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May 28, 1976
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US 76 00j0~~O1SQ~ k9jEftOm-e }/46R[#4p660R0008F WASNINGTON,D.C. 20505 28 May 1976 MEMORANDUM FOR: John O. Marsh, Jr. Counsellor to the President I Acting Legislative Counsel. SUBJECT: CIA Views of S. Res. 400 This memorandum is CIA's response to your request at the 25 May ICC meeting that each agency summarize its views on S. Res. 400. CIA views are part I of this memorandum. The passage of S. Res. 400 requires some decisions and action by the Executive branch and by individual agencies. Part II of this memorandum erxumerates some areas which need Executive branch attention. The Director has not reviewed this paper, and therefore this should be considered a working draft, 1. OPPORTUNITIES AND PROBLEMS A. Both Mr. Bush and Mr. Colby have made strong statements supporting the concept of strong and effective congressional oversight. During his 31 March testimony before the Senate Rules Committee on S. Res. 400, Mr. Bush said: "The Central Intelligence Agency welcomes strong and effective congressional oversight. We have a great deal to gain from it. We gain the advice and counsel of knowledge- able Members. Through it, we can maintain the trust and support of the American people. We will retain this support only so long as the people remain confident that the political structure provides clear accountability of our intelligence services, through effective Executive and congressional oversight. " Intelligence oversight committees have been criticized, even by remembers of the committees, of not adequately performing their responsibilities. Because of this criticism, these committees were not in a position to defend intelligence agencies, even in the face of patently ridiculous charges. Approved For Reif-I",, 20Q4I10d27, : I RpP78111~102660R000800110009-0 r''r6-19i'0 Approved For Release 2004/10/27 : CIA-RDP78M02660R000800110009-0 A new committee, composed of members not associated with past oversight, could prove a powerful asset, a powerful defender. Of course the committee will first have to gain a thorough knowledge of intelligence programs. B. Another positive aspect of S. Res. 400 is its recognition that Congress must find the means to halt the unauthorized disclosure of classified information by Members and staff. Section 8 (c) (1) prohibits the disclosure of information relating to lawful U.S. intelligence activities by individual Members and staff. Section 8(d) directs the Select Committee on Standards and Conduct to investigate any unauthorized disclosure by a Member or staff member. If the Select Committee on Standards and Conduct finds the charges to be substantiated, it is to recommend "appropriate action such as censure, removal from committee membership, or expulsion from the Senate, in the case of a Member, or removal from office or employment or punishment for contempt, in the case of an officer or employee." The legislative history of the Resolution, particularly its consideration by the Government Operations Committee, shows concern about the Senate's responsibility to discipline its own Members, especially because of the Speech and Debate Clause of the Constitution. Senator Huddleston, a member of the new committee, was instrumental in placing disclosure restrictions in the Resolution. Although it remains to be seen whether this spirit: will prove stronger than traditional congressional reluctance to chastise or discipline another Member, the Senate is on record as acknowledging its responsibilities in this area. C. The Resolution does not provide for the exclusivity or concentration . of oversight which would assure that exposure to such sensitive matters would be limited to the minimum number of members or committees required to exercise effective oversight. For most agencies, the Resolution simply creates another committee (a very large one) to delve into agency programs and activities, without removing jurisdiction from standing committees. Legislative and authorization jurisdiction for CIA is exclusively the province of the new committee. However, section 3(c) of the Resolution provides: " (c) The select committee shall also have the duty to study and review the organization and reorganization of any department or agency of the Government to the extent that the organization or reorganization relates to a function or activity involving intelligence activities. " This provision was meant primarily to assure other committees that they could still exercise a general oversight of the intelligence activities of the agencies they oversee. For example, the Judiciary Committee would be. able Approved For Release 2004/10/27 : 9IA-RDP78M02660R000800110009-0 Approved For Release 2004/10/27 CIA-RDP78M02660R000800110009-0 to review and study FBI intelligence activities. However, the provision does not exclude CIA, and a floor colloquy between Senators Ribicoff and Pell (Appendix A) gave a very expansive interpretation to this section. We are hopeful that the new committee will quickly develop the respect and muscle to forestall the proliferation of information on sensitive intelligence through the review and study of CIA activities by other committees . (Of course, reporting responsibilities under section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act remain.) D. Section 8(a) of the Resolution asserts the right of the Committee to "disclose publicly any information in the possession of such committee after a determination by such committee that the public interest would be served by such disclosure." Section 8(b) establishes procedures the Committee must follow in order to release classified information. These procedures involve notification of the President, and referral of the issue to the full Senate should the President personally object and should the Committee maintain its desire to release the information. Procedurally, this section is. as good as the Executive branch could have hoped for. Clearly this section could pose constitutional questions. The President's position on the release of classified information by Congress was stated in his 18 February message to Congress: "Any foreign intelligence information transmitted by the Executive Branch to the Oversight Committee, under an injunction of secrecy, should not be unilaterally disclosed without my agreement. Respect for the integrity of the Constitution requires adherence to the principle that no :individual. member nor committee, nor single House of Congress can overrule an act of the Executive. Unilateral publication of classified information over the objection of the President, by one committee or one House of Congress, not only violates the doctrine of separation of powers, but also effectively overrules the actions of the other Houses of Congress, and perhaps even the majority of both Houses. " Assistant Attorney General Antonin Scalia also addressed this issue in his 1.2 March 1976 statement before the Senate Judiciary Committee. "I would not assert that this [classification by the Executive branch] alone should prevent publication by a House of. Congress. The need for secrecy is, like most needs, a relative matter, and merely because the Executive Branch has determined for its internal purposes that a particular item should not generally be disc:lo: ed, it does not follow that the item should not be published when a House of Congress considers publication essential for the proper performance of its functions. " Approved For Rekiease'id4%10/ : CiA-F LJP1 M02660R000800110009-0 Approved For Release 2004/10/27 : CIA-RDP78MO266OR000800110009-0 It is possible that this provision will be called into play only rarely. Requests for declassification of information by committees have in the past nearly always been worked out to the satisfaction of both parties. Often only a few words need to be deleted or altered to "sanitize" a document. On the other hand, this section could prove a continuing source of discord. Much will depend on whether the new committee is of a disposition to confront or to cooperate with the Executive branch. E. Section 12 of S. Res. 400 requires all intelligence funds to be authorized in bills or joint resolutions passed by the Senate prior to Senate consideration of appropriation bills for intelligence activities. It is not clear what action the I-louse would take on a Senate authorization of funds which has not been subject to the authorization process in the House. An annual authorization of CIA funds is an entirely new requirement. The CIA Act of 1949 permits funds to be appropriated for CIA without an annual authorization [50 U.S.C. 403(j)] . However, the Act does not preclude an annual authorization, and the Senate has now determined that there should be one. The chief problem this requirement presents from CIA's point of view is the danger of budget disclosure it entails. The Agency did not object to giving the new Committee a role in the determination of the level of our budget and its program content. We urged, however, that this be done by means which would give a higher degree of assurance that budget secrecy could be maintained than does an annual authorization "by bill or joint resolution. " A floor colloquy between Senators Nunn and Ribicoff established that this new procedure is not automatically to result in budget disclosure (see Appendix B). However, despite a 55-33 ;tune 1974 vote against dis- closure of a single intelligence community budget figure, ten of the thirteen members of this Committee who have voted on this issue voted for some form of budget disclosure. Under these circumstances, the Executive branch must continue to develop convincing arguments and education to assure maintaining budget secrecy. Approved For Release 2004/10/27 : CIA-RDP78MO266OR000800110009-0 4 Approved For Release 2004/10/27 CIA-RDP78M02660F 000800110009-0 II. POSSIBLE EXECUTIVE BRANCH ACTION I. Section 3(c) of the Resolution provides that other Senate committees can continue to review and study intelligence activities to the extent such activities directly affect a matter within the jurisdiction. of the other committee. 'T'his is precisely the grounds on which 1.1 other committees and subcommittees in the past year have asserted their right to access to sensitive CIA matters. It is in CIA's interest that other committees not gain access to information on CIA activities, and the DCI should consider urging the Chairman to attempt to restrain other committees from seeking access to operational information. 2. The jurisdiction of the new Committee encompasses both foreign and domestic intelligence. The Executive branch opposed this, because Justice did not want FBI intelligence activities split from the remainder of the Bureau's operations. Also a factor was the fear that the Committee would attempt to develop identical standards for both domestic and foreign intel- ligence activities, despite the entirely different constitutional bases, problems, and considerations involved. The concurrent jurisdiction arrangement worked out by Senator Mansfield may have ameliorated Justice's jurisdictional. concerns. It may be wise to develop a paper pointing out the inappropriate- ness of identical standards for the two types of activities in anticipation of the emergence of the second problem. 3. Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act requires reports on covert action to be made to "appropriate" congressional committees. The only Senate committee specifically named is the Foreign Relations Committee. However, the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees have been considered "appropriate" committees, and have been receiving section 662 reports. Because covert action is the exclusive province of CIA, there is a reasonable basis for terminating the reports to the Senate Armed Services Committee. This would reduce the number of committees exposed to this information, although it would eliminate a committee which has posed no security problems. The issue of termination of section 662 reports to the Senate Armed Services Committee might best be resolved between Chairman Inouye and Chairman Stennis, 4. CIA attempted in the Government Operations Committee to have section 662 amended to require reports only to the Appropriations and new intelligence committees. However, when the Committee converted the Church Committee's oversight proposal, S. 2893, into a resolution, this became impossible. Subsequently, Senators Percy and Ribicoff announced that they would introduce a bill to amend section 662 in this manner. The Administration should strongly back such a bill and actively push it. However, it might be tactically advantageous to wait until the House of Representatives Approved For Release-20041110/27.: CIA-RDP78.Mb2660R000800110009-0 Approved For Release 2004/10/27 CIA-RDP78M02660R000800110009=0 has considered the oversight issue, as they may do this summer. At least one House oversight proposal. II. J. Res. 945, introduced recently by Representative Cederberg, would amend these reporting requirements. The house would presumably be reluctant to amend the Act before it has reached its major intelligence oversight decisions. B. Staff Clearance Section 6 of the Resolution provides for staff background investigations, oaths, and written secrecy agreements that the staff member will not disclose Committee information during or after his employment. The Director of Central Intelligence is to consult with the Committee regarding these clearances. The Executive branch should have in mind, before these consultations begin, proposed security agreement language, which agency should conduct the background investigations, and whether or not we should push hard for polygraphs to be administered to the staff. 1. The Executive branch must carefully consider its options in light of the Senate's assertion of its authority to unilaterally declassify Executive branch information. One option, asserting our constitutional objections to this provision, would be to refuse to provide the Committee information unless it agreed in advance not to disclose it. A second option would be to try to win the Committee's agreement to narrow the breadth of this pro- vision. For example, Assistant Attorney General Scalia asserted in his 12 March testimony that in a few situations it would be improper for a House of Congress to authorize any disclosure. The examples he gave were: (1) When the information has been received under an agreement of non-disclosure. (2) When the information is protected from disclosure by statutes, e . g . , classified communications intelligence. We should seek to have this category include intelligence. sources and methods, although the statute is not as helpful as in other cases. Information submitted to the Committee might then he stamped with special designators in addition to the normal Executive branch classification. These designators might include "communications intelligence - protected from disclosure by 18 U . S . C . 798" or "sensitive intelligence sources and methods information - subject to the DCI's statutory responsibility to protect this information from unauthorized disclosure. " (3) When its disclosure has the purpose and effect of negating or frustrating action which both Houses of Congress have authorized the Executive to perform. A third option would be merely to attempt to build a spirit of cooperation which would enable tis to avoid disclosure disputes. As previously pointed out, such disputes have been extremely rare in the past, although a few, such as the four words released by the Pike Committee, have been well publici eci Approved For Release 200#/ 10127 CIA RDP78MOZ6 ORb00800110009-0 Approved For Release 2004/10/27: CIA-RDP78M02660R000800110009-0 2. Section 8(c) (1) prohibits the disclosure of information in the possession of the Select Committee relating to "lawful" U.S. intelligence activities, Nowhere in the legislative history is there a reference to who should make the decision whether an intelligence activity is lawful. If this decision were left to individual members of the Committee, a member who felt covert action was illegal because it violates international law would be able to unilaterally leak this information. The Executive branch should seek Committee agreement that, at a minimum, this determination would be made by the full Committee in consultation with the Executive branch. D. President's Representative Section 9 provides that the Select Committee may permit a representative of the President to attend any closed Committee meetings. A decision. must be made regarding who should serve in this liaison position.. E. Transfer of Church Committee Documents Section 10 provides that all records, files, documents, and other materials in the possession, custody, or control of the Church Committee should he transferred to the new Committee. Legislative history establishes that the Church Committee is to live up to its agreements with the Executive branch for return of documents. The Executive branch should seek the return of as many of these documents as possible. F. Reporting Responsibilities 1. Section 11. sets forth the Senate's view of agencies' responsibilities to report to the Committee. Specifically, the section states that it is the sense of the Senate that the head of each agency should: a. keep the Committee fully and currently informed on intelligence activities; b. furnish the Committee any information or document in its possession upon request; c. report immediately violations of constitutional right=;, law, Executive orders, Presidential directives, or departmental or agency rules or regulations. The Executive branch should carefully consider the mechanisms and criteria tender which it reports to the Committee, and specifically whether existing mechanisms and criteria are satisfactory. The new Committee may well ii-:;lc for more formalized reporting procedures and may attempt to reach agreement with agencies on reporting Approved For Release 2004/10/27 7 CIA-RDP78MO266OR000800110009-0 Approved For Release 2004/10/27 CIA-RDP78MO266OR000800110009-0 2. Section 11(c) provides that agencies should report immediately activities which amount to violations of the "constitutional rights of any person, violations of law, or violations of Executive orders, Presidential directives, or departmental or agency rules or regulations. " A reporting of every violation of minor agency regulations would unacceptably involve the Committee in clay-to-day management of the agencies and is probably outside the Committee's interest. The Executive branch should consider uniform reporting standards in this area and should consider seeking Committee acceptance of these standards. G. Annual Authorization Section 12 requires an annual authorization of all intelligence funds. Intelligence agencies should attempt to reach agreement on how this requirement can best be fulfilled with a minimum of disruption and additional effort, and what procedures would permit intelligence budgets to remain secret. Assuming the Senate continues to support secret budgets, we would then be in a position to recommend a particular course of action to the new Committee. H. Special Study Section 13 directs the Select Committee to make a study of several matters and to report to the full Senate their recommendations by I July 1977. The Select Committee may omit subjects which it determines have been ade- quately studied by the Church Committee. The Executive branch should determine which of the subjects would benefit from study by the new Committee, either because they may lead to improvements in intelligence activities or congressional procedures, or because there is a reasonable chance that the new Committee would overturn unfavorable findings of the Church Committee. The Executive branch should seek to the Select Committee that the other subjects have been adequately studied. 1. Legislation The Church Committee's final report contained 87 recommendations, over half of which were recommended as new laws. Chairman Inouye has already announced that the new Committee will proceed to consider changes in agencies' charters. The Executive branch should be prepared with its responses to the Church Committee recommendations, as these will no doubt be the starting point for the new Committee's work. There may also be the opportunity to seize the initiative by publicly endorsing certain recommendations. Approved For Release 2004/10/27 : CIA-RDP78MO266OR000800110009-0 8 l A / .rl4T rw_ ..JJ 1*I .H.. J.t .,lJt~. -_'- .lj..Z~ t"1..~. i. A.. i d 1. ~ e ti - committee will be ~~{~ ~xotReI@' 91 r! 7 ccC1A1RDp7 o266oR ooo8O ltd ?4(~+9~0, which :vial be nil amendment, to Sena e esolu ion 400 is Foreign Relations Committee, with the important, part of the recommended ac adopted. - . , ..: _ right of the new committee to ask for a tion on. this arnendm.ent. I look forward A strong and .effective Senate Over- sequential referral. :,-- to supporting the Senator. ~. sight Committee with legislative author- Mr. PELL. I thank my colleague. In Mr. RI}3ICO'UP: I thank the Senato ity is required in order to insure that the. section 3, paragraph (b>?.of the amend-- very much. . intelligence activities. of- the United meet it is stated that "any legislation Mr President I suggest-the absence of. . . , States directly support. American secu - reported by the select committee, except a quorum.. . " rity'interests, are conducted under clear, any- legislation involving.. matters spe- '-The PRESIDLNG OFFICER. The clerk legal authority, and do not violate the cifled in clause (1) "-that is, the CIA--or . will call the troll. civil.rights of American.citizens. The (4)(A)-CIA budget-"of subsection(a), .The assistant legislative clerk pro- S,leet Committee headed by .the distin- containing any matter-otherwise within . seeded to call the roll.. , : ,,.~,,, ?: guished Senator from. Idaho has. done an -thee jurisdiction: of: any standing,com- . Mr. RIIIICOFF. Mr. President,'1 ask. excellent job in studying all facets of'che';='mittee shall, at the request of the chair-...unanimous consent.- that.the-order, for activities of: the intelligence.: community rnan of such standing committe, be re- -the quorum call be rescinded. -- - . and-in making recommendationsforl'eg- ferred to such standing. committee -for The PRESIDING OFFICER Without . isla.tive action. But it- is. now essential its consideration.". objection, it is so ordered that legislation be developed and acted . Does that mean that any legislation. Mr. MAI'IIIAS. Mr. President, first, I Y u on That is h I t h d l t d p . w y suppor eve ope t e creation. by he proposed .intelligence congratulate the distinguished Senator of the kind 'of 'intelligence committee committee relating to CIA activities from Connecticut (Mr. Itzsicor'?) and proposed in the amendment before us. having foreign policy implications would the disting;uish.ed Senator from Illinois. Although I .support'tl is amendment be refs rred upon request fn hhe n .r i rn e . -.-__. _ - _ ,;,. _ .. .. ... _._"..,... __. . -;-,~, they. have-none in tailing ideas. contrir)-.. effect of the amendment on the jurisdic- Mr. RIBICOFF. If -the legislation r.e uted by..marty Members .of -the Senate, ?F ..+1. .,< i?+,,,.....+.:a r,nrted },,, +h S l t ~~...,, .,..:++,.,.. u, ,..... tin>- anri activi}1 e e ec es itt t i l f li l th li . ees, pa; Y1, u o e . ;1 po ar y cy '1111p e X oreign Re tlulcan cations, 411e portant views, and "then. br?ingiiig them lotions Committee, of:whichHam a mem- Committee on-Foreign Relations -would here in the form of a le i l tiv l g s a e proposa Der. I would therefore appreciate it if the ' be able to .ask for a sequential referral that I think is going: to pass. I bF lieve. it ... ... _ .s - .7 in+i v.....,.?L, ...a f- ++. l l ti ~~-_~____ t t o e egis a n or from Co Sena who-has done such a fine job in develop Mr. PELL. I thank the Senator. Later expres 1- y Y "? Y..1,> `-1 ' r e i ati n express )ny views acid my apps ec ration -: ing this compromise as the floor manager - - on in that same paragraph it is stated , to them.. of Senate Resolution 400;: would be so that-- 1 :.t e kind as , to respond to. the following- Any proposed legislation reported' by any "i ~ ' Presi ent.,we ar'e iinally'approach - questions committee, other than the select committee, ing the Climax Of a year and a half of an The Committee on Mules, in its report, which contains any matter within. the juris~ unprecedented. investigation into the ld f i t lli repo . o n e gence. When the major --:. diction of the select coinnlittee shall, at the ..wor raised . the possibility that the II Ryan amendment-tt the Foreign Assist- request of the chairman of the select coin-- ity leader and I introduced the resolution once Act, which provides for Presidential mittee, be referred to the select committee . in October 1974 that led to the creation for its consideration: of the Select Committee on Intelligence, reports to four standing committees of it was in the aftermath of Waterg,'ate, -:.; the Senate on covert actions, may be ' Does that mean that the Committee on charges of domestic spyingg by the intel-. superseded if an intelligence committee Foreign Relations could initiate legisla- ligence agencies and their misuse for " is established. The report states that it tion of its own on CIA activities having. is arguable-that the Foreign Relations foreign policy implications as long as. political p ngress. ad taken loran hard such legislation is referred subsequently look the ells gene had taken re the `a- - Committee could lose its statutory au- to the proposed Intelligence Committee? tion;s intelli-ence arm occurred in the - thorny to receive Presidential reports on Mr RIBICO.FI'. That is correct. As I 1940's-in the wake of the great intelli- covert activity. I understand that it is not gence'failure at Pearl Harbor.:. the intent of Senate Resolution 4.00 to af- said in response to your second question, feet the Hughes-Ryan amendment, but I such legislation would be sequentially re- . The investigations a.nd exposures of.. da believe that it would ba useful to f d to the Intelligence Committee. -~'?' th.e past year? have revealed another.. type clarify the matter in light of what has ivir. POLL. Finally, section 3, 17ara- of intelligence failure-this time not a been said by tyre Rules.Cammittee. graphs (c) and (d), state. that other failure of military preparedness but of tee on Rules hearings on these proposals: otherwise within the jurisdiction of such - agreement oil essentials-"-is a si fnificant,' . Senate Resolution-400?? does not repeal committee and that such committees breakthrough in the effort -to remedy' the Hughes-Ryan Act. As a resolution, would "obtain full and prompt access to..the intelligence failure we have recently:.:-. tion of a new committee will not repeal o:f any department or agency of tare av-~ rnaxinium support. the requirement of the CIA to brief the eminent relevant to a matter otherwise Today we see i-; esidential hopefuls ,- 4 Committee on Foreign. Relations....: within the jurisdiction of such commit- cei.ving standing ovations for telling Mr. PELL. I thank the Senator: tee." Do these provisions- mean that the audiences "I promise I will never lie to- Does the granting of exclusive juris_ administration would be expected to pr?o- You." Ili a democratic society; when a, vide all of. the information, which the line like that brings people to their feet diction to the =proposed ' intelligence Committee on Foreign Relations re- applauding, you have really lrit bottom committee over the CIA mean that quires, except of course raw data? I re- Government rests on the confidence of. paragraph 1(i) (1) of Senate rule X.XV, call in this regard that, when I was con- the people. Ties resolution is designed to which states- that the Committee on ducting hearings several. years ago on restore the confidence of the people hr - Foreign Relations has'. jtuisdiction over weather modification activities in South- the intelligence agencies. The way t:o. relations of the United States with for- east tlsia, I was decried infor'matiorr on bring the intelligence- cornniunity out of .. eigrr nations g enerally," should be taken the 9'ounds that the "appropriate" corn-. its present disarray and the drunrfire of to exclude jurisdiction aver CIA activi- nrittei--in this case, Armed Services criticism is: to assure the American. ties which have foreign relations impli- had b ,eci notified. people that Congress is meeting its can- cations? Mr. RIBICOFF. That is correct. Crea- stitutioual .responsibilities to oversee in- Mr. RIBICOFI~. The jurisdiction of tion a' the new committee s.iould not he telligence operations. 'Only then will tile Committee ocr Foreign Relations used b r the intelligence agencies to deny . the clamor of attack and attention re- over legislation affecting the CIA is not the sts. riding committee any .nforrnation cede. changed by Senate Resolution 400. I. e~,- on airy matter with which the, committee In this, our Bicentennial "Year, the islat.ion which now would go to the is concerned, ,such as an irvestig;ation ~?enate has a special opportunity to re- Committee on Foreign Relations be- ?lescrib rd by section 3(c) of tlhe proposed new the values of those who founded this cause of its redominant f i li ' p ore gn po cy substitt.t t Re 1 t n s ago, on Jan- Approved For a e0~~71"7 :~- M ~0~'?I~'OFi~9-` ' Setat:or front Nevada an?ecy of file fi^ures? stauce, in terms of. the overall izltelli?- i\Lr. NUNN. I thank the Senator from Bence activities, that there is a-sequen- Connecticut. Another question along that line: When the select committee reaarts an authorization bill for intelligence funds, haw will the full Senate then consider the matter, assuming ttxat the Senate has decided to continue to keep. these figuz?es secret? Mr. RIEICOE''F'. If the Senate decided to carxtinue to keep the overall figures secret, the process could work this way: In the case of authax3zations for de- fense-related intelligence activities, any bill reported by the ecru committee would be sequentially referred to the Armed Service's Committee. As in file case of sequential referral of other legislation, there would be no need for full Senate debate prior to this sequential referral. The authorization figure would then be clis~uised in the DO7C} authorization bill approved liy the Axmecl Sez?*rrces Com- mittee, as is the case now. In the case of an annual authorization for -the CIA, after the select. committee approves an authorization, I watzld ex- pect that the :figure would be disguised in soma otlle:r authorization measure. " . 2VIr. NUNN. I thank the Senator. I thine that is extremely important, and clarifies a point that has been o.f con- siderable concern to the Senator from Geor~ria and I think many other Sena- tuls. 1'1t.other question along the same line: Ir;tiy would the new c.ommlttee bring a matter involving tdle intelligence ~cu- tllorization Fi;ure to fife attention c>f the full Senate, assuming the figures sre st.i!1 secret? the requirement. in section 12 for an intelligence personnel? ? ant.utal authorization of the intelligence. iVlr. RIBtCOI~'i;'. Let the respancl to the budget interfere with the ability of tkte ell:,tit-cguished Sr n'itot? Il'Olll CsEOZ?i;irt and. Appropriations Committee. to a.ppro- -the distinguished tienators ft:om i~Lissis- priate funds. for intelligence in a timely sippi and North Dakota, who are so deep-? Fashion? ~ .. , . -~ ~... ~ ly involved in such mattet?s: '.Chin is the Mr. IZI-CICOk'P. The committee au- type ~of situation tivttere, i.n my opinion, thorizing~ expenciituces for intelligence- it tvoulcl first go to the Arrned Set-vices activities-would be stzbjeet, litre .other Canxtxtit;tee and theta, sequentially, to thr comrzlittees, to the requirements of the Intelli;;elrce Commit!ee. You would carne I3uctget Act. The committees will have lzrst, in my opinion, where the bill. is a until May 15 to cutnplete action on au- general Defence Dena.rttnent nxanpotiver thorizations for intelligence. At the same bill, time, the Budget Act contemplates that The Armed Services Committee ~vouId continue to have- exclusive jurisdictivtt: over all ast,ects of the le;~islation except for the portion affecting national intel- ligence. The portion of the legislation af- fecting national intelligence would be re- viewed by both the Committee: on Arrned Services and the nea= committee, under section .',. It would be ttp to Lhe eery cote- mittee and the Arrned Services Comrrtit-? tee to work ottt the details an the- pro- eedure for actual corsiclerotvez? .:tttthorization fc r fiscal year Connecticut, but the bill, as I under- stand it, provides to file cuntrazy, i.llat it would go to the Intelligence Commit- tee first. Serza,tors will understand. trtal? oztz? hearings on mc~,npvwez? start in the fall of the year, before the budget even . comes 9n. --- 1~Ir. IZII3ICOI~F'. Well, basically it is uxi tq the Pa.rliamentarialx, in a sequen- tial ref.'erral, on fire i}asis of what is in tlxe b111.:tf it .is basica.Ily armed services, it fyaes to the C:omtni.ttr:e utx Arrned Serv- ices first. If it is }sasically iutcliia~ence, it saes to Irztelligencc first. It is rriy per- sonal interpretation t'rtat if it proviclecl .for overall manpower, covering tl~e en- tire Department of J~efense, eonlrnon-- ,sense would dictate-=and, of course, th.e ? 1.'~trlianxerltarian is the: firt:tl ?iud~?c--?f:llttt tlta.t would no to arnted services first.. The i:'Ri;'S1:DIIV~G C7E'F'IC:F.II. f iLPz?.. Ar,z>;rr). The allotted time has expired. Mr. rZIT3ICUI~'P'. I yic ld myself- 3 mare' tni.nutes. It would go to Arned Services Jrst, because intelligence would bi: only a part: of -the overall. Department of Dercnse Inatll.YobVex' a:uthi>r' - Then out of that would be cact?verl out only the intelligence portion, ~.rhickx would then be referred segttentiaily i.a tYzc Int *Aigence Carnmit:tee. lviay ; sa;y for the benefit oC the Sr.nate that it. 's my feelin> that there :tre a lot oP,;r:r.y areas in this le~;islstt.ion. It is itxll]ossil-.le to ans;a-cr alt f:hc: qucstiuas. ~Ve ..ere gain; 1.v have to work it out between all the commit:tces and the In-? Approved For Release 2004/10/27 :CIA-RDP78M02660ROOfl8O0110009-0 Approved For Release 2004/10/27 :CIA-RDP78M02660R000800110009-0 MEIvtORANDUM FOR: John O. Marsh, Jr . Counsellor to the President. FROM: cting Legislative Counsel SUBJECT: CIA Views of S. Res. 400 Distribution: Orig -Addressee 1 -DCI 1 - DDCI 1 - ER 1 - Mr . Knoche 1 - D/DCI/IC 1 - DDA 1 - DDI 1 -DDS&T 1 - DDO 1 - occ 1 -Review Staff 1 - OLC Subject 1 - OLC Chrono OLC: DFM: srn (28 May 76) Approved For Release 2004/10/27 :CIA-RDP78M02660R000800110009-0 Approved For Release 2004/10/27 :CIA-RDP78M02660R000800110009-0 c.t....i 3 --.1~.. ~r~ f, .t n r , TO: ;:Y-. ~-j: IP Countsle~llor to khe Presi~r~nt ~~lE> ~Y R~YF' 1'la'l/I CIs Washington, :n.C. 20500 L~? 'stn, ~r2,...a.r LOG DATA IN?~ Q173411 DATE TYPE OF MATERIAL .-..I ENVELOPE (S) PACKAGE(S) OTHER DATE AND 71ME OF PICKUP ~'. Z ~ ~~~~ COURIER' INITIALS ORIGINATING OFFICE LOG Approved For Release 2004/10/27 :CIA-RDP78M02660R000800110009-0