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(UNTITLED)

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP78S02149R000100050039-2
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 12, 2001
Sequence Number: 
39
Case Number: 
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP78S02149R000100050039-2.pdf82.25 KB
Body: 
Approved For Release 2006/10/18: CIA-RDP78S02149R000100050039-2 "ARMY Declass/Release Instructions On File" Approved For Release 2006/10/18: CIA-RDP78S02149R000100050039-2 Approved F 0P006S1 21498000100050039-2 "4. The percentage of the air effort in support of land forces by categories as follows: "Close air support, interdiction, armed reconnaissance, and other combat air missions." (S) STAG Comment. (TS) The data available allowed no accurate evaluation of sorties by mission function in SVN. Paragraph 2 of Appendix I to this annex indicates the sortie functions and type missions flown. MACV Directive 95-4, dated 13 July 1965, establishes the following priorities for planning purposes for employment of available air support in RVN: a. Priority 1--Troops engaged with the enemy in combat. b. Priority 2--Units on major ground operations (prestrike and air cover). c. Priority 3--Air cover for trains, convoys, ships, and aircraft. d. Other targets: (1) Priority 4--Targets directly affecting current operations. (2) Priority 5--Lucrative perishable targets. (3) Priority 6--Lucrative targets expected to exist for a period of time. In the event of a major emergency or disaster in the area of MACV responsi- bility which necessitates the use of any or all US air resources, the COMUSMACV may direct the Commander, 2d Air Division to assume operational control. of all US resources. COMUSMACV responsibility in this matter will not be delegated. With these priorities and considering the number of total attack sorties flown it can be concluded that there are sufficient sorties to accomplish all type missions at the current level of combat. This is especially true since the B-52 ARC LIGHT aircraft currently strike many of the 4th priority targets and occasionally even fly in support of 2d priority targets. The value of a B-52 in ordnance delivered on a target when compared to fighter or attack type aircraft is as follows: C-IV-C-1 TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2006/10/18: CIA-R?P78SO2149R000100050039-2 Approved For Tofp /101 JIC 98000100050039-2 Type Aircraft Average tons per sortie Aircraft Equivalents to B-52 B-52 20 A-1 3 6.6 1.2 16,6 1.7 11.7 1.2 16.6 F-8 .6 F-100 1.5 F-104 .7 F-105 2.3 B-57 (Light Bomber) 5.7 Average all aircraft (excl B-52) 1.9 The preplanned use of B-52 aircraft against point targets, in an interdiction role, and in supporting ground operations has made available a considerable number of single and two-engine aircraft for CAS and armed recce. For example, there were 1,153 B-52 sorties flown from 18 June 1965 to 15 Novem- ber 1965 against point targets in SVN. If aircraft stationed in SVN were employed against the same targets and delivered the same total bomb load, it would have required 12,106 sorties or an average of 81 sorties per day for the 150-day period. Without evaluating the effectiveness of the B-52 strikes it must be conceded that, if the targets selected were valid, the use of heavy bombers has gained an average of 81 fighter bomber sorties per day which can be devoted to CAS, armed recce or interdiction, TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2006/10/18: CIA-RDP78S02149R000100050039-2