PROPOSAL TO ACCELERATE THE ANALYTICAL EFFORT ON COMMUNIST CHINESE GROUND FORCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NGA Records (Formerly NIMA)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78B05703A000100030027-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 12, 2004
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: June 18, 1970
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT Proposal to Accelerate the Analytical
Effort on Communist Chinese Ground
Forces
REFERENCE NIE 13-3-70, "Communist China's
General Purpose and Air Defense
Forces"
1. For the first time in a number of years
NIE 13-3 says something different. It questions a
number of generalizations about the Chinese ground
forces which have been repeated in past years to the
point of becoming "conventional wisdom" and it makes
a pioneering attempt to take some measure of the
impact of political aberrations, such as the Cultural
RnNrn I lia-i
It also raises the level of uncertainty on the size
of the ground forces to plus or minus 15 percent.
2. These and other changes from what was be-
coming a stereotype NIE reflect the impact of recent
OSR memorandums, particularly the Shen-yang study
published in March this year. This study indicates
that Chinese armies and divisions deviate much more
widely from the estimated TO&E than had been assumed.
This study and other OSR work based largely on photo-
graphic analysis also bring into serious question
much of DIA's current Order of Battle on China, parti-
cularly below the divisional level. In fact, DIA is
.now scrambling to revise its Order of Battle methodo-
logy to make it truly all-source instead of basing it
almost wholly on
3. In exposing some of the generalizations and
assumptions of the past, we have done only the easier
part of the job. What is needed now is to build up a
new and sounder picture of the Chinese conventional
forces by extending the Shen-yang methodology to a
much broader sample of the country. The study of one
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military region was sufficient to challenge existing
generalizations, but we cannot extrapolate from one
region a set of new generalizations of nationwide
validity.
4. Within the next two years or so, several
additional military regions in China should be given
the same sort of intensive, all-source analysis we
have done on Shen-yang. As a step in this direction
we have scheduled a paper on the xun-mina Military
Region for the end of fiscal year 1971 (which may be
an optimistic deadline). We find that the production
of this study will use all the photo interpreter sup-
port presently assigned to work on Chinese ground
forces. This means that we are limited to covering
one military region at a time, and, at one to two years
per study, this approach would take up to eight years
to cover 4 regions. During this time numerous changes
would have taken place in the Chinese armed forces,
including the movement of armies from one region to
another. The latest study would not be sufficiently
comparable to the earliest, and the purpose of getting
a parallel sample of the forces from several regions
at roughly the same time would be defeated.
5. DIA is now appreciative of the need for in-
tensive, all-source work on this subject and eager to
participate, but I do not think we can count on them
to play a major role. The chronic turnover of per-
sonnel which plagues DIA--along with the tendency to
divert research personnel to various crash projects--
critically reduces the possibility of their developing
and maintaining the sustained expertise needed for the
job. The "China Branch announced at the NIE coordi-
nating sessions that it has done preliminary studies
on the Peking and Nankin Military Regions, which it
does noT plan to p u s i. We are skeptical of the
quality of these hastily done studies, but we will
encourage DIA to make further, more intensive efforts
in this direction.
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7. If OSR could take on two more regions during
the next two years--that is, in addition to the nearly
completed Shen-yang work and the scheduled Kun-ming
project--we F- I would have in hand
studies of 5 of the 11 regions representing differ-
ing parts of the country. This should be sufficient
for us to establish a firm basis for generalizations
about the Chinese ground forces for the first time
in over 20 years.
8. The end result may not be drastically dif-
ferent from what we are saying now. Or there may be
some highly important differences. In any case, the
DCI would be able to speak with a new level of con-
fidence about the armed forces of Communist China.
9. To do this, OSR is prepared to divert a
number of analysts from other projects--projects
which we consider important but not as imperative.
But the analysts can do little without adequate PI
support. I propose to confer with the Director of
IAS and the Executive-Director of NPIC in an effort
to secure sufficient PI manpower to support the
research on the China ground forces. This could in
l.ulli L1ll ~.J QI: :. idil Lilt'- WU.LA. 1.11CY C11-C UV I i1 -j LU.L V l.ii Ct ,?Com-
ponents. If it comes to that, we may have to come to
you for guidance on overall priorities.
25
Director
Strategic Research
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