VIET CONG ATTACKS ON US INSTALLATIONS
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP78S02149R000100070005-8
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date:
March 13, 2002
Sequence Number:
5
Case Number:
Publication Date:
November 3, 1965
Content Type:
BULL
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Approved For Release 2002/09/03 : CIA-RDP78S02149R000100070005-8
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Viet: Con; Attacks on US Installations
The 28 October Viet Cong attacks on air
facilities at Chu Lai and Marble Mountain (Da Nang
East) were the, latest in a series aimed at crippling
US and Vietnamese air power. Because o l their
limited antiaaircr^a,ft capability, the Viet Cony- have
been unable to cope with the stepped-up strikes which
have been dealing out severe punishment. A favorite
tactic is to infiltrate special. assault units into
the airfield complexes to destroy .,aircraft on the
gro.And, and any field with many friendly ai:rcraait or
helicopters must be considered a high-priority target.
The chart opposite shows the important attacks a against:
US or US-Vietnamese installations.
There are seven sizable US-Vietnamese air complexes
that have not been subjected to heavy attack -- at Hue,
An Khe, Qui Nhon, Ban Me Thout, Vung Tau, Vinh Loaag,
and Tan Son Nhut (see map opposite page F--4). The new
field at Cam Ranh Bay where the first eleanents of a
US tactical fighter squadron arrived on 1 November
has also not been hit.
Before they launch an assault on an airfield,
the Viet Cong collect intelligence to determine its
vulnerabilities, thoroughly plan all phases of the
intended. operations, and carefully rehearse the
approach, assault, and withdrawal. The attacks are
usually of short duration and generally occur in the
middle of the night. The attackers have enough
mortars, recoilless rifles, automatic weapons, ire-,
nad.es, and other munitions to cover the infiltration
of the small, specially trained demolition teams.
Cu::ancent:rat.ions of aircraft; on 1.;h~ ground ara?e < nt
lucrative targets, and increased eifc.p.L'is to destroy
the R.:irc:ra~ t by hit-avid-run raids or by mortar and
artillery shelling can be expected. Repeat attacks
on bases already struck are likely as well as attempts
to exploit the -vulnerabilities of installations not
yet hit. (SECRET)
COMUSM..ACV SITREPS
Nov 65
DIA Intelligence Bulletin
Page F--
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Approved For Release 2002/09/03 : CIA-RDP78SO2149R000100070005-8
Bridge D 7,. t? cti n in North Vietnam
Bridges destroyed in North v is tram since
brua ?y total' 181 , but fewer than 53 of ther:X wise
till impa=ssaa.ble as of 30 October.
Over 73; highway bridges ranging from 2:.- t