CRITERIA FOR JUDGING THE ADEQUACY OF KEYHOLE PHOTOGRAPHY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78B05707A000100210006-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 7, 2014
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: November 14, 1961
• Content Type: MEMO

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REMARKS: : Pis note underscore on page 2. Were
you not planning on leaving the image quality meter
at HF for other developmental work. In view, however,
of the need here, we probably should get it back here
as soon as possible. Let's discuss ASAP,
A _ L. feZ.%-itA,._/
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HANDLE VIA TALENT-KEYHOLE CONTROLS ONLY
1
WARNING
"This document contains information affecting the National Defense of the United
States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794,
the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is
prohibited by law".
It is to be seen only by U. S. PERSONNEL especially indoctrinated and authorized
to receive TALENT-KEYHOLE information: Its security must be maintained in
accordance with KEYHOLE and TALENT regulations.
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NOTICE TO ALL HOLDERS OF TCS-10384-61I
The attached. d.odument (TCS-10490-61-1(11) supersedes TCS-10384-61-1CFI,
dated 6 November 1961. Please destroy all copies of TCS-10384-61-KEI.
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TCS-10490,61-KH
USIB-D-33.11/3
Copy 4
14 November 1961
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, United States Intelligence Board
SUBJECT: Criteria for Judging the Adequacy of
KEYHOLE Photography
1,, This memorandum i8 Submitted in response to a recent USIB Direc-
tive requesting the NPIC to refine its criteria for judging the adequacy
of KEYHOLE coverage with respect to confirming the sesence or absence of
IOW deployment in areas which have been covered," 4/
2. For several Weeks the NPIC has held a series of discussions and
conferences with representatives of the major agencies involved in this
problem. There are essentially three basic parts to the problem:
establishment of definitions for rating photography on a qualitative
basis; determining the significance of varying percentages of cloud cover;
and developing mechanical procedures for recording and reporting the
desiredcinformation.
3. With respect to qualitative ratings, it is possible to estab-
lish criteria which will help the intelligence community in various ways
to assess KEYHOLE coverage. However, these criteria cannot be so
definitive as to eliminate all differences of opinion as to whether or
not ICBMs, or other targets, may be deployed in a given area. There
are a number of reasons for this:
a. Photographic evidence can never be absolute in a negative
sense. That is, one can say that a photograph does not show any
recognizable missile activity, but one'can never say absolutely
that this proves there are no missiles present. A degree of
confidence or judgment enters in, and in the specific area of
recent discussions the level of confidence depends upon the extent
to which one believes that the Soviets will employ recognizable
signatures or patterns for activities associated with their
missile deployment. At the present time most of the intelligence
community believes that these patterns or signatures will be
21 Paragraph 2a USIB-D-33.11/2, 26 October 1961
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large and clear enough to be reasOnably sure of identification on
KEYHOLE photography. However, one can postulate deception schemes
which cannot be detected on any photography, KEYHOLE or otherwise.
The confidence level in a negative report depends to a considerable
degree, therefore, on one's concept of the configuration of deployed
Soviet missiles and the types of areas in which deployment is likely
to occur. No qualitative rating of photography will settle this
question.
b. The interpretability of a photograph is conditioned by many
factors: the characteristics of the camera system, the conditions
under which it was exposed and developed, the characteristics of the
terrain and objects photographed, the capabilities of the photo
interpreter, and the availability of collateral. Further, at the
present time any rating system must depend upon judgment rather than
upon some inherent quality of the film itself which is capable of
measurement./ We have under development at NPIg_gILIDgaagg-L4g1LU4L
meter" which will measurz_fils_galiLy in terms of acutance, granu-
ndalialfasy" It ial2pea_that_alLs_quipment can
be correIgn-d-VitE-TH3-1aerpretability and human factors so that
during the next year we can obtain better quality indicators.
However, at present we must ely_gn_humanjudgment.
c. Even if a rigidly defined, generally acceptable quality
rating were immediately available, photography is only one intelli-
gence input. Recent discussions involving ICBM deployment have
frequently implied that it is the sole input or the basic element
at issue, when in fact other evidence or considerations have been
contributory and in some cases overriding.
d. With the above limitations understood, we have nevertheless
recently developed at NPIC a set of quality definitions for use in
rating KEYHOLE photography. These definitions, attached as
Inclosure 1, have been generally agreed upon by Service representa-
tives at NPIC and are believed to be generally acceptable by others.
While not as definitive as desired by some, they can be equated to
at least part of the current problem. For example, there would be
a high level of confidence that any Yurya type sites would be
detected in cloud-free areas rated as quality categories 2 or 3.
,4. With respect to cloud cover, the significance of varying er-
centages is again one of judgment.
2
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a- For point targets visible in cloud-free areas, the
probability of detection through clouds can theoretically be
expressed mathematically for a single mission, and for com-
binations of missions as well, assuming random cloud distri-
bution. However, the problem is not really quite so simple:
cloud shadows affect interpretability to a degree not directly
related to the percentage of cloud cover; the time interval
between missions influences the significance of the coverage;
cloud patterns are not random; and most of our targets are
really complexes in which one distinguishable feature may give
away an entire area. It becomes difficult to say what proba-
bility of detection can be associated with a given level of
cloud cover.
? b. After discussions of this problem, we have decided to
continue recording, cloud cover in the same five categories as
we have in the past 0 - 9%, 10 - 25%, 26 - 50%, 51 - 99%, and
100%. The significance of these amounts of cover undoubtedly
vill be interpreted by various agencies in various ways. For
example, at NPIC we would consider, that given reasonably good
XEYHOLE photography (categories 2 or 3, Inclosure 1) we would
have a very high level of confidence in being able to detect
Yurya-type complexes or any similar configuration in areas with
25% ,scattered cloud cover or less, particularly since every ICBM
site and most MRBM sites have been discovered in areas of heavier
cloud cover.
c. We have kept graphical records on Cloud cover on all
missions and the information from these is available to the
intelligence community through NPIC representatives. For
example, our records indicate that on all missions to date,
57.5% of the area of the USSR has been covered by photography
with 25% or less cloud cover. We do not yet have detailed
quality records, so we cannot indicate how much of this is poor,
or how much is usable for detecting Yurya-type oomplexes. How-
ever, we believe that a fairly high percentage of the film is
suitable for this purpose and considering that there is
additional usable coverage with more than 25% cloud cover, it
is reasonable to estimate that at least 50% of the USSR has teen
covered by photography on which Yurya-type complexes would have
a high probability of detection.
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5. With respect to mechanical procedures for recording and report-
ing coverage, some progress has been made. The size of the problem can
be appreciated when it is realized that we already have some 14,471
frames of photography on hand. Since a frame is too large a unit to
assess for quality or cloud cover purposes and must be broken into
small sections, we obviously have an operation which could become
extremely time-consuming for the type of people and resources most
critical to positive exploitation of photography. We have been
plotting and providing cloud coverage data on all missions and have
been studying the quality problem for many months; but I have bean
reluctant to commit NPIC to any other time-consuming recording qr,
reporting tasks until the utility thereof has been demonstrated; 17 With
a view to the necessity for joint efforts in this area and the necessity
for computer application we have been working with AFIC towards a com-
munity solution. Present NPIC views as to a solution are summarized
as follows:
a. As abasic vehicle we are planning to use a computer-
planned recording and reporting system developed by the Air Porce
and already in partial operation. NPIC negotiations for certain
modifications to this system are presently underway, since it was
originally designed for a somewhat different output for internal
Air Force use.
b. Joint NPIC teams would, under this modified system,
evaluate every frame of photography, previous and forthcoming.
Each frame would be broken into 15 parts and each part would
receive one of the following ratings: good; fair; poor (these
first three defined as in Inclosure 1 and applied to photography
with less than 10% cloud cover); cloud readable with 10 - 25%
cloud cover; cloud readable with 26 - 50% cloud cover; cloud
readable with 51 - 99% cloud cover; completely cloud covered; or
unusable (fog, darkness, malfunction).
c. These evaluations would then be furnished to AFIC for
computer programming and publication as an Air Force report,
containing other generally related information.
d. Once the program is established and data fed to the
computer, according to AFIC it will be possible to obtain basic
statistical data showing the percentages of the USSR, or
selected geographical areas therein, covered by photography of
the various categories described in paragraph b above. Further,
the computer will be able to print out map overlays showing area
coverage by category.
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6. It is uncertain at this time as to how long it will take to
obtain the initial computer outputs, but it probably will be after
1 January 1962. Therefore, we are planning at NPIC to provide an
interim solution using graphical methods. If we are successful in our
analyses and procedures we may be able to provide graphical qualitative
coverage summaries by 1 December.
7. Availability of the type of data described above will not
eliminate requirements for special area and Wget studies, such as
the recent CIA report on railroad coverage. While the general
qualitative criteria in reference report are? consistent with the
proposals herein, reports from specific criteria relating to distance
from the railroad lines and the treatment of cloud cover cannbt be
reconstructed from a system designed to provide area qualitative data.
Similarly, spot area studies by the Deployment Working Group, GMAIC,
will require separate photographic evaluation, although these studies
will be assisted by qualitative coverage statistics which should become
available from the computer on an area basis.
8. In summary, we have developed certitin qualitative and cloud
cover criteria which will be useful in evaluating KEYHOLE coverage
and steps are being taken to record and report it. This will not
eliminate differences in estimates of the significance of coverage
of specific areas due to factors other than photographic quality.
Although it would be desirable to develop a more definitive base for
coverage data, I believe that we have carried the solution of the
problem as far as is practical at this time.
2/ Effective KEYHOLE:goverve of the Soviet Rail Network, CIA, TCS-
10055/61/KH, 18 October 01
1 Incloture
ARTHUR C. LUNDAHL
Director
National Photographic Interpretation Center
5
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DISTRIBUTION:
0y 1 Jhairman, USIB
2 TCO-DTVI
3.4 State
5,6 Army
7.8 Navy
9-10 Air .Force
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12-13 JCS
14 DIA - via/JCS
15-16 NSA
17 NIC
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GMTF - via/ORB
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28,-40 LS/PAD(NPIC) for On
14-145 IS/PAD (NFIC) - for USIB
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11.9 si:0/AF(NPic)
50 SI0/Navy(NPI0)
51 SIO/Ariny( NPIC)
52 SIO/CIA(NP10)
53 ChtimpMPIO
54 Oh/TipitTPIO
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k.)
Proposed Quality Definitions
Inclosure ito
TCS-10490,61-KH
.UBIB-D-33.11/3
Category 1 Image of such low definition that targets cannot be dis-
(poor) tinguished or identified within any reasonable degree
(75%) of certainty. Corners and edges are not sharp,
contrast is either low or very high, image will not
stand magnification beyond about 15X, poor exposure,
low sun angle.
Category 2 Image of sufficient definition as to ensure a high (90%)
(fair) confidence level that targets can be distinguished and in
many cases major features identified. Corners and edges
are visible but not necessarily sharp. Contrast is not
extremely high or low, image will stand 20X magnification/
sOtisTactory exposure and light conditions.
Category 3* Image of such clear, definition that it is virtually cer-
(good) tam n that targets can be distinguished and major features
readily identified. Corners and edges are sharp, contrast
is represented by a fu1ler range of densities, image will
stand 30X magnification or greater, proper exposure,
optimum light conditions.
Distinguished
Identified
Definition
Targets
Major features
Recognized; discerned; separated into classes, kindS or
categories
Establish the identity of; ascertain to be thesame as
some known type or description; to specifically name.
Distinctness or clarity of detail andoutline
100 feet or more in diameter or least dimension such as
ICBM launch pads of the Yurya type, aircraft, ships,
indutrial complexes, and RR yards.
Larger distingUishing features such as launch pads, road
pattern, straight vs swept wing, main buildings, fuel
storage tanks, railroad carS) etc.
*It is anticipated that future collection systems will provide photography
of higher quality; hence this must be considered as only an interim upper
limit.
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