ASSESSMENT OF THE AIR EFFORT IN VIETNAM AND LAOS (S) ANNEX C CLOSE AIR SUPPORT COST SUMMARY AND DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78S02149R000100050022-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 12, 2000
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: December 29, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

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"ARMY Declass/Release
Instructions On File"
ASSESSMENT OF THE AIR Eccmf
IN VIETNAM AND LAOS (S)
U. S. ARMY
STAG
STRATEGY & TACTICS
ANALYSIS, GROUP
TOP SECRET
ANNEX C
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT
COST SUMMARY
AND
DAMAGE ASSESSMENT
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS EXCEPT:____
BY AUTHORITY OF: CHIEF STAG
DATE: 29 DEC. 1965
STAG LOG NO. TS - I S7-(-."
COPY _17- OF 20 COPIES
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR
INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY
DECLASSIFIED DOD DIR 5200.10
TOP SECRET
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WARN ING (U)
This Document contains information affecting the national defense of
the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18,
U.S.C., sections 793 and 794. Its transmission or the revelation of its
contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohobited by law.
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1. (S) Annex C is part of an overall study and assessment of the
air effort in Vietnam and Laos. It presents the cost of close air support
(CAS) in South Vietnam (SVN) in terms of sortie cost, munitions cost, and
cost of aircraft lost. In addition, the annex addresses other areas. such as
airfield construction cost, base security cost, Air Force Special Air
Warfare units' contribution to the overall effort in SVN, and psychologi-
cal impact of air attacks which have caused civilian casualties.
2. (U) Overall effectiveness of CAS in SVN cannot be quantitatively
expressed. The Combat and Reconnaissance Air Activities File (COACT) for
the period 1 January 1965 to 30 September 1965 does not report data on
CAS sorties in SVN. The only source is the DOD Statistical Summary,
Southeast Asia, which reports monthly totals of attack.and other sorties.
These totals do not sepatate CAS sorties from interdiction and armed
reconnaissance. An attempt was made to extract data from the weekly
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) military reports (MILREPS)
but these reports do not contain sufficient differentiation between.CAS,
interdiction, and armed reconnaissance to be of any value. Neither:
do the MACV Daily Situation Reports (SITREPS) present an accurate,
consistent data source. The COACT reporting system changed on 1 October
1965 and now includes data on air activity in SVN. One purpose of the
change in reporting systems is to remedy the paucity of data on CAS.
3. (U) This annex addresses those areas of consideration related
to CAS included in the basic directive from ODCSOPS to STAG.
S CRET
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (U)
Page
ANNEX C--CLOSE AIR SUPPORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-1
APPENDIX I--BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-I-1
TAB A--Aircraft Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-1-A-1
TAB B--Emergency Air Request Channels . . . . . . . . . . C-I-B-1
TAB C--VNHF/USAF Immediate Air Request Channels . . . . . C-I-C-1
TAB D--VNHF/USAF Preplanned Air Request Channels. . . . . C-I-D-1
APPENDIX II--COST ESTIMATES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-II-1
TAB A--Cost and Description of Air Delivered Munitions. . C-II-A-1
TAB B--Cost Estimates of Aircraft Operations in Southeast
Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-II-B-1
APPENDIX III--SUMMARY OF ESTIMATED MUNITIONS AND SORTIE
COSTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-III-1
TAB A--Aircraft Delivered Munitions-SVN, September 1965 . C-III-A-1
TAB B--Aircraft Delivered Munitions-SVN, October 1965 . . C-III-B-1
TAB C--Estimated Cost of Sorties Less Munitions-SVN,
FY 1966 through October . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-III-C-1
APPENDIX IV--STAG COMMENTS TO DCSOPS SUGGESTED AREAS FOR
CONSIDERATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-IV-1
TAB A--The Relationship of Estimated Killed by Air (EKA)
to Actual Killed by Air (AKA) . . . . . . . . . . C-IV-A-1.
TAB B--The Relationship of Sorties Flown to Battalions
Engaged . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-IV-B-1
TAB C--The Percentage of the Air Effort in Support of
Land Forces by Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . C-IV-C-1
TAB D--The Timeliness of Response of Close Air Support
and Reconnaissance Flights to Land Force Requests C-IV-D-1
TAB E--The Type of Armament Expended and the Distance
from Friendly Forces at Which Close Air Support
is Normally Conducted . . . . . . . . . . . . C-IV-E-1
TAB F--The Ability of Land Forces in Contact to Move
Forward with and without Close Air Support. . . C-IV-F-1
TAB G--The Ability of the Air Effort to Support Land
Forces in Periods of Darkness and Inclement
Weather . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-IV-G-1
TAB H--The Effectiveness of Close Air Support by Type
Aircraft in Support of Land Forces. . . . . . C-IV-H-1
TAB I--The Contribution of Air Force Special Air Warfare
Units to the Overall Effort . . . . . . . . . C-IV-I-l
TAB J--The Relationship of the Number of Close Air Support
Sorties Flown per Battalion of Land Forces to the
Number of Sorties Requested . . . . . . . . . C-IV-J-1
TAB K--The Effect of Aborted Close Air Support Missions
on the Accomplishment of the Land Commander's
Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? . , , C-IV-K-1
TAB L--The Percentage of Preplanned to Unscheduled Close
Air Support Missions Flown in Support of Land
Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-IV-L-1
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TAB M--The Number of Aborted Close Air Support and
Interdiction Missions in Relation to the Number
Scheduled and/or Requested. ? . C-IV-M-l
TAB N--The Time Lag in Response to a Request for?an On-
Call Close Air Support Mission. . . . . . C-IV-N-1
TAB 0--The Manner in Which Close Air Support Strikes
Were Controlled . . C-IV-0-1
TAB P--The Level at Which FAC Parties Are Assigned ?and
Control Close Air Support Strikes C-IV-P-1
TAB Q--The Cost of Airfield Construction to Support Combat
Air Missions. ? ? . . C-IV-Q-1
TAB R--The Psychological Impact ofAirAttacks Which ?Have
Caused Civilian Casualties and Damage in RVN. . . C-IV-R-1
TAB S--The Psychological Impact of Air Attacks Which Have
Caused Civilian Casualties and Damage in NVN. . . C-IV-S-1
TAB T--The Total Effort Required to Provide Security for
Air Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-IV-T-1
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Close Air Support
(South Vietnam)
1. (S) There have been 51,192 sorties flown in SVN from 1 July 1965
through October 1965. (This excludes the light observation aircraft (0-1)
and all logistical aircraft sorties).
2. (S) Figure 1 indicates monthly sortie rate for Laos/SVN/NVN
and Figure 2 indicates percentage of air effort by country.
Figure 1--Monthly Sortie Rate,
Laos/SVN/NVN: 1965
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct
Source: DOD Statistical Summary, SEA.
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct
Source: DOD Statistical Summary, SEA
3. (S) The preponderance of the air effort in Southeast Asia has
been allocated to support of ground forces in SVN engaged in combat with
the Viet Cong. It is not possible to break out this support in terms of
interdiction, armed reconnaissance and close air support, but a review
of the MACV weekly Military Reports (MILREPS) and the Daily Situation
Reports (SITREPS).indicates a large percentage of the sorties flown in
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Figure 2--percentage of Air Effort by Country.
Laos/NVN/SVN: 1965
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SVN to be in a Close Air Support (CAS) role. Since the advent of the B-52
raids in June 1965 against point targets the requirement for single engine
high performance aircraft to strike point targets has diminished. Figure 3
indicates monthly sortie rate for US and VNAF aircraft.
Fig;,re 3--Monthly Attack Sortie Rate--US and VNAF
January-October 1965
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4. (S) Research and analysis of all available evidence supports the
general consensus that Close Air Support is adequate, responsive, and effec-
tive; that there does not appear to be any conflict between Air Force CAS
and fires delivered from Army armed helicopters; and that complete inte-
gration of mortar, artillery, armed helicopter, and CAS fires in airmobile
operations is an established fact. Ground commanders consider CAS to be an
essential element of supporting fires to land combat forces.
5. (S) There are problems still to be resolved. Some of the more
important are listed below:
a. Reports from Vietnam indicate that the air space in SVN is be-
coming saturated, requiring closer control of air traffic. An integrated
tactical air control system (ITACS) is being planned.
C-2
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b. Reports from COMUSMACV indicate that reconnaissance and
surveillance efforts have been inadequate to meet rapidly increasing re-
quirements. There has been evidence of continuing improvement. Both the Army
and Air Force are moving units and equipment to SVN to correct the deficiency.
c. Increased ground and air activities will cause continued and
increasing disruption to civilian communities. A concerted effort must be
made to dispel and counter adverse reaction to air and ground action by the
local community. It would appear that there are sufficient agencies of the
US and GVN to resolve this problem and we should profit by past mistakes in
this area.
d. There appears to be an overabundance of reports submitted by
all elements in SVN, yet there does not appear to be a concerted effort
on the part of Army staff agencies at all levels to improve the reports or
to make use of the data in arriving at long range decisions or establishing
usable doctrine for employment of joint forces in an environment such as
Vietnam. This conclusion has been borne out in this study. There was
almost a complete lack of useful data upon which a study of close air
support operations could be made. (See final report for recommendation
on improving the reporting system).
6. (S) The basic directive assigning STAG the mission of assessing
the air effort in Vietnam and Laos contained a series of suggested areas
for consideration. Those areas pertinent to close air support are included
in Tabs A through T, Appendix IV, to this annex.
SE
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