building 213 of
the Naval Weapons Plant, a former warehouse now con-
verted into the most modern and complete photographic
intelligence Center in the world.
' on an around-the-clock basis and covers priority national
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TALE:T-KEY'c.
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intelligence objectives. Second and third phase photo- .
graphic interpretation follows in order to provide a
complete index of the mission coverage and detailed
interpretation of targets of priority national interest..
ACTIVITIES AND
ACCOMPLISENTS Beginning with the first overflights of the Soviet
Union by the U2 in the summer of 1956, photographic anal-,
ysis provided urgently needed information on the Soviet
missile test sites, development and production of missil.es,
atomic energy development and production programs,-the size ;
and deployment of enemy military resources, detailed. .,
studies on industrial production complexes, and ether
? items of priority national intelligence interest. The
program was given further. impetus in the summer of 1960 -
with the first successful recovery of satellite photography
.The ability of NPIC to derive information from this photo-
graphy spurred the collectionefforts with the result that
'nearlysall of the Soviet Union and:much of the world has
been successfully covered. We already have in our film
_ -
'repositories in .the Washington area over 100 million,'
linear feet of film collected from the various.reconnais-
sance programs. Future efforts arc being geared to provide
the Center with higher quality and repetetive inputs on
.areas of Oritical.concorn to the-national-intelligence
? effort.-
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..cpNTRO-
As you will recall, one of NPIC's most signif-
icant accomplishments was in connection with the Cuban .
Missile Crisis. 'It was hero that the original Soviet ?
Missile threat was discovered and the word first flashed
to the Director of Central Intelligence and the White
Mere is a picture on which the original find VUGRAPH I
was made together with a shot of the missile as it
appeared in a Moscow Parade,
You remenber the great stir caused at the Paris?
Air Show by the new SovietiTransport, the largest
aircraft in the world. Well before thaf demonstration
we had obtained a satellite photograpb, and later it
was on this photograph that we saw for the first
time that the Soviets had built 2 of these planes.
On this one frame of satellite photography, both of
them were caught on the ground at the sane time at
an aircraft plant at Tashkent.,
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VUGRAPH 2
VUGRAPH, 3
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CF,
One more example of significant finds made by . VUGRAPH 4
the Center includes the discovery of the Chinese
? development of a new G-Class submarine. Analysis ,
of U2 and satellite photography confirmed that this .
G-Class SSB was constructed on the center building
way of the old Darien shipbuilding company. This
is just one example of our intensive effort to follow
the Chinese Communist military buildup.
Increasing emphasis is being placed on support .
of the Vietnamese effort, and thousands of feet of
film are being received weekly of North and South
Vietnam as well as Laos. Particular emphasis is given
to searching out the infiltration routes, .the surface-
to-air threat at our bombing forces over North Vietnam:.
and the possible introduction of surface-to-surface.
missiles. ?
Here is a'shot of one of the principal routes VUGRAPH 5
in Laos,. Mu Gia Pass, in which the photo interpreters
were able to search.out and find a new by-pass route
to'ithe south. Note the difficulty in discovering this'.
.new route-.. The first discovery of the surface-to-air
missile threat in North :Vietnam was discovered in April .
of 1965 by.NPIC;,and in spite of the fact that the?-
.
photography is first read out in the field,. 42% of the .
4
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FUTURE NEEDS
now known 64 SAM sites have been found by the Center
through repetetive searches.
I have recently instigated a detailed search of -
North Vietnam for surface-to-surface missile implice-
!tents. In this effort we have divided North Vietnam
into 5 priority zones and are conducting a detailed:.
and painstaking search for any indications of the, in-
troduction of this weapons system into the area.
In all of these detailed studies, 'thousands of
man-hours are required to search out and study not'
only the current inputs but all of the previous photo-
graphy. In this way we Chronologically chart the .-
developnent of prime targets through comparative
analysis and this problem becomes increasingly difficult
as our data base expands.
So far I have covered past and current developments. ,
I am worried however about the future ability of the .
Center to handle its mounting Workload in light of. .
the new reconnaissance systems which will be in oper-
ation in the net too distant future delivering increased
volumes of higher.quality photography.
NPIC has deVeloped.a computer-oriented management
information system which has enabled them to determine ?
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the costs of exploiting the various reconnaissance
systems as well as gauge the impact of new collection
systems. NPIC is currently receiving inputs from 2
satellite systems, a search system known as KH-4 and
a spotting system known as KH-7. In the 1967 - 68
period, the KH-7 spotting system is due to be replaced
by a new spotting system known as KH-8, delivering a
much .higher quality film which will enable us to cover
high priority intelligence targets in denied areas in
unprecedented minute detail. In the 1968 - 69 period,
the 1(11-4 search system is due to be replaced by a new
search system known as KH-9, which will give us greatly
increased volumes of photography at a much higher quality.
Here is a Chart showing the relative impact of -VUCRAPH 6
of these systems as developed by the NPIC management
information system. This chart shows by system the
number of manhours required for immediate exploitation
per thousand feet of film for each of these reconnais-
sance systems. You can see from this chart in comparing
KH-8 with KH-7, that it is estimated that twice the work
effort will be required to exploit this new spotting
system as is currently being expended to exploit the KH-7.
When the KH-4 search system is replaced by the KH-9 system,
there will also be a near doubling of the work effort to
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exploit 1,000 feet of film, and this system will
deliver much greater volumes than we are now receiving.
Over on the right you can see the comparative Work
effort to exploit high and low level aircraft systems,
, although it must be remembered that we are receiving
over 400 missions per month from this source and the
rate is increasing-due to the Vietnamese situation.
_
,In order to handle the existing workload as wellas
to 0 forth with new systems just over the horizon,
we have already started a personnel buildup We
expect to have people on board by the
end of this fiscal year.
, In FY 1967 NPIC has been given a personnel ceiling
for
the
although we have indicated a need
more. Total expenditures for
Center this fiscal year will run at about-the
level, and we 'expect to invest
about next year.
I am placing a great deal of emphasis on the
RW efforts of the Center in hopes of cutting back
on their expanding manpower needs through automating
the exploitation processes wherever possible. NPIC
has planned a 5-year development program which will
cover most facets of its operation and hopefully
equip it to deal withtthe problems-presented by the
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CONCLUSIONS
currently planned new systems. The only way to eliminate
people is to substitute electronic or mechanical devices
which will perform the tasks. It is urgent that we press
forward in this area as rapidly as possible although sub-
stantial-investments will have to be made if we are to
achieve our goals within the time limitations.
Gentlemen, I am convinced this effort must be given
greater resources if we are to recognize the full intel-
ligence potential of reconnaissance photography. We are
.zeroed in on the 'obvious strategic threat items but many
other needs are being skimmed over. For example, voluminous
photography over Communist China should be interpreted in
detail to get at the essential facts and rate of growth
of the economic base, particularly the industrial/agri-
cultural fabric of this outspoken and increasingly bell-
cose adversary of the U.S. Our knowledge of Soviet Air-
Defenses and Anti-Ballistic Missile developments and their
current capability, is critical to the.whole.U.S.?War Plan,
and we must monitor these developments at an ever-increas-
ing pace and with steadily improving photo interpretation .
detail. In addition to their substantial ballistic missile ?
fixed .deployments the Soviets are parading their, mobile
missiles And openly challenging the U.S. ability tofind
them... If mobiles are being deployed; our photo interpreters'
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will have to extend their present detail seorchings from
the largely rail-supported areas to more remote expanses ?
of the Soviet Union where camouflage and other deceptions
might be anticipated to make the job even more -difficult.
and time consuming.
We have not had enough photo interpreters and support
personnel to complete these tasks involving thousands of
manhours. Our Government has already expended millions of
dollars.in the development Of reconnaissance collection
. systems. .1 repeat, if we are to realize the impact of
current systems and new ones just over the horizon, the
National. Photographic Interpretation Center must be given
additional resources in order to fully exploit these
materials. We
for
This
estimate our requirements by 1970 to call
personnel and a budget in excess of
is not too much to expend
source of vital information.
'
on this prolific
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BRIEFING AIDS
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