THE KOREAN AIR WAR - - LESSONS FOR VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78S02149R000100040010-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 7, 2000
• Sequence Number: 10
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE KOR.FAN AIR WAR -- LESSONS FOR VIETNAM
I. Introduction
The lessons learned in one war against an adversary using strategy and
tactics appropriate to the time and place cannot often be applied with
success to another war fought under different conditions. Improved weapons
alone can negate the lessons of an earlier war. But further, each war is
unique in its total setting -- the politics and the economic realities of a
North Vietnam are not those of a North Korea any more than the tropical
setting of the former is equal to the harsh climate of the latter. Never-
theless, the experiences and hard won lessons of Korea should not be ignored,
end indeed may be valuable when critically viewed and applied in North. Vietnam.
This report reviews the environment of the two wars and the attempts by
the United States Air Force and Marine and Naval aviation forces to interdict
the transportation system of North Korea. An appreciation of this aspect of
US operations in North Korea would seem to be an especially relevant backdrop
to understanding some of the factors contributing to success or failure in
the current US air operations in North Vietnam.
II. Environment: Similarities and Differences
Numerous similarities exist between the present war in Vietnam and
the Korean War. Each conflict involves a divided country. Communist China
looms over the northern border of both North Korea and North Vietnam as a major
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supplier of war materiel, and as a participant or potential participant. Many
contrasts exist also. For example, the topographic and climatic setting of
the military actions being fought in South Vietnam are unlike those fought
,in Korea. Instead of the guerrilla and inflitration tactics characteristic
of today's war in South Vietnam, the Korean War eventually involved large-
scale land armies. The first attacks of the North Koreans in June 1950 were
spearheaded by Soviet T-34+ tanks. In August 1951 upwards of 60 Chinese and
North Korean divisions, approximately 600,000 troops, were located in the
immediate battle zone across the Korean peninsula. Even when not engaged in
active combat each of these divisions required daily an estimated 40 tons of
supplies.
Other contrasts can help put the two conflicts in perspective. North
Korea occupies an area of about 4-7,000 square miles and in 1953 had a population
of 9 million; North Vietnam has an area of 62,000 square miles and a population
of 16 million. In the northcentral and northeastern areas of North Korea
supplies had to travel down sharply dissected valleys between rugged mountains.
Tunnels, bridges, and bottlenecks were frequently found along major supply
routes. For example, the 400 mile rail line from P'yonggang toChTongjin has
376 bridges and 97 tunnels. In Korea, the winters are extremely cold, much
like those in Kansas. Frozen ground caused delayed-fused bombs to skipoff
targets before exploding. In tropical South Vietnam, such an occurrence is
unlikely.
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The Korean War, which started in June 1950 with North Korean divisions
attacking across the 38th Parallel, lasted until the signing of an armistice
in July 1953. The war had been characterized by bitter reverses, strong
defenses, amphibious landings, rapid advances, and long periods of stalemate.
Initially, South Korean and US forces retreated to the Pusan Perimeter, then
struck back through the amphibious landings at Inchon and the advance into
North Korea and to the Yalu River. October 1950 witnessed the beginning of
the "new war" as Chinese armies entered the conflict and the newly-augmented
United Nations forces found it necessary to retreat to defensive positions
near the 38th Parallel. When discussions of a possible truce began in July 1951
after one year of fighting, the front extended from the Imjin River to Ch'orwon,
then across the Korean peninsula to the Sea of Japan above Kosong.
III. Interdiction in North Korea
A. Introduction
In the summer of 1951 the need for a major interdiction effort against
the transportation system of North Korea became apparent. As talks about a
truce began and the fighting lulled, the US Eight'_i Army calculated that enemy
forces in Korea were stockpiling daily 800 tons of supplies behind their lines.
It was feared that the enemy would ". . . reach a degree of preparedness
previously unparalleled in the Korean War." To interfere with this buildup,
the Far East Air Force (FEAF) planned OPERATION STRANGLE, a comprehensive
interdiction campaign against North Korea's railroads and highways.
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Post-mortems on OPERATION STRANGLE have claimed that the codename was
an unfortunate choice because it implied more than had been intended. Never-
theless, that name matches initial Air Force optimism about the probable
effectiveness of the interdiction program. For example, one official statement
at the beginning of OPERATION STRANGLE claimed:
"The Fifth Air Force and attached units in conjunction
with US Naval Air units and FEAF Bomber Command have
the capability of destroying the enemy's rail system
in North Korea, and of hindering his highway transpor-
tation system to such an extent that he will not be
capable of opposing the US Eighth Army effectively."
Starting in August 1951 and extending over the next 11 months, 81,600
interdiction and armed reconnaissance sorties were flown; more than 104,000
tons of bombs were dropped. By contrast, in a similar time period February -
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December 1965 in North Vietnam, 24+, -sorties were flown against rrd
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armed reconnaissancentargetsA A summary comparison of air operations in the
Korean War compared to current operations in North Vietnam (ROLLING THUNDER)
is presented in Table 1 below.
OPERATION STRANGLE was not, however, the first US attempt at inter-
diction in Korea. In the first year of the Korean War the Air Force had flown
70,000 interdiction and armed reconnaissance. sorties out of a total of 1+0,000
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combat sorties, but the fluid military situation had required that major
emphasis be given to close support of combat troops. In that year, rapid
changes in the battlefront and the use of fighter-bombers as support artillery
were not conducive to a sustained, well-organized interdiction program.
B. Railroad Interdiction -- OPERATION STRANGLE.
OPERATION STRANGLE had two principal objectives: (1) the knocking out
of the North Korean rail system by maintaining continuing rail cuts at
numerous points, and destroying rolling stock and equipment, and (2) dis-
rupting rail services so that the North Korean and Communist Chinese forces
would have to use the highways, which could be brought under effective attack,
to transport the bulk of their military supplies. The resulting damage was
expected to exert unbearable pressure upon the enemy in spite of the absence
of large-scale ground action.
For the first three months OPERATION STRANGLE was successful. Major
rail lines were disrupted and fighter-bombers destroyed railroad track faster
than the enemy could rebuild it. By early October 1951, rail movements
ceased, even on the double-tracked line from the capital of Pyongyang and
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south to Sariwin just north of the battle zone. By November 1951, virtually
all direct major rail routes to Manchuria had been severed although limited
serviceability existed by shunting traffic inland and then back to either coastal
or other interior rail lines. Interdiction and armed reconnaissance accounted
for over 60 percent of all combat sorties from the start of OPERATION STRANGLE
through the end of 1951. As shown in Table 2 below, the numbers of sorties
flown and bomb tonnages expended. reached a peak in October when 9,700 inter-
diction and armed reconnaissance sorties were flown and more than 10,000 tons
of bombs were dropped. In the first two months of OPERATION STRANGLE inter-
diction and reconnaissance targets claimed more than 90 percent of the total
weight of bombs dropped by B-26's, F-51's, F-80's and F-84's.* During the
same period of OPERATION STRANGLE, interdiction targets claimed over 80 percent
of the bomb tonnage dropped by the World War II vintage B-29's which in Korea
were classified as medium bombers. For the most part, B-29's were used to
The B-26 had been a high-speed medium bomber in World War II although at
this stage of the Korean War it was classified as a light bomber and was used
mainly for night interdiction attacks. The F-51, the propellor driven Mustang
of World War II, played an important combat role in Korea because of its
range, bomb and napalm capacity, and ability to operate from secondary air
fields. The F-80, Shooting Star, the first jet aircraft accepted for
operational service by the Air Force, and the F-84, Thunderjet, were also used
extensively for ground support and interdiction. The F-86, Sabre, a swept-
wing fighter was used mainly for counter air-offensive missions against the
large numbers of enemy MIG-15's operating out of Manchuria.
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attack strategic bridges and railroad marshalling yards. Fighter-bombers,
mainly F-51's and F-80's were used in glide-bombing and, later when antiaircraft
fire increased., for dive-bombing attacks against rail targets; B-26's were
used to strike railroad marshalling yards and to lead night attacks against rail
and highway traffic.
These attacks reached a peak of destructiveness in September through
November 1951. In September Air Force pilots alone claimed the destruction
of 38 locomotives, 558 freight cars, 5,1+00 vehicles and about 1,400 buildings.
Rail lines were severed about 15,000 times Table 3 lists the total damage-
claims of the USAF for the 11 month period in which OPERATION STRANGLE .,.ms
underway.*-Eccluded, however, is the damage inflicted by Navy pilots operating
from carrier task forces in the China Sea and Sea of Japan who were also
striking heavily at transportation targets along the coasts.
The official USAF Historical Study of Air Operations in the Korean War
recognizes that pilot's claims of vehicles destroyed were greatly exaggerated,
the results of night attacks being especially hard to evaluate or check. In
September 1951 the Fifth Air Force issued a directive permitting night-intruders
to claim enemy vehicles destroyed only when the vehicles were seen to burn or
explode. Yet, even this requirement probably did not prevent multiple claims.
For example, North Korean truck drivers carried oily rags which were lighted when
they were under attack to feign destruction and be spared further attack. Eventually,
claims of locomotive "kills" were only allowed when attacks were made using 500-pound
bombs or larger and after which the locomotive was observed to be derailed or in
at least three separate parts.
The attacks were not without cost. Through February 1952 the Air Force had
lost 21+3 aircraft and an additional 290 aircraft had received major damage. During
the period OPERATION STRANGLE was underway, about 100 aircraft were lost due to
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In'lretrospect, immense damage was done to the transportation system of
North Korea, even admitting as does the official Air Force history that many
claims of destruction were exaggerated. The first intense blows did not
knockout the system, however, and in the following months the serviceability
h Korean transport system improved materially. Tonnages being
moved on the railroads and highways were only a small fraction of peacetime
"capacity" but the supplies getting through were more than sufficient to
support the Communist armies in the field. Furthermore, in the fall and
winter of 951-52, when the intensity of air attacks decreased slightly, the
North Koreans and Chinese showed an increasing capability to repair damage
from air attacks and to get both rail and highway traffic moving again. Repairs
were being
made so rapidly that by late December 1951 the Fifth Air Force under
FEAF recognized that the ". . . enemy had broken our railroad blockade of
Pyongyang and . . . won the use of all key rail arteries."
February 1952 OPERATION STRANGLE was modified -- and renamed OPERATION
SATURATE -. to reflect the lessons of the previous six months. Railroad inter-
diction was still emphasized, but attacks were concentrated against specific
pre-targetd segments of the rail line. The change in air operations, and its
successes nd failures, can be seen in an officially documented description of
one attack; In a lead off attack in late March 1952, 307 fighter-bombers dropped
530 x 1,00~..pound bombs and 8 x 500-pound bombs. The following day, 160 fighters
dropped 32~ x 1,000-pound bombs. Daring the night B-26's dropped !2 x 500-pound
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bombs on what had already become a major gap in the rail line. However, the
ability of the North Korean's to repair rail damage had further improved -- within
six days the roadbed was almost completely rebuild and the tracks were replaced.
The tl-8-hou' attack and the expenditure of 450 tons of bombs had interdicted the
rail line or 6 - 7 days but had required the virtual commitment of the entire
fighter-bo ber force. At the same time other rail lines had remained open.
Further e erience in another attack area which contained approximately 600
miles of r it lines showed that no more than 6 continuous cuts in rail traffic
could be maintained, too few to interdict successfully the entire rail system
In April 1952 a penetrating staff study by the Air Force recognized
that in spite of the vast damage inflicted the interdiction operation had not
achieved its objectives and such operations were becoming, more costly in terms
of casualties to air crews and aircraft lost and damaged. Furthermore, some
of the most modern US weaponry, spearheaded by expensive aircraft and highly
trained pi ots, was being effectively countered incongruously by hordes of
unskilled ~abor and minimum amounts of easily attainable materials. Replace-
ment railslfrequently were obtained by cannibalizing a double-track system
or strippi.g damaged railroad marshalling yards. Bridges were repaired
frequently with simple prefabricated wooden spans and extensive crib work.
Poilicy changes which emerged from the staff study emphasized the need
to inflicti maximum damage upon the enemy and to minimize US losses, and
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included some shifts in targets. Thus, while locomotives, motor vehicles, and
other transportation targets were still rated as prime targets, equal or greater
emphasis was given to radar, guns, supply depots, mines, power plants, and
military schools. In effect, the new targeting took account of economic
principles From attempts to physically cut the rail and highway systems the
attack moved to inflict maximum damage upon the enemy's limited stock of
military and transport capital in North Korea, capital which would not be
replaced b the labor of unskilled peasants. Nevertheless, the new attack
policy, announced in July 1952, admitted that ". . . obstruction of enemy supply
movement in Korea cannot prevent the enemy from gradually building up his
stockpile.'
Although the Air Force continued to bomb selected bridges and
rail targets during the remaining year of the war, OPERATIONs STRANGLE and
SATURATE were at an end.
C. luation of OPERATION STRANGLE
objectives
Introduction
OPERATION STRANGLE and OPERATION SATURATE failed to achieve their
not only because there were insufficient numbers of aircraft to
maintain ah adequate number of rail cuts, but also because enemy counter-
measures were more successful than had been estimated. Communist antiaircraft
defenses increased markedly, and. the Communists showed an increasing ability
to improvi~e repairs, build bypass lines, and mass peasant labor to maintain
and repair
essential supply lines.
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The declinir'eturns from OPERATION STRANGLE can be gleamed from
an analysis of bombs expended and damage achieved. During July 1951, the
month before OPERATION STRANGLE got underway, approximately 6,600 tons of bombs
had been dropped on interdiction targets in North Korea. Bombs expended in-
creased sharply in August to 8,300 tons. From August to September bombs ex-
pended increased by about 2,000 tons or 26 percent and. the estimated value of
destruction increased by about 50 percent, indicating increasing returns from
bombings. After November, however, these was a steady trend of diminishing
returns from the bombing attacks. A fairly steady expenditure of bombs, between
10,000 to 12,000 tons per month, resulted in less and less physical damage. As
shown in Figure 1, the index of value of damage per ton of bombs expended de-
clined from a peak of 100 in October 1951 to 40 in January and a low of about
26 in April and. June.
It is apparent that the initial attacks found more lucrative targets
and through November the air strikes were able to inflict heavy damage on the
North Korean transport system. After November, however, more effective enemy
countermeasures probably abetted by winter weather greatly reduced the
destructiveness of the air operation. When operations concentrated on. maintaining
physical rail cuts in the winter of 1951-52 even less damage was being done to
the enemy's stock of capital in Korea. It was the implicit recognition of
the declining returns of the bombings which led the Air Force staff study,
previously mentioned, to recommend that the emphasis be shifted from rail cuts
to hardware-type targets.
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2. Railroad Interdiction
The North Korean rail system, during 1950-53, consisted of about
2,300 miles of line, largely standard gage, and included approximately
1,800 bridges and 400 tunnels. During the initial stages of OPERATION STRANGLE
the Air Force engaged in a multi-prong attack against bridges, rolling stock,
tunnels, road beds and rails. Tunnels, used extensively to protect trains
and supplies in daytime attacks, proved in most instances to be impossible
to destroy. Bridges were difficult targets, but were destroyed consistently.
Nevertheless, the enemy showed a rapidly increasing capability to restore
damaged bridges, including the ability to build one or more bypass-bridges
in the vicinity of a bombed bridge and to resort to frequently effective
deception. For example, in some instances key bridge spans would be removed
from a reconstructed bridge during daylight hours and replaced at night.
After the interdiction campaign had been underway for several
months construction materials were being stockpiled near key bridges even
before US attacks. Simple bypass bridges were built frequently in from 2 to
4 days. Rail cuts were repaired in from 2 to 6 hours. Priority was placed
on getting a bridge back in partial operation so that some supplies could
again begin to flow although traffic might remain far below capacity levels.
The damage from an Air Force "maximum effect" operation against one segment
of the rail system ?.aas repaired in from 4 to 7 days.
The North Korean and Chinese stationed railroad construction
troops along all main supply routes which were under attack. Units of 50 troops
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were located at all major rail stations and crews of 10 men were located every
T+ miles along the route. In addition rail walkers spotted damage to the
rail or roadbed. Nearby inhabitants were recruited for common labor, and
sometimes as many as 1,000 persons were used to repair a damaged section.
At dark, experienced railroad construction crews would move in and make the
actual repairs to the rail line. Further, in portage-like operations, rail
service was maintained on very short stretches of usable track -- as short
as 11 miles -- and freight was unloaded and carried around rail cuts or
damaged bridges, and reloaded on another train.
3. Highway Interdiction
The road network in North Korea, originally developed by the
Japanese, had always been of secondary importance to the railroads. Trucks
had been used typically for short hauls and served as links between industrial
and commerical centers and the major railroads. North Korea's principal
highways roughly followed the major rail routes from Manchuria southward.
Altogether about 10,000 miles of highways existed, at best surfaced with gravel
or crushed stone.
Although the major interdiction effort of OPERATION STRA1'TOLE was
against the North Korean rail system attacks against trucks were also pressed,
especially night attacks led by B-26's. On one occasion, an Air Force Wing
reportedly sighted 3,800 motor vehicles and attacked 2,600 vehicles in 1 day.
The Air Force claimed that 6,400 trucks were destroyed in October 1951 alone.
Highway bridges were also attacked, but proved more difficult to interdict
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effectively than rail bridges. Bypasses were built, sometimes at considerable
distance from the original bridge and were thus not easily sighted; fords
were build and used during much of the year.
Truck traffic was uncommon during the daylight hours, and at night
truck movements were hard, to locate and to attack effectively. The results
of night attacks against motor vehicles, as well as rolling stock, were
especially difficult to assess. Before dawn trucks were hidden in caves,
extensively camouflaged, or parked in protected ravines or log bunkers.
.Communist highway repair battalions were stationed along all main supply
routes and platoons of highway repair companies were stationed about 3 kilo-
meters apart along important routes undergoing attack. Although these platoons
relied almost entirely on simple equipment such as picks, shovels, sandbags,
and wicker baskets, a highway crater could be filled, or a blocked tunnel
cleared, in a matter of hours.
Trucks usually traveled in convoys of 15 to 20 vehicles, usually
under blackout conditions. When speed and safety required other measures,
however, convoys did at times use headlights. On these occasions drivers
depended upon sentries stationed at intervals along the main routes to warn of
approaching aircraft. The mileage norm for trucks per night was about 60 miles.
For example, a roundtrip from the Manchurian border to the battle zone and
back required about 10 nights travel.
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1+. Night Operations
Even before OPERATION STRANGLE began the North Koreans had begun
to move virtually all rail and road traffic at night. The B-26 bomber
was used extensively as a night intruder to harass trucks and trains along
major enemy supply routes. During OPERATION STRANGLE 1,500-2,000 sorties
were flown monthly by B-26 bombers, about 90 percent of them at night. The
heavier B-29 bombers were used to attack fixed targets at night.
In the absence of bright moonlight, B-26's attacks achieved only
limited success and numerous experiments were conducted with flares to light
the targets. Various tactics were developed. Flares were dropped by B-26's
operating alone, in pairs, and by supporting B-29's and C-47's with varying
results. Under foggy conditions flares tended to blind the attacking pilots
and frequently flares caused more harm than help by making the attacking
aircraft visible targets for ground fire.
Infra-red detection systems were used on a limited scale to locate
targets such as locomotives, tanks, vehicles and industrial locations. Tests
of such equipment were somewhat promising, but water vapor, haze and ice
crystals interfered with the operation of the equipment and restricted its
use to clear weather.
In 1952 as OPERATION STRANGLE disrupted railroad lines the North
Koreans and Chinese made more intensive use of trucks to transport supplies
to the front. In the fall and winter months, sightings of vehicles declined,
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and the B-26 night attacks were shifted to rail cutting, and to harassing
North Korean night repair activities.
The major lessons from US night-intruder operations during the
Korean War were: (1) aircraft, especially the B-26 that had been designed for
day operations, had only limited success in detecting, identifying and attacking
moving targets at night; (2) air crews required careful selection and special
training for night operations; and (3) a strong need existed for a family of
"denial" weapons that would successful interdict rail lines and highways for
periods that would eliminate the need for essentially inefficient night
operations. Night operations were hampered throughout by the inadequacy of
night photography to adequately assess bomb damage.
5. The Wa-dong Chokepoint
The Korean War offers an excellent example of the difficulty of
successfully interdicting a transportation chokepoint by large-scale aerial
bombing. In the winter of 1952 while OPERATION SATURATE was getting underway
target specialists located what appeared to be a vital chokepoint near the
village of Wa-dong in central Korea about 20 miles north of the 39th Parallel.
Here a major east-west railroad passed over a highway from Wonsan on the east
coast to the capital at Pyongyang. About 100 yards further to the west the
railroad entered a short tunnel. The railroad and highway did not follow
identical alignments across North Korea but came together only at Wa-dong.
Adjacent hills rising to about 300 feet above the valley floor would have made
Wa-dong stand out as an ideal chokepoint to even the most unimaginative target
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analyst. The North Koreans had used both the lateral highway and the railroad
to shuttle supplies between the east and west coastal railroads thus sub-
stantially increasing the flexibility of the badly damaged rail system. The
objective of the attacks was to block all rail and vehicle movement in the
area. Due to the area's rough terrain bypassing the chokepoint would have
proved very costly.
For 44 days, from 26 January to 11 March 1952, 77 B-29 and 126 B-26
sorties saturated the target of about 18 acres with 3,928 x 500-pound GP bombs,
one bomb for every 22 square yards of target. Bomb assessment reports which
were available for 24 days of the 44 day attack period showed the following
results:
Railroad
serviceable 10 days
unserviceable 1 complete day
unserviceable for a portion of 7 days
status unknown 6
N+ days
Highway
serviceable 15 days
unserviceable 4 days
status unknown 5 days
27 days
Bomb assessment reports also revealed that the total effort had
resulted in only 18 actual rail cuts and 15 highway cuts from a total of
3,929 bombs dropped. The effort at best resulted in the railroad being interdicted
for 7 days and the highway for 4+ days. Except for temporary disruptions the
North Koreans had suffered very little damage. The bombs had done little more
than churn up the countryside; hoped for landslides did not occur.
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Evaluations made of the Wa-dong experience during the Korean War
concluded that it is a fallacy to assume there is an "area target" for traffic
interdiction and the Far East Air Forces recommended that in future inter-
diction attacks air power concentrate on pin-point bombing against definite
targets in preference to area bombing.
-IV` Strategic Bombing
A. The Targets
North Korea's modern industry, which was developed by the Japanese,
was in 1950 considerably greater in total capacity and range of output than
that of North Vietnam in 1965. Indeed production of basic industrial products
such as electric power, coal, iron ore and concentrates, chemicals and cement
were greater in North Korea during 1944 than in North Vietnam in 1965. The
production of crude steel and rolled steel in North Korea during 1944, though
not great, exceeded the capacity and variety planned for the first stage of
the North Vietnamese iron and steel plant presently approaching completion at
Thai Nguyen. Although the production of industrial machinery and equipment
in North Korea was not great in 1950 it probably was not far behind the
present capacity of North Vietnam, which consists of one small modern machine
tool plant in Hanoi plus a number of small shops. It is probable that important
machinery repair facilities of various types in North Korea -- notably rail-
road repair facilities, for example, exceeded those presently in North Vietnam
both in number and in size.
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Production of electric power in North Korea during 1944 amounted
to over 8 billion kwh (most of it hydropower) compared with 550 million kwh
in North Vietnam in 1964. North Korean production of coal totalled 4 million
tons in 1949 compared to North Vietnam's 1962 production of 3.5 million tons.
The Hungnam Fertilizer Factory in North Korea, with a capacity of 500,000 tons
of ammonium sulfate, was the largest of its kind in Asia. North Vietnam's
chemical industry is still small.
B. Early Strategic Bombing
During the initial months of the Korean War the B-29's available in
the war theater were engaged in close tactical support of the hard-pressed
US and South Korean forces. It was not until mid-July 1950 that attacks on
industrial targets in North Korea were feasible. In the next 3 months the
FEAF Bomber Command dropped 10,000 tons of bombs, with excellent results, on
the major targets listed below in Table 4.
By late August 1950 the FFAF Bomber Command had difficulty locating
undamaged priority targets in North Korea and the advancing Eighth Army made
it appear that there was little need for additional effort against industrial
targets. Of 20 strategic targets designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff 18
had been destroyed or severely damaged by late September.
In September 1950 plans were underway to destroy the modern complex
of hydroelectric generating plants that had been built by the Japanese. On
26 September, 17 B-29's attacked and inflicted minor damage on the Pujon
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Table 4
Attacks on Strategic Targets in North Korea, 1950
Location Target Bomb Tonnage Percent
Destroyed or Damaged
Wonsan
Hungnam
Dock area
Locomotive shops
Railroad yards
Chosen oil refinery
Bogun Chemical Plant
Chosen Nitrogen
Fertilizer Company
244
372
477
327
695
563
50
70
70
95
70
85
Chosen Nitrogen
Explosives Company
500
85
Pyongyang
Arsenal
99
70
Kan-Ni
500
15
Shunting yards
356
30
Railway shops and yards
584
70
Chongjin
Harbor and submarine base
249
5
Mitsubishi
132
30
Chongjin
Japan Iron Works
203
20
Railroad yards and shops
1,063
55
Rashin
Oil Storage
49
Neg
Dock area
218
Neg
Railroad shops and yards
110
Neg
Chinnampo
Marshalling yards
121
80
Port and sub-base
5
Neg
Japan Mining and Smelter
248
35
Chosen Riken Metals Co.
284
70
Changjingang
Reservoir
Pujon hydroelectric plant-#l
39
Hamhung
Railway shops and yards
547
Haeju
Chosen Nitrogen Explosives
Company
568
10
Railway shops and yards
104
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Table 4
Attacks on Strategic Targets in North Korea, 1950 (continued)
Location
Target
Bomb Tonnage
Percent
Destroyed or Damaged
Kyomipo
Japan Iron Works
252
40
Marshalling yard
23
Neg
Kowon
Songjin.
Railway shops and yards
High frequency heavy
102
10
industry
Magnesite Chemical
326
90
Industry
183
30
Railway shops and yards
280
60
Yangdok
Railway shops and yards
75
85
Namgungni
Storage area
58
80
Munpyongni
Rising Sun Oil Storage
2
No B1Y
Chongju
Railway shops and yards
170
10
Kilchu
Sunchon
Marshalling yards
Chemical industry and
99
50
marshalling yard
138
30
Sariwon
Marshalling yard
81
50
TOTAL
10,446
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Hydroelectric Plant, which had an installed capacity of 128,000 kw. The same
day, however, the JCS suspended attacks on strategic targets. The question as
to whether or not to bomb the hydroelectric installations, which exported
large amounts of electric power to Manchuria, was to be argued at length over
the months ahead.
By late September, the Commander of FEAF, was able to claim ". . . practi-
cally all of the major military targets strategically important to the enemy
forces and to their war potential have now been neutralized." In a few weeks
North Korea's modern industry had been destroyed. Yet, although such destruction
obviously inflicted "punishment" on North Korea's leadership the military effect
of the strategic bombing was of little consequence. Military equipment and
ammunition was flowing into North Korea from China and the.USSR, areas immune
from strategic bombing.
C. Later Strategic Bombing Efforts
1. Hydroelectric Power
In Korea the Japanese had developed hat was at the time one of the
world's largest hydroelectric complexes. Although a major hydroelectric plant
had been bombed in September 1950 the hydroelectric facilities had become
"politically sensitive" targets and immune from air attacks. At that time,
some US officials and most UN partners in Korea became fearful that attacks on
these installations would further antagonize the Chinese. It was not until
June 1952 that the hydroelectric installations were again considered a
legitimate target.
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Over a 3 day period in June 1952, 730 fighter-bomber sorties by
the Fifth Air Force, supported by sorties from a Navy Task Force, were flown
against the power complexes including the Sui-ho Generating Plant on the Yalu
River. Post-strike evaluation of the bombing attack indicated that 90 percent
of North Korea's electric power capacity had been knocked out. Eleven of
13 plants in 4 major complexes were unserviceable. For more than two weeks
there was almost a complete blackout in North Korea until small thermal plants
and undamaged hydroelectric plants restored a small portion of North Korea's
pre-attack capacity.
Although the small dispersed "war-industries" in North Korea
obviously suffered. from the loss of electric power, the extent of the damage
to industry in Manchuria was difficult to assess. It was known that much of
the power generated by the damaged Korean facilities had been exported to
Manchuria. Intelligence reports of the period did indicate that power shortages
occurred in Manchuria. Communist China's concern was indicated by the large
numbers of antiaircraft weapons which were soon deployed at the dam sites,
especially at Sui-ho. At the end of hostilities in July 1953 a number of
bombed hydroelectric installations were still out of operation although partial
operations were continuing at several sites.
Attacks against the hydroelectric installations came much too late
in the Korean War to have much impact on the outcome or do serious damage to
North Korea's war effort. The attacks were designed more to exert continued
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air pressure on the North Koreans and Chinese to accept UN truce proposals.
Over time, however, it became harder and. harder to locate significant targets
2. Irrigation Dams
In the spring of 1953 only slow progress was being made at the
Panmunjom truce talks. Air Force targets specialists seeking additional means
of increasing air pressure against the Communists recognized the importance
of the irrigation dams to Korean rice production. Two provinces in western
Korea annually planted ti22,000 acres and produced more than 280,000 tons of
rice. Production was dependent upon water from 20 large reservoirs. While
Air Force studies showed that attacks against the reservoirs were feasible,
ranking officers were hesitant to attack targets that would expose the US to
charges of destroying civilian food supplies. Military commanders saw no
objection, however to"destroying dams where floodwaterswould interdict the
enemy's transportation lines -- and incidently also harm rice production.
There followed a large-scale and highly successful attack against a 2,300-foot
earth-and-stone dam about 20 miles north of Pyongyang. Along with severe
damage to a major rail line the floodwaters also damaged 5 square miles of prime
rice crops.
Other Korean dams were attacked by US fighter-bombers and B-29's
ostensively to interdict transportation lines. These later attacks were less
successful because the North Koreans, as in other circumstances, improvised
countermeasures. For example, by rapidly lowering the water level it became
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much more difficult to destroy or seriously damage the dams. The North Koreans
were depriving themselves of the stored water but avoiding floodwaters and
preventing more serious damage to the reservoirs. Again massive labor forces
were engaged to rapidly repair the destruction caused by floodwaters and the
damage to the dam itself. Although there was vitriolic Communist reaction to
attacks on reservoirs the continuing threat of USAF destruction of the reservoirs
may have been of some help in persuading the Communists to negotiate for a
truce. In fact, a truce agreement was reached not long after this phase of
operations began.
V=.. Lessons from the Korean War
A. Introduction
The. 250,000 tons of bombs, napalm and rockets expended on enemy targets
in South and North Vietnam last year was equal to about 4+5 percent of the total
tonnage of bombs dropped by Air Force, Navy and Marine aircraft during the
Korean War. However, the total number of sorties flown against North Vietnam
through December 1965 -- 2)4,169 -- was only a small fraction of the 220,000
interdiction sorties flown by the Air Force alone in the Korean War. During
the 11 months of OPERATION STRANGLE the Air Force alone flew almost 82,000
sorties and dropped almost 118,000 tons of bombs on interdiction and armed
reconnaissance targets. In addition, Navy aircraft operating from carriers
probably dropped about one-third the Air Force's tonnage on interdiction targets.
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Even allowing for exaggerated damage claims it is clear that there
were far more lucrative targets in North Korea than are being located and
destroyed presently in North Vietnam. The tabulation below compares de-
struction achieved in the 11 months of OPERATION STRANGLE in Korea with
destruction achieved by ROLLING ThUNDER in Vietnam through December 1965:
OPERATION STRANGLE
ROLLING 1=ER.
Locomotives
272
6
Freight cars
3,638
227
Vehicles
33,210
x+83
Bridges
223
161
Buildings
91 tog
1,837
Barges and boats
225
1,098
The greater destruction achieved in Korea compared to North Vietnam
is not solely a function of the number of sorties and tons of bombs dropped.
North Korea's railroads and highways had to supply almost 1 million troops,
600,000 of which were at the front. North Korea possessed almost 2,300 miles
of rail lines and 10,000 miles of highways compared to North Vietnam's meager
485 miles of rail lines and 5,800 miles of highways. North Korea possessed a
much larger park of both rolling stock and trucks. In addition, although the
population of North Vietnam substantially exceeds North Korea's there was more
modern and semi-modern industry in North Korea than is found in North Vietnam.
In many respects, North Vietnam is an underdeveloped country compared to the
North Korea of 1950-53, a comparison which will sound strange to former target
analysts of the Korean War.
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B. Failure of Interdiction to Strangle
At the time OPERATION STRANGLE was underway it was estimated that each
Chinese division required 50.tons of supplies per day.* With 60 divisio
the front approximately 3,000 tons of supplies had to be moved from Manchuria
to the battle front each day.
Peacetime capacity of the double-tracked line in western Korea from
Sinuiju to Pyongyang was estimated to have a capacity of from 6,000 to 9,000
tons per day. After maximum interdiction efforts it was conservatively
estimated that only 500 to 1,500 tons per day were getting through to the
battle zone. The east coast line with a peace time capacity of 5,000 tons per
day was reduced to less than 500 tons per day. Thus railroads were still able
to transport about one-half of the daily requirements. In addition the North
Koreans and Chinese also relied heavily on trucks and on peasants carrying
supplies strapped to A-frames, and even bicycles for moving supplies to the
front. A staff study completed in April 1952 by two Air Force officers
concluded that after 7 months of maximum effort the Communists still were more
than meeting minimum supply requirements.
. The accepted figure for the
enemy's minimum supply requirements is 2,700 tons per day, in the present
static situation. It is an established fact he is getting more than this . . .
HQ FIII estimates 1,000 tons per day average, over and above his daily
requirements . . . the enemy has been able to stockpile approximately 100,000
tons, or a 37 day supply during the 7 months of the rail interdiction program."
About percent food, 22 percent clothing, weapons and equipage, 10 per-
cent POL, 20 percent ammunition.
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Another logistic study from the Korean war illustrates how difficult
it is to prevent what was called seeping resupply. During 3 months in the
winter of 1951-52 the Chinese and North Koreans were firing 15,000 mortar
shells per month, or 500 shells a day. Each shell weighed 10 pounds so that
a peasant could, carry 5 of them on an A-frame. One hundred peasants (or
about 1 truck) could supply all the enemy's daily needs for mortar ammunition.
OPERATION STRANGLE clearly did great damage to the transport system
of North Korea and conceivably may have been responsible for preventing
Communist China from mounting additional large-scale offensives in Korea. At
the same time, it is also clear that the Chinese and North Korean troops re-
ceived sufficient logistic support to continue to resist the offensive
pressures exerted by the Eighth Army. In short, the defensive capabilities
of the Chinese and North Koreans showed no sign of collapsing as a result of
the interdiction campaign. As the Air Force study pointed out the enemy's
supply situation had indeed improved.
The air interdiction campaign had failed because the North Koreans
and Chinese had been able to take effective countermeasures. One major lesson
that emerged from the Korean War was that US planners underestimated the
effectiveness of the enemy countermeasures. The North Koreans and Chinese
had shown increasing rapidity in rebuilding damaged rail and road bridges and
other key installations. Chokepoints, often given exaggerated importance,
were frequently bypassed without undue enemy effort. Darkness shrouded most
of the enemy's movements from effective attack. A major lesson of the Korean
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War was the clearly demonstrated need for the development of a family of
weapons that could successfully interdict night railroad and highway traffic.
Portage operations over short segments of several rail lines kept the required
minimum tonnages of supplies moving. Trucks, moved only at night and during
bad weather, were used to supplement the rail lines. Vehicle traffic was
dispersed along a maximum number of routes and vehicles were well hidden
during day light hours. In addition, greatly increased concentrations of
antiaircraft weapons took an increasing toll of US aircraft, and decreased
bombing accuracy while requiring a greater number of flak suppression sorties.
C. Air Pressure Tactics and Psychological Warfare
It is difficult to judge the overall effect of US interdiction and
strategic bombing on the will of the political leadership and the morale of the
civilian population of North Korea. There are numerous examples, however,
of the North Koreans and Chinese responding with effective countermeasures
to each new phase of air operations against North Korea. In the early months
of OPERATION STRANGLE the damage to the rail lines and rolling stock was so
great that a less resolute enemy might have abandoned rail traffic completely
in favor of supplying front line troops by trucks,ox-carts and peasants
carrying supplies on A-frames. Rather than yield, however, the North Koreans
were able to devise effective means to counteract the massive rail interdiction
program. The North Korean response to the bombing of irrigation dams -- also
illustrates the tenacity and cleverness with which the Communists met new
phases of US air operations. The Communists voluntarily gave up water supplies
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that would later be needed for the rice crops, but at the same time made the
dams much more difficult to destroy.
The threat to bomb numerous other irrigation dams in the spring of
1953 may have made the Communists more willing to reach a truce agreement.
However, claims by some historians that air operations were almost solely
responsible for the North Koreans and Chinese initially coming to the conference
table and finally signing a truce agreement are gross exaggerations of the
effectiveness of air power.* The Chinese and North Koreans came to the
conference table mainly because -their total losses accruing from the war had
become greater than their total gains, all military, political and economic
factors considered. US air power played an important role in convincing the
Communists to come to terms, but air power probably was not the decisive factor.
In retrospect, because of a host of factors including the unique
nature of UN "police action" in Korea, and the uncertain position of US
officials about the advantages and disadvantages of psychological air warfare,
the psychological warfare phase of US operations in North Korea was little
understood and only intermittently applied. The Air Force was under constant
.pressure to restrict bombings to specific military targets and to avoid
.indiscriminate attacks against North Korean cities. Even the use of warning
leaflets became a controversial issue. For e,c,-mple, on the day before a
large-scale air attack in July 1952 against military targets in Pyongyang,
more than 150,000 leaflets were dropped. to warn the population to stay away
One Air Force historian, for example, in discussing FEAT operations in
Korea in mid-1952 wrote ". . . the destructive force of FEAF's air power had
broken the stalemate."
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from military targets. The purpose of the leaflet drops was not only to
prevent civilian casualties, but to destroy the people's faith in the govern-
ment's ability to defend them. It was also believed that the fear of impending
air attacks would disrupt economic activities. Some US officials, however,
questioned whether leaflet attacks would be misconstrued and backfire against
the US throughout the Far East. Other UN partners in Korea tended to be
critical of any US attempt to apply psychological warfare against the civilian
population of North Korea.
D. Lessons for Vietnam
The lessons from the Korean War indicate that it will prove difficult
to cut off supplies flowing from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. The total
daily tonnages needed by the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese regulars -- 12
tons a day moving to South Vietnam compared to 3,000 a day in Korea -- are so
much less than in the Korean War that trucks, carts, and human bearers should
be able to maintain more than the enemy's minimum requirements. Furthermore,
the experiences of the Korean War suggest that as long as they continue to
receive support from China and the USSR the Communists in Vietnam will show
an increasing capability to develop and improvise countermeasures to circumvent
a, continuing US air offensive. As a result of such countermeasures the Korean
War suggests that diminishing returns can be expected from continuing air
strikes, especially in an economy initially poor in capital and unwedded
to modern technology for its strength. The rebuilding of bridges, the
building of bypasses and the other countermeasures
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in evidence in North Vietnam in no way suggest a less determined enemy than
was encountered in Korea. The primitivism of North Vietnam, the lack of
hard military and significant industrial targets, combined with effective and
increasing numbers of antiaircraft weapons, will make it difficult if not
impossible for air power alone to extract a heavy price for North Vietnamese
intransigency. Only the application of new interdiction weapons in large
numbers infinitely more effective than those that were available in the
Korean War would tip the scales in favor of successful, long-term interdiction.
The bombing of "strategic" industrial targets in North Vietnam, based
on the experience of the Korean War, would probably have little effect on the
course of the war. Communist leaders in North Vietnam would most certainly
prefer not to lose the rudimentary modern industry that has been established
in recent years. However, the much larger and more diversified industry of
North Korea was destroyed in the first three months of the Korean War and
neither deterred China from entering the war nor seriously impeded the North
Korean military effort. Strategic air power can be expected to have little
effect upon an enemy whose bases of supply are outside the theater of operations.
In North Korea there was not sufficient industry to test the importance of
strategic air power. In North Vietnam there is even less reason to believe that
the loss of a small modern industry would alter the course of the war or make
the Communists more prone to negotiate.
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