BOMB DAMAGE ESTIMATE ON BRIDGES IN NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78S02149R000100070029-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 29, 2002
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: August 31, 1965
• Content Type: MEMO

GYTIONAL FORM NO. 10
3010.100
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA cAppF ved For Release 2002/07/01 :~- h - r 78S02149,F3000100070029 2
Memorandum.
To Chief, T/TR
THRU Acting Chief, D/T
FROM Chief, T/CST
SUBJECT: Bomb Damage Estimate on Bridges in North Vietnam
-7 - ?y
,DATE: 31 August 1965
The bombing of railroad bridges on the line running South from Hanoi
and the line from Hanoi Northwest to Lao Kay has caused traffic to cease
on both lines. As long as the bombings continue there is little likeli-
hood of repairs and restoration of traffic on these lines.
On the Hanoi-Lao Kay line there are 76 major bridges, at the pre-
sent time 5 have suffered serious damage which will require extensive
repairs or in most cases complete replacement. If steel for repairs and/
or replacement were ordered from Communist China or the USSR immediately
and work started on all five bridges immediately the line could not be ex-
pected to be serviceable in less than 4-5 months. This time estimate is
based on the North Vietnamese ability to obtain the necessary technical
and skilled labor from outside sources. To carry on the work simultaneously
on the five bridges would require at the peak of operations a total of 1,500-
2,000 men of which 150-200 would have to be technicians and engineers. The
technicians would consist of welders, machine operators, iron workers, truck
drivers, blacksmiths, riveters, etc. Practically all of the technicians
except truck drivers would have to come from outside North Vietnam. There
are very few trained and experienced native technicians of the type needed.
The same situation pertains in the case of engineers, superintendents and
foremen. It is estimated that at the present time there is enough skilled
personnel already in North Vietnam from Communist China and the USSR which
could be drawn from other projects to restore the bridges on this line.
Should this decision be made, it would mean that other repair work, probably
that on highway bridges would have to cease. It is considered more likely
that additional technicians would be brought in from outside the country.
The greatest hindrance to the repair and/or replacement of the railroad
bridges is the shortage of steel structurals. It is necessary to order
bridge steel such as beams, angles, channels, and steel sheets from Communist
China and the USSR. Fabrication and delivery would require at least 4-6
weeks at the best. Erection and repairs, once the steel is on-site, would
require on the average 2-3 months.
On the railroad line from Hanoi south toward Vinh there are 27 major
bridges of which 9 have been destroyed or seriously damaged. It is esti-
mated that about 4,000 men would be required to simultaneously repair these
bridges for rail traffic. Of this number 400 engineers and technicians would
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be required. If men were available immediately and materials are ordered
right away it is estimated that the line could be put in operation in 5 to
6 months. However, in view of the logistical requirements southward, the
economic importance of the Lao Kay line to China, the very large construc-
tion task on the Vinh line, and the acute shortage of men, materials and
construction equipment it is felt that an attempt will be made to put the
Lao Kay line in operation but no attempt will be made to repair the bridges
on the Vinh line except perhaps for limited truck traffic.
The financial cost of replacing all of the damaged or destroyed high-
way bridges would strain the North Vietnamese economy. However, the more
significant consideration is the requirements for manpower, particularly
the need for technical and skilled labor. It is estimated that it would
require more than 12,000 men to replace all the damaged bridges simul-
taneously. Likewise, it is estimated that it would require an equal
number to temporarily repair the bridges, or build temporary structures to
replace destroyed bridges. Of the 12,000 men it is estimated that 1,200
technicians and engineers would be needed.
As in the case of railroad bridges, shortage of steel will hinder the
rapid' replacement of highway bridges and it will be necessary to besort
to timber structures, except in a few cases where wooden structures are
not feasible. Cement for concrete is available and reinforcing steel can be
made available locally or by importing from the USSR and Communist China.
However, concrete bridge construction is more time consuming and is likely
to be used only in those cases where permanent, as opposed to temporary,
structures are built.
Summary and Conclusions
1. The Vietnamese cannot repair the bomb damage without considerable
assistance. They lack skilled manpower, construction equipment, and struc-
tural steel.
2. Even if the limited Soviet and Communist Chinese technical and
supervisory assistance now in North Vietnam is vastly increased choices of
what lines and what bridges on what highways will have to be made. It would
be next to impossible to repair all the bomb damage simultaneously.
3. Since a choice of what transportation construction will be done has
to be made it is likely that the North Vietnamese and the Communist Chinese
will opt for repair of the five railroad bridges on the Lao Kay line. This
can be done in about four months from the time the steel order is placed.
4. The repair or replacement of highway bridges is most likely to take
the form of temporary repairs to damaged bridges and temporary wooden struc-
tures for destroyed bridges. The bridges which have been destroyed over very
large streams will probably be replaced by ferries because they are difficult
and time-consuming to replace or repair. The decision on repair or replacement
will be based on considerations of by-passes, feasibility of fords, impor-
tance of the route to the economy, and logistical considerations.
-2-
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5. It is estimated that it would take from 10 to 20 times the present
work force in transportation construction, repair, and maintenance to repair
the bomb damage to the transportation system.if all the work was begun
simultaneously. :0e.Vc,C -7~d 6oy~?r
25X1A9
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