PHOTOGRAPHIC DETECTION IN OFFENSIVE MISSILE SYSTEMS IN NORTH VIETNAM

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Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP78B05167A001800160001-8
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
9
Document Creation Date: 
December 23, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 13, 2014
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
May 16, 1967
Content Type: 
MEMO
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PDF icon CIA-RDP78B05167A001800160001-8.pdf519.48 KB
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/13: CIA-RDP78B05167A001800160001-8 Stir A.N.1i(A.K.E1 KU HANDLE VIA TALENT?KEYHOLE CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY NO FOREIGN DISSEM TCS-n 7 -61. 16 May 1967 MEMORANDUM SUBJECT: Photographic Detection of Offensive Missile Systems in North Vietnam 1. General: It would be difficult to detect in photography the introduction of offensive missile systems into North Vietnam under the present recon- naissance program. Photographic coverage is irreg- ular, spotty, and of widely varying quality. Thus, it would be hard to make an early positive identifi- cation of a short-range, mobile missile system, par- ticularly if the components of such a system were mixed with other tracked vehicles, trucks, and con- struction equipment. The same can be said for the more complex medium-range missile systems if the individual pieces of ground support equipment were not seen with the missiles, if the missile equipment was not seen in a pattern characteristic of a missile unit, or if the missile equipment was well-camouflaged or in novel site configurations. The weather condi- tions that prevail in North Vietnam much of the time make it difficult to obtain frequent area photographic coverage with high-altitude collection systems. Coverage Requirements 2. The primary requisite is, of course, nearly complete coverage of North Vietnam with particular Mention to those Eljaciu_a_uaa where the emplace- ment of offensive missile systems is considered most likely. In order to detect any introduction of of- fensive missiles as quickly as possible--while in transit--thorough coverage is required of the impor- tant rail transloading yards of Pinghsiang and Kung- ming in China, the numerous marshaling yards and spurs in the North Vietnam rail system and the port of Haiphong.* We do not, at present, have such *With t e completion of a standard guage rail line from Pinghsiang in China to Kep in Vietnam and from Ke,p to Thai Nguyen, much freight can now be brought to these areas without transloading. NO FOREIGN DISSEM TOP ,sprti. Fri" P TITTI Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/13: CIA-RDP78B05167A001800160001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/13: CIA-RDP78B05167A001800160001-8 gyr AN.t.;(.41c1ia' KUM HANDLE VIA TALENT?KEYHOLE CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY NO FOREIGN DISSEM coverage although it should be noted the reconnais- sance effort has been directed primarily in support of bomb strikes (i.e. pre and post strike photog- raphy) the detection of new SAM sites, updating of OB at known military installations, surveillance of key indication targets and lines of communications. A second requirement is that the coverage must be repetitive in order to ensure the timely detection of the introduction of offensive missile systems. This is essential in order that new activity or changes in the nature of previously observed activ- ity can be detected promptly. A third and equally important requirement is adequate resolution to iden- tify different types of missiles or missile-associ- ated equipment. Current Coverage 3. Following is a brief review of the limita- tions of current photography on North Vietnam ob- tained by the various reconnaissance vehicles since 1 January 1967 (see attached map which depicts cov- erage by the various reconnaissance systems). A. Satellite Coverage High resolution is currently being provided by the KH-7 and KH-8 satellites The lower resolution KH-4 missions are capable of providing the necessary complete small-scale cov- erage of North Vietnam since a photography strip covers an area approximately 160 miles wide. Ex- perience has shown, however, that only about one KH-4 mission a year--they are launched about once a -2- ,50X1 OUAI 50X1 bUAl NO FOREIGN DISSEM TOP SFCR ET R VFW Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/13: CIA-RDP78B05167A001800160001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/13: CIA-RDP78B05167A001800160001-8 OUP NE URE1 R (JP. HANDLE VIA TALENT?KEYHOLE CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY NO FOREIGN DISSEM month--finds North Vietnam sufficiently cloudless to obtain adequate over-all coverage of the country. The quality of KH-4 photography would generally permit the detection of a missile site of standard configura- tion, but better resolution would be required to identify missiles or missile-associated equipment and to detect a well-camouflaged site or one of a novel configuration. B. High Altitude U-2 Coverage (Trojan Horse) This reconnaissance aircraft, with any of its camera systems, is capable of providing the required resolution to identify missiles and missile-associated equipment. Since the introduction of surface-to-air missiles into North Vietnam in 1965, however, these aircraft have not been flown within the lethal range of known SAM emplacements. This has generally con- fined U-2 photography to the northwestern portion of North Vietnam. Of the 67 missions flown over south- east Asia this year 37 were over the northwestern portion of North Vietnam and Laos. Considerable cloud cover prevented us from obtaining much usable photog- raphy of that part of North Vietnam on any one mission. C. Combat Reconnaissance Coverage These missions range from high level (30,000 feet) to low level (500 feet) with the majority between 5-10,000 feet. The quality of this photographic cov- erage ranges from excellent to poor. NPIC reports that they received photography from an average of 800- 900 of these missions a month during 1966 and 750 a month this year. About 20-25 percent of these, however are flown to produce infrared or side-looking radar imagery--a product that cannot generally be applied to this problem, although it is useful to the tactical commander for other purposes. The coverage of North Vietnam by combat tactical reconnaissance aircraft has been primarily directed toward strike operations and the indicator targets. As a consequence, over-all cov- erage has been limited and it consists of short film strips covering major road and rail segments, point targets such as the Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Complex and other strike targets. The shortness of the flight lines and the narrow band of lateral coverage because of the relatively low altitude of the reconnaissance -3? NO FOREIGN DISSEM TOP SECRET RUFF , Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/13: CIA-RDP78B05167A001800160001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/13: CIA-RDP78B05167A001800160001-8 6'..E; C4' RE1' RUM HANDLE VIA TALENT?KEYHOLE CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY NO FOREIGN DISSEM aircraft, although responsive to strike requirements, result in numerous gaps in photographic coverage in areas where offensive missile systems might be de- ployed. Further, at the present time, tactical re- connaissance aircraft are prohibited from flying the sanctuary or buffer area--that part of North Vietnam within 20 miles of the Chinese border where strikes are not authorized. D. Drone Coverage (Blue Springs) Low-level drones--24 have been recovered thus far in 1967--are flown at 1,500 feet and provide ex- cellent quality photography. The low altitude of the drone, however, restricts the usable photography to approximately one mile on either side of the flight line. These missions are directed primarily against high-priority targets in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas. The high-level drone--five out of 12 have been recovered this year--are flown at an altitude about 60,000 feet. This drone is vulnerable to the SA-2 missile, although in a few instances it has been successfully utilized in the SA-2 envelope. Most of the high-level drone missions have been programmed to cover the eastern portion of the China/North Viet- nam border and in the buffer zones where tactical aircraft do not operate. These missions, however, have not provided any usable photography of that area this year, largely because of unfavorable weather. High-level drone photography is capable of providing identification of missile or missile-associated equip- ment under optimum operational and weather conditions. Priority Search Areas 4. The priority missile search areas delineated on the attached map (see map and explanatory notes) are a slightly modified version of the ones first es- tablished by the LOOKOUT Task Force over a year ago. These areas are receiving further study. In general, our major considerations for establishing priority search areas--particularly for fixed-site medium-range missiles--were the availability of adequate road nets and the suitability of terrain for the emplacement of the site and for making or camouflaging it. A -4- NO FOREIGN DISSEM TOP ,cFCR1T PTTPF Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/13: CIA-RDP78B05167A001800160001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/13: CIA-RDP78B05167A001800160001-8 .OP SECRET RUM HANDLE VIA TALENT?KEYHOLE CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY NO FOREIGN DISSEM secondary consideration was the availability of air defense protection with such weapons as the SA-2 surface-to-air missile. 5. This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency with the assistance of the Na- tional Photographic Interpretation Center. -5- NO FOREIGN DISSEM TOP ,cFrIP FT PUFF Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/13: CIA-RDP78B05167A001800160001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/13: CIA-RDP78B05167A001800160001-8 TOP SECRET RUFF Handle Via Talent-KEYHOLE Control System Only 100? PHOT RAPHI N TH VIETH 1 JANUAR -30IAPRIL 19 VERAGE 1 10 BURMA SAM NEVA. MUCH COV 2 PHOTOGRAPHY ED BY CLOUDS KH-4 ON MI SION--BAS CALLY CL UDI;FREE--RE OLUTION NO GOOD ENOU H FOR THI PROBLEM I COMBAT RECONNAISSANCE BLUE SPRINGS HIGH LEVEL LOW LEVEL / 11111111111 TROJAN HORSE KH-4 \\1=1 KH-7 NP/C L- 31 38 5 DRONES (HIGH) NO USABLE PHOTOGRAPHY FROM FOUR FLIGHTS DUE MOSTLY TO HAZE AND CLOUDS--NO PI REPORTS ISSUED --- DRONES (LOW) A (LOW) QUALITY GOOD BUT COVERAGE EXTRE F NARROW ONE THAILAND NA NAUTICAL MILES MUANG HON PHANOM. HAKHEK LAOS NKIN COMBAT RECO NAISSANCE-- AREAS GENERALLY teg- -COVEREDT-PHOTO STRIPS GENERALLY SHORT AND OF VARIABLE QUALITY. _=====N DEMARCATION LINE OUANG TRI. TOP SECRET RUFF Handle Via Talent-KEYHOLE Control System Only Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/13: CIA-RDP78B05167A001800160001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/13: CIA-RDP78B05167A001800160001-8 ? PRIORITY SEARCH AREAS FOR SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES .Ko 104 C INA Volg Van 106 1 * Ching-hsi Bao Lac ? en Ha Giang 'Geo Bang Priority 3 Lai Cha Bac Can CHINA 108 Ning-ming Lang Son Nghia Lo Thai Nguyen 22- 4 MongiO?i0 Ptio.itr:4- . rx 4 Hai Duong Samneu ? .LAOS Thai Binh ? uang Prabang ang Vieng. ? _18Ff1hait Xieng Khouang ? sf,,,reVr, Hoa ? (--\-\*. ? Ban Chieng e'Cua Roa Phu Qui ? GULF OF TONKIN THAILAND Muang Nakhon Phanon'N 4\ ? It hammouane Muang Sakon Nakhon N9.1TH VIETNAM MRE3M search areas Shaddock missile search area Shaddock and Scud missile se rch area Samlet coastal defense mi Aile-search area 0 25 50 75 Miles Tap 2tEeRirroF 1b2 NO FOREIGN DISSEM Savannakhet ....er ? .?6 D.'`e l'ararane ? 1 96 ::E" 017 %:C767:11:1.7;71.17:0Z; AAT '1?V Hoi Vi DIEJMn tARCATION LINE Dong Ha Bd Ho Su ,?Quang Tri -181- ,,SOUTH ? Muong LAOS VIETNAM 10f 66582 5-67 CIA Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/13: CIA-RDP78B05167A001800160001-8 nrld-tirt C-177/-Y7l17177 TITTY7771 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/13: CIA-RDP78B05167A001800160001-8 HANDLE VIAWLENT?KEYHOLE CONTROL SYIPM ONLY NO FOREIGN DISSEM ANNEX Rationale for Selecting Search Areas for MRBMs in North Vietnam Priority 1: This area--a short distance north and west of Hanoi?is given first priority because it already has excellent SAM. and AAA defenses and good. interceptor defenses, good rail and road facilities, forested areas for concealment, and suitable plain to hilly terrain. Priority 2: This area along the rail line from Hanoi to China is given second priority because of the rail transportation available and its loca- tion well inland and behind a barrier of SAM, AAA, and interceptor defenses. It also has extensive forests for concealment and large areas of suitable terrain. Priority 3: This area well north of Hanoi is given third priority because of its rearward position, good roads, extensive forests for concealment, and generally suitable terrain. This is the best area for defense by Hanoi's interceptors. Much of the northwestern part of this area is too mountainous to be suitable. Priority 4: Two areas have been assigned fourth priority: a strip of hilly country along the Moc Chau - Lai Chau road in the northwest, and a strip along the northeastern coast from Haiphong to the Chinese border. Except for the SAM-defended Haiphong vicinity, these areas would be difficult to defend from air attack, They have good roads, and offer generally suitable terrain and good opportunity for concealment. Rationale for Selecting Search Areas for Tactical Missinrs The areas for these missiles were selected entirely on the basis of weapons range. NO FOREIGN DISSEM TOP SECRET RUFF Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/13: CIA-RDP78B05167A001800160001-8 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/13: CIA-RDP78B05167A001800160001-8 11. TOP SECRET IF TOP SECRET Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/01/13: CIA-RDP78B05167A001800160001-8