VIET CONG ATTACKS ON US INSTALLATIONS

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP78S02149R000100070005-8
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
4
Document Creation Date: 
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date: 
March 13, 2002
Sequence Number: 
5
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
November 3, 1965
Content Type: 
BULL
File: 
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PDF icon CIA-RDP78S02149R000100070005-8.pdf228.75 KB
Body: 
Approved For Release 2002/09/03 : CIA-RDP78S02149R000100070005-8 MISSING PAGE ORIGINAL DOCUMENT MESSING PAGE(S): -,Q DIA review(s) completed. Approved For Release 2002/09/03 : CIA-RDP78S02149R000100070005-8 Approved ForrRelease 2002/09/03 : CIA-RDP78S02149R000100070005-8 4~t ET--NO Fr i~n ge. 1WJ'N D 8 Eth ~ l Jr f V,l f/ J J~ d ~f ,.Jr? Ji J `~JJ/: :tii~~ ~flff`Jr !ll.J Jiff./F.'.`rfl1~! Viet: Con; Attacks on US Installations The 28 October Viet Cong attacks on air facilities at Chu Lai and Marble Mountain (Da Nang East) were the, latest in a series aimed at crippling US and Vietnamese air power. Because o l their limited antiaaircr^a,ft capability, the Viet Cony- have been unable to cope with the stepped-up strikes which have been dealing out severe punishment. A favorite tactic is to infiltrate special. assault units into the airfield complexes to destroy .,aircraft on the gro.And, and any field with many friendly ai:rcraait or helicopters must be considered a high-priority target. The chart opposite shows the important attacks a against: US or US-Vietnamese installations. There are seven sizable US-Vietnamese air complexes that have not been subjected to heavy attack -- at Hue, An Khe, Qui Nhon, Ban Me Thout, Vung Tau, Vinh Loaag, and Tan Son Nhut (see map opposite page F--4). The new field at Cam Ranh Bay where the first eleanents of a US tactical fighter squadron arrived on 1 November has also not been hit. Before they launch an assault on an airfield, the Viet Cong collect intelligence to determine its vulnerabilities, thoroughly plan all phases of the intended. operations, and carefully rehearse the approach, assault, and withdrawal. The attacks are usually of short duration and generally occur in the middle of the night. The attackers have enough mortars, recoilless rifles, automatic weapons, ire-, nad.es, and other munitions to cover the infiltration of the small, specially trained demolition teams. Cu::ancent:rat.ions of aircraft; on 1.;h~ ground ara?e < nt lucrative targets, and increased eifc.p.L'is to destroy the R.:irc:ra~ t by hit-avid-run raids or by mortar and artillery shelling can be expected. Repeat attacks on bases already struck are likely as well as attempts to exploit the -vulnerabilities of installations not yet hit. (SECRET) COMUSM..ACV SITREPS Nov 65 DIA Intelligence Bulletin Page F-- ` K` ;` S T - F 0 I C 15 'JJJ ~!' pproved For Release 2002/09/03 : CIA-RDP78SO2149R000100070005-8 Approved For Release 2002/09/03 : CIA-RDP78SO2149R000100070005-8 Bridge D 7,. t? cti n in North Vietnam Bridges destroyed in North v is tram since brua ?y total' 181 , but fewer than 53 of ther:X wise till impa=ssaa.ble as of 30 October. Over 73; highway bridges ranging from 2:.- t