LETTER TO HONORABLE ABRAHAM RIBICOFF FROM W. E. COLBY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78M02660R000800040051-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 14, 2005
• Sequence Number: 51
• Publication Date: January 14, 1976
• Content Type: LETTER

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WASH INGrON,D.C. 20505
Honorable Abraham Ribicof#, Chairman
Committee on Government Operations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
I am pleased to provide my views, pursuant to the Committee's requests,
on three bills which would alter the existing pattern of congressional oversight
of the Central Intelligence Agency. All three bills would establish a permanent
joint committee which would, alternatively:
I
(a) exercise legislative oversight of all Federal information
and intelligence agencies (S. Con. Res. 4);
(b) study the extent and methods of investigation or surveillance
of individuals by any Federal instrumentality within the United
States, and make recommendations on the organization of these
agencies (S. 189); or
(c) exercise legislative oversight of the Federal agencies comprising
the intelligence community, the Secret Service, plus any surveillance
or intelligence activities of any other Federal department or agency
(S. 317).
Since the manner of exercising oversight of CIA is a matter for the
Congress to determine, these comments are limited to those considerations
which impact upon our foreign intelligence capabilities---chiefly the security
of sensitive intelligence information.
Consistent with this concern, I believe oversight of CIA should. be
concentrated in the minimum number of committees required to effectively
conduct it. Therefore, I would argue against any proposal which would
merely add another layer of oversight. At present, the, Agency has four
regular oversight committees: subcommittees of the Senate and House Armed
Services and Appropriations Committees exercise traditional legislative and
appropriations review. CIA reports fully on all its activities to these four
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committees. This responsibility goes beyond merely responding to inquiries;
it is the Agency's policy and practice to bring any matter of possible interest
to the committees' attention. Also, pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of
1974, CIA's non-intelligence gathering activities are reported to the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations and House Committee on International Relations
in addition to the regular oversight committees.
Because of the extreme sensitivity of many intelligence activities, the
jurisdiction of the oversight committees should be exclusive. During the
past year there has been an unprecedented trend toward the proliferation
of oversight throughout the Congress. The creation of the select committees
brought to eight the number of committees with a charter to be informed of
CIA activities. Nevertheless, since then at least 11 other committees or
subcommittees have demanded access to operational information. Congress
could once boast that its record in'protecting sensitive CIA information was .
exemplary. Until fairly recently, there had not been a major leak from
Congress of CIA information. The reason is not difficult to discern: CIA
operational information was tightly restricted to members of the oversight
subcommittees. However, the past year has witnessed a shattering of Congress'
formerly fine record of protecting sensitive national security information. The
correlation should be apparent to all: the more widespread the dissemination
of sensitive CIA information throughout the Congress, the greater the risk of
disclosure. Expressly excluding other committees from access to CIA operational
information should rectify the present situation regarding leaks, and would not
impair good oversight.
Concentrated, exclusive committee jurisdiction will work to the advantage
of both the Congress and the Agency. Modern intelligence is a many-faceted
process, but in the last analysis it is an integrated whole. It cannot be
intelligently comprehended by investigating and dissecting its parts separately.
Concentrated, rather than fragmented, oversight will enable Members to build
up expertise on the intelligence agencies, an asset not easily acquired. Congress
will have knowledgeable Members in these responsible positions, Members
whose knowledge of past programs will enable them to make independent judg-
ments on the probable effectiveness of intelligence community proposals.
This same expertise will also work to the advantage of the Agency, as
we will gain the advice and counsel of knowledgeable Members and the resulting
secure environment will facilitate the freer flow of sensitive information.
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To accompany concentrated, exclusive committee jurisclir.tion, I urge
the Committee to establish enforceable rules and sanctions to govern the
handling of CIA information. These rules should have two aspects. First,
CIA operational information should be limited to members of the oversight:
committees and designated staff. Second, any injunctions of secrecy attached
to such sensitive information as a result of constitutional or, statutory respon-
sibilities must be fully respected and enforced.
I am not alone in calling for enforceable rules and procedures. In
the 93rd Congress, the House Select Committee on. Committees studied the
problems of protecting information on intelligence operationrs. Ii: found that
the dangers of the real world are such as to require very close protection of
certain sensitive intelligence information. It strongly recommen.ded that t.13(t
House take the initiative to create an orderly set of rules governing the receipt:,
use, storage, and dissemination of such information. Unfortunately, no action,
or recommendation has been forthcgrning . In 1972 concern over the. propriety
of making public information that had been classified by the Ex.ecuti.ve: branch
led the Senate to create a Select Committee to study questions relating to secret
and confidential Government documents.
One specific proposal in S. 317 is deserving of specwi.al: comnr,ent,
Section (c) (2) of the bill provides that:
"No funds may be appropriated for the purpose' of
carrying out any intelligence or surveillaz:n.ce activity
or operation by any office, or any department or agency
of the Federal Government, unless such funds for such
activity or operation have been specifically authorized
by legislation enacted after the date of enactment of this Act,"
One purpose of Section 8 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1.919 -
(50 U . S . C . 403j) was to eliminate the requirement of an. annual. authorization,
in the interest of protecting against public disclosure of the Central
Intelligence Agency budget. Acceptance of Section (c) (2) of S 317 would
vitiate this principle. I am convinced that disclosure of intelligence budgets,
would provide potential adversaries with significant insight into the nature
and scope of our national foreign intelligence effort, particularly where
analysis of year-to-year fluctuations in the budget are- possible, In addition
publication of any intelligence budget figure will lead immediately to public
discussion of precisely which of our intelligence activities were covered by
the figure and which were not. The ensuing discussion will lead to the
disclosure of many sensitive and critically important intelligence programs
and activities. The history of disclosure o:' Atomic Energy Commission budget
materials and related information by both tl e Executive Branch and the Congress
indicates that publication of any figure with respect to intelligence would quickly
stimulate pressures for further disclosure and probes by various, sectors into
the nature of the figure and its component elements.
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Both Houses of Congress recently endorsed, by greater than 60 percent.
margins, the continuing necessity of a secret intelligence budget. In June
1974 the Senate, by a vote of 55-33, defeated a move to disclose the intelligence
community budget. In October 1975 the House. defeated an amendment to the
Fiscal 1976 Defense Appropriations Bill to disclose the CIA budget total. The
House vote was 267-147. As you know, all of CIA's appropriation is contained
in the Defense Appropriations Bill and the Agency's budget is subject to
intensive scrutiny by the Appropriations and.Armed Services Committees of
both Houses. The committee review of the CIA budget inherent in an authoriza-
tion requirement is now 'accomplished in a manner meeting Congress' expressed
desire to protect intelligence budget figures from disclosure.
In summary, Mr. Chairman, the Central Intelligence Agency is prepared
to work with Congress in any manner Congress chooses to organize itself to
exercise its constitutional responsibilities. However, in order to assist this
Agency's efforts to fulfill its statutory functions, oversight must be concentrated
exclusively in the minimum number of committees necessary to effectively
conduct it. Rules and enforceable sanctions limiting access to CIA operational
information to members and designated staff of the oversight committees, and
procedures for the continuing protection of such sensitive information. are also
required.
W. E. Colby
Director
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TO:
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Assistant Director for
L islative Reference
Office of Management and n get
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