PORTUGUESE SUPERIOR COUNCIL OF THE ARMED FORCES MOVEMENT
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP78S01932A000100110016-9
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
C
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date:
November 30, 1998
Sequence Number:
16
Case Number:
Publication Date:
November 16, 1974
Content Type:
CABLE
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
![]() | 110.58 KB |
Body:
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ItARNTNC N.IOTICE SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS
INVOLVED
ITEM N0: . 1 DATE: .'16 NOVEMBER 1974
SU1J[::CT: PORTUGUESE SUPERIOR COUNCIL OF THE ARMED FORCES
MOVEMENT 25X1A2g
THE US EMBASSY IN LISBON REPORTS THAT THE SUPERIOR
COUNCIL OF THE ARMED FORCES MOVEMENT APPEARS TO BE PLAYING
A MAJOR ROLE IN THE CURRENT CRISIS WITHIN THE PORTUGUESE
MILITARY. THE COUNCIL IS ESSENTIALLY A GROUP OF
CONSERVATIVE-TO-MODERATE MILITARY AND GOVERNMENT LEADERS
TRYING TO ACT AS A BRAKE ON THE YOUNGER, MORE-RADICAL MINDED
OFFICERS IN THE ARMED FORCES MOVEMENT
ASIDE FROM VAGUE PRESS DESCRIPTIONS, THE FUNCTION OF
SUPERIOR COUNCIL HAS NEVER BEEN FULLY EXPLAINED TO THE GENERAL
Approved For Release 2000/08/31 : CIA-RDP78SO1932A000100110016-9
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Approved F'or- Release=2000/08/3t.s,C1ArRDP7.890-19.12AUGGIM1~u00'L ,-9
OUTGOING MESSAGE COMHINT
SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY
AGE COI ATP TOG TPE
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CITE ' MESSAGE REFERE'.JCF NUMEER
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PUBLIC. ITM IS KNOWN, HOWEVER, THAT PRESIDENT COSTA GOMES
HEADS IT. ITS MEMBERSHIP INCLUDES SEVEN MEMBERS OF THE JUNTA,
SEVEN MEMBERS OF THE RADICAL.--DOMINATED COORDINATING COMMITTEE,
AND THE MILITARY COMMANDER FOR LISBON. GOVE1NMENT
REPRESENTATIVES INCLUDE PRIME MINISTER GONCALVES AND FOUR
MEMBERS OF HIS CABINET.
PRESIDENT GONGS MAY BE USING THE COUNCIL TO GAIN GREATER
CONTROL OVER THE MILITARY, ESPECIALLY THE COORDINATING
CO111f L I?TEE~ THE COUNCIL HAS, IN FACT, RECENTLY RECOMMENDED
THAT THE COORDINATING COMMITTEE BE ABOLISHED. THE COUNCIL
ALSO ALLOWS THE PRES:f:DENT TO BRING MEMBERS OF THE
PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT INTO THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS OF
THE AFM. E--2 IMPDET.d 25X1A9a
{SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION: WE DIV NIO
DATE: 16 NOVEMBER 74
0mmmG. ~WHSS 25X1A9a
'UI~IT: CIA OPS CTR
E.xr: 9340
Approved For Release 2000/08/31 : CIA-RDP78SO1932A000100110016-9