ITEM III 'THE ROLLING THUNDER ATTACK'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78S02149R000100100004-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 9, 2002
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: REPORT

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ITEM III "THE ROLLING TUNDER ATTACK"
Paragraph B. "Factors Conditioning the Nature and Sc-:le of
Attacks, Geographic Limitations or Casualties, Etc."
1. There are a number of factors which precondition the natu=:e
and scale of attacks under the ROLLING r1YUNDER program. These
factors are discussed below.
a. Armed Reconnaissance Area. Enclosure A presents
graphically the areas within which armed reconnaissance strikes
have been authorized since the inception of the ROLLING
THUNDER program. The area established by RT 3 (3-16 September
1965) continued until the standdown on 24 December. The final
line provides for a 30 NM buffer along the Communist China
border which is not acknowledged as a military requirement.
b. Other Area Restrictions. While not area restrictions
per se, fixed targets were generally held to the southern
areas of the DRV, moving northward at about the same rate as
the armed reconnaissance areas.
c. Armed Reconnaissance Missions/Sorties. Enclosure B
sets forth in tabular form the evolution of the armed recon-
naissance missions/sorties. Initially, and to the detriment
of the program since the possibility of tactical surprise
was dissipated by an inadequate effort, armed reconnaissance
strikes were restricted to specific LOC routes. This was
subsequently changed to areas with sortie limitations. The
number of sorties increased from 24/24 hours to 1200/2-week
period with timing at CINCPAC's discretion.
d. Fixed Targets. Enclosure C sets forth the evolution
of the attack of fixed targets. The number of fixed tar gets
began with 2 targets/week, increased to 15 targets/week,
early in the program, however, was reduced to-5 targets/2-wee::
period during the last 12 weeks of the program. This represented
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*JCS and USAF review(s) completed.
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a marked reduction of effort against fixed )rgets, in con-
attacks of primary land LOCs were of authorized until
RT 34/35, l-1.4 October. The ationale was not apparent.
e. Type Targets. While fixed targets are specified under
the RT program, me flexibility existed in the area of armed
Initially, armed _reconnaissance
strikes were directed along specific r ..tites against military
movement facilities, ferrl` rc.r',r sites, secondary bridges
and other targets of military character. Subsequently, the
objective was expanded to sustaining for maximum feasible
periods, day and night interdiction of LOCs, through surveil-
lance and destruction of targets of military character en-
countered, including but not limited to trucks, ferries,
lighters, radar sites, secondary bridges, road repair equip-
ment, bivouac and staging areas. The objective of the coastal
armed reconnaissance strikes were to include destruction of
recognized DRV naval craft, and other craft which fired on
our aircraft, along the DRV coast, in estuaries and mooring
areas and in vicinity of coastal islands. In RT-18, 11-17
June, it was stated that daylight armed reconnaissance could
include missions to obtain maximum surveillance of LOCs and
selected missions with the primary purpose of conducting
small precise attacks against pre-briefed military targets
with secondary emphasis on the conduct of armed route reconnais-
sance. Next RT 22/23 ( July), airfields and JCS numbered
LOC targets which have been assigned in previous ROLLING
THUNDER strikes, and are observed to be 'under repair,,
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Naval craft berthing areas were added to the foregoing by
RT 26/27, 9-19 August, and possible SAM systems within the
authorized armed reconnaissance area by RT 30/31, 3-16 Septeib:;y.
f. Miscellaneous Restrictions. In addition to the above,
a number of miscellaneous restrictions have been placed on
the ROLLING Th TDER program, examples of which.are:
(1) Mandatory VNAF participation. This restriction was
removed early in the program.
(2) No recycles. This restriction was removed early in
the program.
(3).No prestrike reconnaissance. This restriction was
removed early in the program.
(4) No restrikes. This restriction was removed early
in the program.
(5) BDA immediately before or during strike. This
restriction was removed early in the program.
(6) No Napalm. This restriction was.removed early in
the program.
(7) Expenditure of ordnance. Unused ordnance was
initially expended by jettisoning it into the China Sea.
RT-9 (2-8 April) authorized using unexpended ordnance to
attack Tiger Island. RT 34/35 (1-14 October) authorized
all previously struck JCS targets plus rail and highway
LOCs in the authorized armed reconnaissance area.
(8) Dams and Locks. These targets, considered since the
inception of the program as being important to waterway
transportation interruption were not authorized for attack
.and a specific prohibition was written into RT 36/37,
15-28 October.
(9) SAM systems. RT-16, 25 May - 3 June, directed
that DRV SAM systems would be avoided. SAM attacks
against our aircraft began during RT-17, 4-10 June,
launched from the DRV politically assured sanctuary.
It soon became clear that SAM battalions were using
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mobile ambush tactics. Subsequently, special anti-SAM
missions were conducted in the DRV within prescribed
geographical areas. In RT 28/29, 20 August - 2 September,
these operations within the authorized reconnaissance
areas were incorporated in the ROLLING 1h U' DER prograra.
RT 38/39, 29 October - 11 November, at long last authorized
an SA-2 SAM facility within the 30 N-114 circle of Hanoi, a
first both as to type of target and strike entry within
the politically assured Hanoi sanctuary. The final
significant action taken on SAp'M1 system restrictions was
in RT 42/L.3, 26 November - 9 December, which authorized
MIG, CAP and screen aircraft to suppress SARI attacks. These
restrictions have violated military prudence and logic
being imposed for asserted political reasons.
(10) Ports. The ROLLING THUNDER program does not
authorize the raining of principal ports or the attack of
major ports, which greatly hampers the accomplishment of
an interdiction program.
11) Airfields. The major airfields in the northern
areas of the DRV have not been approved for attack. Also
there are specific prohibitions against CAP and screening
aircraft attacking these airfields even in hot pursuit.
S. Civilian Casualties. Civilian casualties have been
avoided to the extent possible. Targets which involve
estimated high civilian casualties have not been approves:
for attack. It is significant that credible totals are some
76 killed and 108 wounded which is extremely low for he
extended period of the program. A preliminary analysis of
alleged versus credible totals were provided in the JCS Resume
of Air Strikes Programs Against the DRV, 4 November 1965.
2. Enclosure D updates the Rai' packages provided in the JCS
Armed Reconnaissance Study Group Report, 1 December 1965.
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3. Restraints have prevented the US from successfully exploitir_
a predominate air superiority over the DRV. '--,he enemy has been
allowed to attack from sanctuaries employing limited equipment
assets to a tactical advantage not commensurate with his capabili-
ties and defenses. At the outset of the program, ROLLING TIIU1 DER
contained detailed and specific directives which severely limited
the operational commander's actions. As the program progressed
gradual modification of the restraints occurred and most of the
more restrictive which governed the earlier armed reconnaissance
and strike missions have been relaxed. The gradual ascending
tempo of the program and the slow movement to the north afforded
the DRV time in which to maximize his defensive forces. AAA has
built up and SAMs have been deployed and used against our forces.
The rules and requirements which governed early operations against
the DRV significantly degraded US capabilities. This loss of
tactical flexibility, increased likelihood of attrition, and
decreased effectiveness against the enemy must be considered in
analyzing the results and effects of the ROLLING XIMER program
to date.
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