CIA VIEWS OF S. RES. 400

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78M02660R000800110009-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 2004
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: May 28, 1976
• Content Type: MF

US 76
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WASNINGTON,D.C. 20505
28 May 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: John O. Marsh, Jr.
Counsellor to the President
I Acting Legislative Counsel.
SUBJECT: CIA Views of S. Res. 400
This memorandum is CIA's response to your request at the 25 May
ICC meeting that each agency summarize its views on S. Res. 400. CIA
views are part I of this memorandum. The passage of S. Res. 400 requires
some decisions and action by the Executive branch and by individual
agencies. Part II of this memorandum erxumerates some areas which need
Executive branch attention. The Director has not reviewed this paper, and
therefore this should be considered a working draft,
1. OPPORTUNITIES AND PROBLEMS
A. Both Mr. Bush and Mr. Colby have made strong statements
supporting the concept of strong and effective congressional oversight.
During his 31 March testimony before the Senate Rules Committee on
S. Res. 400, Mr. Bush said:
"The Central Intelligence Agency welcomes strong and
effective congressional oversight. We have a great deal
to gain from it. We gain the advice and counsel of knowledge-
able Members. Through it, we can maintain the trust and
support of the American people. We will retain this support
only so long as the people remain confident that the political
structure provides clear accountability of our intelligence
services, through effective Executive and congressional
oversight. "
Intelligence oversight committees have been criticized, even by remembers
of the committees, of not adequately performing their responsibilities.
Because of this criticism, these committees were not in a position to
defend intelligence agencies, even in the face of patently ridiculous charges.
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A new committee, composed of members not associated with past oversight,
could prove a powerful asset, a powerful defender. Of course the committee
will first have to gain a thorough knowledge of intelligence programs.
B. Another positive aspect of S. Res. 400 is its recognition that
Congress must find the means to halt the unauthorized disclosure of classified
information by Members and staff. Section 8 (c) (1) prohibits the disclosure
of information relating to lawful U.S. intelligence activities by individual
Members and staff. Section 8(d) directs the Select Committee on Standards
and Conduct to investigate any unauthorized disclosure by a Member
or staff member. If the Select Committee on Standards and Conduct finds
the charges to be substantiated, it is to recommend "appropriate action such
as censure, removal from committee membership, or expulsion from the
Senate, in the case of a Member, or removal from office or employment or
punishment for contempt, in the case of an officer or employee."
The legislative history of the Resolution, particularly its consideration
by the Government Operations Committee, shows concern about the Senate's
responsibility to discipline its own Members, especially because of the Speech
and Debate Clause of the Constitution. Senator Huddleston, a member of
the new committee, was instrumental in placing disclosure restrictions in
the Resolution. Although it remains to be seen whether this spirit: will
prove stronger than traditional congressional reluctance to chastise or
discipline another Member, the Senate is on record as acknowledging its
responsibilities in this area.
C. The Resolution does not provide for the exclusivity or concentration .
of oversight which would assure that exposure to such sensitive matters
would be limited to the minimum number of members or committees required
to exercise effective oversight. For most agencies, the Resolution simply
creates another committee (a very large one) to delve into agency programs
and activities, without removing jurisdiction from standing committees.
Legislative and authorization jurisdiction for CIA is exclusively the province
of the new committee. However, section 3(c) of the Resolution provides:
" (c) The select committee shall also have the duty to
study and review the organization and reorganization of any
department or agency of the Government to the extent that the
organization or reorganization relates to a function or activity
involving intelligence activities. "
This provision was meant primarily to assure other committees that they
could still exercise a general oversight of the intelligence activities of the
agencies they oversee. For example, the Judiciary Committee would be. able
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to review and study FBI intelligence activities. However, the provision does
not exclude CIA, and a floor colloquy between Senators Ribicoff and Pell
(Appendix A) gave a very expansive interpretation to this section. We are
hopeful that the new committee will quickly develop the respect and muscle
to forestall the proliferation of information on sensitive intelligence through
the review and study of CIA activities by other committees . (Of course,
reporting responsibilities under section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act
remain.)
D. Section 8(a) of the Resolution asserts the right of the Committee
to "disclose publicly any information in the possession of such committee
after a determination by such committee that the public interest would be
served by such disclosure." Section 8(b) establishes procedures the Committee
must follow in order to release classified information. These procedures
involve notification of the President, and referral of the issue to the full
Senate should the President personally object and should the Committee
maintain its desire to release the information. Procedurally, this section is.
as good as the Executive branch could have hoped for.
Clearly this section could pose constitutional questions. The
President's position on the release of classified information by Congress
was stated in his 18 February message to Congress:
"Any foreign intelligence information transmitted by the
Executive Branch to the Oversight Committee, under an injunction
of secrecy, should not be unilaterally disclosed without my agreement.
Respect for the integrity of the Constitution requires adherence to
the principle that no :individual. member nor committee, nor single
House of Congress can overrule an act of the Executive. Unilateral
publication of classified information over the objection of the
President, by one committee or one House of Congress, not only
violates the doctrine of separation of powers, but also effectively
overrules the actions of the other Houses of Congress, and perhaps
even the majority of both Houses. "
Assistant Attorney General Antonin Scalia also addressed this issue
in his 1.2 March 1976 statement before the Senate Judiciary Committee.
"I would not assert that this [classification by the Executive
branch] alone should prevent publication by a House of. Congress.
The need for secrecy is, like most needs, a relative matter, and
merely because the Executive Branch has determined for its internal
purposes that a particular item should not generally be disc:lo: ed,
it does not follow that the item should not be published when a House
of Congress considers publication essential for the proper performance
of its functions. "
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It is possible that this provision will be called into play only rarely.
Requests for declassification of information by committees have in the past
nearly always been worked out to the satisfaction of both parties. Often only
a few words need to be deleted or altered to "sanitize" a document. On the
other hand, this section could prove a continuing source of discord. Much
will depend on whether the new committee is of a disposition to confront or
to cooperate with the Executive branch.
E. Section 12 of S. Res. 400 requires all intelligence funds to be
authorized in bills or joint resolutions passed by the Senate prior to
Senate consideration of appropriation bills for intelligence activities. It
is not clear what action the I-louse would take on a Senate authorization of
funds which has not been subject to the authorization process in the House.
An annual authorization of CIA funds is an entirely new requirement. The
CIA Act of 1949 permits funds to be appropriated for CIA without an annual
authorization [50 U.S.C. 403(j)] . However, the Act does not preclude an
annual authorization, and the Senate has now determined that there should
be one.
The chief problem this requirement presents from CIA's point of
view is the danger of budget disclosure it entails. The Agency did not
object to giving the new Committee a role in the determination of the level
of our budget and its program content. We urged, however, that this be
done by means which would give a higher degree of assurance that budget
secrecy could be maintained than does an annual authorization "by bill or
joint resolution. "
A floor colloquy between Senators Nunn and Ribicoff established that
this new procedure is not automatically to result in budget disclosure
(see Appendix B). However, despite a 55-33 ;tune 1974 vote against dis-
closure of a single intelligence community budget figure, ten of the thirteen
members of this Committee who have voted on this issue voted for some form
of budget disclosure. Under these circumstances, the Executive branch
must continue to develop convincing arguments and education to assure
maintaining budget secrecy.
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II. POSSIBLE EXECUTIVE BRANCH ACTION
I. Section 3(c) of the Resolution provides that other Senate
committees can continue to review and study intelligence activities to the
extent such activities directly affect a matter within the jurisdiction. of the
other committee. 'T'his is precisely the grounds on which 1.1 other
committees and subcommittees in the past year have asserted their right to
access to sensitive CIA matters. It is in CIA's interest that other committees
not gain access to information on CIA activities, and the DCI should consider
urging the Chairman to attempt to restrain other committees from seeking
access to operational information.
2. The jurisdiction of the new Committee encompasses both foreign
and domestic intelligence. The Executive branch opposed this, because
Justice did not want FBI intelligence activities split from the remainder of
the Bureau's operations. Also a factor was the fear that the Committee would
attempt to develop identical standards for both domestic and foreign intel-
ligence activities, despite the entirely different constitutional bases, problems,
and considerations involved. The concurrent jurisdiction arrangement
worked out by Senator Mansfield may have ameliorated Justice's jurisdictional.
concerns. It may be wise to develop a paper pointing out the inappropriate-
ness of identical standards for the two types of activities in anticipation of
the emergence of the second problem.
3. Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act requires reports on covert
action to be made to "appropriate" congressional committees. The only
Senate committee specifically named is the Foreign Relations Committee.
However, the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees have been
considered "appropriate" committees, and have been receiving section 662
reports. Because covert action is the exclusive province of CIA, there is
a reasonable basis for terminating the reports to the Senate Armed Services
Committee. This would reduce the number of committees exposed to this
information, although it would eliminate a committee which has posed no
security problems. The issue of termination of section 662 reports to the
Senate Armed Services Committee might best be resolved between Chairman
Inouye and Chairman Stennis,
4. CIA attempted in the Government Operations Committee to have
section 662 amended to require reports only to the Appropriations and new
intelligence committees. However, when the Committee converted the
Church Committee's oversight proposal, S. 2893, into a resolution, this
became impossible. Subsequently, Senators Percy and Ribicoff announced
that they would introduce a bill to amend section 662 in this manner. The
Administration should strongly back such a bill and actively push it. However,
it might be tactically advantageous to wait until the House of Representatives
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has considered the oversight issue, as they may do this summer. At least
one House oversight proposal. II. J. Res. 945, introduced recently by
Representative Cederberg, would amend these reporting requirements.
The house would presumably be reluctant to amend the Act before it has
reached its major intelligence oversight decisions.
B. Staff Clearance
Section 6 of the Resolution provides for staff background investigations,
oaths, and written secrecy agreements that the staff member will not disclose
Committee information during or after his employment. The Director of
Central Intelligence is to consult with the Committee regarding these
clearances. The Executive branch should have in mind, before these
consultations begin, proposed security agreement language, which agency
should conduct the background investigations, and whether or not we should
push hard for polygraphs to be administered to the staff.
1. The Executive branch must carefully consider its options in light
of the Senate's assertion of its authority to unilaterally declassify Executive
branch information. One option, asserting our constitutional objections
to this provision, would be to refuse to provide the Committee information
unless it agreed in advance not to disclose it. A second option would be
to try to win the Committee's agreement to narrow the breadth of this pro-
vision. For example, Assistant Attorney General Scalia asserted in his
12 March testimony that in a few situations it would be improper for a House
of Congress to authorize any disclosure. The examples he gave were:
(1) When the information has been received under an
agreement of non-disclosure.
(2) When the information is protected from disclosure by
statutes, e . g . , classified communications intelligence. We should
seek to have this category include intelligence. sources and
methods, although the statute is not as helpful as in other cases.
Information submitted to the Committee might then he stamped
with special designators in addition to the normal Executive branch
classification. These designators might include "communications
intelligence - protected from disclosure by 18 U . S . C . 798" or
"sensitive intelligence sources and methods information - subject
to the DCI's statutory responsibility to protect this information
from unauthorized disclosure. "
(3) When its disclosure has the purpose and effect of
negating or frustrating action which both Houses of Congress
have authorized the Executive to perform.
A third option would be merely to attempt to build a spirit of cooperation
which would enable tis to avoid disclosure disputes. As previously pointed
out, such disputes have been extremely rare in the past, although a few,
such as the four words released by the Pike Committee, have been well
publici eci
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2. Section 8(c) (1) prohibits the disclosure of information in the
possession of the Select Committee relating to "lawful" U.S. intelligence
activities, Nowhere in the legislative history is there a reference to who
should make the decision whether an intelligence activity is lawful. If
this decision were left to individual members of the Committee, a member
who felt covert action was illegal because it violates international law would
be able to unilaterally leak this information. The Executive branch should
seek Committee agreement that, at a minimum, this determination would be
made by the full Committee in consultation with the Executive branch.
D. President's Representative
Section 9 provides that the Select Committee may permit a representative
of the President to attend any closed Committee meetings. A decision. must
be made regarding who should serve in this liaison position..
E. Transfer of Church Committee Documents
Section 10 provides that all records, files, documents, and other
materials in the possession, custody, or control of the Church Committee
should he transferred to the new Committee. Legislative history establishes
that the Church Committee is to live up to its agreements with the Executive
branch for return of documents. The Executive branch should seek the return
of as many of these documents as possible.
F. Reporting Responsibilities
1. Section 11. sets forth the Senate's view of agencies' responsibilities
to report to the Committee. Specifically, the section states that it is the
sense of the Senate that the head of each agency should:
a. keep the Committee fully and currently informed on
intelligence activities;
b. furnish the Committee any information or document in
its possession upon request;
c. report immediately violations of constitutional right=;, law,
Executive orders, Presidential directives, or departmental or agency
rules or regulations.
The Executive branch should carefully consider the mechanisms and criteria
tender which it reports to the Committee, and specifically whether existing
mechanisms and criteria are satisfactory. The new Committee may well ii-:;lc
for more formalized reporting procedures and may attempt to reach agreement
with agencies on reporting responsil.Aliti.es.
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2. Section 11(c) provides that agencies should report immediately
activities which amount to violations of the "constitutional rights of any
person, violations of law, or violations of Executive orders, Presidential
directives, or departmental or agency rules or regulations. " A reporting
of every violation of minor agency regulations would unacceptably involve
the Committee in clay-to-day management of the agencies and is probably
outside the Committee's interest. The Executive branch should consider
uniform reporting standards in this area and should consider seeking
Committee acceptance of these standards.
G. Annual Authorization
Section 12 requires an annual authorization of all intelligence funds.
Intelligence agencies should attempt to reach agreement on how this requirement
can best be fulfilled with a minimum of disruption and additional effort, and
what procedures would permit intelligence budgets to remain secret. Assuming
the Senate continues to support secret budgets, we would then be in a position
to recommend a particular course of action to the new Committee.
H. Special Study
Section 13 directs the Select Committee to make a study of several
matters and to report to the full Senate their recommendations by I July 1977.
The Select Committee may omit subjects which it determines have been ade-
quately studied by the Church Committee. The Executive branch should
determine which of the subjects would benefit from study by the new Committee,
either because they may lead to improvements in intelligence activities or
congressional procedures, or because there is a reasonable chance that the
new Committee would overturn unfavorable findings of the Church Committee.
The Executive branch should seek to prove.to the Select Committee that
the other subjects have been adequately studied.
1. Legislation
The Church Committee's final report contained 87 recommendations,
over half of which were recommended as new laws. Chairman Inouye has
already announced that the new Committee will proceed to consider changes
in agencies' charters. The Executive branch should be prepared with its
responses to the Church Committee recommendations, as these will no doubt
be the starting point for the new Committee's work. There may also be the
opportunity to seize the initiative by publicly endorsing certain recommendations.
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 l A / .rl4T rw_ ..JJ 1*I .H.. J.t .,lJt~. -_'- .lj..Z~ t"1..~. i. A.. i d 1. ~
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committee will be ~~{~ ~xotReI@' 91 r! 7 ccC1A1RDp7 o266oR ooo8O ltd ?4(~+9~0, which :vial be nil
amendment, to Sena e esolu ion 400 is Foreign Relations Committee, with the important, part of the recommended ac
adopted. - . , ..: _ right of the new committee to ask for a tion on. this arnendm.ent. I look forward
A strong and .effective Senate Over- sequential referral. :,-- to supporting the Senator. ~.
sight Committee with legislative author- Mr. PELL. I thank my colleague. In Mr. RI}3ICO'UP: I thank the Senato
ity is required in order to insure that the. section 3, paragraph (b>?.of the amend-- very much. .
intelligence activities. of- the United meet it is stated that "any legislation
Mr
President
I suggest-the absence of.
.
.
,
States directly support. American secu - reported by the select committee, except a quorum.. .
"
rity'interests, are conducted under clear, any- legislation involving.. matters spe- '-The PRESIDLNG OFFICER. The clerk
legal authority, and do not violate the cifled in clause (1) "-that is, the CIA--or . will call the troll.
civil.rights of American.citizens. The (4)(A)-CIA budget-"of subsection(a), .The assistant legislative clerk pro-
S,leet Committee headed by .the distin- containing any matter-otherwise within . seeded to call the roll.. , : ,,.~,,, ?:
guished Senator from. Idaho has. done an -thee jurisdiction: of: any standing,com- . Mr. RIIIICOFF. Mr. President,'1 ask.
excellent job in studying all facets of'che';='mittee shall, at the request of the chair-...unanimous consent.- that.the-order, for
activities of: the intelligence.: community rnan of such standing committe, be re- -the quorum call be rescinded. -- - .
and-in making recommendationsforl'eg- ferred to such standing. committee -for The PRESIDING OFFICER
Without
.
isla.tive action. But it- is. now essential its consideration.". objection, it is so ordered
that legislation be developed and acted . Does that mean that any legislation. Mr. MAI'IIIAS. Mr. President, first, I Y
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of the kind 'of 'intelligence committee committee relating to CIA activities from Connecticut (Mr. Itzsicor'?) and
proposed in the amendment before us. having foreign policy implications would the disting;uish.ed Senator from Illinois.
Although I .support'tl is amendment be refs rred upon request fn hhe n .r
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effect of the amendment on the jurisdic- Mr. RIBICOFF. If -the legislation r.e uted by..marty Members .of -the Senate,
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express )ny views acid my apps ec ration -:
ing this compromise as the floor manager - - on in that same paragraph
it is stated
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to them..
of Senate Resolution 400;: would be so that-- 1 :.t e
kind as , to respond to. the following- Any proposed legislation reported' by any "i ~ ' Presi ent.,we ar'e iinally'approach -
questions committee, other than the select committee, ing the Climax Of a year and a half of an
The Committee on Mules, in its report, which contains any matter within. the juris~ unprecedented. investigation into the
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Ryan amendment-tt the Foreign Assist- request of the chairman of the select coin-- ity leader and I introduced the resolution
once Act, which provides for Presidential mittee, be referred to the select committee . in October 1974 that led to the creation
for its consideration: of the Select Committee on Intelligence,
reports to four standing committees of it was in the aftermath of Waterg,'ate, -:.;
the Senate on covert actions, may be ' Does that mean that the Committee on charges of domestic spyingg by the intel-.
superseded if an intelligence committee Foreign Relations could initiate legisla- ligence agencies and their misuse for "
is established. The report states that it tion of its own on CIA activities having.
is arguable-that the Foreign Relations foreign policy implications as long as. political p ngress. ad taken loran hard
such legislation is referred subsequently look the ells gene had taken re the `a- -
Committee could lose its statutory au- to the proposed Intelligence Committee? tion;s intelli-ence arm occurred in the -
thorny to receive Presidential reports on Mr RIBICO.FI'. That is correct. As I 1940's-in the wake of the great intelli-
covert activity. I understand that it is not gence'failure at Pearl Harbor.:.
the intent of Senate Resolution 4.00 to af- said in response to your second question,
feet the Hughes-Ryan amendment, but I such legislation would be sequentially re- . The investigations a.nd exposures of..
da believe that it would ba useful to f d to the Intelligence Committee. -~'?' th.e past year? have revealed another.. type
clarify the matter in light of what has ivir. POLL. Finally, section 3, 17ara- of intelligence failure-this time not a
been said by tyre Rules.Cammittee. graphs (c) and (d), state. that other failure of military preparedness but of
tee on Rules hearings on these proposals: otherwise within the jurisdiction of such - agreement oil essentials-"-is a si fnificant,' .
Senate Resolution-400?? does not repeal committee and that such committees breakthrough in the effort -to remedy'
the Hughes-Ryan Act. As a resolution, would "obtain full and prompt access to..the intelligence failure we have recently:.:-.
tion of a new committee will not repeal o:f any department or agency of tare av-~ rnaxinium support.
the requirement of the CIA to brief the eminent relevant to a matter otherwise Today we see i-; esidential hopefuls ,- 4
Committee on Foreign. Relations....: within the jurisdiction of such commit- cei.ving standing ovations for telling
Mr. PELL. I thank the Senator: tee." Do these provisions- mean that the audiences "I promise I will never lie to-
Does the granting of exclusive juris_ administration would be expected to pr?o- You." Ili a democratic society; when a,
vide all of. the information, which the line like that brings people to their feet
diction to the =proposed ' intelligence Committee on Foreign Relations re- applauding, you have really lrit bottom
committee over the CIA mean that quires, except of course raw data? I re- Government rests on the confidence of.
paragraph 1(i) (1) of Senate rule X.XV, call in this regard that, when I was con- the people. Ties resolution is designed to
which states- that the Committee on ducting hearings several. years ago on restore the confidence of the people hr -
Foreign Relations has'. jtuisdiction over weather modification activities in South- the intelligence agencies. The way t:o.
relations of the United States with for- east tlsia, I was decried infor'matiorr on bring the intelligence- cornniunity out of ..
eigrr nations g enerally," should be taken the 9'ounds that the "appropriate" corn-. its present disarray and the drunrfire of
to exclude jurisdiction aver CIA activi- nrittei--in this case, Armed Services criticism is: to assure the American.
ties which have foreign relations impli- had b ,eci notified. people that Congress is meeting its can-
cations? Mr. RIBICOFF. That is correct. Crea- stitutioual .responsibilities to oversee in-
Mr. RIBICOFI~. The jurisdiction of tion a' the new committee s.iould not he telligence operations. 'Only then will
tile Committee ocr Foreign Relations used b r the intelligence agencies to deny . the clamor of attack and attention re-
over legislation affecting the CIA is not the sts. riding committee any .nforrnation cede.
changed by Senate Resolution 400. I. e~,- on airy matter with which the, committee In this, our Bicentennial "Year, the
islat.ion which now would go to the is concerned, ,such as an irvestig;ation ~?enate has a special opportunity to re-
Committee on Foreign Relations be- ?lescrib rd by section 3(c) of tlhe proposed new the values of those who founded this
cause of its
redominant f
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cy substitt.t t Re 1 t
n s ago, on Jan-
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 ' Setat:or front Nevada an?ecy of file fi^ures? stauce, in terms of. the overall izltelli?-
i\Lr. NUNN. I thank the Senator from Bence activities, that there is a-sequen-
Connecticut.
Another question along that line:
When the select committee reaarts an
authorization bill for intelligence funds,
haw will the full Senate then consider
the matter, assuming ttxat the Senate
has decided to continue to keep. these
figuz?es secret?
Mr. RIEICOE''F'. If the Senate decided
to carxtinue to keep the overall figures
secret, the process could work this way:
In the case of authax3zations for de-
fense-related intelligence activities, any
bill reported by the ecru committee would
be sequentially referred to the Armed
Service's Committee. As in file case of
sequential referral of other legislation,
there would be no need for full Senate
debate prior to this sequential referral.
The authorization figure would then be
clis~uised in the DO7C} authorization bill
approved liy the Axmecl Sez?*rrces Com-
mittee, as is the case now.
In the case of an annual authorization
for -the CIA, after the select. committee
approves an authorization, I watzld ex-
pect that the :figure would be disguised
in soma otlle:r authorization measure. " .
2VIr. NUNN. I thank the Senator. I
thine that is extremely important, and
clarifies a point that has been o.f con-
siderable concern to the Senator from
Geor~ria and I think many other Sena-
tuls.
1'1t.other question along the same line:
Ir;tiy would the new c.ommlttee bring a
matter involving tdle intelligence ~cu-
tllorization Fi;ure to fife attention c>f the
full Senate, assuming the figures sre
st.i!1 secret?
the requirement. in section 12 for an intelligence personnel? ?
ant.utal authorization of the intelligence. iVlr. RIBtCOI~'i;'. Let the respancl to the
budget interfere with the ability of tkte ell:,tit-cguished Sr n'itot? Il'Olll CsEOZ?i;irt and.
Appropriations Committee. to a.ppro- -the distinguished tienators ft:om i~Lissis-
priate funds. for intelligence in a timely sippi and North Dakota, who are so deep-?
Fashion? ~ .. , . -~ ~... ~ ly involved in such mattet?s: '.Chin is the
Mr. IZI-CICOk'P. The committee au- type ~of situation tivttere, i.n my opinion,
thorizing~ expenciituces for intelligence- it tvoulcl first go to the Arrned Set-vices
activities-would be stzbjeet, litre .other Canxtxtit;tee and theta, sequentially, to thr
comrzlittees, to the requirements of the Intelli;;elrce Commit!ee. You would carne
I3uctget Act. The committees will have lzrst, in my opinion, where the bill. is a
until May 15 to cutnplete action on au- general Defence Dena.rttnent nxanpotiver
thorizations for intelligence. At the same bill,
time, the Budget Act contemplates that The Armed Services Committee ~vouId
continue to have- exclusive jurisdictivtt:
over all ast,ects of the le;~islation except
for the portion affecting national intel-
ligence. The portion of the legislation af-
fecting national intelligence would be re-
viewed by both the Committee: on Arrned
Services and the nea= committee, under
section .',. It would be ttp to Lhe eery cote-
mittee and the Arrned Services Comrrtit-?
tee to work ottt the details an the- pro-
eedure for actual corsiclerotvez? .:tttthorization fc r fiscal year
Connecticut, but the bill, as I under-
stand it, provides to file cuntrazy, i.llat
it would go to the Intelligence Commit-
tee first. Serza,tors will understand. trtal?
oztz? hearings on mc~,npvwez? start in the
fall of the year, before the budget even
. comes 9n.
--- 1~Ir. IZII3ICOI~F'. Well, basically it is
uxi tq the Pa.rliamentarialx, in a sequen-
tial ref.'erral, on fire i}asis of what is in
tlxe b111.:tf it .is basica.Ily armed services,
it fyaes to the C:omtni.ttr:e utx Arrned Serv-
ices first. If it is }sasically iutcliia~ence, it
saes to Irztelligencc first. It is rriy per-
sonal interpretation t'rtat if it proviclecl
.for overall manpower, covering tl~e en-
tire Department of J~efense, eonlrnon--
,sense would dictate-=and, of course, th.e
? 1.'~trlianxerltarian is the: firt:tl ?iud~?c--?f:llttt
tlta.t would no to arnted services first..
The i:'Ri;'S1:DIIV~G C7E'F'IC:F.II. f iLPz?..
Ar,z>;rr). The allotted time has expired.
Mr. rZIT3ICUI~'P'. I yic ld myself- 3 mare'
tni.nutes.
It would go to Arned Services Jrst,
because intelligence would bi: only a part:
of -the overall. Department of Dercnse
Inatll.YobVex' a:uthi>r'iLati.an. -
Then out of that would be cact?verl out
only the intelligence portion, ~.rhickx
would then be referred segttentiaily i.a
tYzc Int *Aigence Carnmit:tee.
lviay ; sa;y for the benefit oC the Sr.nate
that it. 's my feelin> that there :tre a lot
oP,;r:r.y areas in this le~;islstt.ion. It is
itxll]ossil-.le to ans;a-cr alt f:hc: qucstiuas.
~Ve ..ere gain; 1.v have to work it out
between all the commit:tces and the In-?
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 Approved For Release 2004/10/27 :CIA-RDP78M02660R000800110009-0
MEIvtORANDUM FOR: John O. Marsh, Jr . Counsellor to the President.
FROM: cting Legislative Counsel
SUBJECT: CIA Views of S. Res. 400
Distribution:
Orig -Addressee
1 -DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - Mr . Knoche
1 - D/DCI/IC
1 - DDA
1 - DDI
1 -DDS&T
1 - DDO
1 - occ
1 -Review Staff
1 - OLC Subject
1 - OLC Chrono
OLC: DFM: srn (28 May 76)
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 Approved For Release 2004/10/27 :CIA-RDP78M02660R000800110009-0
c.t....i 3 --.1~.. ~r~ f, .t n r ,
TO: ;:Y-. ~-j: IP
Countsle~llor to khe Presi~r~nt
~~lE> ~Y R~YF' 1'la'l/I CIs
Washington, :n.C. 20500
L~? 'stn, ~r2,...a.r
LOG DATA
IN?~ Q173411
DATE
TYPE OF MATERIAL
.-..I ENVELOPE (S)
PACKAGE(S)
OTHER
DATE AND 71ME OF PICKUP ~'.
Z ~ ~~~~
COURIER' INITIALS
ORIGINATING
OFFICE LOG
Approved For Release 2004/10/27 :CIA-RDP78M02660R000800110009-0