THE KOREAN AIR WAR -- LESSONS FOR VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78S02149R000100040006-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 7, 2000
• Sequence Number: 6
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE KOREAN AIR WAR -- LESSONS FOR VIETNAM
*USAF Declass/Release Instructions On File*
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CONTENTS
Page
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II. Environment: Similarities and Differences . . . . . 1
A. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
III. Interdiction in North Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
A. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
B. Railroad Interdiction -- OPERATION STRANGLE . . . . 5
C. Evaluation of OPERATION STRANGLE . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2. Railroad Interdiction . . . . . . . . . ... . . 17
3. Highway Interdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1+. Night Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 20
5. The Wa-dong Chokepoint . . . . . . . . . . . 21
IV. Strategic Bombing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
A. The Targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
B. Early Strategic Bombing . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
C. Later Strategic Bombing Efforts . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.. Hydroelectric Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2. Irrigation Dams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
V. Lessons from the Korean War . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
A. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
B. Failure of Interdiction to Strangle . . . . . . . . 32
C. Air Pressure Tactics and Psychological Warfare . . . 34
D. Lessons for Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Tables
1. Comparison of Air Operations - Korea and Vietnam . . . . 6
2. Sorties Flown and Bombs Expended, OPERATION STRANGLE,
August 1951-June 1952 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3. Damage to North Korean Transport, OPERATION STRANGLE,
August 1951-June 1952 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12a
4. Attacks on Strategic Targets in North Korea, 1950 . . . 25
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Page
Figure 1. Korean War - OPERATION STRANGLE
Indexes of Bombs Expended and Value of Destroyed
Targets, August 1951 - June 1952 . . . . . . . . . . . 16a
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THE KOREAN AIR WAR -- LESSONS FOR VIETNAM
I. Introduction
The lessons learned in one war against an adversary using strategy and
tactics appropriate to the time and place cannot often be applied with
success to another war fought under different conditions. Improved weapons
alone can negate the lessons of an earlier war. But further, each war is
unique in its total setting -- the politics and the economic realities of a
North Vietnam are not those of a North Korea any more than the tropical
setting of the former is equal to the harsh climate of the latter. Never-
theless, the experiences and hard won lessons of Korea should not be ignored,
and indeed may be valuable when critically viewed and applied in North Vietnam.
This report reviews the environment of the two wars and the attempts by
the United States Air Force and Marine and Naval aviation forces to interdict
the transportation system of North Korea. An appreciation of this aspect of
US operations in North Korea would seem to be an especially relevant backdrop
to understanding some of the factors contributing to success or failure in
the current US air operations in North Vietnam.
II. Environment: Similarities and Differences
A. Introduction
Numerous similarities exist between the present war in Vietnam and
the Korean War. Each conflict involves a divided country. Communist China
looms over the northern border of 'both North Korea and North Vietnam as a major
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supplier of war materiel, and as a participant or potential participant. Many
contrasts exist also. For example, the topographic and climatic setting of
the military actions being fought in South Vietnam are unlike those fought
in Korea. Instead of the guerrilla and inflitration tactics characteristic
of today's war in South Vietnam, the Korean War eventually involved large-
scale land armies. The first attacks of the North Koreans in June 1950 were
spearheaded by Soviet T-34 tanks. In August 1951 upwards of 60 Chinese and
North Korean divisions, approximately 600,000 troops, were located in the
immediate battle zone across the Korean peninsula. Even when not engaged in
active combat each of these divisions required daily an estimated 40 tons of
supplies.
Other contrasts can help put the two conflicts in perspective. North
Korea occupies an area of about 47,000 square miles and in 1953 had a population
of 9 million; North Vietnam has an area of 62,000 square miles and a population
of 16 million. In the northcentral and northeastern areas of North Korea
supplies had to travel down sharply dissected valleys between rugged mountains.
Tunnels, bridges, and bottlenecks were frequently found along major supply
routes. For example, the 400 mile rail line from PSyongang to.Ch'ongjin has
376 bridges and 97 tunnels. In Korea, the winters are extremely cold, much
like those in Kansas. Frozen ground caused delayed-fused bombs to skipoff
targets before exploding. In tropical South Vietnam, such an occurrence is
unlikely.
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The Korean War,, which started in June 1950 with North Korean divisions
attacking across the 38th Parallel, lasted until the signing of an armistice
in.July 1953. The war had been characterized by bitter reverses, strong
defenses, amphibious landings, rapid advances, and long periods of stalemate.
Initially, South Korean and US forces retreated to the Pusan Perimeter, then
struck back through the amphibious landings at Inchon and the advance into
North Korea and to the Yalu River. October 1950 witnessed the beginning of
the "new war" as Chinese armies entered the conflict and the newly-augmented
United Nations forces found it necessary to retreat to defensive positions
near the 38th Parallel. When discussions of a possible truce began in July 1951
after one year of fighting, the front extended from the Imjin River to Ch'orwon,
then across the Korean peninsula to the Sea of Japan above Kosong.
III. Interdiction in North Korea
A. Introduction
In the summer of 1951 the need for a major interdiction effort against
the transportation system of North Korea became apparent. As talks about a
truce began and the fighting lulled, the US Eighth Army calculated that enemy
forces in Korea were stockpiling daily 800 tons of supplies behind their lines.
It was feared that the enemy would ". . . reach a degree of preparedness
previously unparalleled in the Korean War." To interfere with this buildup,
the Far :East Air Force (FEAF) planned OPERATION STPANGLE, a comprehensive
interdiction campaign against North Korea's railroads and high5ays.
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Post-mortems on OPERATION STRANGLE have claimed that the codename vas
an unfortunate choice because it implied more than had been intended. Never-
theless, that name matches initial Air Force optimism about the probable
effectiveness of the interdiction program. For example, one official statement
at the beginning of OPERATION STRANGLE claimed:
"The Fifth Air Force and attached units in conjunction
with US Naval Air units and FEAF Bomber Command have
the capability of destroying the enemy's rail system
in North Korea, and of hindering his highway transpor-
tation system to such an extent that he will not be
capable of opposing the US Eighth Army effectively."
Starting in August 1951 and extending over the next 11 months, 81,600
interdiction and armed reconnaissance sorties were flown; more than 104,000
tons of bombs were dropped. By contrast, in a similar time period February -
December 1965 in North Vietnam, 24,169 sorties were flown against JCS and
armed reconnaissance targets. A summary comparison of air operations in the
Korean War compared to current operations in North Vietnam (ROLLPITG =N DER)
is presented in Table 1 below.
OPERATION STRANGLE was not, however, the first US attempt at inter-
diction in Korea. In the first year of the Korean War the Air Force had flown
70,000 interdiction and armed reconnaissance sorties out of a total of 140,000
-4-
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combat sorties, but the fluid military situation had required that major
emphasis be given to close support of combat troops. In that year, rapid
changes in the battlefront and the use of fighter-bombers as support artillery
were not conducive to a sustained, well-organized interdiction program.
B. Railroad Interdiction -- OPERATION STRANGLE.
OPERATION STRANGLE had two principal objectives: (1) the knocking out
of the North Korean rail system by maintaining continuing rail cuts at
numerous points, and destroying rolling stock and equipment, and (2) dis-
rupting.rail services so that the North Korean and Communist Chinese forces
would have to use the highways, which could be brought under effective attack,
to transport the bulk of their military supplies. The resulting damage was
expected to exert unbearable pressure upon the enemy in spite of the absence.
of large-scale ground action.
For the first three months OPERATION STRANGLE was successful. Major
rail lines were disrupted and fighter-bombers destroyed railroad track faster
than the enemy could rebuild it. By early October 1951, rail movements
ceased, even on the double-tracked line from the capital of Pyongyang and
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south to Sariwin just north of the battle zone. By November 1951, virtually
all direct major rail routes to Manchuria had been severed although limited
serviceability existed by shunting traffic inland and then back to either coastal
or other interior rail lines. Interdiction and armed reconnaissance accounted
for over 60 percent of all combat sorties from the start of OPERATION STRANGLE
through the end of 1951. As shown in Table 2 below, the numbers of sorties
flown and bomb tonnages expended. reached a peak in October when 9,700 inter-
diction and armed reconnaissance sorties were flown and more than 10,000 tons
of bombs were dropped. In the first two months of OPERATION STRANGLE inter-
diction and reconnaissance targets claimed more than 90 percent of the total
weight of bombs dropped by B-26's, F-51's, F-80's and F-84,s.* During the
same period of OPERATION STRANGLE, interdiction targets claimed over 80 percent
of the bomb tonnage dropped by the World War II vintage B-29's which in Korea
were classified as medium bombers. For the most part, B-29's were used to
The B-26 had been a high-speed medium bomber in World War II although at
this stage of the Korean War it was classified as a light bomber and was used
mainly for night interdiction attacks. The F-51, the propellor driven Mustang
of World War II, played an important combat role in Korea because of its
range, bomb and napalm capacity, and ability to operate from secondary air
fields. The F-80, Shooting Star, the first jet aircraft accepted for
operational service by the Air Force, and the F-81-, Thunderjet, were also used
extensively for ground support and interdiction. The F-86, Sabre, a swept-
wing fighter was used mainly for counter air-offensive missions against the
large numbers of enemy MIG-15's operating out of Manchuria.
_10_
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