ATTACK ON NORTH VIETNAM INDUSTRIAL INSTALLATIONS - A STUDY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78S02149R000100100009-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 15, 2002
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: January 27, 1966
• Content Type: STUDY

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27 January 1966
WORKING PAPER
ATTACK ON NORTH VIETNAM
INDUSTRIAL INSTALLATIONS - A STUDY
Prepared by J-3, Joint Staff
in collaboration with DIA
Distribution
CJCS
DJS
J-3
J-5
NMCC
CIA
DIA
STATE
CSA
CNO
CSAF
CMC
CINCPAC
JCS review(s) completed.
WORKING PAPER
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Attack on North Vietnam Industrial Installations .. . . . . . .
1
Section A. GENERAL. . . . .
Section B. SIGNIFICANCE OF ATTACKING MAJOR. . . . . . . . .
1
INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES
Section C. WORLD REACTION TO ATTACKING NVN INDUSTRY . . . ?
2
Section D. PRIORITY OF TARGETING OF INDUSTRY. . . . . . . .
3
Enclosure A - Background of NVN Industry . . . . ? ? . ?
5
Enclosure B - Map of Industrial Targets . . . . . . . .
10
Enclosure C - Salient Features of Industrial . .
Targets (target photos attached)
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ATTACK ON NC).Li'1:'1 f VII;`J'N11M :L:NJ ~U ;'I'I IA I _fN 'l'!1 I_:I.I1'.I'1~ ?:N - !t I'll1 ~Y
A. GENERAL
The industrialization of North Vietnam (NVN) was initiated
shortly after the country gained its independence in 1954. Heavy
subsidization by the USSR and Communist China has made it possible
to attain the present level of development. See Enclosure A for
details of the development of industry in NVN.
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF ATTACKING MAJOR INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES
1. The industry of North Vietnam is not presently adaptable to
or capable of producing a significant quantity of war materials.
Therefore, an attack on the manufacturing industry per se would
produce little or no military effect. However, the war between
North and South Vietnam is primarily a military war with ideolog-
ical objectives. This fact has been reiterated by the leaders of
both North and South Vietnam to each other and to the world, although
the military aspects of the ideological war are being escalated to
major proportions while the differences in ideologies are not being
exploited.
2. The industry of North Vietnam has been funded and built by
the communist countries. The North Vietnamese ally themselves to
the source of this aid, and look upon the fruits of their first ten
years of independence with pride and anticipation for the future.
For the present, industrial output from the existing plants and
their contribution to the NVN economy has been slowed almost to a
standstill in many cases, because of the effective interdiction of
transportation by the US fighter bombers. Nonetheless this con-
dition is looked upon as temporary by the North Vietnamese. They
believe when the troublesome Americans realize the futility of
their aggression and leave, the country and its economy will again
flourish and prosper. The North Vietnamese industry, a monument
to communism in an ideological war, has been allowed to remain
unmolested while South Vietnam (SVN) is being torn asunder with
the help of the Viet Cong, the National Liberation Front and its
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American allies. The North Vietnamese position has been that time
is their ally. A long term harassi.rig war will wear down the already
unenthusiastic US support. Any attempts to arbitrate on the part
of the United States will dishearten the South Vietnamese and
their insecure government will crumble.
3. Attacks on industrial targets in North Vietnam, starting in
the sequence stated in Section D below, would indicate to the
leadership of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the
world that:
a. The sanctuary status previously enjoyed by NVN industry
is over.
b. The United States is willing to escalate to terminate
the current war and preclude further aggression of a similar
nature.
c. The price is high for the NVN if they choose to continue
their war of ideology on a full military scale.
d. A new US goal has been established for military action.
C. REACTIONS TO TARGETING NORTH VIETNAM INDUSTRY IN THE
WESTERN WORLD
4+. The probable reaction of bombing North Vietnamese industry
would be a loss of support from and the creation of political prob-
lems for certain European countries. France in particular, as well
as some of the African and Asian nations would be openly condemna-
tory and might seek to formalize their protests in the United
Nations.
5. The communist bloc reaction would in all probability depend
on the sequence of the types of targets struck, their relation to
the war effort, and their association with noncombatants. The
Soviets would find their polipy problems compounded by the US actions.
Although the Soviets are committed to aid the DRV against air attacks,
they would recognize their inability to do so effectively. They
would probably continue to support the DRV but attempt to avoid
overt involvement. Considerable question exists as to the CHICOM
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reaction. There I? genet ti agreemernt, that Iticreacod lid from. Clh:Luia
would be forthcoming with intent to increase the cost to the US for
further attacks against NVN. It is considered probable that the
CHICOMs would offer all possible indirect support including the
use of Chinese airfields but they too would avoid any direct con-
tact with US forces that might be interpreted as a US - Chinese
conflict.
6. It appears desirable and necessary to the cessation of
hostilities to attack North Vietnamese industry. If at the approp-
riate time, which is fast approaching, a methodological attack is
laid down on POL, power plants, industrial complexes outside of
densely populated areas and' industrial. complexes inside populated
areas in that order and in rapid sequence, conditions would be
created that would force a change in the DRV policy of a long war
of harassment. The number of DRV options would be minimized. Con-
tinuing DRV present policy of maintaining support for military
operations in SVN would require logestic support that could not
be maintained. Their allies obviously want to avoid direct confron-
tation with the United States and would not offer direct combat
support. Diversionary actions such as establishing a front would
be ineffective and deadly without air support of a high order.
They could and probably would increase terrorist activity. An
alternative for the entire Communist Bloc would be to create
another major crisis in Europe to draw US forces from Southeast
Asia and compound the US strategy. This alternative is considered
unlikely.
D. PRIORITY OF TARGETING OF INDUSTRY
7. After appropriate public announcements of a policy change,
(Target No. 76) the Thai Nguyen steel plant should be hit in ita
appropriate sequence. The plant is isolated from major populated
area., and it is extremely vulnerable to bombing. Slight damage
to the heavy equipi.,unt or furnaces causes major effects or produc-
tion and causes a complete shutdown for long periods.
`POP SECRET
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111.'tr.r. ,u.t.`L`i.c.1c xit L:Imu ha ulapo t..d Loy: the full import of
the tactic to take effect, the Viet Tri Chemical Plant (Target
No. 75) should be attacked in a similar fashion.
9. Within a time span of one month (Target No. '79) the Bac
Giang Chemical. Fertilizer Plant,(Target No. 78) the Haiphong
Phosphate Plant,(Target No. 77) the Hanoi Machine Tool Plant,
should be attacked.
See Enclosures B and C targeting data.
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