PHOTOGRAPHIC DETECTION IN OFFENSIVE MISSILE SYSTEMS IN NORTH VIETNAM
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP78B05167A001800160001-8
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
9
Document Creation Date:
December 23, 2016
Document Release Date:
January 13, 2014
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
May 16, 1967
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
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Body:
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Stir A.N.1i(A.K.E1 KU
HANDLE VIA TALENT?KEYHOLE CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
TCS-n 7 -61.
16 May 1967
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Photographic Detection of Offensive
Missile Systems in North Vietnam
1. General: It would be difficult to detect
in photography the introduction of offensive missile
systems into North Vietnam under the present recon-
naissance program. Photographic coverage is irreg-
ular, spotty, and of widely varying quality. Thus,
it would be hard to make an early positive identifi-
cation of a short-range, mobile missile system, par-
ticularly if the components of such a system were
mixed with other tracked vehicles, trucks, and con-
struction equipment. The same can be said for the
more complex medium-range missile systems if the
individual pieces of ground support equipment were
not seen with the missiles, if the missile equipment
was not seen in a pattern characteristic of a missile
unit, or if the missile equipment was well-camouflaged
or in novel site configurations. The weather condi-
tions that prevail in North Vietnam much of the time
make it difficult to obtain frequent area photographic
coverage with high-altitude collection systems.
Coverage Requirements
2. The primary requisite is, of course, nearly
complete coverage of North Vietnam with particular
Mention to those Eljaciu_a_uaa where the emplace-
ment of offensive missile systems is considered most
likely. In order to detect any introduction of of-
fensive missiles as quickly as possible--while in
transit--thorough coverage is required of the impor-
tant rail transloading yards of Pinghsiang and Kung-
ming in China, the numerous marshaling yards and
spurs in the North Vietnam rail system and the port
of Haiphong.* We do not, at present, have such
*With t e completion of a standard guage rail line
from Pinghsiang in China to Kep in Vietnam and from
Ke,p to Thai Nguyen, much freight can now be brought
to these areas without transloading.
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
TOP ,sprti. Fri" P TITTI
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gyr AN.t.;(.41c1ia' KUM
HANDLE VIA TALENT?KEYHOLE CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
coverage although it should be noted the reconnais-
sance effort has been directed primarily in support
of bomb strikes (i.e. pre and post strike photog-
raphy) the detection of new SAM sites, updating of
OB at known military installations, surveillance of
key indication targets and lines of communications.
A second requirement is that the coverage must be
repetitive in order to ensure the timely detection
of the introduction of offensive missile systems.
This is essential in order that new activity or
changes in the nature of previously observed activ-
ity can be detected promptly. A third and equally
important requirement is adequate resolution to iden-
tify different types of missiles or missile-associ-
ated equipment.
Current Coverage
3. Following is a brief review of the limita-
tions of current photography on North Vietnam ob-
tained by the various reconnaissance vehicles since
1 January 1967 (see attached map which depicts cov-
erage by the various reconnaissance systems).
A. Satellite Coverage
High resolution is currently being provided by
the KH-7 and KH-8 satellites
The lower resolution KH-4 missions are capable
of providing the necessary complete small-scale cov-
erage of North Vietnam since a photography strip
covers an area approximately 160 miles wide. Ex-
perience has shown, however, that only about one
KH-4 mission a year--they are launched about once a
-2-
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
TOP SFCR ET R VFW
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OUP NE URE1 R (JP.
HANDLE VIA TALENT?KEYHOLE CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
month--finds North Vietnam sufficiently cloudless to
obtain adequate over-all coverage of the country. The
quality of KH-4 photography would generally permit
the detection of a missile site of standard configura-
tion, but better resolution would be required to
identify missiles or missile-associated equipment and
to detect a well-camouflaged site or one of a novel
configuration.
B. High Altitude U-2 Coverage (Trojan Horse)
This reconnaissance aircraft, with any of its
camera systems, is capable of providing the required
resolution to identify missiles and missile-associated
equipment. Since the introduction of surface-to-air
missiles into North Vietnam in 1965, however, these
aircraft have not been flown within the lethal range
of known SAM emplacements. This has generally con-
fined U-2 photography to the northwestern portion of
North Vietnam. Of the 67 missions flown over south-
east Asia this year 37 were over the northwestern
portion of North Vietnam and Laos. Considerable cloud
cover prevented us from obtaining much usable photog-
raphy of that part of North Vietnam on any one mission.
C. Combat Reconnaissance Coverage
These missions range from high level (30,000 feet)
to low level (500 feet) with the majority between
5-10,000 feet. The quality of this photographic cov-
erage ranges from excellent to poor. NPIC reports
that they received photography from an average of 800-
900 of these missions a month during 1966 and 750 a
month this year. About 20-25 percent of these, however
are flown to produce infrared or side-looking radar
imagery--a product that cannot generally be applied to
this problem, although it is useful to the tactical
commander for other purposes. The coverage of North
Vietnam by combat tactical reconnaissance aircraft has
been primarily directed toward strike operations and
the indicator targets. As a consequence, over-all cov-
erage has been limited and it consists of short film
strips covering major road and rail segments, point
targets such as the Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Complex
and other strike targets. The shortness of the flight
lines and the narrow band of lateral coverage because
of the relatively low altitude of the reconnaissance
-3?
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
TOP SECRET RUFF
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6'..E; C4' RE1' RUM
HANDLE VIA TALENT?KEYHOLE CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
aircraft, although responsive to strike requirements,
result in numerous gaps in photographic coverage in
areas where offensive missile systems might be de-
ployed. Further, at the present time, tactical re-
connaissance aircraft are prohibited from flying the
sanctuary or buffer area--that part of North Vietnam
within 20 miles of the Chinese border where strikes
are not authorized.
D. Drone Coverage (Blue Springs)
Low-level drones--24 have been recovered thus
far in 1967--are flown at 1,500 feet and provide ex-
cellent quality photography. The low altitude of
the drone, however, restricts the usable photography
to approximately one mile on either side of the flight
line. These missions are directed primarily against
high-priority targets in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas.
The high-level drone--five out of 12 have been
recovered this year--are flown at an altitude about
60,000 feet. This drone is vulnerable to the SA-2
missile, although in a few instances it has been
successfully utilized in the SA-2 envelope. Most of
the high-level drone missions have been programmed
to cover the eastern portion of the China/North Viet-
nam border and in the buffer zones where tactical
aircraft do not operate. These missions, however,
have not provided any usable photography of that area
this year, largely because of unfavorable weather.
High-level drone photography is capable of providing
identification of missile or missile-associated equip-
ment under optimum operational and weather conditions.
Priority Search Areas
4. The priority missile search areas delineated
on the attached map (see map and explanatory notes)
are a slightly modified version of the ones first es-
tablished by the LOOKOUT Task Force over a year ago.
These areas are receiving further study. In general,
our major considerations for establishing priority
search areas--particularly for fixed-site medium-range
missiles--were the availability of adequate road nets
and the suitability of terrain for the emplacement
of the site and for making or camouflaging it. A
-4-
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
TOP ,cFCR1T PTTPF
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.OP SECRET RUM
HANDLE VIA TALENT?KEYHOLE CONTROL SYSTEM ONLY
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
secondary consideration was the availability of air
defense protection with such weapons as the SA-2
surface-to-air missile.
5. This memorandum has been prepared jointly
by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense
Intelligence Agency with the assistance of the Na-
tional Photographic Interpretation Center.
-5-
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
TOP ,cFrIP FT PUFF
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TOP SECRET RUFF
Handle Via Talent-KEYHOLE Control System Only
100?
PHOT
RAPHI
N TH VIETH
1 JANUAR -30IAPRIL 19
VERAGE
1
10
BURMA
SAM NEVA.
MUCH
COV
2
PHOTOGRAPHY
ED BY CLOUDS
KH-4
ON MI SION--BAS CALLY
CL UDI;FREE--RE OLUTION
NO GOOD ENOU H FOR
THI PROBLEM
I
COMBAT RECONNAISSANCE
BLUE SPRINGS
HIGH LEVEL
LOW LEVEL
/ 11111111111 TROJAN HORSE
KH-4
\\1=1 KH-7
NP/C L- 31 38
5
DRONES
(HIGH)
NO USABLE PHOTOGRAPHY
FROM FOUR FLIGHTS DUE
MOSTLY TO HAZE AND
CLOUDS--NO PI REPORTS
ISSUED ---
DRONES
(LOW) A (LOW)
QUALITY GOOD BUT
COVERAGE EXTRE
F NARROW
ONE
THAILAND
NA
NAUTICAL MILES
MUANG
HON PHANOM. HAKHEK
LAOS
NKIN
COMBAT RECO NAISSANCE--
AREAS GENERALLY teg-
-COVEREDT-PHOTO STRIPS
GENERALLY SHORT AND
OF VARIABLE QUALITY.
_=====N DEMARCATION
LINE
OUANG TRI.
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? PRIORITY SEARCH AREAS FOR SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES
.Ko 104
C INA
Volg Van 106
1 * Ching-hsi
Bao Lac
?
en
Ha Giang
'Geo Bang
Priority 3
Lai Cha
Bac Can
CHINA
108
Ning-ming
Lang Son
Nghia Lo
Thai Nguyen
22-
4
MongiO?i0
Ptio.itr:4-
.
rx 4
Hai
Duong
Samneu ?
.LAOS
Thai Binh
? uang Prabang
ang Vieng.
?
_18Ff1hait
Xieng Khouang ?
sf,,,reVr,
Hoa
? (--\-\*. ?
Ban Chieng
e'Cua Roa
Phu Qui ?
GULF
OF
TONKIN
THAILAND
Muang Nakhon Phanon'N
4\ ? It hammouane
Muang Sakon Nakhon
N9.1TH VIETNAM
MRE3M search areas
Shaddock missile search area
Shaddock and Scud missile se rch area
Samlet coastal defense mi Aile-search area
0 25 50 75 Miles
Tap 2tEeRirroF
1b2 NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Savannakhet
....er ? .?6
D.'`e l'ararane
?
1 96 ::E" 017 %:C767:11:1.7;71.17:0Z; AAT '1?V
Hoi
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DIEJMn tARCATION LINE
Dong Ha
Bd Ho Su ,?Quang Tri
-181-
,,SOUTH
?
Muong
LAOS
VIETNAM
10f
66582 5-67 CIA
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nrld-tirt C-177/-Y7l17177 TITTY7771
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ANNEX
Rationale for Selecting Search Areas for MRBMs in
North Vietnam
Priority 1: This area--a short distance north and
west of Hanoi?is given first priority because it
already has excellent SAM. and AAA defenses and good.
interceptor defenses, good rail and road facilities,
forested areas for concealment, and suitable plain
to hilly terrain.
Priority 2: This area along the rail line from
Hanoi to China is given second priority because of
the rail transportation available and its loca-
tion well inland and behind a barrier of SAM, AAA,
and interceptor defenses. It also has extensive
forests for concealment and large areas of suitable
terrain.
Priority 3: This area well north of Hanoi is given
third priority because of its rearward position,
good roads, extensive forests for concealment, and
generally suitable terrain. This is the best area
for defense by Hanoi's interceptors. Much of the
northwestern part of this area is too mountainous
to be suitable.
Priority 4: Two areas have been assigned fourth
priority: a strip of hilly country along the Moc
Chau - Lai Chau road in the northwest, and a strip
along the northeastern coast from Haiphong to the
Chinese border. Except for the SAM-defended Haiphong
vicinity, these areas would be difficult to defend
from air attack, They have good roads, and offer
generally suitable terrain and good opportunity for
concealment.
Rationale for Selecting Search Areas for Tactical
Missinrs
The areas for these missiles were selected
entirely on the basis of weapons range.
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